

LES  
CAHIERS  
ROUGES

# THE REBIRTH OF EUROPE AFTER THE WAR

Hopes, divisions and failure  
among the French Resistance  
(1942-1947)

---

Robert Belot

FONDATION  
JEAN MONNET  
POUR L'EUROPE

Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe

Les Cahiers rouges

**THE REBIRTH OF EUROPE  
AFTER THE WAR**  
**HOPES, DIVISIONS AND FAILURE AMONG  
THE FRENCH RESISTANCE**  
**(1942-1947)**

ROBERT BELOT

219<sup>e</sup> ouvrage de la collection des Cahiers rouges  
fondée par Henri Rieben en 1957

## Note to Readers

---

The author of this book is Robert Belot, professor of contemporary history at the Jean Monnet University (Saint-Étienne, France), doctor of the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (Paris) and habilitated to direct research at Sciences Po Paris. A specialist in European history, federalist movements and European cultural heritage, he is the author of the first biography of Henri Frenay, hero of the Resistance and herald of a united Europe, minister of General de Gaulle at the Liberation and co-founder of the European Union of Federalists.

He is currently holder of the Jean Monnet European Chair “EUPOPA” which aims to develop knowledge of Europe in higher education on a European scale. The present publication is one of the results of this Chair’s program. The author has waived his royalties to ensure the widest possible dissemination of the work carried out with the support of the Erasmus + Program of the European Commission.

This book is also the result of a cooperation with the publishing association *Presse Fédéraliste* which published in 2021 the book by the same author: *Résistance et conscience européenne. Henri Frenay, de Gaulle and the Communists (1941-1947)*. This edition contains numerous transcribed archival documents to which the reader may refer.

---

### Bibliographic citation

Robert Belot: *The Rebirth of Europe after the War. Hopes, divisions and failure among the French Resistance (1942-1947)*, Lausanne, Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe, coll. “Cahiers rouges”, 2022

The author expresses himself in his personal capacity and his text does not commit the publisher of the collection

© 2022 – Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Lausanne

All rights reserved

## Table of content

---

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Introduction .....  | 7   |
| The deleterious myth of the “big lie” .....   | 14  |
| The parable of penicillin and the microbe .....                                       | 25  |
| The origin of a commitment: The threat of Nazism to Europe .....                      | 31  |
| A patriot against the German occupation .....   | 46  |
| Communists for “France for the French” .....  | 55  |
| Combatting the collaborationist myth of the “new Europe” .....                        | 60  |
| How to convince de Gaulle to break free from nationalism? .....                       | 71  |
| The Combat movement in the Christian-Democrat melting pot .....                       | 83  |
| Liberating the Nation or Liberating Europe? .....                                     | 90  |
| Winning the peace: With or without Germany? .....                                     | 98  |
| The birth of the first seeds of federalism of the Resistance<br>in Switzerland .....  | 104 |
| Altiero Spinelli, Albert Camus and the fight for a federal Europe ..                  | 128 |
| Solutions that are flatteringly radical in appearance,<br>but which are a sham? ..... | 141 |
| The sovereignist Gaullo-Communist front splits the Resistance ...                     | 147 |
| The “Resistance Party”: A stillborn dream .....                                       | 154 |

I am very grateful to my colleague Joyce Johnson, professor at Stephen F. Austin State University (Texas, USA), for her kindness in correcting the English text.

I am very grateful to Gilles Grin for his confidence and to Eva Paul for her cordiality and efficiency.

Finally, I would like to pay tribute to Professor Henri Rieben (†) who welcomed me with kindness in Lausanne and opened many doors during my first research on Henri Frenay.



*The support of the European Commission for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of its contents, which reflects only the views of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.*

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| The hero of the Résistance the Communists wanted to kill.....    | 169 |
| Federalists: Petits-bourgeois with “vague aspirations” .....     | 177 |
| Frenay dropped by Camus and the team at Combat.....              | 185 |
| Is a European Europe possible? .....                             | 190 |
| Socialism first and the United States of Europe afterwards?..... | 201 |
| “The German vacuum is at the heart of the European vacuum”.....  | 207 |
| The people are not sensitive to the European ideal.....          | 219 |
| German metanoia and the persistence of mistrust .....            | 228 |
| Conclusion.....  | 238 |
| Bibliography.....  | 245 |
| Documents .....  | 260 |

## Introduction

---

The hatred felt by modern Europhobes for the European construct and the idea of Europe is fuelled by a faulty and untimely rereading of history<sup>1</sup> that undermines the honour of the pioneers of this history, as well as the sincerity and importance of the aims that Europe was supposed to pursue after the tragedy of Nazism and the war that had left it in ruins and shame. This rereading is the result of a revisionist approach that selects elements of this very complex history to reduce it to a manipulation of the US government and a “liberal conspiracy”. In a purely adverse manner, it follows the “tainted causes” of post-war Europe;<sup>2</sup> it isolates and demonises figures such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman in order to reduce the European project to a project of the US, devised during the Cold War by French people devoid of any sense of patriotism or dignity waging an ideological war, with John Foster Dulles and George Kennan as the new “fathers of Europe”. This thesis is not new: it was the “dominant doxa of the French Communists in the aftermath of World War II, when they dominated the political and intellectual sphere and presented themselves as the spearhead of anti-Americanism and “anti-imperialism”. What is new is the idea that the hunt for “European supranationalist ideology” has been revived by the supporters of an anti-Europeanism that is thriving on the radical right and the national-populist movement. The Communists did not foresee such heirs to their movement.

Contempt for history goes hand-in-hand with contempt for historians, even though some of them are sometimes used as insurance. French historians of Europe are suspect in ontological and corporate terms, due to the fact that they would have lent support to Jean Monnet to write his autobiography; they are suspect because some of them

---

1 On the analysis of anti-Europeanism, we cite: Bernard Bruneteau, *Combattre l'Europe. De Lénine à Marine Le Pen*, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2018; Guido Levi, Daniela Preda, *Euro-scepticisms. Resistance and Opposition to the European Community/European Union*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2019; Robert Belot, “Biais historiques et délégitimation du projet européen: une analyse du contre-récit nationaliste”, *GER-LFINT-Synergies Roumanie*, no. 15-2020 p. 23-40.

2 J. Laughlan, *Tainted source: undemocratic origins of the European idea*, London, Little Brown, 1997.

are Jean Monnet Chairholders, which would disqualify them: it is said that if the European Union finances these positions, it is in order to oversee and monitor these docile academics who are for sale: “It watches, it oversees ... and the whole world trembles...”<sup>3</sup> The author of the book we are about to read is a “EUROPA” Jean Monnet Chairholder.<sup>4</sup> He says he has not come under any pressure: his mission is to teach the history of Europe, as very little is taught about Europe at French universities. He is not afraid: he believes in the power of knowledge; academic freedom is his credos. In his opinion, it is good that young French citizens, who are also Europeans, should be familiar with the history that has made them who they are, and in which they will be able to play a role in the future. In his opinion, one must educate and inform in order to form minds that are able and clear enough to detect the traps set by manipulators of history and conspiracy theorists. He does not teach a “sacred history”, but a critical one: one of Europe’s distinctive values is this ability to distance and to criticise oneself. Faced with the efforts hatched by anti-Europe ideologues to “derecognise” the history of Europe, the aim is to teach what makes the history and identity of Europe. Within this framework, we have developed a collective academic approach with the Department of Political Science of the University of Genoa (Italy), which has led to conferences and publications<sup>5</sup>.

This book examines one of the main points of attack of anti-Europeans: the notion that “Europe emerged fully armed from the brains of the Resistance” is nothing more than “a lie”.<sup>6</sup> To do this, we have chosen the itinerary of Henri Frenay, the founder of the most important movement of the French Resistance, a minister under General de

3 Ph. de Villiers, *J’ai tiré sur le fil du mensonge et tout est venu*, Paris, Pluriel, 2020 (1st ed. Fayard, 2019), p. 171.

4 The Jean Monnet Chairs are an action of the Erasmus + program. They are awarded to full professors. They aim to deepen the teaching of European studies in the official program of a higher education institution; the latter must support the chairholder in his or her teaching, research and reflection activities; the courses given must be integrated into as many programs as possible.

5 *Visions of Europe in the Resistance. Figures, Projects, Networks, Ideals* (Robert Belot and Daniela Preda eds.), Bruxelles, M.I.E. Peter Lang, Euroclio vol. 112, 2022.

6 Ph. de Villiers, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

Gaule following Liberation, and a leader of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*. The readers must decide for themselves who is not telling the truth.

Originally, the Resistance in France was a patriotic leap of consciousness: “Unjustified refusal, imperative without reply, an internal order not to submit”.<sup>7</sup> Over time, it also became an act of propaganda and armed engagement. The Resistance was the effort of an enlightened and courageous elite that tried to oppose both the Nazi occupiers and the Vichy regime, and which gradually became a political project. The aim of this project was to reinstate democratic values in a renewed Republic, but also to give thought to the future of France in a reconfigured Europe that had learnt lessons from the tragedy. In addition to mainland France, where going underground was the rule, the various places that were home to the diaspora of French people opposed to the Nazi and Vichy regimes (mainly London, New York, Geneva, and Algiers) were crucibles from which new ideas for the world of tomorrow emerged. Over time, ties with other European resistance forces were formed, giving birth to hope and converging ideas. The common fight against Nazism and fascism encouraged this elite to imagine the reconstruction of Europe on other foundations. *Combatants* and intellectuals succeeded in raising “their minds above misfortunes and hatreds” and attempted to cast their gaze “beyond war and borders”. Once the occupier was outside the territory and out of mind, what kind of France should we imagine? What would be its place and position in the new world? And how would we be able to raise this bruised Europe? What was to be done with Germany and Italy? Where to position oneself between the Americans and the Soviets?

The myth of a “resistant France” that is supposed to have triumphed with the Liberation to ward off the trauma of defeat and the humiliation of occupation has concealed the disunity of the “victors” and the fact that the process of Europeanising mindsets in France was long, complex, and riven with conflict. The desire for renewal, even

7 Indomitus (Philippe Viannay), *Nous sommes les rebelles*, 1945, Défense de l’Homme collection, p. 50.

revolution, that pervaded the Resistance press from 1943 onwards in part faltered in the immediate post-war period; the European project would have to wait until 1948 to assume a concrete perspective.

It would be wrong to believe that there was a clear awareness of the importance of the European issue from the outset: The Resistance was a polygenic, complex, evolutionary, and very minoritarian phenomenon. Resistance fighters saw themselves as a “new elite”<sup>8</sup> while claiming to be the self-proclaimed representatives of the “people”.

The transformation from a moral and patriotic posture to a political project was a long and chaotic process. Gaullism, which was born in London in June 1940, embodied the nationalist option of the struggle against the German, against all expectations, in the manner of the Communists who joined the Resistance after the end of the German-Soviet Pact. The internal Resistance, which was established outside of Gaullism and Communism, had a different genetic make-up and a unique approach to post-war issues. It was as part of this approach that the idea of Europe and of reconciliation with Germany flourished within Christian-Democratic and socialist circles. These three main players in the struggle against Nazi Germany were rarely in agreement on *Combat* methods and ideas on which France and Europe would be rebuilt. The myth of a united Resistance would be soluble in the resumption of political life after Liberation. It would be courtesy of another war, this time a “cold” war, that the European ambition would be reactivated. The analysis of the causes and forms of the difficulty in considering the European issue is the object of this book.

We do not hide the fact that returning to the birth of the ambition of Europe is also a way of Combatting the anti-European theses of today (both on the left and on the right) that portray the post-war European project as a geopolitical instrumentalization of the United States to impose a “liberal conspiracy”, peddled by a handful of influencers (such as Jean Monnet), cut off from historical reality and devoid of

8 “Combat pour une cité libre”, *Défense de la France*, January 1944, in Indomitus, *op. cit.* p. 53.

all patriotism. These theses have one characteristic in common: they manipulate or ignore the history of the rebirth of the European idea, a rebirth that takes shape in this “army in the shadows” made up of men and women who, in the name of their ideal of peace and freedom, decided, at the risk of their life or freedom, to fight the Nazi order and the reality of a Europe subject to the worst. To ignore these origins is to deny the legitimacy of the European struggle that began in the dark night of Nazi domination and ignore the risks taken by those who sought to build a peaceful and democratic Europe.

For this reason, it was necessary to cite the forgotten figure of Henri Frenay, a man who had a major influence on both Jean Monnet and François Mitterrand, who paid him a solemn tribute at Les Invalides in Paris on September 26, 1988. Frenay “invented” the internal Resistance, to borrow the expression used by Jacques Baumel, creating the broader resistance movement, *Combat*. He was the instigator of the unification of resistance movements through the *Mouvements Unis de Résistance*, and after the Libération de Gaulle made him a minister and a *Compagnon de la Libération*.<sup>9</sup> Through the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* and the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance*, Frenay wished to turn the revolutionary zeal of the Resistance into a political movement led by a new elite. This elite was to allow France to free itself of the dogma of national sovereignty to access the European Federation that would allow Germany to become a democratic country once more and turn Europe into a place of peace, reconnecting with its humanist heritage. The failure of the political transformation of the Resistance in France at the time of Liberation made Frenay determined to commit himself to the service of European federalism: first, in its *Socialisme et Liberté* movement, an affiliate of the *Comité pour les États-Unis socialistes d’Europe* (Committee for the Socialist United States of Europe), then within the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*, of which he would be an iconic figure for ten years.

9 A *Compagnon de la Libération* is a member of the Order of the Liberation, created on November 16, 1940 by General de Gaulle as “leader of the Free French” to reward individuals or military and civilian groups who have distinguished themselves in the work of liberating France and its Empire.

Frenay, a national hero, a republican, a patriot and a Europeanist, should have been among those remembered by anti-European sovereignists, who, as a whole, are convinced that it was people not part of the Resistance who had sought out the European solution; Europe would be “the posthumous victory of those who wanted to degrade France, to humiliate her, to reduce her to a subaltern role, to relegate her to the end of the table”;<sup>10</sup> in short, the “Vichyites”. Did Mitterrand not serve the Vichy regime upon his return from Germany? Did Monnet not favour General Giraud, a “*vichysto-résistant*”? Both would have been in the “Giraudist camp”, i.e. against de Gaulle. The consideration of Frenay requires a complete change of perspective. Through his history, we get another view of the will to create Europe: the desire of Resistance fighters, who were at the very heart of the struggle against Vichyism and Nazism, to imagine a peaceful and democratic Europe. The French Resistance was not from the outset entirely Gaullist.<sup>11</sup> To forget Frenay and all the other pro-European Resistance fighters engaged in the post-war federalist organisations is to avoid admitting the weakness of the theories that reduce the desire for Europe to a Germano-American manipulation or alienation; it is to ignore one of the main sources of the origins of the European construct; it is to deny this legitimacy born out of the purity of the patriotic struggle of the Resistance. Anti-Europeans hide deceptively behind the mask of patriotism that is exclusively their own, as if Europeanists were potential traitors, as if the interests of France were not determined by European interests. Frenay embodies the most perfect denial of this mystification.

This study focuses on the period 1940-1947, in order to avoid the teleological re-readings that set off the history of Europe from the Cold War onwards. In 1944, the collection that focuses on the fight against Nazism and Vichy, *Les Cahiers du Rhône* (published in Neuchâtel, Switzerland), contains a historical and critical study of *L'Allemagne et la réorganisation de l'Europe* (Germany and the reorganisation of Europe). In its preface, Albert Beguin argues that there is “the desire

10 Speech by J.-P. Chevènement in Cergy, April 8, 2014, in *Passion de la France*, Paris, R. Laffont (Bouquins), 2019, p. 107.

11 R. Belot, *La Résistance sans de Gaulle. Politique et gaullisme de guerre*, Paris, Fayard, 2006.

for one Europe” and that we must endeavour to “establish on the basis of communion of spirit what could not be established through violence”.<sup>12</sup> Therein lies the seminal source of what would later be called the “European construct”. European Resistance forces were not only engaged in a psychological and military struggle for national independence: to a large extent, they were behind a new vision of Europe and wanted to translate this “desire for Europe” into policy.

While today there is a flourishing anti-European discourse that promotes the idea that the “European construct” can be reduced to a manipulation by US special services, a strategy for the hegemonisation of capitalism or an avatar of the struggle against Communism, one must recall the existence of this “desire for Europe” held by men as diverse as Albert Camus, Ernesto Rossi, and Grégoire Gafenco. The accounts of the rebirth of post-war Europe very often start with the *fiat lux* of the Schuman Declaration (1950). The decision to put the intermediate period between the end of the war and the start of the Cold War in parentheses is largely a product of the absence of historical knowledge.

This book aims to help fill this historiographical void. On the one hand, it aims to explore the conditions under which this “desire for Europe” was confronted by opposing forces – some of which came from the Resistance itself – who refused to accept this geopolitical and philosophical transformation of the issues; on the other hand, it seeks to analyse the way in which this humanist ideal of peace had to scale back its ambitions and limit itself to “little Europe”.

12 Claude Moret (pseudonyme de Armand Bérard), *L'Allemagne et la réorganisation de l'Europe (1940-1943)*, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière (Les Cahiers du Rhône), 1944, p. 8.



## The deleterious myth of the “big lie”

Today, we are witnessing a perverse and media-saturated rewriting of the history of contemporary Europe, one that attempts to deny the geopolitical importance of the post-war European project, understate its contribution to the development of peace and progress, and distort the intentions of the pioneers of European federalism. It does this, against a backdrop of a nationalist narrative; a revisionist claim that unfolds over a broad spectrum with Euroscepticism at one end and the violent Europhobia of “Brexiters” at the other. This rewriting stems from three biases that should deprive it of credibility: the misuse and faulty use of historical analogies, the conspiratorial doxa that prospers with the culture of new social media, and the *argumentum ad personam* that unfolds in the form of retrospective defamation in order to discredit the “fathers” of Europe, men such as Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, and Henri Frenay.

We forget the worst aspects from which 20th century Europe emerged (nationalism, fascism, Nazism, crimes against humanity, economic crises) to promise the worst of present-day Europe: “A certain idea of Europe conceived by Monnet in the aftermath of World War II now struggles in convulsions of agony. It is not the idea of Europe that is dying, but the idea that we could create Europe beyond nations, or even against them, to put it at the service of an external hegemony”.<sup>13</sup> Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a former minister in the government of François Mitterrand, a sovereigntist on the left but close to some sovereigntists on the right, provides a component in addition to disqualification as a result of “decline”, a myth that fuels the nationalists:<sup>14</sup> the imperialist conspiracy, the myth that brings together anti-Europeans of all nationalities and all political persuasions, from the extreme left to the extreme right. All serious historians cannot help but note that

13 J.-P. Chevènement, *1914-2014. L'Europe sortie de l'Histoire ?*, Paris, Fayard, 2014, p. 34.

14 David Engels, *Le Déclin. La crise de l'Union européenne et la chute de la République romaine*, Paris. Published by Le Toucan, 2012.

the opposite has come to pass: it is the “European construct” that has reinserted Europe in history, pulling her out of the ruins of war and the shame of Nazism.

The man at the heart of the conspiracy and person responsible for this “decline” was Monnet, whose diabolical plan would have been to break up the nation and have France absorbed into a federal Europe. Furthering the plans of Julius von Eckardt and Stresemann for a customs union through the idea of a “pan-European common market”, he would have been “the Americans’ man” whose secret mission was to help establish US influence in Europe on a sustainable basis. Monnet would not have wanted the *United States of Europe*, as prophesied by Victor Hugo, but *Europe of the United States*.<sup>15</sup> To this end, he would have completed the geopolitical degradation of France, but also of Europe.

Detractors of Monnet forget his fundamental note written in Algiers, the capital of wartime France, on 5 August 1943, in which he explains that a liberated Europe must be rebuilt based on “essential notions that should allow the reestablishment of democratic institutions” and a “constructive programme for European reorganisation” that leads to a sustainable peace. However, this new development also had been an opportunity for France to regain its position as “the leading continental power”. Detractors on the left, such as Chevènement, ignored the fact that the *Parti communiste français* in 1946 (when it was in its patriotic phase) was very favourable to the action of Monnet as the General Planning Commissioner.<sup>16</sup> In Eurosceptic British literature Monnet appears in a different light, as the defender of French interests. Hence this paradox of memory: British anti-Europeans are of the view that Monnet served French interests, while French anti-Europeans believe that Monnet served Anglo-American interests.<sup>17</sup> The *Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier* (CECA) illustrated the British point of view:

15 *Europe, États-Unis d'Europe, Europe des États-Unis ou indépendance*, Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialiste, Bruno Leprince, 2010.

16 Georges Soria, *La France va-t-elle devenir une colonie américaine?*, Éd. du Pavillon, 1948.

17 C. Booker, R. North, *La Grande dissimulation. L'histoire secrète de l'UE révélée par les Anglais*. Paris, L'Artilleur, 2003-2016, p. 53.

the CECA enabled France to avoid energy decline, and paved the way for Franco-German reconciliation. The English refused to participate, putting paid to the theory of those who put Monnet in the category of the henchmen of Anglo-American capitalism.

Jean Monnet was a pragmatist, a patriot, and a humanist; as such, he was in favour of a united Europe. Democratic values were at the heart of his struggle: he was a Resistance fighter from the outside, and had been since June 1940. In Algiers in 1943, Monnet was not alone: he met fighters from the internal Resistance who were also in favour of building a new Europe. These included the academic André Philip, who would later become the President of the International Executive *Comité d'études et d'action pour les États-Unis socialistes d'Europe*, and Frenay, the founder of the *Combat* movement and the second president of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*. Frenay was a hero of the Resistance who had developed his theses on the need to overcome this dogma of national sovereignty from the end of 1941 onwards.<sup>18</sup> Most theoretical studies (in particular sociological studies) overlook the history of this rebirth of the European idea in the shadow of prisons and underground action where individuals faced the greatest risks every day.

This is the objective of this book: to find, apart from Jean Monnet and the conspiratorial phantasmagorias that his name evokes at present, the men (and women) who brought the European idea to the heart of the Resistance. The European project is not just about Jean Monnet: Frenay was one of the most representative of this pro-European current that forged a path under very difficult conditions. Texts bear witness to his early commitment. Finally, they had to be made available to those interested in Europe to thwart the theses and hogwash of the deniers of history who cash in on populist myths of a “liberal conspiracy”<sup>19</sup>, “the big deception”<sup>20</sup>, and the “big lie”.<sup>21</sup>

18 Robert Belot, *Henri Frenay, de la Résistance à l'Europe*, Paris, Seuil (“L'Univers Historique”), 2003.

19 Peter Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and The Struggle for The Mind of Europe*, New York, The Free Press, 1999.

20 C. Booker, R. North, *The Great Deception...*, *op. cit.*

21 Ph. de Villiers, *op. cit.*

Turning men who have been undisputed patriots – heroes, even – into traitors is a strange way of rewriting history and giving lessons in patriotism. Anti-Europeanism is not shy about any falsification. Historians must react against a dangerous process of “dis-knowledge” that is becoming invasive.

The thesis of the “big lie”, which is connected to that of the “120 one12re12”, was reactivated with a bang in 2019 by the former French Secretary of State for Culture, Philippe de Villiers. It is rich, we note in the passage, for this right-winger, who resigned when Mitterrand came to power, to recycle theories that had been formulated by the Communist left during the Cold War. This book generated real emotion, given that it was released just before the European elections of 2019. The Paris-based publisher, which was once a benchmark in historical books, made the following announcement in 2019, taking sides with its author: “A breath-taking investigation reveals revelations about the Big Lie that presides over the European construct. It is the end of a myth.” In an activist tone, the editor continues: “It’s all there: the apocryphal memoirs, the dollars, the CIA, the agents, the past we erase, the concealed allegiances, the high betrayals. The story is sometimes a chilling one. Conducted at the speed of a breathless investigation, it reads like a thriller. We do not emerge unscathed. It is the end of a myth: they worked for other people and knew what they were doing: they wanted a Europe with no body, no head, and no roots. This has happened before our very eyes.” De Villiers claims to have done a “historian’s job” and sought “the truth” through new archival sources, whereas this is a compilation that does not meet any rule of scientific approach.<sup>22</sup> Historians did not wait for this Johnny-come-lately author to document the question.<sup>23</sup>

22 On the initiative of historians Robert Frank and Gérard Bossuat, a group of European academics specialising in contemporary history responded by publishing a column in the newspaper *Le Monde* (March 28, 2019) denying any historical credibility to a text that is “a fabric of pretences specific to conspiracy theories”.

23 It should be noted that the international activities of the large American philanthropic foundations towards Europe long predate the Cold War. See, for example, Ludovic Tournès (dir.), *L'Argent de l'influence. Les fondations américaines et leurs réseaux européens*, Autrement, « Mémoires/Culture », 2010; *Id.*, « The Rockefeller Foundation and the Transition from the League of Nations to the UN (1939-1946) », *Journal of Modern European History* (numéro spécial sur « International Organisations During the Second World War » coordonné par Sandrine Kott), 12, 2014/3, pp. 323-341.

To develop his theory of CIA manipulation, he does not hesitate to tarnish the reputation of men such as Frenay, whose struggle against the Vichy regime and Nazism was exemplary and put their lives on the line. In particular, he uses an article by Rémy Kauffer to which the author of these lines has contributed within the framework of the writing of his biography of said Mr Frenay, which had been prepared within the context of an accreditation to supervise research, supported at Sciences Po Paris, under the direction of Professor Serge Bernstein. In the US archives, I had found – 15 years before Villiers – proof that the CIA had financed bodies engaged in the promotion of the European project (including the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*, among others). We can refer to my book, *Henri Frenay, de la Résistance à Europe* (published by Editions du Seuil in 2004). However, I have demonstrated that this support, which was very specific and limited in nature, was in no way decisive in the process of European engagement described by Frenay and his friends, or in its evolution. This book is a new attempt to illustrate this thesis. First and foremost, the geopolitical context imposed by the Cold War provided the justification for tactical repositioning more than for doctrinal repositioning. In the absence of European resources, US assistance was accepted by default.

According to my research, Kauffer, citing me, published the article *Quand la CIA finançait la construction européenne* (“When the CIA financed the European construct”) in the journal *Historia* (March 2003, no. 675). His intention was to demonstrate the complexity of the emergence of movements favourable to Europe. His article, which has been very seriously substantiated, has been manipulated and misinterpreted by Europhobes who, as a general rule, are unable to produce their own sources, since they are in the middle of an ideological process that is the result of what I would call voluntary “unlearning”. In 2017, a movement led by anti-European Asselineau, had posted the article on its website but had to remove it following legal action brought by *Historia*. Since then, the article in question has not been visible on the website of the journal. Far-left websites, such as that of the “Comité Valmy”, also contain this article; the *Comité Valmy* aims to help “popularise diverse analyses that demonstrate the driving role of US imperialism in development of the supranational and Atlanticist euro-dictatorship since World War II”. Of course, the purpose of

this decontextualized exploitation of a fact, which has been known for a long time, is to delegitimise the European struggle and the deep, pure intentions of Resistance fighters who fought for a Europe that has been liberated from the worst chapter in its history.

What is this context? At the start of the Cold War, the Soviet bloc developed a strategy to exercise massive influence in western Europe, and in France in particular; this action led to a counter-strategy of psychological warfare by the US and British governments. The CIA participated in the discreet financing of events, structures, and “mediators” (today, these would be known as “influencers”) through organisations with a storefront.<sup>24</sup> This is the case of the office of the American Committee for a Free and United Europe, created by the federalist Coudenhove-Kalergi on April 19, 1948. This office bears the names of General William Donovan and Allen Dulles, two iconic figures of the now-defunct OSS (the Office of Strategic Services created during the war). Dulles joined the CIA in December 1950 (Deputy Director of Operations), accompanied by Tom Braden. Another committee, the American Committee on United Europe (ACUE), was officially created in New York on January 5, 1949 on the initiative of Allen Dulles (during the war, Dulles had organised assistance to European Resistance forces in Switzerland and would head the CIA in 1960). It was no surprise that General Donovan should become its first president! And yet, Churchill’s European movement was to a large extent subsidised by the ACUE.<sup>25</sup> Of course, this was ignored at the time: thus, as I discovered in the US archives, the cost of certain publications was covered by the US embassy.<sup>26</sup> It is argued that the CIA mobilised 4 million US dollars for the European movement. Federalist circles would not criticise this, since they too (including

24 Frances Stonor Saunders, *Qui mène la danse ? La CIA et la Guerre froide culturelle*, Paris, Denoël, 2003, p. 108.

25 Richard Aldrich, *Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*, UK John Murray, 2001/US Penguin-Putnam, 2002, republished by Duckworth 2006; François-Xavier, Rebattet, *The “European Movement”, 1945-1953: A study in national and international non-governmental organisations working for European unity*, University of Oxford, 1962, pp. 208-210; Max Beloff, *The United States and the Unity of Europe*, Washington DC, Brookings, 1963, p. 74; Irwin M. Wall, *L’influence américaine sur la politique française, 1945-1954*, Balland, 1989.

26 National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Washington (NARA), RG 84, E 2462, B 30.

the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*) would benefit from the windfall from the US. US archives show that the State Department was very well informed about Europeanist movements.<sup>27</sup> Clearly, from 1949 onwards there was an attempt (and I emphasize the word “attempt”) to bring Europeanist groups reputed to be anti-Communist under its influence (the *Parti communiste français* was not mistaken), a phenomenon seen in other sectors.<sup>28</sup>

The *Union européenne des fédéralistes* was created<sup>29</sup> in Paris on December 15, 1946. It is a truly European organisation, in that it brings together the main national federalist movements. The man who would become president of this organisation was a great Resistance fighter: Henri Frenay, the founder of the *Combat* movement and a European federalist since 1942 in the name of his fight with the Resistance. Frenay was very familiar with Allen Dulles and Tom Braden, who, as representatives of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) in Switzerland, had helped his movement set up base in Switzerland during the war (subsidies, transmission equipment, and channels.)<sup>30</sup> For Frenay, it was the same war for freedom.

The *Union européenne des fédéralistes* was favoured by the US administration, which, as revealed in a file on Frenay’s movement, presents it as “non-political” and as the most dynamic force in the field of federalism.<sup>31</sup> In 1950, the European Vigilance Council received significant assistance.<sup>32</sup> Frenay wrote personally to Eisenhower, the future president of the USA from 1953 to 1961.<sup>33</sup> The same US files show, for example, that Frenay travelled to the United States in 1951 with the

27 NARA, RG 84, E 2462, B 30; RG 84, E 2462, B 44 (La Fédération); RG 84, E 2478, B 41.

28 Irwin M. Wall, *L'influence américaine...*, *op. cit.*

29 Jean-François Billon (eds.), *Les Fédéralistes en Europe des années 1930 à la fondation de l'Union européenne des fédéralistes* (Paris, décembre 1946), Lyon, Presse Fédéraliste, 2018

30 R. Belot, G. Karpman, *L'Affaire suisse. La Résistance a-t-elle trahi de Gaulle?* Paris, Armand Colin, 2009.

31 The European Movement, its constituent movements, and their objectives (sd), NARA, RG 84, Entry 2462, Box 30.

32 Pierre Mélandri, *Les États-Unis face à l'unification de l'Europe, 1945-1954*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, Editions Pedone, 1980, p. 353.

33 A. Spinelli, *Diario europeo. 1948-1969*, a cura di Edmondo Paolini, Bologne, Società editrice il Mulino, 1989, p. 93.

German Eugen Kogon, a leading member of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*. The aim of this visit was not just to explain to Congress the goals and difficulties of European federalism,<sup>34</sup> but also to raise funds. In his private journal, the Italian Altiero Spinelli, also a former Resistance fighter and an eminent member of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*, confirmed that General Donovan “promised help, but there was nothing specific”.<sup>35</sup> Frenay would remain in contact with A. Dulles, an old acquaintance from the time of the struggle against the Nazis who would become a rising figure within the CIA<sup>36</sup>... Spinelli, for his part, often met with Donovan. From 1950 onwards, the Ford Foundation provided assistance, including funding for the work of US academics who would lend their support to the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* to format its draft texts (treaties, constitutions, etc.),<sup>37</sup> such as Robert Bowie.

The *Union européenne des fédéralistes* was also financed out of the ACUE budget. Frenay’s private correspondence bears witness to the difficulties he encountered in this respect: for example, he had to cancel a series of conferences for budgetary reasons. He wrote to US Harvard academic Robert Bowie, a CIA correspondent (he had been part of the US occupation force in Germany), to ask him to find out about the US decision to freeze credit to Europe, a decision that could have “totally paralysed our efforts” (which, incidentally, demonstrates the extent of the assistance):

If it were possible for you to intervene with the competent authorities to remove this freeze on credit, at least in relation to our efforts to promote the Defence Community and

34 H. Frenay, Memorandum of the members of Congress of USA, July 1951. NARA, RG 84, Entry 2477, Box 17.

35 A. Spinelli, *Diario europeo...*, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

36 NARA, RG 84, E 2477, B 17. Office Memorandum. United States Government, secret security information, “Request of European Movement for Assistance on Hague Congress,” July 17, 1953, NARA, RG 84, E 2462, B 30; RG 84, E 2478, B 24.

37 Altiero Spinelli, *Diario europeo...*, *op. cit.*, p. 86.



the Political Community, and in particular for our efforts in France, you would be doing the common cause that we defend an immense service.<sup>38</sup>

Through a colleague of Bowie, Carl J. Friedrich, he requested from the Ford Foundation a “first down payment of 10,000 dollars” in order to “set up a real secretariat and organise a certain number of international meetings before the end of 1953”.<sup>39</sup> On November 12, 1953, for example, Frenay wrote to the ACUE head office in New York to inform it of his action programme and very clearly formulate a request for assistance:

The five projects presented are therefore not merely plans devoid of substance; everything is in place to carry them out. All that is needed is the materials means for their implementation. It is our sincere hope, Gentlemen, that you will kindly provide us with assistance in the critical period we are currently going through in France, for which we thank you in advance.<sup>40</sup>

The ongoing cash flow problems of federalist movements would certainly indicate that federalist theses were difficult to implement: indeed, French and European sources of funding were scarce. One exception was industrialist Eugène Schueller, the founder of L'Oréal, a notorious anti-Communist since he joined La Cagoule before the war and who provided the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* with use of the headquarters of his General Secretariat in Paris at no cost.<sup>41</sup> It was probably through his friend François Mitterrand that Frenay was able to contact Schueller.

This financial dependence on the Americans was a difficult pill to swallow for the founders of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*. Proof of this can be found in the speech given by Henri Brugmans, a close friend of Frenay, at the first congress of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*,

38 Letter from H. Frenay to R. Bowie, Paris, May 14, 1953. Private collection H. Frenay / J.-P. Gouzy.

39 Letter from H. Frenay to C. J. Friedrich, Paris, July 8, 1953. Private collection H. Frenay / J.-P. Gouzy.

40 Letter from H. Frenay to the American Committee on United Europe, Paris, November 12, 1953. Private collection H. Frenay / J.-P. Gouzy.

41 *Ibid.*

which was held in Montreux (August 27-31, 1947). In his speech, he stated that “the United States, tired of throwing money into an endless void, of financing an ineffective multinational system, formulated the Marshall proposal”. The United States said, “Unite first, then we’ll see. It was the language of common sense, and it is a shame that Europe had to wait for a slogan from across the Atlantic to discern its duty and interests.” According to Brugmans, Europe faced two threats. “The first was to see the United States – disgusted by our incoherent quarrels – return to its isolationism of yesteryear. This would pose an immense danger, since the peoples of Europe are so ravaged by war – a war with losers on all sides – that a rebirth would indeed be compromised without massive aid from the US. On the other hand, it is no less obvious that the Marshall proposal presents *the danger of American preponderance*. And yet, we have no intention of allowing any foreign interference in our move towards superior social reforms”. Thus, the federalists are aware that there is a risk of dependence. They know that, as Brugmans had said in public, “the United States is not primarily pursuing a humanitarian objective” and that it watches with gusto a Europe that is “a massive outlet for several hundred million people”. Europeans must not be seen as the “poor relative”. His conclusion is clear: “Europe is ill; she will only heal herself. This is why we are partisans of European independence. But for our fight, we must unite as soon as possible. To deserve the assistance of the United States and, at the same time, to defend ourselves against its possible interference, there is only one weapon: unity. We must still forge it, and forge it as soon as possible.”

This financial connection would end up posing problems of conscience for the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* hierarchy. Frenay wrote to the Dutchman Hans Nord:

In a conversation leading up to our executive office meeting, we agreed to recognise that it was essential to start planning funding of growing importance and as much as possible for the *Union européenne des fédéralistes with specifically European funds*. While we have received external assistance on several occasions (sic), there is nothing to say that this assistance will be able to continue indefinitely; on the other hand, it would

be very desirable from a political perspective for this external assistance to be counterbalanced by *assistance that is specifically European*.<sup>42</sup>

There is a latent poor situational awareness that becomes apparent in the embarrassed silences contained in the minutes of organisations. At the meeting of the European Movement in 1955, as Retinger claimed ignorance of the origin of the funds of the Action Committee that Frenay and Spaak had established in 1952 and was surprised to have never received any accounts on this subject, “Mr. Henri Frenay intervened very strongly, noted the report and was astonished that Mr. Retinger would pose such questions. This was because (...) he was well aware of the origin of these funds, which was no different to the origin of the funds he himself had long received”.<sup>43</sup> Frenay, an upright and deeply selfless man, knew, as he confided in a correspondent, that this obligation to request “extra-European financial assistance” was “a little humiliating”.<sup>44</sup> However, he agreed because he believed that Europe was in the middle of a war, a Cold War. In the words of C.-D. Jackson, a special adviser to President Eisenhower and the president of the National Committee for a Free Europe, the aim was to “win World War III without having to fight”. It was for this reason that Frenay participated in the action that would result in the creation of the *Congress for Cultural Freedom* in Paris (1950-1975).<sup>45</sup> Faced with the “microbe” represented by the Soviet totalitarian system, we could not fail to accept the “penicillin” that the Americans were offering us. But we had to put ourselves in the position of wanting to get the means to do without this remedy as soon as possible.

42 Letter from H. Frenay to H. Nord, Paris, September 18, 1953. Private collection H. Frenay / J.-P. Gouzy.

43 Session notes taken by H. Frenay, ME Executive Office, Brussels, Palais des Académies, January 12, 1955. AHUE, UEF 210.

44 Letter from H. Frenay to Arrigo Olivetti, Paris, July 8, 1953. Private collection H. Frenay / J.-P. Gouzy.

45 Pierre Grémion, *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme. Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris, 1945-1975*, Paris, Fayard, 1995.

## The parable of penicillin and the microbe

The intangible battle was a cultural battle, not just a political one. As Foreign Office Secretary Ernest Bevin said, “we cannot hope to drive Communism back by depreciating it only on material grounds”. There was a need to promote the idea of free culture in a free world (Berlin Congress, June 1948). This would be done by changing minds. Thus, there was the need for a permanent, apparent structure to coordinate cultural and intellectual action. It was directed and financed behind the scenes by a former OSS<sup>46</sup> operative in Switzerland who had since moved to the CIA: Tom Braden, with whom Frenay and his friends had met in Switzerland in 1943. He himself would recognise its mission in the film shown on ARTE. At the CIA, Braden was responsible for the IOD (*International organisations division*). Its ultimate mission: “To demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom” (as can be read in the circular of March 1950 that instituted it).<sup>47</sup> Braden recalls his state of mind at the time: “The idea that the world would succumb to a sort of fascist or Stalinist concept of art, literature, and music, was a horrifying prospect”.<sup>48</sup>

The founding congress was the *Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit*. Held in Berlin (June 1950), it was placed under the auspices of a committee: The *American Committee for Intellectual Freedom*, which would become the *American Committee for Cultural Freedom* (ACCF). Financed by the CIA, it was conceived by committed intellectuals: Melvin Lasky (journal *Der Monat*), Arthur Koestler, James Burnham, Irving Brown (trade union representative). Note the participation of representatives of European cultures and countries under Soviet control (in particular Russians). There were very few French participants (compared to the number of Americans and Germans). Present were the former Resistance member and federalist Henri Frenay,

46 Office of Strategic Services, the first US secret services created in 1942.

47 Cited by F. Stonor Saunders, *Qui mène la danse ?...*, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

48 Cited by F. Stonor Saunders, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

André Philip, Rémy Roure, David Rousset (the man who revealed the existence of the Soviet camps), Jules Romains (who had ties to the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*), etc. Raymond Aron was also present (although his name does not appear on the list).

The main themes addressed were: freedom versus totalitarianism: two opposing systems; incompatibility between totalitarian control and creation (artistic or scientific); the importance of the European construct; the rejection of neutralism (“Neutralism was an idea and a movement supported by the Soviets. (...) There is no neutral corner in the liberty room”); the assimilation of Stalinism to Nazism; the role of the Soviet camps; the importance of culture. The issue of culture and its geopolitical dimension are aptly summed up by Denis de Rougemont, an iconic figure of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*: “The moral conditions of the life of the mind in the 20th century can be summed up (...) in the following paradox: those that let culture run wild in the West virtually disregard it; and those in the East who recognise that it has a central role distort it and enslave it”.<sup>49</sup>

The hypothesis of a war between the two systems is cited by Raymond Aron, with whom Frenay is in intellectual agreement:

The chances that war will not become unlimited are increased when two conditions are met: 1/ The Soviet Union is not allowed to achieve superiority, even at the outset, so that the temptation for a great adventure becomes irresistible. Hitler was unable to resist this temptation. 2/ The Soviet Union is prevented from achieving success in political warfare that would strengthen it to such an extent that any hope of balance would vanish.

At this congress, it was noted, with regret, that the federalist dream of a “European Europe”, an independent Europe outside the transatlantic alliance, had come to an end. For this Europe to emerge, one would have to wait for the end of the Cold War... to quote Aron, “bellicose

49 P. Grémion, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

peace” must be replaced by a “serene peace”. The condition for this outcome? The USSR must abandon its “claim to a monopoly on the truth and power”. The ideological and cultural action of the West is an attempt to break this monopoly. After this success, it was agreed to set up the headquarters of the movement in Paris. The name of the movement: *The Congress for Cultural Freedom*.

The decision was made in Brussels, in November 1950. At the outset, François Bondy (from Switzerland, a founder of the journal *Preuves* and a member of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*) explained that there was a need to create “a sort of intellectual Atlantic community”; the need to affirm the “moral and emotional solidarity of all free societies in the face of a common threat”. The aim was to create a political, high-level network of influence that concealed its sponsors. The targets of this network were mediators, intellectuals, politicians, and academics. The aim was to detach intellectuals from their attraction to Communism, which at the time was very strong. It had to occupy the intellectual space: journals, publications, demonstrations, festivals. The main organisers were those of the Berlin Congress. It had to address the West, but also the East (the distribution of books behind the Iron Curtain). It also had another mission: to show that there is such a thing as US culture, that it did not consist solely of Coca Cola and Disney. Stereotypes had to be broken. As the philosopher Karl Jaspers would put it: “The truth also needs propaganda”. In Paris, there were two conductors: Michael Josselson and Lawrence Neufville. The Secretary-General was Nicolas Nabokov, the composer and musicologist and a friend to federalists Denis de Rougemont and Bondy.<sup>50</sup> All three served in Berlin.

Nabokov presented the issue of this “psychological war” thus:

There were no modern precedents, there was no template in the Western world. No one had tried to mobilise intellectuals and artists on a global scale in order to wage a psychological war against the oppressors of thought or to defend what

50 F. Stonor Saunders, *Qui mène la danse?...*, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

was referred to using the hackneyed expression *our cultural heritage*. Until that point, this type of warfare had been the prerogative of Stalinists and Nazis. (...) To me, conducting a rational, glacial, and resolutely intellectual war against Stalinism without falling into the easy Manichean trap of artificial value seemed essential...

Contrary to what its detractors would have others believe, the Congress was not monolithic. The members of the international committee were of different (intellectual) origins and from very different cultures. There were the “hard-core” members, who were violently anti-Communist (such as Koestler), and the “moderates”, such as Frenay and his friend, the socialist and humanist André Philip (a former Resistance fighter), who told the Berlin Congress:

Today, Europe is weakened after its long and painful illness. The Americans have sent us the penicillin to *Combat* this illness, and the Soviets the microbes. Of course, every doctor would prefer a combination of the two. However, our duty as Europeans must be to take care of the microbes as soon as possible, in order to avoid needing the remedy any longer.<sup>51</sup>

The federalists who emerged from the Resistance were all on this wavelength: while US assistance was necessary and inevitable, we had to wean ourselves off it as soon as the context would allow.

It would be totally incorrect to see it as evidence of an enlistment of minds. One example is the journal *Preuves*, to which Frenay was a contributor after the war. A fatal shadow was cast over this high-level journal when it was discovered, in 1966, that part of its funding came from the *Congress for Cultural Freedom*. However, a historical analysis easily shows that “the image of an “American propaganda magazine” was consistent with a Cold War logic and did not correspond to reality”. To do this, one need only refer to the contents of the journal, which publishes political texts (Frenay, Philip, Mitterrand),

<sup>51</sup> Cited by F. Stonor Saunders, *Qui mène la danse?*, op. cit., p. 90.

intellectual controversies, analyses of current events (Raymond Aron, Jean Daniel, Kœstler, Claude Mauriac, de Rougemont, Ignazio Silone, Boris Souvarine), philosophical texts (Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, Karl Jaspers, Jeanne Hersch, Wladimir Weidlé), and literary texts (Yves Bonnefoy, Roger Caillois, Italo Calvino, Henri Calet, Camus, Charles-Albert Cingria, Cioran, Pierre Emmanuel, Jean Genet, Witold Gombrowicz, Eugène Ionesco, Alain Jouffroy, Alberto Moravia, Czeslaw Milosz, Francis Ponge, Armand Robin, Nathalie Sarraute, Georges Simenon, Jean Starobinski).<sup>52</sup>

The accusation of treason that underpins the discourse of those who accuse federalists of having been paid out of the budget of the CIA is not only contrary to the facts and intentions of those who have received these funds: it also minimises the value of their commitment against Nazism during World War II, a war that, unlike the Cold War, could easily and dramatically lead to death. The federalists who emerged from the Resistance were great patriots. One of the aims of this book is to reinforce historical knowledge of this phenomenon, which cannot be denied. This accusation also has the effect of hiding or relativising the funding received by organisations under Communist influence, the intellectuals and artists for whom the USSR was the model that was to inspire western Europe.

The analysis of the methodological and cognitive flaws in this invasive discourse allows us to access a broader line of questioning of the underlying reasons for the nationalist *revival*: was it the most profound indication of a lack of historicity in Europe and of a historiographic deficit or, more broadly, of insufficient consideration being given to the subject of Europe in social sciences?<sup>53</sup> The nationalist counter-narrative is the product of a questioning of the importance and benefit of Europe in history (including at the present time), but also of the importance of history in the process of building Europe and of its

<sup>52</sup> François Bordes, “*Preuves*, revue marxienne?”, *Cahiers du GRM* (online), 12 | 2017, posted online December 17, 2017, URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/grm/924>; DOI: 10.4000/grm.924. See also: Pierre Grémion, “*Preuves* dans le Paris de Guerre froide”, *Vingtième Siècle, revue d'histoire*, no. 13, January-March 1987. Dossier : Nouvelles lectures de la Guerre froide. pp. 63-82.

<sup>53</sup> Antoine Vauchez, “Les études européennes, quel ennui!” Quelques mots sur une illusion bien fondée..., *Politique européenne*, no. 50, 2015, pp. 160-169.



historical significance. The crisis in European awareness is also *a crisis of the awareness and historical knowledge of Europe*. Thought should be given to rediscovering Lucien Febvre, one of the few historians who has wanted to understand Europe “not as an epiphenomenon, but as the stage of a humanist anthropology of universality” that has made it possible to “update through history the figure of hope and freedom of spirit that Europe has carried with it in its long-term”.<sup>54</sup> The advice given by the former historian Jacques Le Goff, calling on Europe to “do away with the manipulations and falsifications of history and the crippling weight of a certain reference to history”, is still valid: while “memory must prevent the errors and the crimes of the past from being forgotten”, it must also “leave it to a scientific and objective historiography to build the common history of Europe on respect for the history of everyone”.<sup>55</sup>

Frenay’s itinerary shows us that his European awareness was not born after the war: it emerged before the war, in reaction to the threat that Nazism posed to France and to the values of Europe. It became structured under the Occupation, despite the general trend among Resistance fighters not to see the struggle as something beyond the national framework, like Gaullism. This demarcation with regard to Gaullist nationalism was not the smallest difficulty in this struggle.

<sup>54</sup> Denis Crouzet (dir.), *Historiens d'Europe, historiens de l'Europe*, Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 2017.

<sup>55</sup> Jacques Le Goff, *La vieille Europe et la nôtre*, Paris, Seuil, 1994.

## The origin of a commitment: The threat of Nazism to Europe

It was not by chance that Frenay became a Resistance fighter and a European federalist. The Cold War would only be a moment on his journey: at the heart of his commitment, there was an awareness of the Nazi threat to Europe and the desire to face it down. This awareness was stirred in 1935. What made Henri Frenay the man he would become? How did a brilliant officer from a bourgeois and military background succeed in questioning his culture and education to participate in rebellion and resistance in his own country and become aware of the importance of the choice of federalism for Europe to overcome its lowest point? Frenay’s story did not start in 1940 (the year he first made a commitment to the Resistance) or in 1945 (the year he made a commitment to Europe). It required a research and training at the Centre for Germanic Studies in Strasbourg for some French officers.

Frenay was born in Lyon on November 19, 1905 into a typical Lyonnais family: a family of practising Catholics that was demanding by virtue of its austerity and sense of tradition and order. “Without realising it”, Frenay would say, “I belonged to this traditionalist, poor, patriotic, and paternalistic French right”. His father was an officer, and his son would become one. To attempt to alter the moral or social order would be sacrilege and heresy. The sabre and the bottle brush: these were the two structuring references of the family universe. This predisposed his mother to show great respect for Marshall Pétain, including the Marshall Pétain of the “dark years”. When a Frenchman was born in 1905, his childhood was rocked by a hatred of Germany, which had seized Alsace-Moselle from France. The historical accounts shared with children in schools were fuelled by the ideology of revenge. Patriots had just one horizon: the blue line of the Vosges. When war was declared, Frenay was nine years old; at the time of the armistice, he was thirteen. War had already been part of his life. We understand that for a long time, his concern with it structured his vision of the world; the choice of the army as his profession was also

an echo of this concern. Another great figure from that generation, Raymond Aron (also born in 1905), would recognise that his thinking and commitments could be attributed first and foremost to this inescapable obsession with the war. As a child, he had only one dream: to become the “little captain” whose editorial staff praised his sense of honour and courage. Frenay had the same fantasy and the same ambition, which he would make a reality.

Frenay could not help but prepare for the Saint-Cyr competition at the prestigious Lycée du Parc, in Lyon. From 1924 to 1926, he was at Saint-Cyr. Appointed second lieutenant on October 1, 1926, he was assigned to the 10th Machine Gun Battalion in the Army of the Rhine, opposite a defeated Germany. There began what appeared to be the most classic of careers: Frenay seemed perfectly fulfilled in his profession, which was also a vocation, and turned out to be a shining star, even if a little fiery, as indicated in this appraisal from 1927 in his military dossier: “A very good officer, educated, intelligent, driven by the best intentions, lively, and active. After taking too many liberties with the service, he has received two minor sanctions. But with his intelligence and heart, he should become a choice officer”. After Germany, he was assigned to Syria in 1930. His superiors made note of his “well-developed critical mind”. His good scores secured him entry to the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris, where he would learn of the threats that faced Europe after the advent of Nazism. What gave rise to this revolution was a crucial, unforeseeable meeting with a woman. He himself would recognise the importance of this meeting: “This woman facilitated the evolution without which my life would not have been the same.”

This woman was Berty Albrecht. They had actually seen each other for the first time in August 1934, when Frenay was stationed at Hyères. Both the Frenays and the Albrecht family had a secondary residence in Sainte-Maxime. The young man very soon fell for her charms; he was fascinated by her. The two became companions, both of the heart and in a political struggle. It seemed that everything would conspire to distance the young officer from this woman. To start with, there was an age difference: Berty was 12 years older than Frenay. She was married. At the time and in that environment, such contact was itself

tainted with suspicion. The environment: she was Protestant, at a time when Protestants and Catholics were not yet ready for dialogue. Berty’s husband, a Catholic, would be excommunicated following his marriage. Finally, there was the difference in their ideas: Berty was resolutely left-wing. From that point onwards, Frenay, with this friendship, asserted himself as a volunteer for freedom.

Berty Albrecht, who would be the person closest to Frenay when he joined the Resistance, was no ordinary woman. In 1932, she had moved to Paris on her own with her children, as her husband was a banker in London. She soon became a part of leftist intellectual circles in Paris. She met Victor Basch, a professor of aesthetics at the Sorbonne and president of the Human Rights League, the *bête noire* of the far right; she formed ties with Gabrielle Duchêne, the founder of Friends of the USSR; and she made the acquaintance of Léon Blum and Maurice Thorez. The Human Rights League was the place where she thought she could flesh out her ideal. In this instance, the defence of human rights would be the defence of women’s rights. Her ideas pleased those on the left, and beyond. She became a member of the Executive Committee of the World League for Sex Reform on a scientific basis. In November 1933, with Paul Langevin, she created with the means available a journal with a title that, at the time, stood out: *Le Problème sexuel* (The sexual problem). The first issue of this journal contained the Communist bill calling for social protection for maternity, the institution of sex education, and freedom of contraception and abortion. Berty was anything but a party woman. However, she greeted and welcomed without exception anyone who wanted to bring women out of the shadows to which they were confined by society at the time. In its first issue, this journal, which would only be published for two years, said that it was aimed at “free, truth-loving spirits in search of the means to make man less unhappy and humanity better”. Nazism was the exact opposite of this state of mind, this vision of the world. It would be the great threat that Berty would want to fight. From 1935, she made a commitment to help “Hitler’s outcasts” who had sought exile in France. These outcasts were people who now represented suffering and scorned humanity. Since Berty spoke fluent German, she established a committee to receive anti-Fascist refugees. Her beautiful apartment on Avenue Victor-Emmanuel (later Avenue

Franklin-Roosevelt) in Paris, then 16, rue de l'Université, became a reception centre, a place for debate, and a place for "resistance". It was here where Frenay would discover the reality of the brown plague that was on the rise in Europe. "In Bertie's lounge room, I met people who for me were of an unknown species: from the left, far-left, free thinkers, and Freemasons, people who introduced me to political and psychological moral horizons that were quite different from those I had known up until that point. Had we not met, my existence would have been profoundly different". He felt he had to get away from his family: "The Spanish Civil War, the Third Reich, popular fronts: there were so many issues that divided French opinion and put an invisible but heavy barrier between me and those around me". Frenay knew that he was engaged in a process of family and political rupture.

Thanks to Bertie, who had a perfect command of Goethe's language, the young officer was able to meet major figures of the German anti-Nazi exile: the sculptor Jacques Lipchitz, a member of the Association of Revolutionary Artists, who exhibited *Prometheus Fighting a Vulture* in front of the Palais de la Découverte in 1937; the communist novelist Gustav Regler, who took part in Willie Müzenberg's anti-fascist propaganda actions before going to fight against Franco in Spain; the president of the association of German writers in exile, Rudolf Leonhard, who was interned in the Vernet camp, fought in the Resistance before joining the German Democratic Republic; the well-known novelist Anna Seghers; the great psychologist Magnus Hirschfeld, and many others. Bertie's daughter remembered, when I interviewed her once, that Carl Heil came to their home for lunch twice a week. He gave German lessons to her and her brother. He was a teacher, a theater and radio man who had fled Hitler's dictatorship and lived in poverty in Paris. For the anecdote, we can see his face in the film *La Grande Illusion*, because he was the officer who was at Erich von Stroheim's side and transmitted his instructions to the French officers. He was introduced to Bertie Albrecht through the Jewish and communist playwright Friedrich Wolf, another exile who would soon join the anti-Franco struggle. He participated in the "war of the airwaves"<sup>56</sup> by

56 Éveline Brès, Yvan Brès, *Carl Heil, speaker contre Hitler*, Paris, Les Éditions de Paris, 1994.

accepting to be, from 1937 to 1939, a German speaker for the French radio, more exactly the radio called "Strasbourg", launched by Pascal Copeau (future resistant and member of the steering committee of the *Mouvements Unis de Résistance in France*, under the title of *Libération-Sud*, alongside Frenay, who represented *Combat*) to counter the influence of pro-German propaganda in France in the hands of the future collaborator Paul Ferdonnet.<sup>57</sup> He was deported to Buchenwald in 1943.

The actors of this charitable and humanitarian network would sometimes find themselves in the fight of the Resistance. This is how Bertie Albrecht met Gilbert Lesage, a prominent member of the Quakers of France who participated in the reception of "Hitler's banished"<sup>58</sup> and Franco's, whom she met again at the beginning of the Occupation at the Commissariat for the Fight against Unemployment where she worked; Lesage, in charge of the Social Service for Foreigners in this Commissariat, saved many refugees and Jewish children, which earned him the title of Righteous Among the Nations.<sup>59</sup>

But how, then, could one be interested in Germany and its relationship with France without "doing politics"? To quote Raymond Aron, "Between '34 and '39, politics was essentially all about Germany". Frenay would have to leave the Franco-French framework where his history and vision of history lie. Bertie, on her own, was a "daughter of Europe" of sorts due to her origins and marriage. What was at stake was not the eternal Franco-German quarrel: it was a matter of civilisation. The refugees who knocked on Bertie's apartment door showed Frenay that the first people persecuted under Nazism were Germans. Frenay had read the original edition of *Mein Kampf*, and it had filled him with terror. But when Hitler came to power, it did not seem to cause a stir in French opinion:

57 Pierre Leenhardt, *Pascal Copeau (1908-1992). L'Histoire préfère les vainqueurs*, L'Harmattan, 1994, p. 92-95.

58 Gilbert Badia, *Les bannis de Hitler. Accueil et lutte des exilés Allemands en France 1933-1939*, éditions Atelier, 1990.

59 Antoinette Maux-Robert, *La lutte contre le chômage à Vichy. Henri Maux, le juste oublié, 1939-1944*, éditions Lavauzelle, 2002, p. 62-64.

However, in France, opinion about this new Germany that had succeeded the Weimar regime was far from unanimous. Many saw the new Germany as the best bulwark against Communism, and did not pay much attention to the disturbing rumours than came from across the Rhine. Financial scandals took up more space in the newspapers than the words and aims of the new master of Germany. We had to see clearly, go beyond the incomplete information that reached us. It was this realisation that led me to take classes at the Centre for Germanic Studies for one year.<sup>60</sup>

In the August 28, 1943 edition of the journal *Combat*, in which Frenay evoked the figure of Berty Albrecht (who had recently committed suicide following her arrest by the Nazis), he recalled that since 1935 both of them had been convinced of the inevitability of war, and of the need to prepare for it: “For her as it was with me, the war was inevitable. We knew with absolute certainty that no concession would satisfy the Hitlerian Moloch and that, in the near future, two forces of civilisation would collide. We knew that France would soon undergo the great test. We decided to prepare for it, in order to serve better.” Frenay entered the *École de Guerre* in November 1935, and left in 1937. The young 32-year-old captain’s awareness of events would distract him from a conventional career: he had to prepare for a new type of conflict, one of an ideological nature. He would also do a year of study, from October 1937 to June 1938, in an attempt to better understand this new Germany. To be able to “serve” effectively, he first had to have knowledge.

Established in Mainz in 1922 under the dual patronage of the French High Commission and the University of Strasbourg, the Centre for Germanic Studies (CGS) was created as the tool for affirming French cultural presence in line with the needs of policy for French occupation in Germany to prepare French students for the German licence

60 H. Frenay, “Hommage au Centre”, Association des Anciens du Centre d’études Germaniques, January 1972.

and aggregation.<sup>61</sup> Above all, however, it was also an instrument of information, an observatory of German life intended to inform French leaders. One of its original characteristics was that it welcomed civilians and soldiers. Military trainees were recruited mainly from among commissioned officers leaving the *École de Guerre* and/or assigned to Staff Headquarters and to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Bureau, the secret service of the French army. The internship of an officer lasted eight months, and ended with the defence of a thesis that addressed a particular question. As a consequence of the evacuation of French citizens from the Rhine region, the CGS relocated to Strasbourg in July 1930. As noted by Jean-Paul Bled, its legal attachment to the presidency of the Council and the decision of Raymond Poincaré to accept the presidency of the board to improve the Centre accurately reflect “the importance given to the activities of the Centre in high political and military spheres” and the desire for increased vigilance of Germany in this post-Briandist phase of Franco-German relations in which German “revisionism” was asserting itself.<sup>62</sup> The first thesis, which focused on National Socialism, was defended during the 1929/1930 academic year, i.e. even before Hitler came to power. From that date onwards, there was a growing polarisation of education and, above all, of lectures and theses on the unprecedented and formidable phenomenon of Nazism. In the decade prior to the catastrophe of 1940, the Centre for Germanic Studies, like a lookout anxiously scrutinising the rise of a threat, was one of the places of research in France that paid closest attention to this Germany that was becoming a threat once more, the place of research most concerned with rationally analysing this danger, which the old analysis grids could not account for.

The general teaching template was impressive: 443 hours of course time, which are broken down as follows:

61 Corine Defrance (in collaboration with Christiane Falbisaner-Weeda), *Sentinelles ou pont sur le Rhin? Le Centre d’études germaniques*, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2008.

62 J.-P. Bled, “Le Centre d’études germaniques”, *Saisons d’Alsace*, no. 128, summer 1995, p. 54.

|                                 |              |       |
|---------------------------------|--------------|-------|
| German language                 | 154 h        | 34.8% |
| General German history          | 60 h         | 13.6% |
| The Nazi party (1919-1933)      | 35 h         | 7.9%  |
| National Socialist institutions | 34 h         | 7.7%  |
| German thought                  | 34 h         | 7.7%  |
| International law               | 33 h         | 7.4%  |
| Geography                       | 30 h         | 6.8%  |
| Political economy               | 28 h         | 6.3%  |
| Demography                      | 18 h         | 4%    |
| Constitutional problems         | 9 h          | 2%    |
| Sociology                       | 8 h          | 8%    |
| <b>Total:</b>                   | <b>443 h</b> |       |

The CGS' reputation as a serious organisation was a product of the level and reputation of its speakers and teachers: the geographer Henri Baulig, Robert Redslob, public international law chairholder and author of reference books read by Frenay (*Théorie de la Société des Nations* (1927) and *Le principe des nationalités* (1931)), the jurist René Capitant (a co-tutor of Frenay who would have a profound influence on him, and with whom he would be reunited in the Resistance<sup>63</sup>), the historians Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, founders of *Les Annales*, the Germanist Edmond Vermeil, etc. While there was no place for germanophobic prejudice within this institution, the rejection of Nazism was to a large extent shared. From 1933 onwards, almost all officer memoirs focus on a particular aspect of the reality of Hitler: from territorial questions to religious issues to racial policy, including a study of the economy, the army, and the Nazi Party.<sup>64</sup>

63 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira. Mémoires de Résistance, 1940-1945*, Paris, R. Laffont, 1973, p. 27 and p. 209.

64 R. Belot, "Le rôle du Centre d'études germaniques dans la formation des officiers à la vigilance antinazie. Tentative d'évaluation et d'approche prosopographique à travers l'itinéraire d'Henri Frenay", *Revue d'Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande*, October-December 1997, tome 29, no.4, pp. 677-701.

The graduating class of Captain Frenay had just 11 officers;<sup>65</sup> 124 members of the class were students from the Strasbourg faculty who were preparing for exams or competitions. While all received the same education and attended the same conferences, each focused on a particular and particularly detailed aspect of current events in Germany in 1938, and of the dangers it represented. The 11 thesis subjects were: "The military education of German youth"; "German automobile policy"; "Multiple aspects of German taxation"; "German motorways"; "The Sudetenland question and the attitude of Germany"; "Attempt of the Third Reich: Honour, the foundation of social peace" (sic); "The National Socialist Air Force"; "The training of leaders in the Third Reich"; "The Islamic policy of Germany"; "The Kiel Canal". Frenay, for his part, chose to focus on the German minority in Polish Upper Silesia.<sup>66</sup>

This is a crucial aspect of the history of Europe through which one can make out the outline of a new conflagration as the errors of the peace of 1919: the problem of minorities born out of World War I. This peace of 1919, which was inspired by Wilson, was intended to enshrine the principle of the right to self-determination. The map of the new Europe was designed according to the principle of minorities. However, the entanglement of nationalities rendered this ideal impossible, and the balkanisation of Europe would be the source of all of the crises to come. Frenay was particularly interested in Poland, an old nation and a new state with contested borders on all four sides. Frenay intended to study the German minority in Polish Upper Silesia, an austere and complex subject. He wrote a thesis of one hundred or so tight, arduous pages that drew on the best sources, both Polish

65 Among the officers, there were six captains (Frenay, François Paoli, Clément Vernier, Charles de Cossé-Brissac, Ernest Champeaux) and five lieutenants (Lucien Wolf, Marcel Thillo, Aimé Perrin, Michel Lickel, Frédéric Goguel, René Richard).

66 H. Frenay, *La minorité allemande en Haute-Silésie polonaise*, a brief presented by Captain Frenay (commander of the XVIIIth region), Centre d'études germaniques, 1937-1938, 109 p. Archives départementales du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg. 2059 W 169. See: Robert Belot, *Observer l'Allemagne hitlérienne à travers ses minorités à l'étranger. Henri Frenay au Centre d'études germaniques de Strasbourg (1937-1938)*, Lyon, Presse Fédéraliste, coll. Minorités nationales, 2022, 161 p.



and German. For him, it was an initiation to Europe, to its problems. Without this step in his journey, his commitment to Europeanism after World War II would have been inconceivable.

Upper Silesia is a crossroads of sorts that lies on a major communication route that connects the plains of Russia to western Europe, and one of Europe's great industrial regions. Silesia has long been home to Germans and Poles, who have lived side-by-side with little interaction with each other since Frederick II conquered Silesia in 1742, the first step towards German unification, conducting a brutal colonisation that included a systematic denationalisation of Polish elements; this policy was reinforced by Bismarck in 1871 with his *Kulturkampf*. Frenay pointed out that social injustice was flagrant on the eve of World War I: Germans held the wealth and power when they were a minority (Germans accounted for around 21% of the total population of this region). The resurrection of Poland in 1919 allowed this region to return to the Polish fold. Poland arose in part from the carve-up of Germany, this Germany that we wanted weak, even if it meant recreating other iniquities. Thus, the plebiscite of March 1921 gave a majority of votes to Germany. A redistribution of land took place, under the leadership of the SDN: Germany would recover the north and west, retaining 2/3 of its territory, while Poland would retain the south. The industrial region was divided in two. However, the problem of the German minority remained, as this new redistribution could not resolve every problem. The interpenetration of populations made it "impossible", wrote Frenay, "to draw a single line to demarcate both political and racial boundaries". The new border "would inevitably leave minority elements in the two countries".

After the war, as a supporting figure, Frenay showed that the situation had changed imperceptibly, despite the forcing of Nazi policy. From 1937, Polonism scored points in its fight against Germanism: the number of Germans fell and there was a decline in their influence. Why? Because the Polish, recognised Frenay, did not always play the game and did not always follow the rules put in place to protect the German minority. "At the risk of hurting our Polish friends, we are convinced that overall, German children have not found the places in schools to which they would have been entitled". Captain Frenay wanted to be

honest and unbiased; he wanted to act on the basis of knowledge, not propaganda. For example, he cited German journals that revealed the dismissal of German employees at the same time as Polish employees were being recruited. He did not dismiss these sources out of hand: "It is true that some of them are not without foundation", he wrote. Therefore, he did not doubt that there may have been some German distress. This was one of the reasons the minority German proletariat, he said, looked more and more to Hitler's Germany. Another reason would be the fact that the German minority was not united. Frenay resisted the facile temptation to conflate all Germans with Nazism, to amalgamate them. He wished to point it out that the Deutsche Christliche Partei became "the pillar of the anti-Nazi reaction". He recalls that the Polish had to protect the federation of all German cultural organisations (the Deutscher Volksbund) that the Nazis wanted to phagocytise. Similarly, the seizure of the union of trade unions was unsuccessful. With honesty and distance, Frenay demonstrated that not all Germans should be lumped together. On the contrary: The German minority in Silesia, which *a priori* did not have his sympathy, despite everything we have heard, would emerge as one of the elements of resistance to Nazism: "The union that manifests itself when it comes to defending German culture is broken in political life. The reaction to National Socialist principles, which can no longer manifest itself in Germany, was apparent here in its fullest expression. Conservatives, Christians, and socialists were still far from allowing the methods of dictatorship unveiled in the new Reich".

The lessons he would draw from this work would guide his view of Europe (and of Germany) for a long time. Frenay understood that the problem of minorities, which the post-war peace treaties had not been able to resolve; that it was a cancer, a source of conflict. The German minorities scattered across Europe were "live torn shreds of German flesh", according to the Hitler quote cited by Frenay. It was a time bomb that we had given to Germany, the Germany of Stresseman as well as that of Hitler. According to Frenay, the problem was not only German-Polish: it was a problem for the whole of the new Europe of 1919. Very critical in this regard, Frenay believed that an overall solution would be required, a sort of general treaty on minorities, under

the control of the SDN and drafted and signed by all states that were home to a minority population. Perhaps Nazism could have been avoided.

For Frenay, after the Czechoslovak crisis that erupted during his time in Strasbourg in March 1938, the German-Polish problem was crucial to the future of peace. His thesis ended with this premonitory sentence: “Therefore, it is not impossible that in the future the German population of Upper Silesia, ignored by the broader public, could come to the forefront of the political scene”. His thesis began with this other phrase: “In addition, tomorrow, as the Sudetenland did yesterday, Upper Silesia may hold the anxious attention of the world”. For Frenay, who signed his thesis on June 1, 1938, war was imminent because Europe had not been able to redirect the bad treaties that resulted from World War I and resolve the problem of minorities, which was a source of frustration and nationalism.

Unlike many, he thought *Mein Kampf* should be taken literally. Frenay posed the question of Poland: “Does she really believe that the author of *Mein Kampf*, the invader of Austria, is in mourning for the Danzig Corridor and Upper Silesia?” It was an inevitable move in the realisation of *Grossdeutschland*. Hitler needed to do this in order to “execute his racial programme”, but also for economic reasons: “Adolf Hitler and the leaders of the Third Reich are not claiming new rights on behalf of the German state, but on behalf of the German *Volk*, on behalf of the *Volksgenossen*”.

Frenay would remember that his time at the Centre enabled him to overcome the germanophobic reflexes common in his original environment, to distinguish Hitler’s Germany from that of Goethe, to separate anti-Nazism from anti-Germanism:

I owe a great deal to these professors, to the Centre itself. I owe them a debt of gratitude that will remain after my admission today. (...) Little by little, the exact nature and extent of the danger looming over Europe began to emerge before us. But at the same time, we learned to tell the difference between Germany, where for the most part our professors had studied and

later taught, and the awful caricature of that country depicted by Nazism. So often, I have noticed in the tone of our teachers a tenderness for the country they loved, but which at the time so worried them.<sup>67</sup>

René Capitant, who was his tutor, was the professor who had the most important influence on Henri Frenay. It is no coincidence that they would meet again in the Resistance, then in the fight for European unity. As a professor in Strasbourg from 1930, he knew Germany well, a country in which he lived from 1933 to 1934, thanks to a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. He wrote a dozen essential articles on Nazi Germany that students studied. In his teaching and his articles, Capitant proposed a “liberal critique” of Nazism, that is, a non-Marxist critique that took the ideology seriously. René Capitant is the one who goes the furthest in the analysis of the Nazi phenomenon, both politically and socio-economically, giving an understanding of “the data of organicist thought”.<sup>68</sup>

He draws out its “coherence” and its foundations, ruining the thesis of those who see Nazism as a simple, temporary, untimely reaction. He denounces the “fundamental inhumanity” of Nazism. Sometimes leaving his academic neutrality, he does not hesitate to declare that this totalitarian project “requires the irreducible resistance of all those who remain faithful to humanism”: “For the profound truth is that the human person is denied as soon as one ceases to take him as an end, that man ceases to be man if he is no more than a means. God has left him free to make his own salvation. But today the State wants to confiscate his autonomy... Everything that flows from such an idea is poisoned at its source”. He took into account and denounced the racist policy, which he placed at the center and not at the periphery of Nazi ideology.

67 H. Frenay, “Hommage au Centre”..., *op. cit.*

68 René Capitant, *Face au nazisme. Écrits 1933-1938*, Texts collected by Olivier Beaud, Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2004. See also: Louis Dupeux, « René Capitant et l’analyse idéologique du nazisme (1934-1939) », *Francia*, 5 (1997).

At the beginning of 1942, while he was in Algiers, he contacted Frenay, his former student who had become the head of the most important internal Resistance movement. This is how was born the Algerian branch of the *Combat* movement, the only extension in Algeria of the metropolitan Resistance.

Frenay was very satisfied with this experience: “We are familiar with the Third Reich, in its intent, its institutions, and its achievements”. He applauded the teaching of the professors, whose efforts consisted of ensuring that those in their charge were able to penetrate “the German mentality”: “However difficult it may be for minds imbued with rationalism, I think that it is no longer a mystery for us, that we have understood it. I believe that this is the best praise that could be given to the instruction we have received”. In his report, Frenay noted that he would leave with “a solid set of skills” that would enable him to render “important services” wherever he served. Astonishing foresight. However, his time in Strasbourg revealed to him the gaps in the knowledge of Nazism among French officers and the inability of the military (like elsewhere in French society) to adapt to a reality whose intractable novelty it could not perceive. From this point of view, the Centre for Germanic Studies was a remarkable exception. Frenay liked to repeat, from the beginning of the German occupation in France, that it was not a question of confronting Germany as Germany:

I even remember that, a few months later, towards the end of 1940, to some friends who asked me what were the motives of my action, after having explained to them what Hitler was, I added in substance: I am not fighting the German people, but a demonic ideology, so much so that, if Hitler were a conqueror, such as History has known, aiming at unifying, while respecting the traditions, the values to which we are attached, I would join the German army. My interlocutors at the time were surprised and even shocked. Such was however my feeling.<sup>69</sup>

69 Response to an inquiry by Claude Jamet, June 1964. Personal archives.

Henri Frenay wanted to pass on the knowledge he had just acquired within his community with a view to vigilance. Just a few months after he left the Centre, when he was assigned to Staff Headquarters of the 17th Region in Toulouse, he attempted to convince his colleagues that the war to come would be more than a military matter: it would be a war of ideas, ideologies, and civilisation. In September 1938, in front of an audience of reserve officers in Toulouse, he explained that the German army was “driven by a dangerous mystique”; it would “set off tomorrow, no longer as it would to a fresh a joyous war but as if it were on a crusade”, since “the whole Reich is fermenting on the fringes of the civilised world”. In early 1939, he embarked on a series of lectures entitled “National Socialist ideology conquering the German soul”. These lectures were aimed in particular at intelligence services. The aim of Germany’s new “crusade” was to *Combat* “heresy”, i.e. the values of the democratic world: “The heretics”, he said to his audience, “are the democrats, the rationalists, the humanists, the liberals. That is us, gentlemen. (...) What we will have to defend is something that is much more precious than our lives, our homes, and the sweet soil of France. It is the freedom of our minds, our view of the world, and of life”. His audiences were captivated, moved, and concerned.



## A patriot against the German occupation

The original Resistance on French soil, what one might call the “*primo-Resistance*”, was a quiet, disorganised, and marginal phenomenon that was essentially a product of individual reactions or reactions on the part of small groups. It expressed a rejection of the system of German occupation, which was consistent with a French tradition of anti-Germanism. This patriotic leap, which was more internalised than objectified, was to a large extent apolitical and did not present itself as opposition to the Vichy regime, of which Marshall Pétain was the cornerstone, at least at the start of the occupation.

From the outset, one should dismiss the idea that the French Resistance, in its multiple expressions, would have had a clear awareness of the issues of the war and, less still, of the post-war period since the defeat of France (June 1940). First, we had to overcome the astonishment caused by the shock of such a rapid and brutal defeat, the drama of the exodus, and the trauma of a humiliating occupation. As early as 1948, US historian William L. Langer summed up the context very well: there was “*deep respect*” for Pétain, since the French believed in his will to “*ultimately fool the Germans and save France from complete annihilation*”; the Republic “*was rightly and wrongly discredited*”; the chances of Great Britain “*seemed slim*”; de Gaulle “*was almost completely unknown*”.<sup>70</sup>

That said, one must remember that the French Resistance<sup>71</sup> was a unique and unprecedented phenomenon: polygenic and evolving, it manifested itself in very different places (inland France, London, United States, Algiers, Switzerland) in a wide variety of forms, and to varying degrees of intensity. First of all, it was a survival reaction and

<sup>70</sup> W. L. Langer, *Le Jeu américain à Vichy* (trad. *Our Vichy Gamble*, 1947), Plon, 1948, p. 408.

<sup>71</sup> In this contribution, I will use the terms “Resistance fighters” and “Resistance” in a very broad sense: citizens who, in a clandestine manner or otherwise, in France or elsewhere, rebelled against the nazification of Europe and of their countries and expressed this rebellion in a variety of ways.

an intention to fight the oppressor that, little by little, became a revolt against the Vichy regime and Nazi ideology. While the British were waging war against Nazism (not against Germans), Europeans, for whom Hitler was no more than an incarnation of the German peril, were first and foremost fighting Germany.<sup>72</sup>




Figure 1: The geography of the clusters of the French Resistance, within France and overseas. ©R.Belot

The “Resistance”, a generic expression that encompasses a highly diverse collection of situations and positions, was anything but a united movement. It was a composite, heterogeneous, fractal reality that did not really resonate in the first two years of the occupation.

The reactions of those who refused to submit to the German occupation or the Vichy collaborator regime led by Marshall Pétain were dominated by three elements: patriotism, which one could describe as instinctive; a hatred of the Germans who occupied their country; and a rejection of the world of politics that was responsible for the catastrophe. This can be seen in the underground newspapers, the first speeches of General de Gaulle, and the correspondence, leaflets, and

<sup>72</sup> Raoul Roussy de Sales, *L'Amérique entre en guerre. Journal d'un Français aux États-Unis*, La Jeune Parque, 1948, p. 200.

positions expressed by exiles. One exception to this observation was the Communists, whose speech was restrained by the German-Soviet Pact until June 1941.

The proto-French internal Resistance (as opposed to the “external” Resistance, outside mainland France) wanted to be patriotic, apolitical, and circumscribed to “native soil”. A French journalist based in London decided not to heed the call of General de Gaulle and returned to France, as he wanted to “share in the suffering of his compatriots” and not to “evade the test of his native soil”.<sup>73</sup> The underground newspaper *Défense de la France*, for example, expressed disapproval of those who, while wanting to resist, “turned to Communism or overseas”. In its issue of August 15, 1941, it expressed this mainland France and obsidional tropism to perfection. The title of the editorial by Philippe Viannay (Indomitux) sounded like the motto of French Far-Right Action: “One France”, with a focus on “hatred for the enemy” and a “love for France”. The article, which was entitled “Neither Germans, nor Russians, nor English”, ended with a Franco-centric flourish:

Written by the French, for the French, with for the most part French concerns, it is the only French voice that can now be heard above lies and flattery. A stranger to any ideology, independent and free, it alone has the right to speak on behalf of France, and meets the wishes of all French people. It says out loud what everyone is thinking: that France will not allow herself to be hindered or seduced.<sup>74</sup>

This most sincere patriotism, which asserts its apoliticism, creates the conditions for a lesser awareness of the harmfulness of the Vichy regime. It is a dangerous illusion in that it echoes the dominant Vichyist discourse, which plays on the same register of anti-political patriotism.

73 P.-L. Bret, *Au feu des événements. Mémoires d'un journaliste. Londres-Alger. 1929-1944*, Paris, Plon, 1959, p. 15.

74 *Défense de la France*, no. 1, August 15, 1941, in Marie Granet, *Le journal Défense de la France. Histoire d'un mouvement de Résistance (1940-1944)*, Paris, PUF, 1960, pp. 38-39.

The official and intellectual France that was born in Vichy, the seat of the government of Marshall Pétain, developed a discourse that rarely contained any reference to Europe. It compensated for its ontological weakness and political status as a country under domination with an exaltation of “eternal” France, a vernacular, rural, immobile, and reassuring France. In 1941, one of the people who inspired this new regime, Charles Maurras, published a book whose title clearly expresses a tendency for the country to turn inwards: *La Seule France* (The lonesome France).<sup>75</sup> From September 1940, his newspaper, *L'Action française*, cautioned against a Europe “under German hegemony”.<sup>76</sup> The primal and structural anti-Germanism of the French far-right and its hatred for the philosophy of Franco-German reconciliation espoused before the war by Aristide Briand rendered it insensitive, even hostile, to the Europeanist rhetoric of the victor. The collaboration of the State was presented by Vichy “as an (illusory) instrument for the reconquest of sovereignty”.<sup>77</sup> This limits the ramblings on the nostalgic utopias of a “French and Christian Europe” or of an imaginary Celtic Gaul that is supposed to have shaped “the ancestral soul of Europe”.<sup>78</sup> One young follower of Maurras, Thierry Maulnier, recognised that France is made up “of the largest number of heterogeneous elements”: it cannot be enclosed in “one form of monistic civilisation”; “modern myths” (read: Nazism) do not suit it because “the French people are a product not of blood, but of history”.<sup>79</sup> The collaboration ultras defended the position of Maurras in the name of overcoming nationalism: “At the moment, we see this national pride as unbearable and – let it be said – criminal meanness”.<sup>80</sup> Pro-Europeans condemned Vichy, which did not understand that Hitler was a “benevolent enemy”.<sup>81</sup>

It would not be until July 1942 that *Défense de la France* would escape the grip of Petainism. The National Liberation Movement (a

75 Ch. Maurras, *La seule France*, Lyon, H. Lardanchet, 1941.

76 Maurice Pujo, “Le briandisme des vaincus”, *L'Action française*, September 5, 1941.

77 B. Bruneteau, *L'“Europe nouvelle” d'Hitler... op. cit.*, p. 172.

78 Louis Lallement, “La Mission de la France”, Uriage, École nationale des cadres d'Uriage, 1942, cited in B. Bruneteau, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

79 Th. Maulnier, *La France, la Guerre, la Paix*, Lyon, H. Lardanchet, 1941, p. 154, p. 157.

80 Lucien Combelle, “Confession d'un jeune nationaliste français”, *Deutschland-Frankreich*, no. 2, 1942.

81 A. Fabre-Luce, *Journal de la France*, t. 2, p. 2.

prefiguration of *Combat*) also advocated an “authentically French” Resistance: at the end of 1940, its co-founder was of the view that “the struggle against Germany should continue in France, not just overseas”.<sup>82</sup> Léon Blum, the leader of the *Parti Socialiste* (SFIO)<sup>83</sup>, was also of the view that it was in France where an attempt should be made to include the party “in the fight against the occupant and against Vichy”.<sup>84</sup> In the Republican collective imagination, exile was not seen in a good light; this in part explains why Gaulle was such a solitary figure across the Channel at the start of his adventure. This first expression of rejection is a-Gaullist, or even anti-Gaullist, and shows a very clear tendency to place faith in Marshall Pétain.

Let us now turn to England. The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, allowed General de Gaulle (the Undersecretary of State for War in the last French government before defeat) to base himself in London to encourage the French to resume the fight. The founder of “Free France”, who made his famous “call of 18 June 1940” in London, had nothing but contempt for politics and for the defunct Republic. In this initial phase, de Gaulle wanted to come across as a wartime leader who picked up “the sword”, as he put it in his radio address of July 13, 1940. It was for this reason that he called on officers, soldiers, engineers, and specialist workers in the armaments sector but wilfully ignored politicians, from whom he sought no guarantees (for the moment). This concern to be outside the realm of politics is made clear in his letter addressed to the French National Committee of Egypt dated July 24, 1940: “The military force I have put together *does not do politics*. Under my command I have officers, soldiers, and technicians from the national defence sector; they come from everywhere, and have only one idea: the freedom of France.” This was for two reasons. De Gaulle had a deep disdain for the politicians he accused of having led France to defeat, and he made the unheard-of claim that he was the embodiment of “France”, that he personified it. He would also be criticised for this.

82 General Chevance-Bertin, *Vingt mille heures d'angoisse, 1940-1945*, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1990, p. 41.

83 SFIO : Section française de l'International Ouvrière (1905-1969).

84 D. Mayer, *Les socialistes dans la Résistance. Souvenirs et documents*, Paris, PUF, 1968, pp. 12-13.

The speeches given by General de Gaulle were essentially intended for the enemy, i.e. Germany, “Germany eternal”, and “Germanic fury”.<sup>85</sup> He himself said that he wanted to embody “the eternal soul of France”.<sup>86</sup> There is little room for criticism of Nazi ideology: the armistice signed by Pétain was a cardinal sin, according to de Gaulle, and collaboration a crime. “No! No! France can expect nothing, neither from the enemy that hates France and crushes it, nor from the men who handed her over”.<sup>87</sup> The aim was to “continue the fight” and save “the honour of the Motherland”: “Long live France free in honour and independence”.<sup>88</sup>

With Gaullism, the internal Resistance shared an initial apoliticism and the same reticence towards the Third Republic, which was deemed to have failed in its mission. However, unlike Gaullism, it did not adopt a truly anti-Vichyist and anti-Pétainist attitude. Marshall Pétain was in fact perceived by public opinion as a bulwark that, at that time, would protect what remained of France at a time when everyone else was faltering. It was credited with anti-German feelings and, we believe, a tragic illusion that in its own way it would be able to “resist” the pillaging of the occupier. For this reason, ideological collaboration (“collaborationism”) would be loud, but would not influence public opinion.<sup>89</sup>

The first issue of the newspaper *Résistance*<sup>90</sup> following the dismissal of Pierre Laval by Pétain (December 1940) saluted “a France that had started to believe that it could refuse” and expressed its confidence in the head of state: “May the Marshall stand firm for a task and for an

85 General de Gaulle, “Un seul combat pour une seule patrie”. Speech at a meeting organised by the Français de Grande-Bretagne, London, November 11, 1942. Ch. de Gaulle, *Discours (juin 1940-décembre 1942)*, Fribourg, LUF/Egloff, 1944, p. 284.

86 General de Gaulle, “Ce que veut la France libre”. Speech at a meeting organised by the French of Great Britain, London, November 15, 1941. Ch. de Gaulle, *Discours, op. cit.*, p. 174.

87 General de Gaulle, speech given on Radio London, August 12, 1940.

88 General de Gaulle, speech given on Radio London, June 22, 1940.

89 R. Belot, *Lucien Rebatet. Le fascisme comme contre-culture*, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015.

90 *Résistance*, no. 1, December 15, 1940, Official bulletin of the National Public Health Committee. Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF), Res. G. 1470 (334).

attitude that are at one with the hearts of all French people". In the first call to "the Resistance", which was launched at the same time by General Cochet, we find this confidence in Pétain and hatred for the German: "A single enemy: the Boche, and, with him, all those who help him or call on him".<sup>91</sup> In November 1940, the first manifesto of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*, a prefiguration of *Combat*, ended with a phrase that would cause a scandal in the 1990s: "May Marshall Pétain have a long enough life to support us with his high authority".<sup>92</sup> It is considered that "today's enemy is the same as that of yesterday", i.e. the Germans. The aim was to "kick the Boche out of France". But sometime later, the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* would be the most openly pro-European movement.

At the very beginning of his commitment, the great Resistance fighter, Henri Frenay, founder of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* and a pioneer of federalism, did not escape this ambiguity and the ambient Germanophobia. Frenay would explain that in its dereliction, France, "haggard, wounded, and bloody", threw herself into the arms of the old man who appeared to the country as this providential saviour that France meets every time she is in mortal danger"; he imagines him as an "uncompromised soldier, free of any villainy and removed from political manoeuvring".<sup>93</sup> In his first underground newspapers, the word "Boches" was mentioned often, something that would surprise his friends after the war. In its January 1, 1941 edition, the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* bulletin said that "everywhere the Boche has shown himself, he is hated." In the leaflets of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*, there are expressions such as "Kill the Boche"<sup>94</sup>. Such Germanophobia is more than clear in all texts published by groups of the Resistance in 1940 and 1941. Even the very left-wing journal *Libération-Sud*, which was first published in July 1941 and was one of the first publications to establish a total equivalent between

91 This article is reproduced in: *Appels à la Résistance lancés par le général Cochet, 1940-1941*, preface by Jean Nocher, Paris, Gallimard, 1945, pp. 150-152.

92 See R. Belot, *Henri Frenay, de la Résistance à l'Europe*, op. cit., pp. 163-188.

93 H. Frenay, "Pour comprendre la France d'aujourd'hui", handwritten note, London, October 1943. Private sources.

94 Daniel Cordier, *Jean Moulin. L'inconnu du Panthéon. Tome 3. De Gaulle capitale de la Résistance, novembre 1940-décembre 1941*, Paris, J.-Cl. Lattès, 1993, pp. 1038-1039.

Vichy and collaboration, advocated the liberation of France "from the collaborators of the Boche" (July 1942).<sup>95</sup> But there is some nuance. In *Liberté*, Europeanist academics Pierre-Henri Teitgen and François de Menthon (who would join Frenay's movement at the end of 1941) referred to "the enemy" and the "German jackboot" and fought for "French greatness", "unity", and the "freedom" of France.<sup>96</sup>

It is easy to see why this first *patriotic* Resistance could only be anti-German: Nazi Germany had brought down France and had slipped a noose around its neck. The Germans were present on French soil. They reigned over Paris. In theory, the zone not directly occupied by the enemy, south of the Loire, was under the authority of Marshall Pétain and was more independent (at least until November 1942). In some parts of the Vichyist administration, there was still an anti-German sentiment that advocated a certain form of resistance; this was the case with the special services. The head of the 2nd Bureau, Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Baril,<sup>97</sup> decided to maintain the "Germany" section (which was in contravention of the armistice agreement) and camouflage it in Lyon. Thus, until November 1942, it had an "exact knowledge" of the German order of battle in France.<sup>98</sup> It was Baril who would recruit Captain Frenay. He was pleased to find that his leader was "anti-German" and that "the 2nd Bureau was in good hands".<sup>99</sup> In his personal diary, Captain Jacques Britsch, who had been assigned to the 2nd Bureau that same day, made the following entry: "17.12.1940. I have been here in Vichy for a week. I have a very strong impression of Germanophobia among those around me. Almost everyone shares my view of events in general".<sup>100</sup> Everything is happening as if "the special services did not have to resume a fight that they had not given

95 L. Douzou, *La Désobéissance. Histoire du mouvement Libération-Sud*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1995, pp. 279-281.

96 "Notre combat", *Liberté* (1941), cited by P.-H. Teitgen, *Faites entrer le témoin suivant. 1940-1958. De la Résistance à la IVe République*, Ouest France, 1988, pp. 32-33.

97 Baril would be removed from his post on March 23, 1942.

98 Note from General de Cossé-Brissac on the firm Technica, cited by Augustin de Dainville, *L'ORA. La résistance de l'armée*, Lavauzelle, 1974, p. 65.

99 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, op. cit., p. 41.

100 Jacques Britsch, *Nous n'accepterons pas la défaite (1940-1945)*, chapter 2, "Aux écoutes à Vichy", p. 1. Unpublished document.

up”.<sup>101</sup> Colonel Baril would go on to conclude secret agreements to send military intelligence to Washington through the French embassy to the United States.<sup>102</sup> Baril believed, rightly, that “the vast majority of French people were hostile to a rapprochement with Germany, in which she only sees her executioner”.<sup>103</sup>

101 Michel Garder, *La guerre des services spéciaux français (1935-1945)*, Paris, Plon, 1967, pp. 277-278; Philip John Stead, *Le Deuxième Bureau sous l'Occupation*, Paris, Fayard, 1966, pp. 70-72.

102 W. L. Langer, *Le jeu américain à Vichy*, op. cit., pp. 180-181.

103 Report by Colonel Baril, June 17, 1941, Service Historique de la Défense (SHD), Vincennes (France), 1 K 229. See also Henri Navarre, *Le temps des vérités*, Paris, Plon, 1979, p. 112.

## Communists for “France for the French”

The Communists, at least as a collective, were out of the game because of the German-Russian Pact. Although it was pacifist and did not (yet) intend to wage war against the German occupier, the underground *Parti communiste français* thought that it could “defend the interests of France”. A poster published in November 1940 promised the French that they would “live in peace, have work, and be independent”.<sup>104</sup> For the Communists, all parties had “betrayed the people, sold France out, and wanted war”<sup>105</sup> and denounced “the despicable band of Vichy, London, and Wall Street” that would distort the meaning of the diplomatic action of the Soviet Union towards Nazi Germany. De Gaulle was no more than an “agent” of the “imperialist war” sought by Anglo-American capitalism. On the eve of June 21, 1941, one could still read in the underground *L'Humanité*: “Europe cannot be rebuilt without the active participation of the USSR and without the collaboration of Moscow and Berlin.” The end of the Pact (June 1941) led the Communists to move suddenly towards a position that was no longer ideological but strictly independentist, national, and patriotic. The objective was no longer to defend one social class from another or to stigmatise an anti-imperialist war, but to resolutely commit to a patriotic struggle for national liberation. The aim was no longer to pit some of the French against others, but to extend “a fraternal hand to all French people of goodwill”.

The originality of the Communist approach, which was also its strength, came from the fact that the ideological *topos* was put to one side in favour of rhetoric that was purely patriotic and aimed at French people, irrespective of class. “It is from our love for our admirable country of France that we draw our will to fight”, read *L'Avant-Garde*

104 André Rossi, *La guerre des papillons. Quatre ans de politique communiste (1940-1944)*, Paris, Les Îles d'Or, 1954, p. 76.

105 *Ibid.*, p. 20.



of January 1942.<sup>106</sup> The Communists waged an assault on chauvinism and reinvested in respect for old values and of ancestors: "...we will never surrender, and all means, including poison in the hands of our women and children, will be good to protect our honour, our independence, and to defend this land of France that is so mixed with the ashes of our dead." We have rediscovered the martial charms of "the glorious Marseillaise" and the basic love for the "tricolour" to train the "real French" (*L'Humanité*, June 13, 1943) to die not for the revolution, but "so that France can live". And this in the name of a slogan that the far right would not have disavowed: "France for the French, long live the USSR", as *L'Humanité* proclaimed as early as August 29, 1941. Anti-fascism was put to one side in favour of the glorification of Joan of Arc, the "symbol of the fight against the invader, weapons in hand", aware that "the invader at the time was the Boche, the damned Boche that we will kick out of France".<sup>107</sup> In London, on the BBC, the Free Frenchman Maurice Schumann drew on the same mythographic repertoire in his call on the French to come together on May 1, 1942 under the banner of Joan of Arc, a symbolic incarnation of "our fraternal hope".<sup>108</sup> The underground *Parti communiste français* created a subsidiary that adopted an apparently apolitical position vis-à-vis the Résistance: the *Front National*<sup>109</sup> ("Front national pour la libération, la renaissance et l'indépendance de la France"). The divide was no longer between left and right, but "between those who wanted to fight for the independence of France and those who had betrayed her and sold her out to the enemy"; the *Parti communiste français* was committed to the search for "national unity", as it "puts the interests of the French nation above all other considerations".<sup>110</sup> In 1942, the Communist Charles Tillon, the founder and commander-in-chief of *Francs-Tireurs et Partisans* (FTP) informed his chief of staff of the

106 Cited by H. Michel, *Les courants de pensée de la Résistance*, Paris, PUF, 1962, p. 599.

107 *L'Humanité*, May 8, 1942.

108 Cited by Aurélie Luneau, *Radio Londres, 1940-1944*, Paris, Perrin, 2005, p. 196.

109 Nothing to do with the political party created by Jean-Marie Le Pen.

110 André Marty, *L'heure de la France a sonné*, London, February 1943, cited by S. Courtois, *Le PCF dans la guerre. De Gaulle, la Résistance, Staline*, Paris, Ramsay, 1979, p. 325.

motto of the organisation: "To each their own Boche!".<sup>111</sup> Unlike other movements that would integrate the European dimension, this patriotic and ecumenical line would be pursued until Liberation.

Through various nominally national manifestations, such as the *États généraux de la Renaissance Française*, the *Parti communiste français* intended to bring together non-Communists to broaden the basis of its influence. The young philosopher Roger Garaudy did not hesitate to end his brochure *Le Communisme et la Renaissance de la culture française* (Communism and the renaissance of French culture) with the motto of the *Action Française* created by Charles Maurras: "All that is national is ours".<sup>112</sup> This apparently neutralist line was part of a strategy to secure power upon Liberation and to *Combat* the political influence of other Resistance movements, which violently denounced this "enterprise to create a core Resistance".<sup>113</sup> According to a brochure of the *Témoignage Chrétien* movement, the Communist attitude was "much less national and French than proletariat and pro-Soviet".<sup>114</sup> It contains references to "the scam of patriotism", "makeup", and "disimulation", and we concur with the judgement of Blum, who, in *À l'échelle humaine*, his book written in captivity and published in 1945, expressed the view that the *Parti communiste français* "was therefore not an internationalist party, but rather a foreign nationalist party".

One can see that in the first phase of the history of the French Resistance, it was difficult, even impossible, to find pro-European positions in the underground press. 1941 saw the start of a decisive development for three main reasons associated with changes in the context. The first reason was the end of the German-Soviet pact: the USSR's entry into the war resulted in the entry of the *Parti communiste français* into the underground war. The first resistance movements had to deal with what many saw as competition. But at the same time, General

111 Marcel Prenant, "Les FTP", in *Vie et mort des Français, 1939-1945*, Paris, Tallandier, 1980, p. 377.

112 R. Garaudy, *Le Communisme et la Renaissance de la culture française*, Paris, Éditions Sociales, 1945, p. 56.

113 J. Soustelle, *Envers et contre tout. D'Alger à Paris (1942-1944)*, t. II, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1950, p. 301.

114 *France, prends garde de perdre ta Liberté*, Éditions du Témoignage Chrétien, October 1945, p. 46.

de Gaulle, taking into account the USSR's entry into the war, supported this new partner. Admittedly, his reasons were not ideological. He explained to Churchill: "If you do not help the USSR this year (1942) and the USSR is defeated by Germany, then you will perish. If the USSR defeats Germany without your help, then you will also perish".<sup>115</sup>

The second reason was the military commitment of Vichy through the creation of an expeditionary force intended to fight alongside the Wehrmacht against the USSR: The *Légion des Volontaires français contre le Bolchévisme* (French Volunteers against Bolshevism, LVF, July 1941). Vichyist discourse was ideologised: it developed the theme of the need for Europe's struggle against Bolshevism. Resistance fighters clearly saw that the instrumentalization of "European" rhetoric coincided with Nazi discourse, and that it bore witness to an ever-closer alignment of the vanquished with the victor. Marshall Pétain covered a policy that yielded to "the shameful temptation to submit to the will of the conqueror" (Churchill). He did not hesitate to subsidise the PPF (Parti Populaire Français), a collaborationist party, led by the inspiration for the LVF, Jacques Doriot: he was the incarnation of armed collaboration from the time he left to fight on the Eastern Front in a German uniform.<sup>116</sup> That was the end of the famous myth of Pétain's "double game" that had confused many. For Resistance publications, this "ideological war" was nothing more than a "pretext" for Europe to help Hitler "not in the fight against Communism, but to conquer the wheat of Ukraine and the oil of Baku". The non-Communist Resistance did not fear the paradox of calling on the French to resist the anti-Communist temptation: "People of France, will you be taken in by this crude tactic, by such a poor argument? Germany, the provisional master of Europe, is and remains the sole current danger: Let it be said and shouted out!"<sup>117</sup>

115 Cited by François Lévêque, "Les relations entre l'Union soviétique et la France libre (juin 1941-septembre 1942)", in Maurice Vaisse, *De Gaulle et la Russie*, Paris, Éd. CNRS, 2006, p. 24.

116 Rita Thalman, *La Mise au pas. Idéologie et stratégie sécuritaire dans la France occupée*, Paris, Fayard, 1991, p. 239.

117 *Bulletin des cadres du Mouvement de Libération Française*, published by Combat, July 1942, BNF-Paris, Res. G. 1470 (506).

One iconic figure within French diplomacy, exiled in the United States, had expressed this danger and paradox very well: the writer and former Secretary-General of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexis Léger ("Saint-John Perse"). At a conference held in New York on March 28, 1942, he denounced the perverse use made by supporters of collaboration in Vichy of the rapprochement between the two countries. He underlined this "chiasmus", which could have misled the opinion of the French in France: "Those, in France, who most violently fought the offer of collaboration made, founded on peace, in full agreement with the European community, by a strong, victorious France to a republican, disarmed Germany, are the same people who were one day to find acceptable the offer of collaboration made on a war footing, for the benefit of a Germanic order, by a totalitarian, imperialist, and racist Germany to an enslaved, oppressed, and isolated France".<sup>118</sup>

118 Cited by Jeffrey Mehlman, *Émigrés à New York. Les intellectuels français à Manhattan, 1940-1944*, Paris, Albin Michel, 2005, p. 219.

## Combatting the collaborationist myth of the “new Europe”

The word “Europe” was overused and corrupted by the supporters of Hitler’s Europe. This manipulation would be one of the difficulties federalists and Resistance fighters would have to address when promoting a democratic Europe. From 1941 onwards, when he wrote *À l’échelle humaine* and made reference to “the European order”, Léon Blum wanted to repudiate “the abominable abuse of these formulae stolen from our lexicon”. He made the point: “When we refer to the *European order*, we are thinking of peace and not of war; when we refer to a *European organisation*, we are not thinking about a common subjugation under a tyrannical hegemony, but an equal federation of free nations, a League of Nations”.

A united front of the three clusters of the Resistance emerged to denounce the myth of a “new Europe” propagated by German and Vichyist propaganda<sup>119</sup>. The collaborationists of Paris were the noisy zealots, flooding the press with this deadly mystification that is the celebration of Franco-German cultural roots, the promise of “a Europe (...) that the people of the continent will build tomorrow in the mutual understanding and reciprocal esteem of reconciled nations”.<sup>120</sup> Journals, such as the prestigious *Nouvelle Revue Française*, in which Pierre Drieu La Rochelle greeted “European Germany” (January 1942), fuelled this intoxication. Multiple (ultimately unsuccessful) initiatives were put in place: exhibits, such as *Le Bolchevisme contre l’Europe* (Bolshevism against Europe) (March 1942); public meetings that addressed the theme of the “crusade against Judeo-Bolshevism”; a trip by French writers to Weimar in October 1941 for the “Congress of European Writers” (on this occasion, Goebbels proclaimed that

119 See Georges-Henri Soutou, *Europa ! Les projets européens de l’Allemagne nazie et de l’Italie fasciste*, Paris, Tallandier, 2021.

120 Guy Ferchault, “La Semaine Mozart à Vienne”, *Cahiers franco-allemands*, 1942/1, February 1942, cited by Marie-Hélène Benoit-Otis, Cécile Quesney, *Mozart 1941. La Semaine Mozart du Reich allemand et ses invités français*, Rennes, PUR, 2019, p. 196.

“Germany was not only fighting for her living space, but to defend European culture”<sup>121</sup>); filmmaker tours; visits by painters and performing artists living across the Rhine in the name of “new Europe”; concerts in Paris and a pilgrimage to Vienna to mark the 150th anniversary of the death of Mozart, “an undoubted genius but also a figure of European synthesis”<sup>122</sup> and celebrated by collaborationists in Paris as the symbol of “two great peoples whose civilisations intersected” and which “were not made for eternal hostility”.<sup>123</sup>

The “collabos” who came from the left were represented by Marcel Déat, a former Socialist member of parliament and the founder of the *Rassemblement National Populaire*. An anti-war pacifist, since the summer of 1940, he had advocated the advent of a “revolutionary” Europe freed from the shortcomings of capitalism and from national egoisms: “Cooperating within an enterprise that goes beyond the winner and the loser and reconciles them in a common effort of European creation can give meaning to all life and replace dull resignation with ardent enthusiasm.” The far right gives in to Europeanist mysticism, as in the case of Alphonse de Chateaubriant, who declared in *La Gerbe* in December 1940: “Collaborating will no longer consist of a gesture or taking a position of principle; it will be to provide support and, as we can see, total support – organic support, we could say – for the constitutive act of the new Europe, and agree to be an integral and joint part of the great operation of its unified activity”. There were those who tried to convince themselves of the benefit of this Europe by imagining an undivided, transnational cultural and spiritual heritage in the manner of Alfred Fabre-Luce in his *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Europe*, which was published in 1942. Some openly accepted the idea that this Europe would be dominated by the Reich. To quote the writer Drieu la Rochelle: “There is no federation without hegemony. Equality does not exist. Declared hegemony is better than concealed hegemony.” Overall, the French were not ready to believe in this delirium. The German attack on Russia could have seen a rise in

121 Cited by François Dufay, *Le Voyage d’automne. Octobre 1941, des écrivains français en Allemagne*, Paris, Perrin/Tempus, 2008, p.108.

122 M.-H. Benoit-Otis, C. Quesney, *Mozart 1941, op. cit.*, p.193.

123 Lucien Rebatet, “Huit jours à Vienne”, *Je suis partout*, December 13, 1941.



anti-Communism in Europe and constitute a negative unifying link of sorts. The theme of ideological warfare and the “defence of European civilisation” were essential. At the end of 1941, the director of the German press (*Reichspressechef*), Otto Dietrich, highlighted the “spiritual foundations of the new Europe” and praised the advent of a new order founded “not on the principle of the privileges of a particular nation, but on that of equal opportunity for all”.

The Resistance reacted. In an issue entitled “France européenne” (European France) (25 July 1941), the underground journal *Les Petites Ailes de France* called on its readers to turn away from this Europe in the depths of despair that could only be “a collection of slaves” under “Prussian rule”. This Europe, it said, would be the negation of “our civilisation” founded on humanism and “respect for the dignity of the person.” In the article “Comment ils font l’histoire” (“How they write history”) (September 15, 1941), *Vérités*, the successor to *Les Petites Ailes*, denounced “the myth of Aryan superiority”, which was but a pretext to put Europe at the mercy of “the imperialism of the Germanic race and nation”. In the article “Votre opinion et la nôtre” (“Your opinion and ours”) (August 25, 1941), *Vérités* warned against the dangers of the “Franco-German collaboration” of the Vichy government and the illusions of the promise of “broad prospects” that a “reconciled continent” would offer (a quote from the speech given by Marshall Pétain on August 12, 1941):

However, we refuse to engage in this reconciliation under the aegis of Germany, which for France (and we have weighed up our terms) would represent a material and spiritual death foreseen, conceived, and organised by the current masters of the Reich. (...) A reconciled Europe does not awaken in us, as it does across the Rhine, a concept of the master race (*Herrenvolk*) surrounded by slave peoples (*Dinervolker*), but that of a continent on which each nation will freely develop their own virtues for the general good of the Community.

Words were not enough: Resistance fighters took direct action and conducted regular attacks on LFFV recruitment offices. In particular, at the outset, the non-Communist and non-Gaullist Resistance

understood that it had to develop counter-propaganda on the theme of Europe and to start to give thought to what the Europe of tomorrow could be. Little by little, some sectors of the Resistance came to dissociate Hitler’s Europe, “a war machine at the service of Pan-Germanism”, from what post-war Europe could be: “Should we give up on a salutary idea because some people misuse it?”, reads the article “France et l’idée d’Europe” (“France and the idea of Europe”) in *Les Cahiers Politiques*. The response is in the negative: far from this caricature, a “veritable Europe” can and must be imagined for economic and cultural reasons. But to avoid a return to war, one had to avoid repeating errors from the past. The “vanquished” could not be absent from the new system that would be put in place. However, a European solution cannot be conceived of without a relationship with “the world coalition of peaceful powers”, with “global society”, in order to avoid any “continental particularism”. The socialist idea that would dominate Europe, foreseen by *Les Cahiers Politiques*, would allow a “close, fraternal collaboration between the democrats of Germany”.<sup>124</sup>

The need to give thought to the world of tomorrow and to position oneself in the field of ideas and values also arose from an event that occurred in August 1941: the historic meeting between the British Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, who signed the Atlantic Charter. The two heads of state sent a message to Stalin to propose coordination in war production and strategy. The United States was on the verge of joining the war; this would in fact occur after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941). The war is now a veritable global conflict. We knew that the world of tomorrow would be very different from the present, and that we had to prepare for it. Indeed, this Charter underlined the importance for the future of the world of ensuring respect for, restoring, and promoting the “four founding freedoms” of democratic culture: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. These are the same values that Europe had invented, and which America had intended to propose as a meta-objective of this war. As the historian Emmanuelle

124 “La France et l’idée d’Europe”, *Les Cahiers politiques*, April 1943, cited by H. Michel and B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, *Les idées politiques et sociales de la Résistance*, Paris, PUF, 1954, p. 392.

Loyer said: “The brutal Nazi crusade resulted in the United States, by reaction, identifying with the defence of a heritage of values that was ultimately the best of what European modernity had produced”.<sup>125</sup>

It was in autumn of 1941 that the leader of Free France emerged from his original apolitism. From that point onwards, his discourse would note what was at stake in the war in philosophical terms: this war went beyond a Franco-German conflict; it was a clash of civilisations. It was the “gigantic struggle between freedom and tyranny”. On September 18, 1941, de Gaulle mentioned “democracy” for the first time: “And when democracies must reshape the world on the foundations of human freedom, the sovereignty of peoples, and the cooperation of nations...” Little by little, but at varying intensities depending on political culture, the traditional anti-Germanism of the French gave way to anti-Nazism.




Figure 2: The chronological evolution of the aims and issues of the non-Communist French Resistance. ©R.Belot

125 E. Loyer, “La Voix de l’Amérique. Un outil de propagande radiophonique américaine aux mains d’intellectuelles français”, *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire*, no. 76, October-December 2002, p. 81.

We see this evolution in one of the first Resistance movements: The *Mouvement de Libération Française* (in fact *Combat*). Its “manifest” of November 1941, drafted by Berté Albrecht and Frenay, starts with a formula that perfectly signalled this evolution: “Freeing territory from the enemy is good, but not enough”.<sup>126</sup> The patriotic reaction can no longer be seen from other than a political perspective.<sup>127</sup> The relationship between nations must be re-evaluated. It is not by chance that this text refers explicitly to the Atlantic Charter. The first pro-European petition of principle arose: the aim of this war had to be to “establish a politically, economically, and spiritually united Europe, a step towards world unity.”

This consideration of the extra-military dimension of the fight against the occupier and Nazism was concomitant with the process of rapprochement between the internal Resistance and the Gaullist Resistance. Resistance movements and groups proliferated; their respective memberships grew and became structured. General de Gaulle began to understand that his ability to act was determined by the formation of strong ties to the internal Resistance. The Resistance became politicised and did not intend to remain thus upon Liberation, when France had to be rebuilt: the representativeness of de Gaulle and his credibility in the eyes of the Allies depended on it. For the two clusters of the struggle against the occupier, it was no longer possible not to take into account the political and geopolitical issues of the war. Gaullist intellectuals exiled in the United States and those who had come together at the *École Libre des Hautes Études de New York* started the political turn: it is explained that “the principles of today flow from the principles of yesterday”, and that “the world of 1942 is fighting for the ideas of 1789”.<sup>128</sup>

126 Preamble (manifesto of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*), November 1941. Fonds Mireille Albrecht.

127 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira*, *op. cit.*, p.185.

128 B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, *Pour la Victoire*, January 24, 1942, cited by François Chaubet, Emmanuelle Loyer, “L’École libre des hautes études de New York: exil et résistance intellectuelle (1942-1946)”, *Revue historique*, 616, October/December 2000, p. 962.

The patriotic reaction had to turn into political action aimed at restoring republican principles, which would be gradually detached from the negative image of the regime that led to defeat. This rapprochement would result in the creation of “*Combatant France*” (France *Combat-tante*), which would succeed “*Free France*” (France Libre) on July 14, 1942. The CNR (Conseil National de la Résistance), which was created in 1943, would be the symbol of this desire to structure the governance of the Resistance which would constitute a quasi-government with a political programme. Movements such as *Défense de la France* started to believe in the “ideal city” of tomorrow: “Formulate, then implement a political doctrine: this is the task of the Resistance”.<sup>129</sup>

It was precisely at the start of 1943 that work began on a revolutionary political doctrine for the seizure of power. Documents, written or annotated by Frenay, were found in the suitcase of the secretary of the head of *Combat*, which had been seized by the French police. An unpublished note “exclusively for heads of regions and of departments, their delegates, and workers’ action delegates” written in early 1943, inspired by Frenay and written by Bourdet, states that Communism has positive elements, in particular in that it “represents a concrete effort towards building a fair society” and “a serious attempt to create a fully organised modern society”.<sup>130</sup> Above all, it stems from a “universal doctrine” as “it understands that *purely national doctrines were outdated*.” As for “negative aspects”, the author of the note lists: the violence of the Bolshevik Revolution; it “terrorised the bourgeoisie of all countries in the world”; it fuelled fascism; “the proletarian state has become a grandiose machine that crushes man even more than the capitalist machine”. In the chapter “*Notre position de principe*” (“Our position of principle”), it says that:

The aim of our revolutionary action is also to build a fair and rational society.

129 “*Combat pour une cité libre*”, *Défense de la France*, January 1944, in Indomitus (Ph. Viannay), *Nous sommes les rebelles*, op. cit., p. 53.

130 Archives Nationales de Paris (AN) 72 AJ 2026. Document Frenay France politique. CE. Réseaux et organisations de résistance (affaire de Lyon). Documents in the hands of the police. Documents found in the suitcase of Denoyer Christine. Ant 3 and Jax 1 /31.632. R6 /CE. Date of dissemination: 1.11.43. *Combat et le communisme*.

Our demand for justice is a reflection of faith and of the ideal that informs all of our actions. If we are in the Resistance today, it was first and foremost because it is the only attitude consistent with individual and collective honour, and with our dignity.

*Our political actions* are a function of our revolutionary aims and the ethical rules that constitute our ideal: justice, the truth, and freedom.

Our revolutionary aims and our permanent ethics constitute a unit. We believe that this unit corresponds to the fundamental unit of the universe, which is oriented in all of these details from negative to positive; from bad to good. Any bad act generates evil, even if it seems to temporarily lead to a good outcome.

We believe that far from undermining our revolutionary action, this unitary attitude gives it strength, rigour, and even simplicity that “the “forecast calculation” cannot give it. In purely practical terms, it seems to us that indifference to the moral value of actions has done Communism immense damage and prevented many people who may otherwise have been tempted from coming to it. To use an example that affects us directly, the attacks carried out by the underground *L’Huma* in 1940-41 against the “servants of Anglo-Saxon imperialism” Gaullists mean we can have no definitive confidence in their current friendliness.

We can feel the shadow of Frenay’s federalist culture when he writes that above all, it is the Communist conception of the State that is the source of a deep political divergence: “We do not want Communism, as it uses a Moloch State whose physiognomy is the exact opposite of what the future society should be as a transitory means of achieving a classless society. Historical experience proves that such an all-powerful State acquires its own will and habits and does not fade away on its own.” Conclusion: “Communism represents a force; our spirit will only triumph if it represents a greater force. We do not care about female spirits at *Combat* ready to follow behind the Communist

force. (...) If we want to be free to collaborate with the Communists today and perhaps oppose them tomorrow, we must form a force and a revolutionary force. (...) We can, and must, become a point of attraction for the working class, even the Communist class.”

Another circular, entitled “*Remarques sur le Comité général d’études*”<sup>131</sup> à l’occasion du questionnaire envoyé par lui aux comités régionaux” (“Comments on the Comité général d’études at the time of the questionnaire sent by it to regional committees”) and signed “Lefebvre” (one of Frenay’s pseudonyms), sets out *Combat*’s position with regard to the General Study Committee created by Jean Moulin and the policy of the latter to bring the old political parties back into the game. Frenay was radically opposed to this, as its ambition was to turn the Resistance into a political party. For him, the challenges of the time required that those involved have “revolutionary guts”:

Here, we will not go into the substantive Issues that need to be analysed by the Comité général d’études. We merely wish to emphasise strongly and with insistence the shortcomings that became apparent to us both in the working methods of the Committee and in the decisions made by it and its members. In my opinion, these shortcomings could render the solutions to the problems studied by the Comité général d’études ineffective. (...) The Resistance in the South found it very difficult to make its voice heard. However, for us it seemed not only fair but also necessary for this Resistance to know *for the benefit of which ideas it was fighting*, and even to have a preponderant role in the formulation of these ideas. The questionnaire, which was drafted several months ago and which denotes a very clear (and therefore, indisputable) trend, was not sent to the steering committee of the united movements. If any responses were given to the Comité général d’études, the

131 The Committee of Experts (Comité des experts), which was to become the General Study Committee (le Comité général d’études), was created in July 1942 by Jean Moulin. It was a central service of his General Delegation in France, which aimed to ensure the cooperation and control of the three major movements in the free zone, *Combat*, *Franc-Tireur* and *Libération-Sud*. Its mission was forward-looking: it had to work on the constitutional, political, economic and social reform projects to be implemented at the Liberation.

Comité directeur was not aware of them. If correspondence has been sent to London on this matter, the Comité directeur was not informed of this.

In a specific region (Castor), a policy committee was created. It did not contain any Resistance fighters. On the other hand, a political section of the united movements was put in place. Its mission was to prepare texts for the benefit of committees, which ultimately decided on the final solution to be adopted. This was equivalent to putting the Resistance in a position of subordination vis-à-vis politicians of yesteryear who were given regrettable pre-eminence. (...) It would have been an error to make the politicians of yesteryear think that, as in the past, they were the only ones with the ability to “think” in the France of tomorrow, an error because Resistance France, I can guarantee, would not accept this de facto subordination. Finally, it would have been an error because we cannot expect those who represented the France of yesterday to build the France of tomorrow according to your wishes. The revolution we want to see cannot be planned by them alone. We refuse to validate via any measure whatsoever the reconstitution of the parties, but we must recognise that there are valid ideas to be expressed. And yet, if we take the composition of the Comité général d’études, we do not believe that socialism is sufficiently represented. Do we believe that the socialists would accept the plans drawn up by the COL and in which they had not participated? In the political sphere, I believe we have a sufficiently clear view of what the government of tomorrow should be... Almost all of us are convinced that the liberal economy in its previous form is dead: the two solutions that currently seem to exist are a socialist or semi-state form of economy or a distributive economy, all with the same goals. In future, there must be only one test to determine who will have the honour of representing the country: Resistance.<sup>132</sup>

132 AN 72 AJ 2026. “Remarques sur le Comité général d’études à l’occasion du questionnaire envoyé par lui aux comités régionaux”. Copy sent to Max (C.XC.), *Combat* regional heads, *Libération*, FT, and *Forestier* on March 1, 1943.

It cannot be stated more clearly that the Resistance now pursued political objectives, and that the internal Resistance had no intention of coming under the supervision of the Gaullist Resistance. In the *Combat* (Algiers) edition of October 2, 1943, Frenay assumes the political dimension of the war and announces the conditions under which France could experience a political rebirth:

Without doubt, this war, even more than the previous war, is a political war. Victory for the United Nations is, ultimately, only the means by which to overthrow dictatorships and bring down tyrannies. This is why our victory will overthrow the Vichy regime, which is even more loathsome than Nazism, since it does not even have the sombre grandeur of Nazism. This war is political. It pits two conceptions of life against each other: freedom against slavery, fraternity against hate, equality against inequality, justice against injustice, etc. Parties, which will be something other than anachronisms, can only be born once the political, economic, and social foundations of the new world have been established. When France knows its place in Europe and in the world, then only in this new situation will new parties be freely created. This, I believe, is what the Resistance wants as a whole.

Frenay knew that on crucial points (such as peace negotiations and the role of Europe in the post-war period), there were fundamental divergences that had to be discussed. The issue of the reinstatement of the old political parties would be a divisive point and a source of division within the Resistance.

## How to convince de Gaulle to break free from nationalism?

---

De Gaulle's awareness of geopolitical issues was apparent, but it remained a prisoner of France's traditional foreign policy framework. We can say with the historian Andrew Shennan that Gaullism could not come up with a veritable plan for the renewal of France and of its geopolitical environment during the war.<sup>133</sup> In May 1942, as he sought support from movements of the internal Resistance, de Gaulle strengthened his own international position. He wrote a "declaration" that was reproduced by the main underground newspapers:

We want this war, which affects the destiny of all peoples in the same way and brings democracies together in a common effort, to result in the creation of a global organisation that establishes solidarity and mutual assistance for nations in all fields in a sustainable manner. It is our understanding that in this international system, France occupies the eminent place assigned to her by virtue of her worth and genius. France and the world have struggled and suffered for freedom, justice, and the right to self-determination. The right to self-determination, justice, and freedom will win this war, both in fact and in law, for the benefit of each man and for the benefit of each State.

However, contrary to non-Communist internal Resistance movements, Gaullism persisted with generalities; it would not go so far as to imagine what Europe could be. The essence of its discourse continued to be nationalist; this would concern some of his partisans. One such person was Raoul de Roussy de Sales, a French journalist living in the United States and the diplomatic correspondent for the Havas agency and of the newspaper *Paris-Soir*, who agreed to join the first official representation of Free France (then of *Combatant France*)

---

133 Andrew Shennan, *Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal 1940-1946*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989.



in Washington. On September 26, 1942, during an exchange with Jacques Maritain and other members of the Gaullist delegation, it was explained to him that “France was on its way to becoming fiercely nationalist” and that “this nationalism would find in de Gaulle its ideal”.<sup>134</sup> He took offence and found it ridiculous that the Maurrasian (Charles Maurras was a figure of the extreme right wing) myth of “France alone” should regain currency; he described it as “a philosophical and sentimental chimera”. The French had still not understood that “even if she were to rise once more”, France would not regain the place it occupied before the war: “It is no longer a great power”.<sup>135</sup> Following its defeat, Vichy dug its grave. Roussy saw it as a sort of “transfer to de Gaulle, who now polarises chauvinistic tendencies, and the Pétain mystique”. In his opinion, such a view ignores the geopolitical weakness of France. After 1914, France “had no direction other than as a member of a coalition”. It would only play a role in the world “to the extent that it would act as a creator of universal ideas and ideas of internationalism”.<sup>136</sup>

Roussy de Sales expressed a point of view that was widely shared within the French exile community living in the United States. This was the case with the writer and former Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Alexis Léger (“Saint-John Perse”). He declined the invitation from General de Gaulle to meet with him in May 1942. Among the reasons for this refusal, it is clear that the position of the General in relation to his geopolitical conceptions played an important role. Léger had not forgotten that he had been a collaborator of Aristide Briand, an apostle of France-German reconciliation at a time when this reconciliation was achieved on the basis of equality and free will. This was also the case for Claude Lévi-Strauss, who ridiculed the “Boulangistes de Londres”<sup>137</sup> and who saw in de Gaulle a putschist apprentice. One of the figures of humanist

134 R. Roussy de Sales, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

135 *Ibid.*, p. 256.

136 *Ibid.*, p. 341.

137 Cited by J. Mehlman, *Émigrés à New York... op. cit.*, p. 225. General Georges Boulanger (1837-1891) was an officer who fought in the 1870 war and became Minister of War in 1886. Embodying extreme right-wing and anti-parliamentarianism, he was accused of having wanted to foment a coup d'État against the Third Republic. His movement was called “boulangisme”.

Christianity, Jacques Maritain, also declined the invitation from the founder of Free France, who he accused of wanting to create a “Vichy without the Nazi”.<sup>138</sup> Maritain was along the lines of Pius XI, who, in the encyclical *Ubi arcano Dei consilio* (December 23, 1922), denounced “excessive nationalism” as a degeneration of love for the Motherland that makes one forget that all people are part of the universal human family. For Maritain, this war was not a “national” or “ideological” war: it was “a war of civilisation”.

This nationalist posture of General de Gaulle was encouraging to his detractors: it was the source of the “dictator de Gaulle” counter-myth developing in the circles of the republican left (Pierre Cot) and on the republican right and formerly anti-Munich, as Léger accused the General of not holding any mandate from the French people like the former MP Henri de Kerillis, who did not like the idea of a soldier playing politics “any more than the idea of a priest getting married”.<sup>139</sup> Paul Vignaux, who was once close to the Christian Workers’ Youth and a teacher at the École Pratique des Hautes Etudes before he went into exile in the United States and involved in trade unionism, criticised the criticism made by General de Gaulle of the Third Republic and putting it on the same plane as his criticism of Vichy; he compared Gaullist nationalism to a form of Bonapartism that instrumentalised the Resistance.<sup>140</sup> A liberal intellectual such as Raymond Aron would have been aware of this, as borne out in the article published in the journal *France Libre à Londres*: “À l’ombre des Bonaparte” (“In the shadow of Bonaparte”).<sup>141</sup>

Despite all of the fantasies resulting from a fear and an ignorance of Gaullism, General de Gaulle was not a potential dictator. According to what some of his critics on the left believe or would have others believe, not everyone around him was on the far right. There were

138 Letter from J. Maritain to Yves Simon, August 9, 1942, cited by Jean-Luc Barré, *Jacques et Raïssa Maritain. Les mendiants du ciel*, Paris, Stock, 1995, p. 500.

139 Jean-Yves Boulic, Anne Lavaure, *Henri de Kerillis. L’absolu patriote*, Rennes, PUR, 1997, p. 218.

140 E. Loyer, *Paris à New York. Intellectuels et artistes français en exil, 1940-1947*, Paris, Grasset, 2005, pp. 198-199.

141 R. Aron, « L’ombre des Bonaparte », journal *La France libre*, August 1943, reproduced in R. Aron, *Chroniques de guerre. La France libre, 1940-1945*, preface by J.-M. Soutou, Paris Gallimard, 1990 (republished), pp. 763-776.

pro-Europeans who would emerge after the war, such as René Plevén,<sup>142</sup> the General's Commissioner for External Relations, and his protégé, the young Robert Marjolin, who was close to Jean Monnet.<sup>143</sup> As Marjolin said, "the shades were endless" and the debate between the various groups was often "fierce". However, because he had the restoration of French honour and "greatness" in mind, he was led to promote a purely national strategy and to misjudge the shift in the geopolitical paradigm that would result from World War II. The tributes he repeatedly paid to "Russia" (he avoided references to "the USSR") bear witness to a classic geopolitical conception that aimed to neutralise Germany by encircling it.<sup>144</sup> The Franco-Russian pact,<sup>145</sup> which was signed at the end of 1944, was first and foremost an expression of the wish of both parties to "guard together against a new German aggression".<sup>146</sup> It was the expression of a balance of power policy, as de Gaulle had announced on the BBC on January 20, 1942: "The certain appearance of Russia as a leader among the winners of tomorrow gives Europe and the world a guarantee of balance on which no power has as much reason to congratulate themselves as France."

One man tried to persuade him to change his position on this point: Frenay, the founder of the *Combat* movement. At the end of 1941, he aggregated Christian-Democrat groups such as *Liberté*. In the spring of 1942, he wanted to bring together the three great movements in the Southern zone: *Libération*, *Franc-Tireur* and, the most important among them, *Combat*. This would become the *Mouvements Unis de la Résistance* (United Resistance Movements). Frenay and the men from *Combat* had already undergone their own Europeanist transformation, in the spring of 1942. At the start of autumn 1942, he went to London to meet General de Gaulle and attempt to define the connection between the internal Resistance and the Gaullist Resistance. In London, he met

142 Christian Bougeard, *René Plevén. Un Français libre en politique*, Rennes, PUR, 1994.

143 R. Marjolin, *Le travail d'une vie. Mémoires, 1911-1986*, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1986, pp. 113-118.

144 R. Belot, "La Russie de Staline dans la parole publique du général de Gaulle au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale", *De Gaulle et la Russie*, under the supervision of Maurice Vaisse, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2006-2012, pp. 107-122.

145 Georges-Henri Soutou, "Le général de Gaulle et l'URSS, 1943-1945: idéologie ou équilibre européen?", *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1994/4.

146 Ch. de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 2000, p. 649.

a number of representatives of European governments in exile, in particular Polish, Czech, and Belgian representatives. "We were able to talk about our struggles, our hopes, our views for the future. Like them, I was struck by the astonished concordance of our thoughts." His beliefs were reinforced when he learnt that the Polish and Czechoslovakian governments in exile in England had signed a federative alliance on January 25, 1942. Frenay was aware that these European Resistance forces would be responsible for rebuilding Europe on other foundations, and that the anti-Nazi *Combatants* "have raised their spirits above misfortune and hate": "They have set their sights on the post-war period and beyond borders."<sup>147</sup> The two "Free French" with whom he felt the greatest affinity were two socialists: André Philip, from Lyon, and Pierre Brossolette,<sup>148</sup> the latter promising a deep "political transformation" of post-war France that should move away from the "old game of party politics".<sup>149</sup> Frenay saw the leader of *Combatant* France on numerous occasions and wrote him several letters in an attempt to convince him to overcome his anti-German nationalism.

On November 8, 1942, he wrote a 16-page letter to de Gaulle, calling on him to "think about the world of tomorrow".<sup>150</sup> His aim was to convince the founder of Free France that the French aspired to a patriotism "purified by ordeal", "of a more generous essence, more universal than we were accustomed to seeing before the war". Speaking on behalf of the French in France and carried by his natural optimism, he assured them that "the country" was aware that "future peace" could not be guaranteed by a wholesale return to the formulae of the past".

He started by citing the causes of the war. For Frenay, these were essentially economic: "The geographical and demographic characteristics of these three countries indeed offered commonalities that can be summed up as: too large a population on land that was too narrow

147 "Résistance... Espoir de l'Europe", *Combat* (Alger), December 12, 1943. in H. Frenay, *Combat*, Paris, Denoël, 1945, p. 71.

148 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

149 P. Brossolette, *La Marseillaise*, September 27, 1942, cited by Guillaume Piketty, *Pierre Brossolette. Un héros de la Résistance*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1998, pp. 213-214.

150 Letter from H. Frenay to General de Gaulle, November 8, 1942. Archives Nationales (Paris), 72 AJ 47. All citations below are drawn from this letter. See the whole text at the end of the volume.

and too poor. All three were what the Germans would have called *Volk ohne Raum*.” This situation resulted in a social and economic crisis that led to these countries (Germany, Italy, Japan) being “plunged into growing distress”: “threatened with suffocation, (they) listened to apprentice dictators and put totalitarian regimes in power. From then onwards, war was inevitable”. Frenay did not hesitate to question democracies in the process that led to this explosive situation:

I am not afraid to speak my mind, and I believe there is a certain greatness in affirming it before the world: while totalitarian countries are most directly responsible for the war, democracies bear indirect responsibility: Hitler and Mussolini are their creation. The abominable fascist myth, the cult of war and blood, and the exasperation of racial pride, were used to galvanise their people and strengthen their resolve and muscles for war, for which they prepared using ruthless methods. It must be recognised that both domestically and in their international interactions, democracies have betrayed the principles of generosity, justice, and equality that they now claim to uphold. Social conflict and war were the inevitable consequences.

It follows from this assumption that the German problem cannot be reduced to Hitlerism or Prussianism: it is Europe (or the absence or dysfunctions of Europe) that is at stake. Frenay’s position on Germany demonstrates amazing foresight and courage; one could even describe him as a visionary. The man who invented the internal Resistance, which was the object of repression by the occupier, called for magnanimity and lucidity vis-a-vis the Germany of tomorrow:

But then the question will be asked: Will you allow a German bloc of 80 million, a bloc that outnumbers its two largest neighbours, to exist at the heart of Europe? Well, yes! I am firmly convinced that to do otherwise would be to perpetuate a crime of lèse-nation and place a time bomb against the peace. German unity is a given. At the risk of appearing sacrilegious, I would add that I rejoice in it because it is a capital expression of this ongoing, painful effort of people towards an ever greater and deeper unity that I consider both necessity and positive.

According to Frenay, we had to return to a particular way in which we have seen history in France and distance ourselves from the theories of Jacques Bainville, one of the favourite authors of General de Gaulle who shaped a generation:

In France, Bainville still has followers who want to return Germany to a state close to that of 1803. There is still the sign of serious misunderstanding, of culpable historical conservatism. Admittedly, Bainville was an enlightened mind and a distinguished historian: in his judgments, he could not help but be the man of his generation. For him, German unity, which was forged before his very eyes, was an accidental phenomenon and not the result of historical developments. He could not make up his mind, because he lived his youth in the years that followed our defeat in 1870. Affected by his ardent patriotism, he could not raise his mind to judge good for others what had been good for France. He judged German unity through the prism of French interests, not through the prism of the benefits for humanity.

Thus, a return to real peace required us to avoid falling back into habits of the past. Frenay pleaded for a change in our way of seeing the State and relationships between states. A peace of the “winners” and a European diplomatic system designed on the basis of a system of alliances should be banned. Everything had to be done to prevent the formation of “generations of revenge” in Germany. We must avoid the trap of demonising the German people:

Above all, the culprits are these cadres of the Nazi Party, who instilled the insane cult of race, war, and blood in a whole generation of young people. These are the people who must be punished even before the perpetrators of the atrocities, because they are the people who armed them. The German people themselves will thank you for it. As do all peoples of the world after a defeat, they will hold their leaders responsible. It is in the name of the German people and of the whole of humanity that several tens of thousands of Hitlerites will have to be executed. Above all, let us remove from our intentions



that which would consist of humiliating a great people for decades to come. These intentions would include a brutal sanction imposed on a responsible minority; and would revolt against a less harsh but generalised and prolonged sanction.

He then states what would constitute the heart of his view of the world: “The peace will be a peace of justice and generosity, not of hate and egoism. Otherwise, there will be no peace.”

For this to occur, Germany would have to be reinstated in Europe as a major player. Only a united and federal Europe could sustainably resolve the German problem. For this to happen, there must first be a political revolution and a preparedness to revisit our conceptions of sovereignty:

The main error, the mortal sin in the eyes of history, would be to want to restore these states to the fullness of an illusory sovereignty. In view of the mosaic of peoples that make up Europe, the right to self-determination should be considered one of the main causes of the current war. The sovereignty of states born out of the treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Neuilly, and Trianon, was a myth that may have given satisfaction to narrow-minded nationalists but could not delude far-sighted statesmen.

He knew that this did not correspond to what he had heard in the antechambers of Gaullian power in London. The dominant line, rather, is the Bainvillian<sup>151</sup> line calling for the butchering of Germany. And he dared tell the General so:

I am saddened when the differences between north and south, east and west, are pointed out in my presence, and when we

<sup>151</sup> J. Bainville (1879-1936) was an intellectual on the French far right. A historian and foreign policy journalist and the director of *La Revue Universelle*, he evolved in the sphere of French Action, of which he was the theoretician. His major work (*Les conséquences politiques de la paix*, 1920) contains his famous phrase: “This is a peace that is too soft for what is hard, and too hard for what is soft.” He denounced the Third Republic (“the son of Bismarck”) and its inability to face the German threat. He was in favor of the Franco-Russian alliance against Germany. De Gaulle read Bainville. According to Frenay, his geopolitical analysis grid was “Bainvillian”.

conclude that the mutilation of German territory is a possibility. I am familiar with the differences that separate Prussians from people from the Rhine region, and Pomeranians from Bavarians. I also know that there are fundamental differences between the Breton and the Provençal, the Basque and the Flemish, and the Savoyard and the Alsatian. However, these people would become part of a united France. In the name of Bainvillian principles, Germans recently believed that they could foster Breton separatism and Alsace-Lorraine while fascist Italy, in the name of so-called historical rights, wanted to annex Corsica, Savoy, and the County of Nice. Isn't their failure resounding? All they have succeeded in doing is strengthen the ties they wanted to cut, and unleashing ever-greater hatred against them.

On the contrary: Frenay was of the view that we should imagine a revolutionary formula that, following the defeat of Nazism and the punishment of those responsible, allows “Germany to be treated on a strictly equal footing with all other Nations”. This formula is “a well-conceived European union”. In a united Europe, “could any one nation have the means to resort to war? Can one imagine California declaring war on Wisconsin?” In order for the countries of Europe to unite, there had to be “unity in foreign policy and the creation of a European army, no longer national armies”. This was the announcement of the *Communauté européenne de défense* (CED), of which Frenay would be an ardent defender. According to Frenay, the economic problem must also be solved at the base. His proposal: “The state control or socialisation of heavy industry would prohibit not only Germany, but also any other Nation, becoming a danger to others.” This was the announcement of the *Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier* (CECA). Jean Monnet would propose something very similar in 1943 when he was in Algiers; thus, Frenay and his friends thought of this Franco-German mutualisation of heavy industry *before* Jean Monnet (and, therefore, well before the Americans and the Cold War). The economic question had to be asked of the whole of Europe. European solidarity had to take account of a situation in which “wealth is very unequally distributed”, but also of the fact that the states of western Europe are the only colonial states,

while “the countries of central and eastern Europe have requirements for colonial products that, in proportional terms, are as great as those of France, Belgium, or Holland”.

But first, in order to unite and love each other, countries had to get to know each other better. For the first time, Frenay cited possible cultural action in order to overcome prejudices and unite people around common values. Frenay would also announce what the Erasmus programme (among others) of the 1980s would put in place:

This unity, which in the past took so long to achieve, can be forged within a few years as a result of the progress with which science and technology provide us. To love one another, we must first know one another, which in turn allows us to understand each other. In the past, it took weeks to travel the breadth of France. Now, one can travel across Europe in 24 hours. The spoken word is instantly carried from one end of the world to the other. If European nations determined to come together in a large federation should decide at the same time on a concerted plan by which men and people would have to know each other better, and if they should apply this plan with perseverance, in the future (i.e., within a generation) the European community would be a *fait accompli*. Let us organise travel for young people, for workers, for intellectuals; may French people could take holidays in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and in Italy, and Germans in France. May unions between nationals of two countries be made easier. May the works of the great European masters be translated into all languages and taught in schools; may students in educational institutions no longer be taught about the formation of the current states as an objective in itself, but rather as a moment in historical evolution; may they be taught at the same time about the achievements of Louis XIV and those of foreign sovereigns; may international associations be automatically created on professional or cultural grounds. May cinema, radio, books, and theatre be united in the service of this objective, and the game will be won.

Thus, Europe cannot be reduced to a coalition of interests. The cultural issue is major, since there is a need to “create the European spirit, to elevate our thoughts above old borders, to create a new spiritual community”.

The crowning achievement of his argument is his questioning of sovereignty. For him, state sovereignty was illusory, and even dangerous. Above all, it was unsuitable for building a Europe freed from the risks of war and for living in a world whose borders had been watered down and in which interdependence was growing in an irreversible manner:

If we really want to build states commensurate with the century in which we live, we persevere with the fragmentation of Europe. The historical evolution of the world highlights a fundamental law that is stronger than man: borders are widening, not narrowing. The world is moving, sometimes with growing pains, towards an ever wider and deeper unity. Any construction that starts from a systematic desire to maintain or increase division would be criminal madness that would condemn us to new and bloody conflicts. Technical progress has created economic interdependence between nations. The exterior proves abundantly that to regulate their relations, it is no longer enough to sign treaties: we must boldly design an entirely revolutionary *modus vivendi*.

Frenay knew that his pro-European positions were disruptive, and that they would clash with the culture of General de Gaulle. He warned that “this thought is not the product of a dreaming brain, of a dangerous dreaming utopian, of a dangerous utopian. On the contrary: I draw from the lessons of history the certainty that this enterprise is both necessary and possible.”

November 8, 1942 was also the date of the US-British landing in North Africa. It is not known whether or not de Gaulle reacted to this letter; what is certain is that he would not take it into account when shaping his future policy. Three days later, in a speech delivered to the French of Great Britain, he did in fact mention the Resistance movements, including *Combat*. He paid tribute to the Resistance, which

would have condemned Hitler's plan for a "united, compact Europe that would henceforth brave the onslaught of the liberators" to failure. He emphasised that "other European peoples, crushed by suffering such as ours, had followed this example. He stated that "...the support of the Europe that resist tyranny cannot be ignored". However, the main thrust of his speech was structured around the idea that in military strategy terms, France was the country best placed from which to launch the attack on fortress Europe. The "efforts" made by France for the common cause (with the USSR, England, and the United States) could not be "dispersed or drowned out as auxiliary in the power of their various allies". He insisted: "No! No! The services of the French are owed only to France." These services must allow France "to ensure all of her rights to victory".

General de Gaulle's mission was to re-establish the "national routine", to "save the life" of France. "All other considerations are not worth a thing<sup>152</sup>..." Frenay's letter went against the process of the Messianic iconisation of the leader of Free France: his speech, his approach summed up "the classic elements of French providentialist mythology.<sup>153</sup> "Frenay focussed on the complex post-national space of post-war France, while de Gaulle wanted to save "French heritage" by reactivating great exemplary figures of French history. His mission was to pick up "the sword of Joan of Arc (who) sent forth the great impetus that drove the enemy out of France."<sup>154</sup>

152 General de Gaulle, "Un seul combat pour une seule patrie", Speech delivered at a meeting organised by the French of Great Britain, London, November 11, 1942. Ch. de Gaulle, *Discours*, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

153 Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Le mythe gaullien*, Paris, Gallimard, 2010, p. 50.

154 General de Gaulle, "Appel pour la fête de Jeanne d'Arc", Brazzaville, May 10, 1941. Ch. de Gaulle, *Discours*, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

## The Combat movement in the Christian-Democrat melting pot

It cannot be said that the *Combat* movement's commitment to Europe is a reflection of the entire internal Resistance: The Resistance that evolved in the Communist environment would continue to be distant from its geopolitical positions. However, it illustrates a fairly general trend that would become consolidated from 1942 onwards. To understand the originality of *Combat*, one must return to the context and terms of constitution. There was a "third way/voice" of the Resistance, which intended to assert its specificity between Gaullism and Communism. It was a rather fuzzy philosophical and political space, structured around *Combat* and Frenay, but it was the space where the first visions of Europe of the future arose.

As we have seen, from the 1930s onwards Frenay committed himself, alongside the committed feminist Berty Albrecht, to the fight against Nazism and anti-Semitism and the defence of human rights.<sup>155</sup> At the Centre for Germanic Studies in Strasbourg, he studied the dysfunctions of the Europe of Versailles and analysed the threat posed by Hitler. Frenay, who was on the left, evolved in the Christian-Democrat and "personalist" environment marked by a defiance of principle with regard to the totalitarian Communist system. This environment was particularly well represented in Lyon, the city of his birth, where he decided to take refuge at the end of 1940 to join the Resistance. He had ties with the Lyonnais circle of Jesuit renovators from La Colline de Fourvière. Their leader was Father Pierre Chaillet,<sup>156</sup> who would also be on the side of European federalism after the war.<sup>157</sup> Pierre Chaillet was one of the first

155 Dominique Missica, *Berty Albrecht, féministe et résistante*, Paris, Perrin, 2005; Mireille Albrecht, *Berty. La grande figure féminine de la Résistance*, Paris, R. Laffont, 1986; Antoinette Maux-Robert, *La lutte contre le chômage à Vichy*, *op. cit.*, p. 63-64; interviews of the author with Mireille Albrecht, July 1995.

156 Renée Bédarida, *Pierre Chaillet. Témoin de la résistance spirituelle*, Paris, Fayard, 1988. See also: H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, *op. cit.*, p. 88; R. Bédarida, *Les armes de l'esprit. Témoignage chrétien, 1941-1944*, Paris, Éditions Ouvrières, 1977.

157 Along with Alexandre Marc, he would play a role in the creation of the European Centre for Culture in 1949.

in France to denounce the ideological perversity of Nazism after investigating *in situ*. In June 1939, he published a very well-researched book on the annexed Austria: *L'Autriche souffrante*.<sup>158</sup> Upon his return from Hungary in January 1941, he participated in a humanitarian organisation for rescuing Jews founded by Father Alexandre Glasberg and sponsored by Cardinal Gerlier: *Amitié Chrétienne*. This committee included Jean-Marie Soutou, a member of *Combat*, as a press attaché to the Swiss delegation of the French Resistance. Frenay met him and included him in the writing of his first underground newspaper, *Les Petites Ailes*, before he became the head of the religious chronicle *Vérités*, which succeeded the former and would become *Combat*. Chaillet developed the thesis that the values of Christianity are counter to Nazi ideology and the cult of the state. The banning of Emmanuel Mounier's journal *Esprit* and on Stanislas Fumet's *Temps Nouveaux* in 1941 allowed Frenay to welcome high-level journalists who supported his humanist philosophy. Moreover, it was at the head office of *Temps Nouveaux* (Rue de Constantine in Lyon) and of *Amitiés Chrétiennes* and a publishing house where Frenay met Chaillet. Philippe de Pierrebourg, the former parliamentary assistant of André Philip, the MP for Le Rhône, had opened a fabric company there. It was he who, in May 1941, founded this refugee aid group. He had met Frenay through Berty Albrecht, who he would meet up with before the war. To quote Vincent Planque, a Frenay supporter who, after the war, would draft a note on the birth of *Combat* in Lyon: "Through his numerous connections and the high standing of his organisation, Stanislas Fumet in a sense polarised the Resistance. (...) Fumet's role at the start of the Resistance was remarkable: as a thinker, he had to communicate his faith, build relationships, and allow men of action to draw on all goodwill. It was he who made this house on Rue de Constantine a centre of Resistant thought and a refuge for the hunted. Everyone knew that the Jews would find comfort in this pleasant place, where each engraving, image, and journal was a discreet warning against the Nazi invasion and accomplice Vichy propaganda. The Gestapo was to raid the premises after the French "police", and even come and slaughter patriots, at the end of 1942 and in early 1943".<sup>159</sup>

158 P. Chaillet, *L'Autriche souffrante*, Paris, Éditions Bloud & Gay, 1939.

159 AN 72 AJ 2026. "Sur les origines de Combat à Lyon (Plaisantin)". Communiqué by M. Planque, 5. Av. de l'Opéra, Commissariat au Tourisme. May 8, 1949.

With the support of Alexandre Marc (a future fellow campaigner for federalism), Frenay encouraged Chaillet to set up *Les Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien* in November 1941, printed on the presses of the newspaper *Combat* and financed in part by the *Combat* movement.<sup>160</sup> The idea was to separate "the political from the spiritual."<sup>161</sup> For Chaillet and those who engaged with him, the drama of Europe was the triumph of Nazism as a "religious revolution". The "pagan myth" was no more than "the racist religion of German divinity" and the negation of "Christian civilisation".<sup>162</sup> This myth was used to enslave Europe; it was used to attack the soul of France and the Christian values that constitute the "shared heritage" of Europe, as proclaimed in the first issue entitled "France, beware of losing your soul".<sup>163</sup> In the name of "Christian universalism", *Témoignage Chrétien* was opposed to nationalism experienced as a cult and an absolute; it called for a patriotism that would not be a "return to itself". It saw the nation as the "pursuit of an ideal" and France, to quote Charles Péguy, as "patron and witness (and often, martyr) of freedom in the world".<sup>164</sup> What is interesting to note is that *Les Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien* expanded their analysis to the whole of Europe. *Les Cahiers* show the Christian communities faced with hostility from the Nazis and their minions in a number of countries, including Germany. Thus, the philosophical approach of *Témoignage Chrétien* was not only transnational; it also showed the Germans who victims of Nazism were. The consideration of this environment where Frenay grew up, in this city of Lyon, the "capital of misery and hope",<sup>165</sup> allows a better understanding of why he believed that the issues of the moment had to be posed at the level of Europe as part of a post-national approach.

160 Eyewitness account by Frenay, February, March, and April 1948. AN, 72 AJ 46.

161 Letter from H. Frenay to L. Cruvillier, September 17, 1947, cited by R. Bédarida, *Pierre Chaillet...*, *op. cit.*, p. 119. See also: H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

162 "Les voiles se déchirent", *Les Cahiers du Témoignage chrétien*, XV-XVI. August 1943, in *La Résistance spirituelle, 1941-1944. Les Cahiers clandestins du Témoignage chrétien*, texts presented by François and R. Bédarida, Paris, Albin Michel, 2001, p. 225.

163 *La Résistance spirituelle, 1941-1944...*, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

164 "Espoir de la France", *Les Cahiers du Témoignage chrétien*, XXVIII-XXIX, July 1944. In *La Résistance spirituelle, 1941-1944...*, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

165 Henri de Lubac, *Résistance chrétienne à l'antisémitisme. Souvenirs 1940-1944*, Paris, Fayard, 1988, p. 42.



The first edition of *Combat* (December 1941) bears witness to this broadening of the issues behind the struggle. It reads: “The European crusade against Nazism is coming together. Dutch, Belgians, Norwegians, Poles, Czechs, Serbs, and Greeks are polishing their weapons. We are by their side”<sup>166</sup> France was not the only country that risked “losing both its body and its soul”. The theme of the European Resistance gradually gains ground in the newspaper: it is only about France and its independence. Also at stake is the battle of truth against lies, of “good” versus “evil”, of Christianity against Nazism, and of “freedom against slavery”. The French should not hold the erroneous belief that they are alone: there is solidarity among “bruised peoples worldwide, since the war has “affected all nations”: “defeats should be measured on a worldwide scale” (*Combat*, August 1942). Everywhere, preparations for the “European insurrection” are in progress.<sup>167</sup>

Frenay also attracted left-wing Christians such as Mounier, a prestigious recruit as the founder of “personalism” and of the journal *Esprit* (1934) who Frenay had met in Lyon<sup>168</sup>. From the outset, *Esprit* wanted to be pan-European and, after Liberation, would advocate the advent of a pacifist and humanist Europe.<sup>169</sup> In 1941, Frenay relied on Mounier to double “resistance via sabotage”, to double “ideological resistance”.<sup>170</sup> He put Mounier in charge of organising study groups whose aim was to provide the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* with a doctrine.<sup>171</sup>

In November 1941, the newspaper *Combat* strengthened its intellectual credentials by acquiring the competence and networks of academics from the *Liberté* movement. It should be noted that the co-founder of *Combat* was a professor of law, François de Menthon. A former president of the *Action catholique de la Jeunesse française* (ACJF), he

166 H. Frenay, *Combat*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

167 “Nous gagnerons la guerre des nerfs”, *Combat*, August 1942, in H. Frenay, *Combat*, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

168 Michel Winock, “*Esprit*”. *Des intellectuels dans la cité. 1930-1950*, Paris, Seuil, 1975-1996, p. 229.

169 Stève Bessac-Vaure, “L’idée européenne dans *Esprit* et *Les Temps modernes*: penser ou construire l’Europe ? Idéalisme intellectuel et refus du réalisme (1945-1954)”, *Siècles* (online), 41 / 2015, posted online June 1, 2015.

170 Notes by J.-M. Soutou in “Emmanuel Mounier”, *Esprit*, no. 12, December 1950, p. 1027.

171 Eyewitness account of J.-M. Soutou to the author, January 2002.

had founded the *Liberté* movement in Annecy when he was living in his château in Menthon-Saint-Bernard, where he would receive Jean Moulin. He participated in the orientation of the movement towards Christian Democrat culture and its European tropism. Menthon, a future *Comité français de la Libération nationale* Justice Commissioner, would be a leading member of the *Mouvement républicain Populaire* (MRP), a key political party during the post-war Fourth Republic; as such, he would be part of the committee that would create the Council of Europe and manage the European University Centre. Three others would place their trust in Frenay: Pierre-Henri Teitgen, another professor of law but at the Université de Montpellier, who would also be a figure within the MRP; Alfred Coste-Floret, a professor at the Université de Strasbourg who had relocated to Clermont-Ferrand; and Georges Bidault, who had been transferred to Lyon to work as a teacher at the Lycée du Parc in Lyon and a former columnist at Catholic newspaper *L’Aube*; in 1943, he would succeed Jean Moulin at the CNR and later would become a Minister for Foreign Affairs.<sup>172</sup> Mention should also be made of Edmond Michelet, the professor André Hauriou from Toulouse, and journalist Charles d’Aragon, a future *Mouvement républicain Populaire* and a member of the *Liberté* movement who would become leader of *Combat* for the Tarn. Thus, what we had was a “movement with somewhat bourgeois origins”<sup>173</sup>, to quote Bourdet, who was part of the management team. This would later prompt Edgar Morin to say that Europe is “the homeland of cultivated people”.<sup>174</sup>

For Mounier, Frenay, Chaillet, and de Menthon, Europe was the ideal place for the rebirth of a humanism characterised by responsibility, one that went beyond capitalist individualism and totalitarian socialism. They wanted to go beyond the anti-Germanic dimension of the Resistance struggle to develop the thesis of the intrinsically perverse nature of Nazism. The “spiritual” dimension of this anti-Nazism was inspired by Christianity and ecumenicalism: hence their decision

172 Georges Bidault, *D’une résistance à l’autre*, Les Presses du Siècle, 1965; Maxime Tandonnet, *Georges Bidault*, Perrin, 2022.

173 Cl. Bourdet, *L’Aventure incertaine. De la Résistance à la Restauration*, Paris, Stock, 1975, p.106.

174 E. Morin, *Penser l’Europe*, Paris, Gallimard, 1987-1990, p. 236.



to attend the sermons of Swiss pastor Roland de Pury (who would participate in *Les Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*) in Lyon.<sup>175</sup> In this Lyon nebula of non-Communist Resistance, certain socialist elements had to be included, such as André Philip, a Resistance fighter and a future supporter of federalism alongside Frenay. A Protestant, he also attended his sermons, which were a revelation and stimulated the audience.<sup>176</sup>

André Philip, a professor of political science, had been a socialist MP in 1936. After joining General de Gaulle in London and the Free French Forces, he became Interior Commissioner of the French National Council, then joined the *Comité français de la Libération nationale* (June 1943), where he would meet Frenay. Neither was a fan of de Gaulle. One day, Philip told the founder of Free France: “You are fighting to restore the greatness of the Nation. I am fighting to build a socialist and democratic Europe”.<sup>177</sup> Frenay would meet up with him in London, while he was there in 1942. They would cross paths again within the National Liberation Movement (the 1944 version), and agree to refuse attempts at control of Communist obedience by the *Front National*. With regards to this pro-European positioning and this refusal to reduce Germany to Nazism, Philip experienced the absence of consensus between the Gaullist Resistance and the internal Resistance. Having received the manuscript of Vercors’ *Silence de la mer*, in the presence of de Gaulle he challenged Jacques Soustelle, as Soustelle believed that it would not be appropriate to present a German in such a friendly and respectful manner. As Information Commissioner at the CFLN, Soustelle would nevertheless publish it in Algiers in the summer of 1943. However, in his memoirs he would recall that “the Communists would violently oppose the publication of *Le Silence de la mer*, which they deemed to be not anti-German enough”.<sup>178</sup> Similarly, the Communists disapproved of this pacifist Resistance, which was a negation of their strategy of immediate action. From the USSR, Ilya Ehrenbourg spoke of “political provocation” and was of the view

175 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, op. cit., p. 88.

176 Papers by André Philip, AN 625 AP.

177 According to Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, Paris, Seuil, 1969, p. 96.

178 J. Soustelle, *Envers et contre tout...*, op. cit., p. 271.

that it “plays into the hands of the enemies of France”: “In France, patriots kill the Boche not with silence but with grenades, bullets, and knives”.<sup>179</sup> He had a very hard, very anti-German line: “If you have not killed one German a day, you have wasted your day.” Philip responded that he was “for a democratic Europe” and that, while he agreed to the temporary use of violence, he rejected “the spirit of hate”.<sup>180</sup> This was the message that Frenay had sought to convey to General de Gaulle in November 1942. We can see a real line of division emerging in the face of the rejection of the Vichy and Nazi order.

179 Ilya Ehrenbourg, cited by Anne Simonin, *Les Éditions de minuit. 1942-1955. Le devoir d'insoumission*, Paris, IMEC Éditions, 1994, p. 95.

180 Cited by Loïc Philip, *André Philip*, Paris, Bauchesne, 1988, p. 100.

## Liberating the Nation or Liberating Europe?

For the most part, the newspapers that dared to give thought to the post-war period and adopt a position on the European issue were a product of the non-Gaullist and non-Communist Resistance. We are not surprised to see the *Combat* movement at the forefront of this trend, the views of which were seldom heard reflected in public opinion. However, we can immediately say that this position was not the majority position within the *Comité français de la Libération nationale* or at the Consultative Assembly of Algiers.

This intellectual environment, dominated by Christian Democrat culture, explains the pro-European position of *Combat*, one of the new movements to try to project itself into the future. The first text in which *Combat* made a public commitment to the Europe of tomorrow was a manifesto. Drafted in July 1942, it was published in the *Combat* newspaper in September 1942 under the heading “*Combat et Révolution*” (“*Combat and Revolution*”). This text was drafted at a meeting of national leaders of the movement held at the château of Charles d’Aragon. At this moment of change, after the return to power of Pierre Laval that had cleared up all the ambiguities in relation to Vichy and Pétain, while the rallying cry to Gaullism had been issued in the spring of 1942, the leaders of *Combat* wondered: “But now, for the first time at a meeting of leaders, we pose questions that each of us has raised as individuals: What is the purpose of our struggle? Will it end with the liberation of our motherland?”<sup>181</sup> After a day of discussions, three people were assigned to summarise the discussions: Frenay, Claude Bourdet, and Professor André Hauriou.<sup>182</sup>

This “profound meaning of our struggle” is made clear from the very outset; it was from the terrible ordeal of the war that “a better

<sup>181</sup> H. Frenay, *La Nuit finira...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-202.

<sup>182</sup> H. Frenay, *Combat*, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-79. See Charles d’Aragon, *La Résistance sans héroïsme*, Paris, Seuil, 1977, pp. 91-96.

world” and a new France that would become “the opposite of Vichy” should arise: “Our role will not end with the liberation of France. Beyond that, we want to rebuild France. In the restoration of Europe and of the world, we want to provide the necessary contribution from France.” The Resistance had an eminent role to play in redefining society, renewing political life, and implementing a “transformation in principle” and a “radical change in social, economic, and political relations”. It was not only a question of bringing about a France that was “free”, “just”, “honest”, “strong, balanced, and modern” courtesy of the advent of a new republic, the “Fourth Republic”. But it was not just about France. World War II bore no resemblance to the Great War: it was “a global civil war”. The “revolution” being prepared went beyond the borders of one country; it was the promise of “the dawn of a new civilisation”: “Beyond that, we want to rebuild France. In the restoration of Europe and of the world, we want to provide the necessary contribution from France.” Frenay summarises the main lines of argument he had made to General de Gaulle:

History teaches us that borders are constantly getting broader. The United States of Europe, a step towards world unity, will soon be a living reality for which we are fighting. Instead of a Europe that is not united but enslaved under the jackboot of a Germany drunk on its own power, we will create with other peoples a united Europe organised on the basis of the law in liberty, equality, and fraternity.

“Remaking” France in this perspective requires the country to come under the double banner of General de Gaulle and of the United Nations to, first of all, win the war and defeat “fascism”. A new, united, socialist France: “The revolution we carry within us will be socialist”. However, (and the dividing line that would split the non-Communist Resistance and the Communist Resistance was already emerging) this revolution would not involve a “class revolution”, since the aim, according to those who drafted the text, was to bring all of the French together under the aegis of the Resistance elite:

The revolution we carry within us will be a revolution of all French people, for all French people. The magnificent gift that

the Resistance movements have given France is an immense cohort where the will to testify together has already brought together and combined the representatives of all social classes, of all the old parties. From our crucible will emerge not a class revolution, but a revolution in which workers, peasants, technicians, and thinkers will have their place and part, based on their merit and efforts.

In his memoirs, Bourdet would describe this text as “naive” and “pompous”.<sup>183</sup> He was sincere and prophetic. It marked the political turning point of the internal Resistance, and a leap of faith in post-war Europe. This tone is found in some of the new movements that emerged in 1942. One example of these movements is *Libérer et Fédérer*, which was created around leftist intellectuals Jean Cassou, Georges Friedmann, and Silvio Trentin.<sup>184</sup> The first issue of this underground newspaper (July 1942) clearly expressed the wish to bring about a “European federation founded on freedom, peace, and prosperity”: “To liberate France and Europe from the fascist and Nazi invasion and bring together the peoples of Europe to avoid a return to war”.<sup>185</sup>

The European theme unfolded when Frenay, after a new stay in London, returned to Algiers, where the *Comité français de la Libération nationale*, the first “official” government of the “France Combattante” was formed in June 1943 under the authority of General de Gaulle. While the patriotic imperative and agonistic rhetoric dominated the discourse of the underground press, there was a renewed focus on the struggle against Nazism, against “totalitarianism” and “fascism” (a generic term used to refer to non-democratic regimes), from autumn 1942 onwards.

This change reflects a more global approach to the issues of the war, its causes, and its consequences. Given the view of fascism as a form of hyper-nationalism, it was the question of the nation (and, therefore,

183 Cl. Bourdet, *L'Aventure incertaine*, op. cit., pp. 386-387.

184 Harry Rod. Kedward, *Naissance de la Résistance dans la France de Vichy. Idées et motivations. 1940-1942*, Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 1989, p. 179.

185 Cited by H. Michel and B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, *Les idées politiques et sociales...*, op. cit., p. 392.

the overcoming of the nation) that was at stake. However, it also started a process of reconsideration of Germany and Germans. Little by little, the demonization of the “Boche” became a condemnation of Nazi ideology: The *Combat* manifesto of September 1942 stated that “We are fighting Germany and its allies, whether they are in Rome, Tokyo, or Vichy. However, through Nazism, we are fighting alongside all wounded Nations, so that out of the appalling ordeal that our country is going through a better world will be born”. As we have seen, this change in perspective was reinforced by Frenay’s time in London. On December 28, 1942, the Algerian edition of *Combat* published an explicit article called “Death to fascism”. This article states that “this war makes sense, as it is a fight to the death against fascism.”

Other movements, which initially bore their Franco-Centrism and their “hatred” of Germans as a badge of honour, began to look beyond borders and refused to “descend into the dismal contemplation of a bygone past” (Philippe Viannay, February 1944). This was the case of *Défense de la France*, a movement that bore witness to a change of scale when taking realities into account. The instinctive reaction of a primitive refusal that came “from the soul, flesh, and blood of France” became a quest for a “philosophical view”, a quest for an “ideal”, “spirit”, and “values”, in short, a vision of the world, of geopolitics. In a fundamental article, “*Le Combat pour une cité libre*” (“The fight for a free city”), Viannay wrote: “Politics must no longer be confined to the narrow borders of separate states. Politics must become geopolitics. Finally, it must consider the climate”.<sup>186</sup> In *Les Cahiers de Défense de la France*, there is a masterful contribution dedicated to “French foreign policy” (September 1943). In this article, a young Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, a future diplomat, develops the notion that the era of “exacerbated nationalism” and “antagonisms between nations” will soon be over. The logic that corresponds to the “salvation of civilisation” is that of a “gradual rapprochement between peoples”. The French must understand that “we cannot live in isolation” and that “the Maginot Line mentality” must disappear. The French must get used to the constitution of “federations”: A Danubian federation, a “federation

186 Indomitus (Ph. Viannay), “Le combat pour une cité libre”, *Défense de la France*, in M. Granet, *Le Journal...*, op. cit., p. 219.

of western Europe”, etc. While measures had to be put in place so that Germany can no longer cause harm, he does not advocate revenge or banishment. The author recommends a policy of neutralising coal in the Ruhr area with the aim of establishing an “economic combination” with the Lorraine steel industry.<sup>187</sup> This is reminiscent of Jean Monnet.

One should not believe that these new converts to post-national culture were naive pacifists or idealists oblivious to the harsh realities of the balance of power. The need to build Europe is also related to the concern for its strategic independence in the face of the emergence of new powers. In Geneva, although imbued with Swiss neutralism, the federalist Raymond Silva did not ignore the fact that Stalin had always shown “his contempt for all things European”. He had read the book by Edward Halett Carr: *Conditions of Peace* (London, Macmillan, 1942). This British academic warned of the danger that the shift of the centre of gravity of the world, from Europe to the United States, would pose for Europe, and that “the United States would assume the heritage of Great Britain”. Concerned, Silva responded that “today, Europe’s worst enemy is the European himself.” Silva was reassured by noting that Anthony Eden, the head of British diplomacy, had given a speech in the House of Commons (December 1942) in which he declared that “never again will we turn our back on Europe”.<sup>188</sup> But at the same time, Silva noted that the same Anthony Eden had explained that “it was on cooperation between England, the United States, China, and Soviet Russia that the best chances of building a new and better international society after the war rested”.<sup>189</sup> Did this mark the end of Europe? In Paris, the diplomatic expert within the *Défense de la France* movement was also concerned. Indeed, Eden again expressed this idea in Annapolis (the United States) on March 26, 1943. “There is a dangerous idea that is sometimes supported by the English: the idea that peace must be policed only by the new Big Four (the USA,

187 *Les Cahiers de Défense de la France* (J.-D. Jurgensen), in M. Granet, *Le Journal...*, op. cit., pp. 261-279.

188 R. Silva, *Au service de la paix. L'idée fédéraliste*, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1945 (written in July 1944), pp. 156-157.

189 *Ibid.*, p. 212.

Great Britain, Russia, and China”).<sup>190</sup> The collection committed to the fight against Nazism and Vichy, *Les Cahiers du Rhône*, published in Neuchâtel in Switzerland, published a historical study and critique of *L'Allemagne et la réorganisation de l'Europe* (“Germany and the reorganisation of Europe”). In its preface, Albert Beguin states that there is “the desire for one Europe” and that we must strive to “base on the communion of spirit what could not be established through violence”.<sup>191</sup>

Frenay made the same observation: this was why he believed that Resistance fighters had a legitimate right to produce a line of thought and a strategy on the future of Europe. A famous article published in *Combat* (Algiers) bears witness to this expansion of the geopolitical horizon: “Resistance... Hope of Europe” (December 12, 1943). Frenay wanted to give “hope” to the millions of men who, “irrespective of the diversity in their customs and languages, waged the same war against a common enemy: the fight for freedom against slavery, for justice against injustice, for law against power”. In the shadowless night of triumphant Nazism, “an exhilarating certainty” dawned: “The Europe that is fighting, the Europe that is suffering, the Europe united in hunger, has the same thought and expresses the same desire: first, to win the war; then to win the peace”. People had “examined their conscience” and understood that “divisions” were the cause of current misfortunes. The “nationalist” was a category that would soon disappear. Resistance fighters repudiated the Maurrassian motto of “France, France alone”, which they see as “the most stupid and criminal of errors”. Carried away by his optimism, Frenay was persuaded that “people, in their misery and because of it, have changed more in three years than they had in the previous fifty years”.

Fiercely optimistic, he believed that “the miracle of the Resistance” would happen. This miracle: the union of peoples, in each country around “patriots” and “brave” bearers of “a common and grandiose hope”. He was persuaded that after having suffered in their bodies and

190 *Les Cahiers de Défense de la France* (J.-D. Jurgensen), in M. Granet, *Le Journal...*, op. cit., p. 266.

191 Claude Moret, *L'Allemagne et la réorganisation de l'Europe*, op.cit., p. 8.

souls the effects of the catastrophe the product of nationalism, peoples would feel a common desire for union across Europe. They would represent a political force that governments would not be able to ignore.

Governments need to know that it is their people who will impose the necessary unions. At their head, one will have in each country the men of the Resistance, pure, hard men who will put at the service of unity their faith, their courage, and their tenacity, the same virtues they will have demonstrated in the underground war. People, in their misery and because of it, have changed more in three years than they had in the previous fifty years.

The Resistance served in the war; it would also serve in the peace. This belief can be summarised in two formulae: “The European Resistance will be the cement of the unions of tomorrow”; and “The men of the European Resistance will be the builders of a new Europe tomorrow”. According to Frenay, Europe would reconnect with its civilising mission. The hundreds of thousands of underground *Combatants*, “from North Cape to the border of the Pyrenees, from the shores of the English Channel to the shores of the Aegean Sea”, lead “the fight of the spirit” and fight “together for another civilisation”. Frenay believed he felt a fundamental movement (“a deep wave”) in favour of all countries that had had to fight Nazism. Resistance fighters across Europe “had raised their spirits above misfortune and hate” and have learned to cast their gaze “beyond war and beyond borders”: “The Europe that is fighting, the Europe that is suffering, the Europe united in hunger, has the same thought and expresses the same desire: first, to win the war; then to win the peace.” The men of the French Resistance “reached out to those of other nations”: “With them, they wanted to rebuild their country, then Europe, in the same spirit as that of 1789, but now applied to nations: freedom, equality, and fraternity”.

It is difficult to confirm that this position was the majority position within movements of the internal Resistance. Let’s take *Défense de la France*, a movement based in the Nord zone and which initially had a strict patriotic line. Upon establishing contact with *Combat*, it very soon evolved into a new geopolitical conception of the world, inspired

by the United Nations Charter. Given that there are no distant countries anymore and that the policy of each country is “destined to be dominated by external matters”, it called for more “open” societies and the creation of “a collection of federations”. This presupposes a renouncing of the cult of the “absolute sovereignty of each State”, he proclaimed in September 1943: “No federalism, no living, active, and powerful League of Nations will be possible if the States that form it will not surrender even the smallest part of their sovereignty”.<sup>192</sup> A movement influenced by Communist positions, such as *Libération-Sud*, showed a real difference: its “fight against Germany” is connected to its “struggle for national insurrection” (*Libération*, October 30, 1943) and its desire for France to find “a choice place at the table of the victors” (July 1941). However, like *Combat*, and even though its Europeanism was clearly less strident, it too intended to move away from the “lazy solutions of the past” to promote “the limitation of national sovereignty” and the “federation of nations” (*Libération*, January 10, 1943).<sup>193</sup> In July 1943, the socialist newspaper *Le Populaire* expressed its rejection of the perspective of a “carve-up of Europe” among two or three great powers; it expressed the view that “all nations, even the largest nations, must abandon an important part of their sovereignty”.<sup>194</sup>

192 *Les Cahiers de Défense de la France* (J.-D. Jurgensen), in M. Granet, *Le Journal...*, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

193 Cited by L. Douzou, *La désobéissance...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-291, p. 300.

194 Cited by H. Michel and B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, *Les idées politiques et sociales...*, *op. cit.*, p. 390.



## Winning the peace: With or without Germany?

Resistance movements could not be content with winning the war: they also had to “win the peace” and work on what was to happen after the war. “Peace is also a struggle!” This was the conclusion reached at the *Combat* congress, which was held in Algiers on April 2, 1944 and which led to “The Revolutionary Charter of Free Men”. The political dimension of the movement was thus affirmed. Its legitimacy acquired as an underground movement due to the sacrifice of its members meant it had a duty to play a role in the “profound change in morals and institutions”. Victory was not an end in itself: it was a means. This Charter was a real programme of governance. Regarding France in the world, the delegates agreed to take an important step towards federalism. Noting the consequences of the war, *Combat* believed it would have been good to “accelerate the march of the world towards unity”. This presupposed that governments would come together to overcome “pride and egotism” and learn to share major decisions. To arrive at this point, it would be advisable to have another look at the sacrosanct principle of “sovereignty”, a principle that is largely “illusory”: “That France, after having regained its sovereignty, should declare itself ready to limit its sovereignty in order to join an international organisation.” This was the stumbling point with the policy of General de Gaulle.

It is one thing to win the peace, but how? How to design the new Europe? The answers are political, and crystallise different views of the world at the front of the Resistance.

With regards to Russia, de Gaulle and the internal Resistance were in agreement: the peace had to have the agreement of the soon-to-be victorious nations, irrespective of their political regime.<sup>195</sup> To de Gaulle, this was to contain Germany. A long time later, Frenay would sum up

195 Jean Gauvain (Jean Laloy), “La Russie et l’Europe”, *Bulletin des MUR*, no. 45 (late 1943, early 1944). Private collection of Jean-Marie Soutou.

the position of the head of the *Comité français de la Libération nationale* (CFLN) with regards to post-war Europe very well: “To de Gaulle, Europe did not appear to be necessary in itself, but as an effective instrument of protection against Germany and whose first act was to cut off part of its territory. Thus, a few months after Liberation, it still appeared to him that even after its defeat, Germany would remain the enemy.”<sup>196</sup> *Combat*, however, was of the view that Germany should be reintegrated once it had completed its punishment. In London, Frenay had told de Gaulle that this could be done by subscribing to the perspective of “a peace of justice and generosity”. For him, the new Europe did not *a priori* have to exclude Germany or Russia: “We do not want a League of Nations that loses itself in discourse, of peoples ostracized from humanity. We do not conceive a Europe without Germany and Russia”.<sup>197</sup>

For the *Combat* movement, the equation of the future was as follows: peace required the reintegration and normalisation of Germany; the precondition is the creation of a European federation, and this federation had to be designed on resolutely socialist political foundations. An article from late 1943 provides a perfect summary of this peak design compared with all other movements:

If there is a need to control Germany in the future, what should be done to ensure acceptance of this control? Have all European nations abandon some of their national sovereignty to the European Federation. In the middle of the 20th century, we do not believe in the resurrection of fragmented Germanies modelled on the Treaty of Westphalia or the idyllic restoration of the powerless Weimar Republic. A federated and socialist Europe will include a socialist Germany.<sup>198</sup>

*Combat* disassociated Germany from Nazism and totalitarianism (an expression the use of which would multiply from 1943 onwards)

196 H. Frenay, “De Gaulle et la Résistance”, in *Preuves*, no. 70, December 1958, p. 84.

197 H. Frenay, *Combat*, Algiers, March 1944.

198 Cited by P.-H. Teitgen, *Faites entrer...*, *op. cit.*, p. 475. Teitgen adds: “Wasn’t this already the idea of the Schumann Plan?”.

very early on. It was also convinced that the heroism of the Russian people would lead the USSR towards a policy of rapprochement with western Europe; it sincerely believed that Germany could be reborn different as a result of the redeeming pains she was going through: “Today (March 1944), it seems to us that the cruel suffering of the German people would be the only chance to impress the horror of war on this tragic nation. However, we don’t want the life of every German to be an ordeal”.<sup>199</sup> This trust in Germany has distant roots: Frenay’s encounters with the German anti-fascists who Berty Albrecht helped within the framework of the Human Rights League before the war. *Combat* was one of the few Resistance newspapers to welcome German Resistance fighters: “We do not forget that the German Resistance was the first Resistance to stand up, the first to be martyred; we do not forget Dachau or the many German socialist, Catholic, and Communist activists who disappeared without trace”.<sup>200</sup>

To de Gaulle, Hitlerism appeared as an untimely avatar of pan-Germanism, and this seemed to have to be consubstantial with Germany. At the Consultative Assembly of Algiers held on March 18, 1944, he explained that the sole cause of the evils of Europe was “the frenzied power of Prussianised Germanism”.<sup>201</sup> Was this view a majority view among Resistance fighters and public opinion? It is hard to tell. But what is certain is that “the idea of Europe was part of the *Zeitgeist*”.<sup>202</sup> In enlightened circles in France and elsewhere, there was a pro-European effervescence. The line embodied by Frenay and his movement was not isolated: with some nuances, other commissioners of the CFLN adopted theses that resembled that of Frenay and his movement (Jean Monnet, André Philip, François de Menthon, René

199 *Combat*, March 1944. In his report dated May 27, 1943, the head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Ernest Kaltenbrunner, noted that Frenay did not want “all German people to bear the whole burden of defeat for a number of years, as had been the case in 1918. The punishment meted out had to be brutal but short-lived, and target only the Nazis responsible... German unity had to be based on European unity.” Cited by M. Granet and H. Michel, *Combat. Histoire d’un mouvement de résistance de juillet 1940 à juillet 1943*, Paris, PUF, 1957, p. 321.

200 Cited by P.-H. Teitgen, *Faites entrer... op. cit.*, p. 475.

201 Cited in *La France sera la France. Ce que veut Charles de Gaulle*, Paris, RPF, 1951, p. 253.

202 Pierre Du Bois, “Le mouvement européen au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale”, *Relations Internationales*, no. 48, winter 1986, p. 410.

Capitant, and René Plevin). His book, *Demain la Paix. Esquisse d’un ordre international* (Plon, Paris, 1945), written with Emmanuel Monick, Michel Debré (alias Jacquier-Bruère, his Resistance pseudonym), a future Gaullist sovereignist, contains the shock formula: “Today, in order to live, a nation must be dependent”.<sup>203</sup> For these authors, “from now on, in order to live, nations must abandon part of their sovereignty and abide by the harsh law of the union.” While in German captivity, Léon Blum, writing *À l’échelle humaine*, also fuelled fear of a policy of revenge against Germany: “One does not destroy a people, a language, a tradition, a legend”. It was through a “peaceful and secure status for Europe” that “the German nation could be incorporated into an international community powerful enough to re-educate it, to discipline it, and, if need be, to master it”. It was Blum to whom Frenay felt closest at the time of Liberation. In *À l’échelle humaine*, the socialist leader imagined the post-war world in terms of relationships of interdependence that would lead to “the national œuvre” being conceived of via integration into “an international organisation”. He called for the creation of “solid” institutions that would allow the emergence of an entirely effective international power”, a condition that had to be met in order to avoid a return to war. The same tone was adopted by the former socialist MP Vincent Auriol, the first president of the Fourth Republic who refused to vote for full powers for Pétain, and went into hiding in the Aveyron mountains after being interned by Vichy and before he joined de Gaulle in London and established the Provisional Consultative Assembly in Algiers. He wrote a book that would appear in 1945: *Hier-Demain*. The writer François Mauriac wanted to believe in the advent of a “federative organisation of Europe and of the world” that would be like “our last earthly experience”.<sup>204</sup> In July 1945, Raymond Aron explained that to come out of it, France herself would first have to reform before she could envisage participating in the construction of a “western Europe (that) would exist by itself and for itself”; the aim was to “return to Europe its sense of

203 Cited by G. Bossuat, *L’Europe des Français, 1943-1959: La IVe République aux sources de l’Europe communautaire*. New edition (online), Paris, Éditions de la Sorbonne, 1997 (generated on April 24, 2020). Available at: <<http://books.openedition.org/psorbonne/708>>. ISBN: 9782859448677. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/books.psorbonne.708>.

204 F. Mauriac, *Le bâillon dénoué*, Paris, Grasset, 1945, p. 258.

unity, but without sacrificing its rich, deeply diverse heritage”.<sup>205</sup> In the immediate post-war period, his “enemy brother”, Jean-Paul Sartre, also appeared to have come round to this idea of a Europe that served as a “vector of regeneration”<sup>206</sup> and a promise of democracy. In *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?* (1948), he defended the idea of a “socialist Europe”, i.e. “a group of states with a democratic and collectivist structure, each of which would, while waiting for something better, relinquish part of its sovereignty for the benefit of the whole”.

In the United States, Jacques Maritain, who was in exile and always suspicious of Gaullist nationalism, wanted the advent of a peace that established “a regime that is fairer and more worthy of man” and which combines “social justice” and “the economic unification of the world”. To do this, he recommended the creation of institutions “that could limit the sovereignty of States”.<sup>207</sup> The end of increasingly “devastating” wars required that “everywhere, the idea of nation must be rigorously separated and purified from the idea of nationalism”. As “the nerve centre of the conscience of Europe” France would have a major role to play in the new geopolitical configurations. In Switzerland, Raymond Silva, a future director of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*, recommended that the winners should not surrender “to the temptations of vengeance”. Peace and vengeance were incompatible. To “save Europe”, “Germany had to be integrated into the community”, economic and financial assistance provided to the victorious countries and vanquished countries, and set out on the path of a freely-consented federalism built “on a common idea”, not on the “primacy of economics”. He did not believe in one “uniform constitution” for all countries that would ignore “national heritage”. He recommended the creation of organic ties (in all areas) that would create real solidarity. This would require, he explains, revealing the approach of the CECA<sup>208</sup>, “the abandonment of a fraction of national

205 R. Aron *L'âge des empires et l'avenir de la France*, Paris, Éd. Défense de la France, 1946, in R. Aron, *Chroniques de guerre*, op. cit., 1990, p. 731.

206 According to Stève Bessac-Vaure, “L'idée européenne...”, art. cit.

207 J. Maritain, *À travers la Victoire*, Paris, Hartmann, 1945, p. 21.

208 CECA: Communauté européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier (European Coal and Steel Community).

sovereignty for the benefit of the community”.<sup>209</sup> In London, Raymond Aron explained that “the nation, in the modern sense of the term, is a historical concept”, and that men have not always “demanded that the homeland be one through culture, as well as through administration”. He welcomed the fact that the thinkers of 1943 willingly subscribed to the thesis of Spengler, according to which “nations do not understand each other”. For Europe, the drama of the war could be “a chance to gradually achieve authentic unity”.<sup>210</sup>

To influence General de Gaulle and his policy, a new division of the French Resistance emerged in Switzerland. In early 1943, the internal Resistance decided to create an underground “embassy” in Switzerland.<sup>211</sup> This embassy would present itself as a delegation of the *Mouvements Unis de Résistance* (MUR) but was a creation of *Combat*, which pulled its strings. By forging ties with other representatives of European resistance movements in Switzerland and forming a network of federalists who were very dynamic in Switzerland at the time, this delegation became the laboratory of the idea of Europe.<sup>212</sup>

209 R. Silva, *Au service de la paix*, op. cit., p. 214, p. 177.

210 R. Aron, “Destin des nationalités”, April 1943; R. Aron, *Chroniques de guerre*, op. cit., p. 619.

211 R. Belot, Gilbert Karpman, *L'Affaire suisse*, op. cit.

212 R. Belot, “Altiero Spinelli e Henri Frenay: due combattenti dell'impossibile richiesta federalista”, in Cinzia Rognoni Vercelli, Paolo G. Fontana, and D. Preda (dir.), *Altiero Spinelli, il federalismo europeo e la resistenza*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2012, pp. 267-302.

## The birth of the first seeds of federalism of the Resistance in Switzerland

Switzerland would be the base from which Frenay and his companions would disseminate their federalist ideas and organise a first European network<sup>213</sup>. The need for a contact in Switzerland was felt by metropolitan Resistance movements and networks (in particular from mid-1942 onwards) that suffered from insufficient resources (both military and financial) and a lack of opportunities to form ties with the outside world. The young lawyer Philippe Monod (who came from an old Geneva family and was a dual French-Swiss national), who then replaced de Bourdet as the head of the *Combat* movement in the Alpes-Maritimes, had a fortuitous meeting in Cannes in early November 1942 with a certain Max Shoop. This American, a member of the OSS, the first unified secret service in the United States, was once his boss at an American law firm where Allen Dulles, who became the head of the OSS for Europe in 1942 (and whose head office was in Berne), also worked. At the end of January 1943, he approached Monod to propose to him “the establishment of a permanent contact in Switzerland and all the help we could ask for”.<sup>214</sup> Monod, accompanied by Bourdet, cited the offer again before Frenay, who, with great enthusiasm, sent him to Berne to conduct reconnaissance in February. With the *Combat* movement growing and maquis beginning to form, needs were growing (weapons, subsistence, underground passages) while the contributions allocated by Jean Moulin were decreasing. On the other hand, Switzerland allowed contact with the outside world. On April 4, 1943, a permanent liaison between the OSS and the Resistance” was established based on the following arrangement: The Resistance would provide military intelligence in exchange for a

213 See: *Visions of Europe in the Resistance. Figures, Projects, Networks, Ideals* (Robert Belot and Daniela Preda eds.), Bruxelles, M.I.E. Peter Lang, Euroclio vol. 112, 2022; Robert Belot, Gilbert Karpman, *L’Affaire suisse*, op. cit.

214 Cl. Bourdet, *L’aventure incertaine*, op. cit., p. 197.

financial contribution, hardware, and broadcasting and communications equipment. Frenay’s young lieutenant, Guillain de Bénouville, was put in charge of Franco-Swiss relations at *Combat*, then in the *Mouvements Unis de la Résistance*, and suggested the retired general René Jules Davet to lead the Delegation. Jean Moulin would never accept this creation (which was necessary), which he saw as unfair competition and a way of getting into the hands of the Americans (who did not support de Gaulle). He would violently attack Frenay, who would accuse Moulin of committing “a crime against the Resistance”.

The above persons “were joined” by the Mouniériste Jean-Marie Soutou, a future secretary-general of Quai d’Orsay, who Frenay met with in Lyon, the capital of the Resistance. While there, Soutou found a friend, the federalist theorist Alexandre Marc. It was through Father Pierre Chaillet that both would play a role in a humanitarian organisation for rescuing Jews established by the abbot Alexandre Glasberg and sponsored by Cardinal Gerlier: *Amitié Chrétienne*. It was the same Father Pierre Chaillet, seconded by Alexandre Marc (a convert to Judaism and future companion in federalism of Resistance member H. Frenay, who clandestinely travelled to Switzerland in December 1942) and Louis Cruvillier (a former *Temps Présent* activist who would also join him in Switzerland in the autumn of 1942<sup>215</sup>), who created *Les Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien* in November 1941, printed on the presses of the newspaper *Combat*.<sup>216</sup> The threats to their activities (Soutou would be arrested) led both of them to seek refuge in Switzerland and to continue their struggle in another form. Marc was part of the humanist movement that seeks a spiritualist “third way” between materialist capitalism and Communism. Both had links to Emmanuel Mounier’s journal *Esprit*, where they met Denis de Rougemont and Albert Béguin. Frenay shared their values, and his struggle was theirs.

215 In Fribourg, where Cruvillier was in hiding, he strived to familiarise himself with *Les Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*. He was in contact with Soutou, Béguin, and the abbot Charles Journet.

216 Letter from H. Frenay to L. Cruvillier, September 17, 1947, cited by R. Bédarida, *Pierre Chaillet*, op. cit., p. 119. See also: H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, op. cit., p. 133. Eyewitness account of Henri Frenay, February, March, and April 1948. AN. 72 AJ 46.




Figure 3: The federalist networks of the European Resistance in Switzerland  
©R.Belot

From April 1943, Soutou in a sense became the press attaché for the delegation. He was put in charge of writing the *Bulletin d'information* for the *Mouvements Unis de Résistance* in Switzerland, a bulletin aimed mainly at the Swiss press agency, Reuter, and United Press. It had a dual mission: to inform the internal Resistance of what was happening overseas, and to portray a reliable image of the captive and reborn France overseas.<sup>217</sup> Soutou stated that his action had “helped him establish the prestige of the Resistance in the world, with most of these articles having been retransmitted by the agencies”.<sup>218</sup> Jean-Marie Soutou secured a number of collaborations, both French and Swiss. He benefitted from the knowledge of two geopolitical experts present on Swiss soil: the Russia specialist and Europeanist Jean Laloy, who he met at *Esprit*, where he signed “Jean Gauvain” (he would later be Deputy Consul-General in Geneva), and Jean Payart, the chargé d'affaires

217 *Bulletin d'information* of the *Mouvements Unis de Résistance* in Switzerland, no. 23 bis, 18/9/43. BNF-Paris, Rés.G.1470 (495).

218 Activity report of the Press Office (undated, no author named, but written by Soutou). Private collection of General Davet.

at the French embassy in Moscow before the war and who at one time had been tipped to become the *Comité français de la Libération nationale* ambassador in Switzerland.<sup>219</sup>

In financial, technical, and political terms, this delegation was very powerful. In particular, it reinforced the *Combat* movement and its leader, Frenay, who wanted to play a major role in the Resistance, but also after Liberation. Indeed, this delegation had a dual mission: a liaison mission and a mission of representation, which clearly gave it a political dimension. “It was only qualified to speak for the French Resistance and, under the terms of the agreement reached with the Allies in Berne, had to analyse any demand that had been sent directly to the Allies by any element of the Resistance in Switzerland without a mission from the External Relations Department”.<sup>220</sup>

This was how the “Swiss affair” was born. Officially, the delegation represented the *Mouvements Unis de Résistance* (MUR) created in January 1943 to bring together the movements in the Sud zone under the leadership of Moulin. It has often been repeated that it was a sudden move by Frenay to seize the MUR. And yet, Emmanuel d’Astier de La Vigerie, the patron of the *Libération-Sud* movement, the second-largest movement in the Sud zone after *Combat*, was kept fully informed of this initiative, since he defended the principle of the same even before Moulin was aware of it.<sup>221</sup> Indeed, as borne out in several telegrams,<sup>222</sup> the steering committee of the *Mouvements Unis de Résistance* was perfectly informed of the manoeuvre, including de Gaulle’s representative in Switzerland. Frenay was of the view that domestic resistance

219 Eyewitness account of J.-M. Soutou to the author, February 8, 2002.

220 The author of this note goes even further, expressing the view that the delegation “is in a way the only valid representation of France.” Note by Barrès (Bénouville), the head of the External Relations Department of the General Delegation of the Resistance on its activities, February 8, 1944. Collection of General Davet.

221 This is how a Briton (unidentified, but part of His Majesty’s Secret Service) described his conversation with “Bernard” (Astier’s pseudonym): “I tackled him on the subject of the Committee of Federated Organisations of French Resistance in Switzerland. He cheerfully admitted the existence of this committee, and explained that its aim was to attract American support. (...)” Note of meeting between AMR and Monsieur Bernard, April, 17, 1943. National Archives, London, HS 6/ 316.

222 Telegram from 2 (Monod) to 3 (Bénouville), April 23, 1943. Collection of the *Mouvements Unis de Résistance* delegation in Switzerland.



movements, born spontaneously outside Free France, must retain a certain level of political and tactical independence, while at the same time rallying to the symbol represented by General de Gaulle.<sup>223</sup> This point of view is held by d'Astier de La Vigerie. Indeed, the “creators” of the Resistance were ready to make an effort towards unity, but reluctant to accept outright subordination; hence the incomprehension that left a lasting mark on the relationship between the internal Resistance and the external Resistance. For the prefect Jean Moulin, this conception was heretical. His ambition was to subordinate movements and bend them to the will and designs of the founder of Free France: hence his hostility towards this initiative: “You are really stabbing de Gaulle in the back.” He also requested that London do everything it could to reduce this delegation to nothing, at the risk of depriving the Resistance of significant resources. Frenay got upset (on April 30, 1943, he said he was ready to “regain full freedom for the *Combat* movement”) and demanded a meeting with General de Gaulle.

This delegation of the Resistance in Switzerland would be a laboratory of ideas for the France of tomorrow and the Europe of the future. How could we put an end to the infernal cycle of conflicts that weakens Europe and disregards its values and its identity? It was for this reason Soutou was given the mission to contact future European elites. In his note on the operation of the general delegation of the Resistance written on February 8, 1944, “Barrès” (Bénouville) emphasised this international liaison mission:

It (the delegation) must endeavour to find the qualified representatives of Resistance movements in Belgium, Holland, Norway, Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain, Greece, Poland, etc. This is an essential point of its mission, as it is important for the Central Committee not only to be kept up to date with events in other occupied countries, but also to deepen the characteristics of

<sup>223</sup> Indeed, on April 15 the newspaper *Combat* published an article by Frenay, “Le peuple a choisi” (“The people have chosen”), in which allegiance to de Gaulle was total. It ends as follows: “Voilà ce que nos alliés ne doivent pas perdre de vue. Entre de Gaulle et Giraud, le peuple a choisi de Gaulle. Telle est sa volonté. (“This is what our allies should not lose sight of. Out of de Gaulle and Giraud, the people have chosen de Gaulle. That is their choice.”)”

the various national Resistance forces and attempt to establish close contact with all Resistance forces. These contacts were difficult to use in London, even when countries had official representation that, of course, could not take into account the political and social aspirations of the Resistance movements. It is not the same for us in neutral territory. In addition to the great benefit of the relationships established henceforth between the various liberation movements, we see the great facilities that resistance movements in border countries can provide to French resistance fighters in charge of the mission who have to cross these countries. In addition to contact with the various Resistance movements in various countries, the DGR (Délégation Générale de la Résistance) must establish contact with official representatives of the USSR at any cost. It would not have escaped the attention of the DGR how important it was for the Central Committee to have contact with Soviet Russia other than through the French Communists. I expect the DGR to establish, as soon as possible, the various contacts I have just listed, and that it provides me for each country with a report that is complete as possible, updated on a regular basis.

The functions of the delegation allowed it to meet the representatives of other countries that shared the European dream. Thus, it was able to meet the Italian anti-fascists Ignazio Silone,<sup>224</sup> Ernesto Rossi, and Altiero Spinelli, founders of the European Federalist Movement and promoters of the federalist cause within the exile community.<sup>225</sup> From August 1942, on behalf of the Italian Socialist Party, Silone published in Zurich the manifest of the Centro Estero, which called for the political unification of Europe and the destruction of the “old reactionary system of national sovereignties”.<sup>226</sup> Soutou also formed an

<sup>224</sup> Frenay would be elected president of the Comité Central of the Comité pour les États-Unis socialistes d'Europe on November 11, 1948, replacing the writer Ignazio Silone, whose term had come to an end.

<sup>225</sup> Historical archives of the European Union, Florence (AHUE), AS, 5. See also: R. Belot, “Altiero Spinelli e Henri Frenay: due combattenti...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>226</sup> I. Silone, “Terzo fronte (tesi sulla guerra e sulla pace)”, cited by Alessandro Bresolin, *Albert Camus: l'unione des différences. Le legs humain et politique d'un homme en révolte*, Lyon, Presse Fédéraliste, 2017, p. 213.

association with Egidio Reale, a journalist and professor of law at the Institut des Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva who had been in exile since 1926, and with Visser't Hooft, a Dutch Protestant pastor, theologian, and Secretary-General of the Provisional Ecumenical Committee of Churches since 1938. It was at the latter that meetings of federalist Resistance fighters would take place, and it would be Soutou who, according to our sources, put the pastor in contact with the Italians.<sup>227</sup>

The Dutch pastor was at the heart of a world Protestant network, linked to the World Council of Churches in Geneva, a network of which the Dulles had been part since before the war. *The Six Pillars of Peace*, a brochure disseminated in the United States in 1943 that provided an outline for the post-Nazi world, was to a large extent indebted to this network.<sup>228</sup> From 1939 onwards, the pastor was committed to ensuring that churches ended their silence, denounced the anti-Christian dimension of Nazism, and made a commitment to help bring about a new international order: hence the obviousness of the OSS/Soutou/Visser't Hooft<sup>229</sup> link. The French hard core would be hard at work from February/March 1943, while Spinelli, Rossi, Bolis, and Uselli arrived in September 1943. The Italian Egidio Reale played an important role providing a connection between refugees. Himself a refugee since the 1920s and a teacher at the Institut des Hautes Études Internationales in Geneva and close to the World Council of Churches, he was a regular informer of the OSS under the pseudonym “Carr Philipps”. It was through him that Rossi met Soutou and Jean Laloy. And it was courtesy of Soutou that the Italian federalists established contact with the pastor Visser't Hooft.<sup>230</sup> It was through Silone and the Swiss journalist François Bondy, in close connection with the French Resistance, that Spinelli established contact with the Swiss socialist and anti-Nazi

227 W.A. Visser't Hooft, *Le temps du rassemblement. Mémoires*, Seuil, 1975, p. 226. Walter Lippens, Wilfried Loth, *Documents on the History of European Integration*, 2 vol., Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1985-1986, pp. 449-450.

228 Anthony C. Arend, *Pursuit a just and durable Peace. John Foster Dulles and International Organization*, New York, Greenwood Press, 1988.

229 Neal. H. Petersen, *From Hitler's Doorstep, op. cit.*, p. 527-529.

230 Willem Visser't Hooft, *Le Temps du rassemblement. Mémoires*, Paris, 1973, p. 226.

René Bertholet<sup>231</sup> and with Dulles. Bertholet, in conjunction with both the OSS and, above all, Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE), was well aware of the existence of Jean Moulin and of Frenay: present in France and in Switzerland at the same time under the cover of the humanitarian organisation “Le Colis Suisse”, in control of one passageway, he sent messages from Moulin and information on the French delegation in Switzerland to London, then to Berne.<sup>232</sup>

An entire informal network was set up in very short order, structured around French and Italian refugees, with the complicity of certain Swiss men of influence who had joined the causes of anti-Nazism and European federalism, and courtesy of the interpersonal skills of Visser't Hooft, who provided the link with the OSS and the Swiss intelligence service.<sup>233</sup> Connections were established with refugees and Resistance fighters of other countries, but this was difficult. It should not be forgotten that this network was an illegal network, since Swiss authorities prohibited refugees from moving about freely and from engaging in political activities. The delegation of the French Resistance, which had a large budget to support the French internal Resistance (in particular the maquis), which relied on a network of complicity with the Swiss intelligence service and allied embassies, which maintained a privileged relationship with the OSS, which managed important passageways, was the sole shadow structure able to play a role in welcoming and federating the underground groups present in Switzerland. It supported these groups by relaying intelligence and disseminating information in their country of origin. One example was a courier service that ran between Lyon and Turin for Italians (“Christ Service”). This mission of “close contact” with European Resistance forces was, to quote a note by written by “Barrès”

231 Before the war, Bertholet was very close to the ISK (Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund), and was still in contact with some of its members during the war. His wife, Hanna Fortmuller, was German and involved in the ISK. Her friend, Hilda Monte, a member of the ISK, also participated in the activities of Europeanist federalists before she was executed by German customs on April 18, 1945. She published *The Unity of Europe* in London in 1943.

232 Jacques Beynac, *Présumé Jean Moulin. Juin 1940-Juin 1943*, Paris, Grasset, 2006, p. 320-324, p. 663.

233 See Christian Rossé, *Guerre secrète en Suisse. 1939-1945*, Paris, Nouveau Monde Éditions, 2015, pp. 368-369.

(Bénouville) in February 1944, “one of the essential points of its mission”. The same is true for the “daily action” of the struggle and for political reasons.

This delegation, which was very engaged in direct action, saw the opportunity to form an alliance with Italian refugees who had a veritable federalist culture and a doctrinal legitimacy that the French did not always have and whose views matched those of Frenay. The political positioning of the delegation was provided by Soutou and Laloy, a French diplomat who was a supporter of the federalist cause, both of whom were linked to the personalist milieu of the pre-war era. They translated federalist texts written in Italian, and sent them to France. Soutou became a member of the *Movimento Federalista Europeo*. Also present at the meetings were Philippe Monod, a friend of Allen Dulles (“Martel”); then, from early 1944 onwards, Jacques Strohl, representing the Resistance in the Nord zone; and “Marcus”<sup>234</sup> (Jean Bloch-Lainé).

In autumn of 1943, all of these networks set themselves a goal: to prepare an international congress of federalists to unveil their conception of the world and of Europe after the war, and publish in Switzerland a “European political journal” that would be published in French, English, and German. This would be the dual objective that would result in regular meetings among refugees and consolidate a European network of federalists: around fifteen people of ten different nationalities. This was the genesis of the totemic Geneva Declaration of July 1944. The two men who provided the impetus for this development were Soutou and Rossi.

The delegation did a remarkable job in such a short space of time to establish a permanent liaison between the Resistance movements of the various occupied countries. “Many of our comrades from the

<sup>234</sup> Jean Bloch-Lainé (alias “Marcus”) was Director-General of the bank Lazard. He was given responsibility for the financial affairs of the general delegation of the Resistance. However, a note by Bénouville indicates that Soutou (“Béraud”) should “combine it with the diplomatic work of the Délégation Générale de la Résistance”. Perhaps it was he who was hiding behind the “M” found in the notes circulating among the federalist exiles (see the questions posed by historians Antonella Braga, Veronika Heyde, and Paolo Caraffini).

Resistance had asked us to put this issue at the forefront of our concerns, and we have never lost sight of it.” Following a preparatory meeting between representatives of six countries (France, Holland, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia), Soutou and his friends formed a “Provisional Office of the Resistance of the Occupied Countries”. It was specified that this office would only become permanent if the principle that gave rise to its creation (i.e. “the creation of a core of the European Resistance”) was approved by the bodies responsible for the Resistance in each country in question. This approval was obtained, demonstrating the existence of a common awareness of the need to reinvent Europe. Jean-Marie Soutou described the process he had set up in January 1944 thus:

We thought the time had come to organise a general meeting of representatives of the various European Resistance forces with whom the Press Office had until that point maintained close but unofficial ties, and to whom it has provided a number of technical services for a year. Our delegation was the oldest and enjoyed more robust immunities than others, so we were able to help them organise themselves. This was how our bulletin became the official bulletin of all the delegations. (...) A first meeting, organised by the Press Office, would be held in late March. To avoid sterile discussions and excessive dispersion, we will propose the joint formulation of a collaborative project by the various Resistance forces for the reorganisation of Europe. This project would be submitted by each delegate to the Resistance movements that they represent and, once any necessary corrections and modifications have been made, it may be the subject of a joint declaration by the European Resistance. If we can think big, it will be the birth of the 5th International in Geneva (the place has been decidedly predestined)!

In fact, it was on the basis of this delegation that the first European meetings of Resistance fighters would be organised around a hard core of exiled federalists. Alexandre Marc, a close associate of Soutou and of Frenay, was highly agitated in Switzerland, bringing about unusual encounters, publishing important books, and imagining the future.

There was the feeling that everything would be possible with the end of a Nazified Europe, that solidarity would go hand-in-hand with freedom. Thus, during the preparation of the collection of selected texts by the Franche-Comté anarchist, for the “Le Cri de France” collection published by the Université de Fribourg, Marc attempted to demonstrate that without realising it, the French Resistance had been a follower of the theories of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as a result of its repugnance towards “partisan survivals”, of its “concrete patriotism”, its type of organisation built “not around an arbitrary centre but around an irreducible multitude of spontaneous centres of intelligence, desire, honour, scattered, isolated, limited, and imperceptible centres at the origin”, of this “need for purity and this desire for intransigence”, and finally, as a result of this unique historical opportunity that the Resistance has created so that “the liberation of nations and the liberation of men can become one and the same liberation”.<sup>235</sup>

Fundamentally, federalist culture is anti-statist and anti-totalitarian. In the archives of the Swiss delegation, I have found an unpublished note (most certainly written in 1944) that describes a conversation in which Soutou had been a participant. The author of the note is of the view that the overt anti-Communism of the delegation’s press attaché could be harmful to the movement. For Soutou, who held positions that were close to those of Frenay, “the Communists were the first collaborationists: not only did they betray their country in 1939, but also in June 1941. They sabotaged the Resistance and prevented the French working class from taking a stand against the occupier”. In the Resistance, they were “latecomers” and benefitted from the fact that “the Germans and Vichy made them play the leading role by calling all patriots Communists”. Maurice Thorez was a deserter. In all countries, the Communists were the “agents of Russia”. This anti-Communism also had a philosophical basis. Soutou and his friends, who had personalist sensitivities, rejected the totalitarianism that encompassed Communism and fascism: “If we go to the philosophical heart of the problems, Communism and fascism have a common basis: both are the product of Hegelianism. Any profound repudiation of

<sup>235</sup> Proudhon, texts chosen by A. Marc, Eglhoff, coll. “Le Cri de la France”, 1945, pp. 44-50.

fascism must lead to a repudiation of Communism.” And considering that Russia was “an imperialist power”, Soutou was of the view that “(Soviet) influence had to be counterbalanced by relying firmly on the English”. This was what the author of the note considered unacceptable. Not everyone in the delegation shared this opinion: in 1943, for example, Jean Gauvain, a diplomat and a friend of Soutou and a preeminent specialist in Russia, thought that one could imagine the possible emergence of a “Russian humanism” as a result of the war: “If Europe is to unite, it wouldn’t be against Russia, however dreadful she may momentarily appear to be, but with her, since the danger lies elsewhere.” He agreed that the “only danger” facing nations was “totalitarianism”. Pierre Guillain de Bénouville, for example, was of the view that the delegation should “establish contacts with official representatives of the USSR”, other than the French Communists.

It was from Switzerland that Soutou forged the ties that would culminate in the Hertenstein meetings in 1946. His federalist positions reflected his original intellectual background, which he rediscovered in part in Switzerland. They were also in line with the messages that Jacques Maritain (a point of reference for Soutou) broadcast on New York radio (these messages were copied in Algiers and broadcast by Soutou from Switzerland) and which pleaded in favour of “the idea of a federation of peoples”.<sup>236</sup> Soutou was in contact with the anti-fascist Italians Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli, who, after launching the first European manifesto (on the island of Ventotene) in June 1941, founded the *Movimento Federalista Europeo* in Milan after the fall of fascism.<sup>237</sup> This movement used its Swiss network to become, in 1944, an effective promoter of the federalist cause within the exile community.<sup>238</sup> Thus was born the Provisional Committee for the European

<sup>236</sup> J. Maritain, a message reproduced in *Quatrième République* (no. 21, April 1, 1944), a weekly publication available in Algiers. See: *L’Europe fédéraliste. De la Résistance à l’unité européenne*, no. 1, September-October 1944. AHUE, AS, 5.

<sup>237</sup> See Cinzia Rognoni Vercelli, *Mario Alberto Rollier. Un valdese federalista*, Milan, Jaca Book, 1991, p. 85-112.

<sup>238</sup> See Bernard Voyenne, *Histoire de l’idée fédéraliste*, t. 3, Préface d’Alexandre Marc, Nice Presses d’Europe, 1981, pp. 200-205.

Federation. This led to the publication, on May 20, 1944, of the first manifesto of the European Resistance, which was a draft of the future *Declaration of July 1944*.<sup>239</sup>

A collective work was at the origin of a first draft, entitled *Déclaration des mouvements de Résistance et de libération européens* (“Declaration of European Resistance and Liberation Movements”). It was prepared by Spinelli from January 1944 onwards, reworked by Rossi, Soutou, and Einaudi, and was the subject of numerous discussions; it would also be the subject of modifications.<sup>240</sup> Hilda Monte and Hanna Fortmuller, Bertholet’s German wife, played an active role, with both pleading for the integration of a democratic Germany in the Europe of the future, believing that the crimes of Nazism could not be blamed on the German people.<sup>241</sup> A first draft text was debated on March 31, 1944. Soutou presented the text.

The central idea is that to avoid “international anarchy” on the continent and the risk of war (in particular border conflicts related to areas with mixed populations) in the future, it would be advisable to “courageously limit the principle of the absolute sovereignty of States, an illusory principle and erroneous in practice and anachronistic to the modern technology of production and transport”. The initial assumption (which was incorrectly presented as obvious) was that this principle would be “dismissed by the conscience of all men oriented towards social and political progress”. The second preliminary consideration was the fear that future victors would envision a security system based on “the permanent exclusivity of military power held in the hands of England, the USSR, and the United States”; such a system could constitute a threat to the “political freedom” of European countries if governments of the United Nations were to provide assistance to “reactionary groups to regain and consolidate their power to defend

239 A. Bresolin, *Albert Camus...*, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

240 AHUE, AS, 4.

241 On the complicated formulation of the Declaration of July 1944, see: Paolo Caraffini, *La contribution française à la Déclaration fédéraliste internationale des mouvements de Résistance*, in “Die Welt war meine Gemeinde” Willem A. Visser’t Hooft. *A Theologian for Europe between Ecumenism and Federalism*, Filippo Maria Giordano, Stefano Dell’Acqua (eds.), Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2014, pp. 189-215.

their privileges in countries that will be freed from Nazi oppression”. Thus, the aim is not to give America a free pass. A “federalist system” in Europe (that respects “absolute political and legal equality” for all peoples<sup>242</sup>) would provide a guarantee against this risk. This first text evoked “the formation of a United States of Europe” that could form part of “a larger organisation” on a global scale.

The geographical limits of the future European Union, and the place of Germany, Great Britain, and the USSR were discussed. The Czechoslovakian representative was hostile to the reintegration of Germany, and pleaded in favour of the USSR. The Italians and the French pleaded the opposite. The Norwegian and Danish representatives were more favourable to a group of states than to a merger: they feared that a “European nationalism” would develop to the detriment of small states, and would have a negative effect on the Americans and their support.

In view of the meeting held in April 1944, the various partners produced texts. The text prepared by the Yugoslavs cited the major characteristics of “European civilisation” (freedom, social justice, peace, and, bizarrely, “the autonomous development of national life”). Mention was made only of “limitations” on the sovereignty of states and of the first stage of the reconstruction process, which involves “the formation of large States”. The German “problem” was highlighted: “Any solution for the issue of the peace and security of European peoples depends on the permanent elimination of the threat of aggression from Germany or from any other State that follows in the footsteps of Nazi Germany after the war.” There is a reference to “reparations”, a cursed word among Europeanists.

On behalf of the French delegation, “Suffren” (Jacques Strohl) proposed a text (“Projet d’unification européenne”) (“Plan for European unification”) that was inspired by the positions of Frenay. It started with an analysis of the failure of the League of Nations and of the plan by Aristide Briand as a cause of the war, but also the absence of a

242 It was pointed out that this union would give the various peoples of Europe “the possibility of unhindered development in accordance with their ethnic, geographic, linguistic, and cultural characteristics.”



“European federation”. It cited other explanatory factors: the opposition of Germany, “the intervention of the USSR” in the internal affairs of Western states, the power of “nationalist circles”, the lack of appetite in Great Britain, and the lack of preparation of “public opinion”. The issue was “political”, it insisted: to avoid exposing Europe to a new conflict. There was to be a “European federation”, which would also be a way to “integrate” Germany and prevent her from becoming “a chancre in the middle of the continent”. A high degree of federalisation requires a serious limitation of “the Wilsonian ideal of the self-determination of nations”. However, he warned that France “would certainly refuse to participate in any agreement that would involve the total submission of its military security, foreign policy, or colonial responsibilities to Great Britain or any other foreign power”; this would be to revert to a new “imperialism”. Like Frenay, he pleaded for the USSR and Great Britain to become stakeholders in this federation and for the formation of “close ties” with the United States.

Unlike the text published in March, the new version made clearer references to European Resistance forces as a source of legitimacy for the federalist option, “given that the resistance to Nazi and fascist oppression that united the peoples of Europe in a single struggle created a solidarity and a community of goals and interests between them”. The word “federation” (rather than the expression “federalist system”) was recognised as the ultimate objective: “Europe must be united in a close Federation”. It points out that European peoples (“represented today by Resistance movements”<sup>243</sup>) do not reject “*a priori* the enlightened leadership of the three great powers”; on the contrary, they are counting on their “friendly collaboration” for the reconstruction of the continent. A subtle nuance is made in the passage concerning the USSR, which is about an “an ever-greater understanding between the European democratic world and the Soviet world” (i.e. the Soviet world is not democratic). What is new is the proclaimed desire that post-war Europe should retain its strategic and political independence: “However, European peoples do not want to see the emergence of a new Holy Alliance, which would tend to maintain the centre of

243 This is a slightly dismissive way of assuming a degree of self-proclaimed legitimacy.

civilisation of the world under its permanent military control.” The purely political dimension is cast to one side in favour of recalling abstract categories: “human rights” versus “barbarism”, the “forces of progress”, the “working classes”.

In an intermediate text dated May 1944, Spinelli recalled that the federal authority should control all heavy industries that could serve as the basis for German rearmament, and that it should create the conditions to “prevent the education of the German people from being based on racist, militarist, and totalitarian ideals, even in disguise”. One annex reads: “The peace that will emerge from this war must be based on justice and progress, not on revenge and reaction.”

These humanist exiles were occupied with one particular question (“What are we going to do about Germany?”), a question that very shortly thereafter would become “What are we going to do with Germany?”, explained Soutou. He said he had been influenced by “the extraordinary articles written by Maritain just after the declaration of war, in which he said that we had to avoid the Jacobin approach, avoid repeating the errors made at Versailles, and seek out with Germany, which for centuries has been at the centre of our contradictions, cooperation that could only be a wise measure of political integration”. He recalled a proposal Maritain had put to Mounier, set out in a letter dated September 30, 1939, which he made his own: “While, in accordance with its true meaning, the federal idea is also given as valid for the whole of Europe and as encompassing shared reductions in sovereignty and common goodwill for all of the States that comprise it, it assumes quite a different meaning for the German people. We must abandon the idea of imposing on Germany a punishing fragmentation perpetuated by foreign coercion, ignoring the progress of history in the process, as if that were achievable today, as if economic conditions had not made peoples strictly dependent on each other in a living space that is the world”. Soutou, who made known his sharp divergence from the positions held by de Gaulle, made the following comment: “There, it very soon dawned on me that French policy towards Germany in 1945 was completely aberrant, not only in its fragmentation but also in terms of what one was to think when we

saw the General proposing the detachment of the whole of the Ruhr with a Soviet presence, without the Americans. I will oppose all of this throughout my career”.<sup>244</sup>

The discussions of the Provisional Committee for the European Federation led to the publication of what it was agreed would be called the *Déclaration des Résistances européennes* (Declaration of European Resistance Movements), considered the “first truly European manifesto” of the war, in Geneva on July 7, 1944.<sup>245</sup> This name does not appear in the original text. In fact, according to the authors of the text, it was the “first call for coordination” and for the “first effective act of the European federalist movement”.

One last text was finalised at the meeting held on May 20, 1944. This meeting saw the announcement of the creation of a “centralisation body” to achieve these objectives and to organise “a first European federalist congress of parties, movements, and organisations that accepted and were sympathetic to the federalist point of view”. It was an “assembly centre”, warned the participants, not a party. The common demand: to consider “democratic methods as the foundation of European civilisation”.<sup>246</sup> This would be the Provisional Committee for the European Federation.

From the end of May 1944 onwards, the draft Declaration was sent beyond Swiss borders; it was found in underground Italian and French publications. The idea was to obtain a guarantee from emerging political forces in order to increase representativeness. In these troubled times, in which the struggle for power was divisive (in particular as a result of the non-unitary strategy of the Communists), this was an unrealistic project. The Italians sent the text to the National

244 J.-M. Soutou, *Un diplomate engagé. Mémoires 1939-1979*, Éditions de Fallois, 2011, pp. 47-48.

245 The declaration was reproduced in an almost contemporary manner in *Centre d'action pour la fédération européenne, L'Europe de demain*, Neuchâtel, Éditions de la Baconnière, 1945. See G. Bossuat, *L'Europe des Français*, op. cit., p. 27. See also J.-P. Gouzy, *Les Pionniers de l'Europe communautaire*, Centre de Recherches Européennes, Lausanne, 1968, p. 24.

246 AHUE, ER, 5.

Liberation Committee, while the French sent the draft Declaration to the CNR (Conseil National de la Résistance), which was dominated by Communists.

In the archives of General Davet, I have found the transmission letter, dated June 7, 1944. Jean-Marie Soutou announced it thus: “Draft Joint Declaration of the National Resistance Councils of France, Holland, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia”. This text only mentions the final struggle that would lead to “the total crushing of Hitler’s Germany” and the “liberation of Europe”, and the commitment of “delegates of European Resistance movements” to collaborate to “build the peace”.

There was also a “preliminary draft” and a “letter from the Provisional Office”. On the other hand, I was not able to determine the reaction of the CNR. Knowing that the delegation of the French Resistance in Switzerland had come in for strong criticism within Resistance circles (Gaullists and Communists), one can imagine that it was not warmly welcomed. Driven by his Europeanist passion and the caution of Frenay, Soutou, carried by a consummate sense of self-fulfilling prophecy, committed an obvious abuse of representativeness (unlike the Italians, who worked with political parties and Resistance groups). However, he was too sharp not to understand the limits of the exercise and foresee the possible hostility of its recipients. As at that date, Frenay was not at the CNR but in Algiers. It was very risky business. Here is the unpublished letter:

The question of a permanent link between the Resistance movements of the various occupied countries is a long-standing issue, and there is no point in emphasising the benefits it could bring both in terms of morale and joint action within bodies of this type. Many of our comrades from the Resistance had asked us to put this issue at the forefront of our concerns, and we have never lost sight of it. We are happy to inform the Conseil National that a first result has just been obtained. Following a preparatory meeting between representatives of the six countries referred to above, a decision has been made to open a Provisional Office of the Resistance of the Occupied

Countries. This provisional office will only be effective if the principle that gave rise to its creation, i.e. the creation of a core of the European Resistance, is approved by the bodies responsible for the Resistance in each of the countries in question. Until we can secure such approval, the Provisional Committee will be no more than the meeting of private persons whose deliberations will not be binding on anyone and who, after exchanging their views, would confine themselves to reporting on these deliberations to the movements of which they are part.

He concludes by stating that only the “governing bodies of the Resistance” will have the power to reserve follow-up to the project. The absence of any sign of a reaction from the Conseil national de la Résistance would suggest that the “leaders” were indifferent to this project. In its public statements, the CNR never mentioned this case, and forgot the European issue. This can be pretty much explained by the Communist hegemony with the CNR following the disappearance of Jean Moulin, but also by the fact that the CNR (and this was why it came in for strong criticism from Frenay) stems from a desire to reconstitute political parties (which he calls “whitewashed tombs”).<sup>247</sup> Unlike the Italian Resistance, the French Resistance was a prisoner of national tropism and political issues, of which the National Liberation Movement would be a victim.

In a note written on July 8, 1944, Soutou announced that the Declaration would be preceded by the famous introit:

A number of activists in the Resistance movements of Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Holland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and the representative of a group of German anti-Nazi activists, met in a city in Europe on March 31, April 29, May 20, and July 6-7. They prepared the draft declaration below, which they submitted for discussion by, and the approval of, their respective movements and European

<sup>247</sup> See René Hostache, *Le général de Gaulle, Jean Moulin et la création du CNR*, Paris, Éd. La Bruyère, 1989.

resistance movements as a whole. They considered it appropriate to make it known henceforth to the international public, subject to its final publication as soon as it has been accepted by the movements, groups, and parties to which it will have been submitted.

In the letter, he states that the Declaration would be “published” “on Friday evening”, i.e. July 14, the French national holiday. Was this intentional? But it was the newspaper of the *Movimento Federalista Europeo*, *L'Unità Europea*. *Voce del Movimento Federalista Europeo*, that would publish it first, in its issue number 5 (July-August 1944).<sup>248</sup> *L'Unità Europea* cited the first congress of the *Combat* movement, which was held in Algiers in March 1944. The speech of Henri Frenay was cited, in particular the following passage, which was a nod to what was happening in Switzerland: “I know from an abundance of evidence that in every country of occupied Europe, the men of the Resistance have a desire and hopes that strangely concur with ours” and to launch “an appeal to all men of the European Resistance”, who would be “the first link in the chain that would unite free people tomorrow”. Other newspapers would reproduce the text, e.g. *Le Peuple* (a daily newspaper for French-speaking workers) on September 1, 1944.

In Geneva, no fewer than five underground meetings were held (March 31, April 29, May 20, and July 6-7, 1944), bringing together French, Danish, Italian, Dutch, Czech, Norwegian, and Yugoslav *Combatants*, and even some German anti-Nazis. These *Combatants* with a single cause promised to help establish a new European order, and to make their voices heard in their respective countries. The starting premise of the various texts drafted with the support of Frenay (which in fact take up the Europeanist themes of the newspaper *Combat*) was the need to be organised for the future protection of freedom and civilisation on the continent of Europe. According to the editors, there was only one way: a “federal union” that must replace “the current

<sup>248</sup> AHUE, ER, 5 and ER 26. See Cinquanta Raffaella, «Partigiani di tutta Europa, unitevi!». *L'ideale dell'Europa unita nelle riviste clandestine della Resistenza italiana*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2020 (Capitolo Primo : « L'Unità Europea e la propaganda del Movimento federalista europeo resistenza e rivoluzione europea », p. 15-51.

anarchy of the 30 sovereign states”, building on the active “solidarity” that “now unites all peoples and all movements fighting Nazi oppression” and which “must not end when this oppression is overcome”.<sup>249</sup> The Declaration sets out a framework for the Federal Union that rests on three pillars:

1. A government accountable not to the governments of the various Member States but to the people, through which it must be able to exercise direct jurisdiction within the limits of its powers;
2. An army placed under the command of this government, excluding any other international army; and
3. A Supreme Court that will adjudicate on all matters relating to the interpretation of the federal constitution and settle disputes between Member States or between states and the federation.

In addition to the reintegration of Germany, this federal European union would allow the resolution of “problems with the demarcation of borders in areas with mixed populations. With these problems resolved, these areas would no longer be the focus of mad nationalist lusts and would become merely questions of territorial demarcation, of pure administrative competence”. The result would be a consolidation of democracy and of the “general order”, and finally progress on welfare due to economic reconstruction and the abolition of national monopolies and autarkies. Everything had to be done to prepare for the future protection of freedom and civilisation on the continent of Europe. “These aims cannot be achieved until the various countries of the world agree to overcome the dogma of the absolute sovereignty of States and become part of a single federal organisation.” Overcoming the “dogma of the absolute sovereignty of States” had been Frenay’s dream and obsession since the start of his European struggle.

249 A number of activists from the Resistance movements of France, Holland, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, “Aux partis, mouvements et groupes de Résistance de...”. Private collection of General Davet.

The deeply-held conviction of these Resistance fighters-turned-revolutionaries (but which was a tragic illusion) was that the struggle against Nazism had created a solidarity that would survive the ordeal of war. Frenay, drawing on his experience in the Resistance, was convinced that the “people” (this would now be described as “civil society”) that had arisen and acted against the institutional framework would make governments understand, and that they would impose their vision of Europe: “The resistance to Nazi oppression that united the peoples of Europe in a single struggle created among them a solidarity and a community of purpose and interests that assume their full significance and scope in the fact that the delegates of European resistance movements had met to draft this declaration, where they intended to express their hopes and intentions as to the fate of civilisation and peace.” The attitude of Frenay and of his friends was the product of what they consider to be a “European resistance” beyond national cultures. It was a wish, but not a general reality: Resistance fighters first fought for their country. Only an elite group had access to this level of knowledge. Their prophetic idealism and the overestimation of their power to influence events and minds had made members of the Centre of Action for the European Federation believe in the creative power of the “people” and in the idea that the war had delegitimised state-national culture. They were waiting for the manifestation of the “Fiat Lux” of a united Europe and the great evening of federalism. The federalist epiphany was to throw the world of yesterday into limbo.

But in the name of what and of whom these men speak? Where did they get their mandate from? Were they representatives of this famous “public opinion” of which they spoke, and which they claimed to have on their side? Spinelli tended to consider these questions superfluous, since, in his opinion, history was made from top to bottom. Frenay was of the same view: the new European elite owed its legitimacy not to elections, but to the bloodshed and risks taken. His belief was stronger than temporary realities. Soutou’s friends were aware of this problem, and circumvented it in a very simplistic and I manner: validation would come after the war, when parties and governments had aligned themselves with the positions of the Declaration:

Given the very conditions of the struggle waged by the various Resistance movements, conditions that meant that a veritable general assembly where this will would be affirmed could not be convened, said activists thought that it would be a good idea to draft a joint declaration to be sent to all countries where possible so that all parties, movements, and resistance groups that have become aware of the need for a close union of European peoples could accede to it. Thus, this declaration, the work of a few people, would become a clear position for the main Resistance movements and solemnly demonstrate their desire to solve the fundamental problem of the peaceful existence of free and civilised peoples.

However, this *ex-post* validation would not relate to the principles, which, for the members of the Centre of Action for the European Federation, were a given and went without saying, but only the “details”: “Detailed discussions may be postponed until the general meeting following the end of hostilities.” European irenicism was at its height, and would fall abruptly with political realities.

The first mission of the Centre of Action for the European Federation was to publish the first collection of documents relating to the European federalism that was a product of the Resistance: *L'Europe fédérale* (September 1944)<sup>250</sup>. An investigation in the Historical Archives of the European Union, in Florence, allowed me to verify that it was through Soutou that Frenay was able to be put in touch with Rossi, Spinelli, and Frenay, but also other figures in the Resistance whose support would be required to implement the strategy of the Italian federalists. In a letter dated October 1944, Soutou informed his “friend” Altiero Spinelli that he was returning from a trip to Paris, where he had met with “the leaders of the main French resistance movements, in particular the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* leadership”. He confirmed that the international programme of the National Liberation Movement (the political grouping created on the initiative of Frenay

250 See Lubor Jilek, “L'idée d'Europe devant la guerre: les exilés et le fédéralisme européen en Suisse, 1938-1945”, in *La Suisse en Europe. Une réflexion pluridisciplinaire*, Institut Universitaire d'Études Européennes, Geneva, September 1992, p. 51.

to organise the political conquest of the Resistance upon Liberation) was largely inspired by “texts that we ourselves have written on European federalism” and suggested to Spinelli that he accompany him on a trip to Paris to “get in touch with my French friends”.<sup>251</sup> In another letter, Spinelli welcomed Soutou's work and congratulated himself on their collaboration:

I have just received your letter dated September 13. In truth, our work has not been in vain. I have seen with pleasure that the CFFE and the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* have made use of it, preparing their texts not only on the basis of our *Declaration of Geneva*, but also on the federalist theories of Milan. Paragraph 3 of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* draft was a recasting (sic) of paragraph 4 of our theories. As it was you who, in our *Bulletin d'information*, introduced our theories to France, I would like to thank you for your intelligent federalist work (sic) done from the moment we met, but also for everything you did even before the formation of the Provisional Federalist Committee to facilitate an agreement between Europeans that went beyond national distinctions.<sup>252</sup>

From autumn of 1944, Spinelli understood that the country best able to launch and structure a movement in favour of Europe was France. On September 19, 1944, he wrote from Switzerland: “I believe that from now on, any development of a truly European movement must have France as its base. This damned Switzerland was too frightened by Hitler, suspicious of new European trends and self-satisfied for something important so to be built there.”

251 Letter from J.-M. Soutou to A. Spinelli, October 23, 1944. AHUE, AS, 5.

252 Letter from A. Spinelli to J.-M. Soutou, September 19, 1944. AHUE, AS, 5.



## Altiero Spinelli, Albert Camus and the fight for a federal Europe

With Frenay's blessing, Soutou and Spinelli disseminated a brochure published by the Provisional Committee for the European Federation (which they had recently established). The first issue (September-October 1944) was called *L'Europe fédéraliste. De la Résistance à l'unité européenne*. (Federalist Europe: From the Resistance to European Unity). This Committee had one overriding ambition: to convince "Europeans of all nations, of all parties who had fought for freedom to create "a European democracy" that alone could guarantee peace. It contained the first federalist manifestos: that of Geneva and that of the CFFE (June 1944).<sup>253</sup> It also contained the international programme of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* directly inspired by Frenay,<sup>254</sup> an open letter from the *Movimento Italiano per la Federazione Europea* to the French Committee for the European Federation, and messages (such as that of Jacques Maritain and Thomas Mann).<sup>255</sup> Soutou and Spinelli intended to coordinate emerging federalist initiatives, whereas Frenay, who was committed to the government, could not speak freely and had the huge issue of the Return to manage.

In his letter to Soutou dated September 19, 1944, Spinelli claimed that it was "our Declaration of Geneva" that had inspired both the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* and the CFFE. And yet, the CFFE programme was dated June 1944 and the *Mouvement de Libération*

253 On the CFFE, see the pioneering study of J.-F. Billion, "Il Comité Français pour la Fédération Européenne: le radici, la fondazione, i contatti", in C. Rognoni Vercelli, Paolo G. Fontana, and D. Preda, *Altiero Spinelli il federalismo europeo...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 237- 266.

254 Frenay was a member of the steering committee and policy office of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*.

255 *L'Europe fédéraliste. De la Résistance à l'unité européenne*, no. 1, September-October 1944. AHUE, AS, 5. The CFFE declaration was also published in a *Cahier de la Fédération européenne* which was published (undated but sometime in early 1945) in Lyon with a view to the meeting in Paris with the draft Geneva Declaration dated July 1944, the *Movimento italiano per la Federazione europea* theories of Milan of August 1943, and three other texts, AHUE, W. Lippens archive, WL-350.

*nationale* programme certainly from the summer of 1944. Spinelli must have been referring to the manifesto of the European Resistance of May 1944. The only way to resolve this contradiction would be to consider that from the time of the first "official" meeting of the friends of Soutou in Geneva, i.e. March 1944, a text was able to circulate and lead to Lyon or Paris. The Resistance delegation in Switzerland had a very well-developed courier system: it would be best to refer to the first issue of *L'Europe fédéraliste*, designed by Soutou and dated, if memory serves, "September-October 1944". See how Soutou presented the manifesto of the CFFE:

In France in particular, the draft Declaration (developed in Switzerland, *nda.*) won the support of many movements that, in the manifestos, posters, and leaflets that they distribute, showed that they were resolute supporters of European federalism. Upon receipt of the draft Declaration from the Provisional Committee, a number of activists from French Resistance movements created the *Comité Français pour la Fédération européenne* (CFFE), which published the declaration below.

And yet, this declaration is dated "June 1944". Soutou claimed an anteriority of sorts; *idem* *Mouvement de Libération nationale*. Yet in *L'Europe fédéraliste*, the editor wrote:

As with the CFFE declaration, the relationship between the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* program and the draft Declaration of the Provisional Committee is clear. The reader will be easily convinced of this: the persons who drafted the CFFE declaration and *Mouvement de Libération nationale* programme adopted most of the important formulae drafted by the Provisional Committee.

In fact, the same ideas circulated thanks to the action of Frenay and his friends. For example, the phrase "The European Federation is not opposed to the progressive elements of nations" is exactly the same phrase as one contained in the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* programme. One common point: the advent of socialism to achieve

social justice; make Europe so that “it ceases to be the powder keg of humanity”;<sup>256</sup> “avoid any return of the “brown plague”, sustainably install democracy and “civilisation”; and deprive any country of the temptation to establish its hegemony over other countries. Another common point is the difficulty in defining concrete means to achieve this gigantic ambition.

The Provisional Federalist Committee, which was formed in Switzerland, did not intend to let the nascent federalist forces disperse in France. On September 20, 1944, it wrote the *Comité Français pour la Fédération européenne* and the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* an “open letter” to propose that they work together, but always claiming authorship of the movement: “We are extremely happy reading the CFFE declaration and seeing that in the first paragraph of the draft *Mouvement de Libération nationale* programme you have appropriated our declaration on the need for a democratic federal European union, the first step towards a world federation.<sup>257</sup> We are also happy to attach to this letter the “draft Declaration”, which was not dated March or July 1944, but May 20, 1944. It was this draft (the manifesto of the European Resistance) that must have circulated in France and fed the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* and the CFFE. The message: “We will not be able to achieve it (a federal Europe) unless we combine our efforts with yours. Therefore, we formally propose that we establish, as soon as possible, direct relations and an understanding between us to jointly prepare a first congress of European federalist forces around which all the progressive movements of the continent will come together.”

Soutou and Frenay allowed Spinelli to establish a network in France. The Italian federalist was a smuggler. On January 15, 1945, he was in Lyon, where he was meeting with André Ferrat, a close associate of Camus whom he had met in Algiers;<sup>258</sup> this was how he came to be at

256 Open letter from the Movimento Federalista Europeo to the French Committee for the European Federation, August 1944. AHUE, AS-5.

257 Open letter to the French Committee for the European Federation and to the National Liberation Movement of the Provisional Federalist Committee (Switzerland), September 20, 1944. AHUE, AS-5.

258 A. Bresolin, *Albert Camus...*, op. cit., p. 222.

the first federalist conference in Paris in March 1945. Spinelli trusts that the process of federalisation could only start in France. He was very active to participate in the first international conference of European federalists in order, as he wrote in a letter to Camus, “to attempt to lift Europe out of the abyss into which it had fallen and put it back on the path of civilisation”.<sup>259</sup> The coordination effort was effective: an International Committee for the European Federation was established during this conference.

Paris became the heart of this federalist spirit. From March 22 to 25, 1945, two months before the capitulation of the Third Reich, the first international conference of European federalists was held there, on the initiative of the *Comité Français pour la Fédération européenne* (CFFE). This committee was now under the influence of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* and men from *Combat*. The members of the CFFE steering committee were: Pascal Pia (the director of the newspaper *Combat*); Albert Camus (editor of *Combat*); Jacques Baumel (former member of the *Combat* movement, Secretary-General of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*); André Ferrat (director of *Lyon-Libre*<sup>260</sup>); Yvon Morandat (director of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* and journalist, future member of the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance*); Pierre M (member of the executive committee of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*), and Gilbert Zacsas (representative of *Libérer et Fédérer*). However, Frenay did not attend (we assume because of his obligation to secrecy as a minister); nor did his close associates (Bourdet, Soutou, Bénouville, etc.). At this conference, the Parti socialiste was represented by Daniel Mayer. Maurice Guérin<sup>261</sup> was the moderator.

259 Letter from A. Spinelli to A. Camus, March 11, 1945, AHUE, AS-7.

260 *Lyon-Libre* was a regional evening daily established by the Mouvement de Libération nationale in August 1945. Ferrat was the director of the newspaper until early 1946. Ferrat was a member of the Mouvement de Libération nationale steering committee, and an activist within the Rhône federation of the SFIO.

261 M. Guérin had an MRP focus, and was a member of the Resistance in *Combat*. The head of the CFTC union in the Rhône, he was chairman of the Christian Action Coordination Committee (1944) and attended this conference as a delegate of the Provisional Consultative Assembly.

It wanted to be “the first rallying point of democratic and socialist forces for common federalist action”. The *Appel du Comité international pour la Fédération Européenne* (CIFE, not to be confused with the CIFE later founded after the war by A. Marc), which was launched on this occasion, was a demarcation of sorts of the Geneva Declaration. Pending the advent of the United Nations, Europe had to stop being “torn apart by perpetual antagonisms” and be a “guarantee after the unleashing of mistrust and hatred provoked by war”. The peoples of Europe want “self-determination” and to rebuild “free national communities” based on a true “European democracy”. If “the fatal dogma whereby the national State is the supreme form of political organisation of humanity were to triumph”, this would clear the way for the “fragmentation of Europe” and the “rebirth of nationalist rivalries”. It was reminiscent of Frenay and his articles in *Combat*, in which he says that States must freely and by common consent waive “part of their sovereignty” to “a European Federation, which alone would be able to confront and resolve problems that are of major interest to the whole of Europe, such as those relating to post-war reconstruction, currency, customs, the management of large industrial complexes of international importance, the demarcation of borders in areas with mixed populations, the control of Germany and of its democratisation, and finally, the protection of the fundamental liberties of European citizens.”

In his address,<sup>262</sup> Ferrat held as fundamental the criterion of democratic legitimacy that the Federation had to meet. To do this, the Federation would have to have “a chamber of representatives elected directly by the people. This was of major importance: there would never be a federation, nothing would be done in the way of the abolition of sovereign States, if the higher body was made up of delegates of these States”. There was, already, the fear of technocracy. Ferrat, referencing what had happened in America 150 years earlier, said that states would not be represented as countries: we must imagine a “vertical organisation according to major political, religious, and cultural trends”. This is exactly what the current European Parliament looks

262 The address given by Ferrat can be found in the dossier “Congrès pour la Fédération européenne”, March 1945. Archives of OURS (Office universitaire de recherche socialiste), Paris.

like. Next to this chamber, a “supreme tribunal” would be elected to resolve disputes between states and between citizens and states, and to “ensure the rights of European citizens”. Similarly, the heads of the European army would be appointed by the federal government, not by the states, and this army would be an “international amalgam”, not the coming-together of national contingents. It would have a specific budget, financed with the proceeds of a special tax. Ferrat made the point that national states would continue to exist, as would “the Nation”, which “would still have to continue to exist”. This is an important point, as Ferrat and his friends wanted to disassociate themselves from the radical abolitionists of the concept of the nation:

For us, it is not some type of utopia of abolition of nations, which are something historical and real; rather, the aim is to ensure that national governments that have relinquished an essential part of their sovereign attributes to the federal government can simply apply what remains of their government attributes in a whole series of areas.

Under these conditions, there was nothing “utopian” about this project, warns Ferrat. The United States showed that this was possible, even though the union of 13 states has been called utopian.

To demonstrate the realism of the project Ferrat emphasised its economic dimension, the very condition for the rebirth of Europe. It had to rationalise and eliminate the source of economic rivalries.

In fact, the aim is to create a new rational economy at a time when the destruction of war and the need to repair the ruins of Europe meant that we had to build it; it is a question of knowing if we are going to rebuild Europe in these old cells, if we are going to rebuild this economy, which had long been an autarchic economy operating as a loss and in which agriculture was predominant, or if we are going to build a rational economy on a European level.

The sources of endemic conflicts in Europe would be eliminated by removing internal borders: “There would be no more oppression of national minorities”. This point had been highlighted by Frenay in his thesis written at the Centre for European Studies in Strasbourg.

This federalist project reflected a feeling widely held in certain circles: that the state was a potential factor in oppression; “statolatry” had given birth to dictatorships, fascism, and Nazism. Therefore, the national state had to become “a mere cog of administration”. According to federalists, this was the condition of democracy and the best way to prevent a return to “barbarism”. As Frenay had done on several occasions in *Combat* and elsewhere, Ferrat agreed to recognise that the federalism of 1945 could only be structured and thought out around what he referred to as “the German problem”; this had been the “central” problem for three of four generations. Therein lay the true meaning of the Europeanism of those who had fought in the Resistance.<sup>263</sup> Ferrat admitted that he agreed with punishing war criminals, destroying the German feudal agrarian and industrial system, disarming and decentralising Germany, and re-educating its people, “but we would not be able to keep Germany in a permanent state of tutelage and enslavement”. Ferrat thought that the annexation of certain areas of German territory (this was Gaullist policy) would only reconstitute “Alsace-Lorraine in reverse”. Frenay was in agreement: a sustainable and viable decentralisation of Germany would be possible if Europe were to federalise. Similarly, the aim was not to destroy the German economy, which had to be integrated into a collective dynamic and, hence, would be channelled and normalised: the new German states should not be separated by customs barriers. For Frenay and his friends, who had fought Nazi Germany, federalism was first conceived as the best way to normalise Germany and ensure peace in Europe; it was for this reason that they rejected any policy of long-term punishment. The fear of the Treaty of Versailles is in the minds of those who wanted to give a chance to a Germany that had transformed into a democracy. The federal approach was the only way to resolve the German problem.

<sup>263</sup> Even though Ferrat did not mention the word “Resistance” in his long address, unlike Frenay.

When Ferrat raised the question of the limits of this European federation, he was thinking of England, which, despite its empire, aimed to integrate the federal approach. He also thought of the USSR. Often, he would come up against the following argument: “Everything you have said, all your great ideas about the European Federation, it’s all very beautiful, you should have started your address with this: Russia is against the organisation of a European federation. Therefore, there is no point in giving addresses or preparing reports as long as Russia is against...” Former Communist Ferrat was sensitive to this argument, but was content to attribute it to the “chauvinists” who had not understood anything about the current world. He tried to get by by explaining that the official position of the USSR could change if said federation was not against its interests. Nothing was said about the anti-democratic nature of the Soviet system; the Red Army had not yet revealed the treatment it would reserve for the countries of eastern Europe. Based on the democratic nature of the future European federation, he assumed that the USSR would not be able to see it as a threat, as if democracy were, by its very nature, peaceful and unable to oppose a totalitarian system. Unfortunately, we had indeed seen this, in the 1930s. To get out of this aporia, Ferrat thought it unlikely that the USSR could belong to the federation, not for ideological or philosophical reasons, as one might expect, but because of the fact that the USSR had a “highly centralised” system: a “structural incompatibility”. This cautious position is understandable if one considers that the Cold War had not yet started, that in France the USSR was seen as the great power most committed to the struggle against Nazism.

That said, Ferrat agreed with Frenay, who wanted Europe to play “an indispensable, highly progressive role of liaison between the Soviet state and the English-speaking states.” French socialists did not yet dare use the expression “third force”, as they remained attached to a conception of history that obeyed “the more general march towards an organisation of the United States of the world”.

However, the Appel wanted to clarify that the aim was not to create a new political party or a new International. The CFFE was presented as an offshoot of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* and a variation of the declaration of July 1944. The shadow of *Combat* and Frenay

hung over this initiative, even though this movement was created in Lyon in June 1944 on the initiative of Franc-Tireur and around the former communist A. Ferrat, who had become a socialist; Ferrat sat on the steering committee of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*. A “manifesto” was circulated; this manifesto developed the idea that it would be “inconceivable to rebuild a prosperous, democratic, and peaceful Europe as an assembly of sovereign states, separated by political and customs borders”. Thus, nation states had to create a European citizenship and “federate and hand their economic, commercial, and military organisation over to the European state”. The formulae chosen were at times rigorously identical to the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* programme, which was not surprising. It should be noted that the Paris conference was hardly international: 37 of the 49 people in attendance were French.<sup>264</sup>

The key figure was Spinelli, a close associate of the Swiss delegation of *Combat* and a friend of Jean-Marie Soutou. Resistance fighter Albert Camus, who had become one of the most prestigious writers of the *Combat* newspaper founded by Frenay,<sup>265</sup> gave his opening address. Camus’ presence was linked to his avant-garde position on Europe and Germany, which intersected with that of Frenay and of Spinelli. The *Combat* of the Liberation, which was very much influenced by Camus, pleased Spinelli as its line (which was also that of Frenay, who could not express his views in such clear terms due to his position as a minister) was based on the idea that France must relinquish its claim to being a major power to become part of an approach of cooperative governance with other European states. On February 9, 1945, for example, Camus pointed out the contradiction “in which a world is entangled between a new international economy and stubbornly nationalist policies” that cling, he would later write, to the “myths of sovereignty”; he called for a “political federation that would prevent peoples from slaughtering each other every twenty years”. This address pleased Spinelli. A few days later, he would write to his Italian friends:

264 The other countries represented were England, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Holland, Germany, Austria, and the United States.

265 Camus participated in meetings of the *Combat* movement courtesy of Pascal Pia.

The pretentious attitude of a great power confronted with the real impotence of France, this attitude, as the newspaper *Combat* had written a few days earlier, resembles that of a person who, having fallen, wants to hide their misery and tragically continue to talk in terms of the superb. This contrast between the policy of de Gaulle and the situation of France meant that several groups and people began to open their eyes to the veritable mission of France in Europe. Thus, the newspaper *Combat* (the most high-brow and bravest of the many newspapers in Paris) adopted a federalist orientation and continued.<sup>266</sup>

A month later, Spinelli revisited this idea. Once again, he acknowledged *Combat*, “the best newspaper in Paris” that was fighting for “France to find its greatness as the promoter of international democracy and of the European Federation, and not to allow herself to be tempted by the mirage of power or the desire to be the instigator of other small powers (Belgium, Holland, etc.) against larger powers”.<sup>267</sup>

It was precisely this position that stirred the hatred of the Communists and the contempt of the Gaullists, who had imagined power and independence. When Spinelli described *Combat* as “brave”, it was to emphasise that this philosophical-political line was not broadly shared in France at the time, either by public opinion or the dominant political parties. This would be the cause of the hostility aroused by Frenay. Spinelli made no mistake: he wrote to Camus, to convince him to participate in the conference in Paris:

The masses are already almost completely organised along the lines of traditional parties and slogans. They include the slogans and arguments of the Motherland, democracy, socialism, and liberty, while the argument of the federation does not resonate with them because it has no sentimental halo associated

266 A. Spinelli, Letter to Mario Alberto Rollier and Valiani, February 23, 1945, in *La rivoluzione federalista – scritti 1944-1947*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1996, p. 187, cited by A. Bresolin, *Albert Camus... op. cit.*, p. 224.

267 A. Spinelli, Letter to Rollier and Valiani, March 15, 1945, in *A. Spinelli, La rivoluzione federalista... op. cit.*, p. 225.



with it. This is not an exciting myth; it is a sober and prosaic question. We must address It those who lead the masses, the political class (to use a term from Italian political science).<sup>268</sup>

However, he was persuaded that “the struggle for the federation, which in the past had been nothing more than propaganda by idealists, could and must now become a concrete political struggle”. The “humanitarian utopia” had to get back in touch with “political reality”. The issue that dominated all others: the opportunity to reinvent “European civilisation”, a civilisation “founded on liberty and justice”. This approach to the problem could not help but win Camus over.

Camus had illegally published three “Letters to a German friend” (in the *Revue Libre* and in the *Cahiers de Libération* in early 1944, then in the newspaper *Libertés*), then a letter to Gallimard at the time of Liberation.<sup>269</sup> There, he developed the idea – dear to Frenay– that Germans had to be dissociated from Nazism and that hatred and justice not be confused in France and Europe, which would soon be liberated. One of the themes addressed at this conference was indeed the call for the inclusion of Germany in a democratic Europe, through the European Federation, to fight against the formation of two antagonistic blocs. The first subject addressed by *La Peste*, as Camus would write to Roland Barthes (and even though “the enemy is not named”) was “the struggle of the European Resistance against Nazism”.<sup>270</sup> The new Europe had to learn the lesson of the agony into which Hitlerism had plunged it.

Frenay had been invited to this first manifestation of federalism, but did not attend. My theory is that as a minister, he had to respect a certain obligation of secrecy. A month earlier, de Gaulle had asked him not to attend the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* congress. In fact, of those invited, he had been the only minister, alongside Robert

268 Letter from A. Spinelli to A. Camus, March 11, 1945, AHUE, AS-7, ASCE.

269 *Cahiers Albert Camus*, vol. 3: *Fragments d'un combat 1938-1940*, Paris, Gallimard, 1978, tome II, pp. 611-657.

270 Letter from A. Camus to Roland Barthes, dated January 11, 1955. The letter was copied in Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi, *La Peste d'Albert Camus*, Paris, Gallimard (Folio), 1991, p. 190.

Lacoste. Vincent Auriol was a delegate to the Consultative Assembly, as were Jacques Baumel, André Philip, Daniel Mayer, and Jacques Rebeyrol. The presence of MLN and CGT representatives was noticed, as were journalists who had evolved in the movement of the *Esprit* journal (including Yvon Morandat, its director) and of the newspaper *Témoignage Chrétien* (André Mandouze).<sup>271</sup> His government, directed by de Gaulle, was not receptive to such European engagement. Far from it.

As proof of this, there was the official *Crimes of Hitler* exhibit held at the Grand Palais (June-July 1945). It was an uncompromising presentation of the worst evils of Nazi policies, including anti-Semitism and deportation. It had an apocalyptic and deadly feel, at a time when Frenay was organising the return of those who had endured the worst. Children were also banned from seeing the exhibit. It showed “German crimes” (despite the fact that the exhibit was called “Crimes of Hitler”. These were not the crimes of one man but of a party and a doctrine, said the organisers by way of justification) and stigmatised “pan-Germanism”. A documentary that is shown as a repeat, *Les camps de la mort*, condemns “German sadism”.<sup>272</sup> This anti-German fixation served to exorcise the French people from their divisions and to reweave the national bond that had been greatly damaged by the Vichy regime and collaboration. This exhibit was part of a desire to depict the French as a community of sufferance. In their monthly summaries, the police observed Germanophobic sentiment among the French when watching the news in cinemas: “Following the news, the French population as a whole would express its hatred of Hitler’s executioners and tended to see the German people as a whole”.<sup>273</sup> Thus, this exhibit was in tune with what the French felt: they saw themselves as patriots or victims. They were not ready to hear words calling for reconciliation with Germany. At the inauguration, on June

271 A second (and final?) *Cahier de la Fédération européenne* was published, this time by the *Comité international pour la Fédération Européenne*, in August 1945, including in particular certain reports presented at the meeting in Paris, AHUE, W. Lippens archive, WL-350.

272 Cited by Cédric Gruat, *Crimes hitlériens. Une exposition-deuil au sortir de la guerre*, éd. Tirésias-Michel Reynaud, 2017, p. 84.

273 Archives of the Paris police, BA 1821. Report dated May 2, 1945. Cited by C. Gruat, *Crimes hitlériens... op. cit.*, p. 64.

10, 1945, Frenay was present, accompanied by Teitgen, the Minister for Information, who gave the inaugural address. Teitgen, a former Resistance fighter of Christian-Democrat culture, slightly distanced himself from the dominant opinion, refusing to cite the collective guilt of the German people: “All those who knew what was happening in these appalling mass graves, all are responsible and must pay”. With regards to Frenay, it is known that he was not very pleased with this exhibit; he had it postponed for a few months. The pretext: to spare the German authorities in the context of the negotiations underway on the repatriation of French deportees. There was also the issue of the content of the exhibit. On March 23, 1945, Teitgen wrote to Frenay: “However, Monsieur Mitterrand, determined both to comply with government directives with discipline and remain consistent with the spirit of initiative of his movement, attempted a new approach with you. Subsequently, he informed me that the project seemed acceptable to you, provided that the part of the exhibit relating to the atrocities committed in Germany was removed”.<sup>274</sup> Thus, the reticence of Frenay, who was already engaged in another approach, was clear. The exhibit was a success: it received 500,000 visitors in two months.

<sup>274</sup> AN, F9 3135. Cited by C. Gruat, *Crimes hitlériens...*, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

## Solutions that are flatteringly radical in appearance, but which are a sham?

In his letter to Camus, as in his correspondence with Frenay, Spinelli demonstrated that he was well aware of the difficulty of the task. The “political class” that had been reborn in Europe tended to forget the lessons of history, settling into the habits of the past: “On the other hand, it must be noted that progressive, socialist, democratic, and liberal forces do not seem to be aware of this urgency. They do not oppose it: they are content to ignore the problem, to let things continue along the path, already fixed and known, of their traditional problem.” The masses were unaware, he lamented. Yet he knew that “the construction of a civilisation could not, under any circumstances, be the work of the spontaneous forces in a society”. He agreed that his view of history could seem “authoritarian”, but was convinced that “constructive strength descends from the heights of humanity; it does not rise from the bottom of valleys”. This was where he differed from Frenay, who believed that a European opinion could be created. But Frenay would also soon come to understand that he could not develop his action with a view to the European Federation within the framework of traditional political life.

The path to success and bringing the project to fruition was narrower than it seemed. In its letter of August 1944 cited above, the *Movimento Federalista Europeo* (i.e. essentially, Spinelli) had warned the CFFE that the aim was not to create a federalist party, “as it would have no chance of rallying around it sufficient popular forces that would understand the effective priority of European problems over national problems”. This is a lesson from history: Communists and socialists have always called for the founding of an international party, but have always “fallen to the level of national parties”. In renaissance Europe, covered in ruins, questions of internal policy would have priority. Only “a detour” could help overcome this difficulty. Federalists could only act on the flank, in support, influence, as an agency that provides

ideas and projects. Would this be sufficient for federalism to “leave the realm of utopias”? Nothing could be less certain. For his part, Soutou, on behalf of the European Provisional Federalist Committee, did not ignore the fact that the federalist movement had been unable to go beyond the inner circle of “small meetings” and underground newspapers. In his letter dated August 1944, he deplored the fact that the federalist project could not yet be proclaimed “in the name of *Combatants* in the various Resistance forces”. There was an urgent need to prevent the old practices of governance from taking over. “Statesmen have not yet been able to constructively envisage the future of the world and, in particular, the future of Europe.” He went on to say: “And yet, the fate of Europe is of too much interest to all peoples to allow us to continue allowing only diplomats to engage in their traditional and dangerous manoeuvres”.<sup>275</sup> Was it the case, of course, that “all peoples” at this point had a desire for Europe? Clear-eyed, he recognised that the “nebulous and incoherent affirmations” of Europeanists at the time were unsuitable to challenge the politicians grappling with the difficulties of everyday life, and of war. Too optimistic, he thought that only Resistance fighters, as “representatives of various peoples” who had “fought and understood the meaning of the catastrophe of our nationalist civilisation”, could “show the people the path to true progress”.

That was the time to pose the question whether, as Frenay presupposed, the Resistance was united in the face of European demands. Would the Resistance culture predispose it to an awareness of the need to make Europe? Were the people waiting for this revolution? The *Conseil national de la Résistance*, which was supposed to represent the Resistance but to which Frenay was fiercely opposed upon its inception in 1943, bore witness to the reticence towards a Europeanist positioning. A little-known anecdote is worth mentioning to situate the debate. A programmatic text for the post-war period (the “Laffon project”), certainly inspired by André Philip, a friend of Frenay and a colleague in his struggle, was submitted to the National Resistance

<sup>275</sup> Open letter to the CFFE and to the Mouvement de Libération nationale of the Federalist Provisional Committee (Switzerland), September 20, 1944. AHUE, AS-5.

Council<sup>276</sup> in the summer of 1943. The text advocated for an abandonment of sovereignty in order to build an international order that would limit the risk of war:

1. The total destruction of fascist dictatorships, of the spirit and propaganda that feed them, and the harsh punishment of crimes and spoliations are the first conditions of peace. The establishment of peace requires a period of reform and adaptation of defeated states;
2. Once this period is over, there will be a lasting peace only when there is absolute equality among peoples: inequalities and injustices in the treatment of different nations give rise to mistrust, hatred, and armed conflicts.
3. The growing interdependence of states is incompatible with the continued existence of sovereign nations, each master without control of its policy and economy and the sole judge of the advisability of war.
4. The necessary waivers of sovereignty occur voluntarily and simultaneously for the benefit of a superior community of states, and should never be the result of pressure exerted for its benefit by a large nation on a small nation.
5. There is still too much diversity among nations to unite them all by the same ties. In order to be effective, the new international organisation will have two degrees.
6. Neighbouring states in terms of territory or civilisation, and which cannot live on their own resources, will remove the monetary, customs, and military barriers that separate them to form unions.

<sup>276</sup> The messenger was Émile Laffon, or “Lachaux”, chargé de mission at the Commissariat for the Interior, sent by André Philip to organise the libération committees.

7. A universal league, endowed with real powers, will coordinate through comprehensive plans and economic activities to constantly improve the well-being of all communities and suppress crises. It will monitor and control education, propaganda, and armaments, in order to protect civilisation and culture, these common spiritual goods of humanity, from all damage, and to stifle hotbeds of war.
8. France, fully aware of its responsibilities, is prepared to consent to the *waivers of sovereignty* required to bring about the only international order that can guarantee peace in freedom and justice, on the condition that other powerful and not-so-powerful nations agree to grant the same waivers at the same time.<sup>277</sup>

This text, which does not explicitly mention the need to make Europe, would not be adopted, since it did not correspond to the views of most senior dignitaries of the Resistance on the *Conseil national de la Résistance*. Within the *Comité général d'études* itself, the idea of seizing the project of a united Europe does not seem to have aroused overwhelming enthusiasm. During his first participation in a meeting of the *Comité général d'études* in Paris, Émile Laffon recalled this comment by Francisque Gay, a figure in “démocrates-populaires” movement who welcomed guests on Rue Garancière on the premises of the publishing house Bloud-et-Gay:

I arrived first. Mr. Francisque Gay had me read the famous passage in which Bismarck wrote that in the name of Europe alone, he listened because he did not know, he says, of a situation where this word has not been used to conceal the most interesting political thoughts, but who don't openly dares admit! Hitler's European propaganda was in full low.<sup>278</sup>

277 Claire Andrieu, *Le programme commun de la Résistance. Des idées dans la guerre*, Paris, Les Éditions de l'Érudit, 1984, pp. 141-142

278 É. Laffon cited by Diane de Bellescize, *Les Neuf sages de la Résistance. Le Comité général d'études dans la clandestinité*, Paris, Plon, 1979, p. 139.

The notion of abandoning sovereignty was still hardly conceivable. General de Gaulle was not ready for it; nor were the Communists, who would be the first to reject this proposal, which they considered “contrary to the right of nations, a right recognised in the Atlantic Charter and recently won at the cost of so much blood”. The great flights of socialists and federalists on world government (ironically presented by the Communists as “the supreme State”) and the great ideals were, for the Communists, a “chimera”. Their reaction to the *Programme du Parti Socialiste clandestin* (December 11, 1943<sup>279</sup>) illustrates this reticence to abandon the national framework. They laughed at the shortcomings of this programme and the remoteness from reality shown by the people who wrote the programme: “Our friends are way above our mundane concerns. They have incomparably higher aspirations: they are aiming for nothing less than the creation of a United States of Europe and the United States of the world, without stopping, “in the very aftermath of the war.” The Communists ridiculed socialist idealism to show their ability to embody an obsessive patriotism close to reality, which had to form the basis of their legitimacy to govern this country: “For any thoughtful patriot, the essential problem of international relations during the Liberation was maintaining French unity and the restoration of the greatness of France. The SFIO does not pose this problem”.<sup>280</sup> On the vaticinations on freedom and democracy, the *Parti communiste français* first intended to ensure that France could count on “a powerful national army” to secure it freedom, of which SFIO made no mention. It did not share the Socialists' faith in the “English-speaking democracies”, and was offended that the *New York Times* should “proclaim that the United States would be obliged to intervene “to prevent chaos... in the countries of liberated Europe”. To dream of the “United States of the world”, warned the Communists, could favour “financiers who are the authors of plans to enslave the world”. And what about the dream

279 In particular, the following passage: “Drawing on the set of convictions and beliefs that have formed the common fund of humanity since the dawn of our civilisation and which, strengthened by the victory of English-speaking democracies and the Russian people, now traces its way around the world, the Parti socialiste intends to define, as follows, the common programme that it is proposing to the French Resistance.”

280 “Observations of the Parti communiste on the draft of a common programme presented by the Parti socialiste to the Resistance”, April 25, 1944, cited by H. Michel and B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, *Les Idées... op. cit.*, pp. 218-238.

of the “United States of Europe”? The Communists contrasted the reality of the facts: “the problem of Germany”. For the Communists, the belief that one should not deem the German people to have been supportive of Hitlerian policy and that one could be content with moral formulae (along the lines of “you do not extinguish hatred with hatred or violence with violence”) was simplistic; they recalled that they supported the struggle of the German Resistance fighters. The decision to deny the “gravity” of this issue and to act as though the reintegration of Germany into a democratic Europe had been taken for granted was seen by the Communists as a dodge and not a serious way of looking into the future: “To posit in no uncertain terms, as our friends do, that Germany must be incorporated into “an international community powerful enough to re-educate it, discipline it, and, if necessary, bring it under control”, is not to provide a solution to the problem, but rather to dodge it.” The Communists did not wish to immediately dismiss the fact that France was one of the “countries most threatened by German imperialism”, and that it had to adopt “certain external security measures”. The conclusion of the Communists: “...France should not expect too much from the goodwill of others or from universal cooperation” and should “refuse to allow any foreign interference in the decisions of the French in relation to their own fate”, because above all is the need for “the absolute guarantee of its territorial independence”. The rest is literature. The Europeanist proposals of the Socialists fell under the category of “magical incantation”, not under “rational practice”. For the Communists, who were very little inclined towards socialists, “it was the height of political unrealism and imprudence”. This could only compromise the ideal being pursued. “The plan to give up national sovereignty is full of mortal perils for our country”.

It is clear that the dividing line resembles a trench. Frenay, who described himself as a socialist, found himself on the side of the unrealistic “bourgeois”. The animosity of the Communists towards him was also a product of this stance. Before he was stigmatised by them (with the advent of the Cold War) as a figure of the vassalisation of Europe to America, he was classified with his socialist friends in the bourgeois category of followers of “flight in conscientious objection” and supporters of “solutions that appear flatteringly radical but which are a sham”.

## The sovereigntist Gaullo-Communist front splits the Resistance

The Communists would continue to brandish “the supreme State” or “superstate” like a spectre intended to ridicule their adversaries and political rivals tempted by a European and globalist approach. In the *Observations du Parti communiste sur le projet d'un programme commun présenté par le Parti socialiste à la Résistance*, dated April 25, 1944, they declared their loyalty to sovereigntist theories.<sup>281</sup> For them, as it was for General de Gaulle, “the abandonment of national sovereignty would represent a very serious danger, in particular for states that, like France, were not among the powers recognised as leading in the struggle against Hitler, whether rightly or wrongly”.<sup>282</sup> The Communists pleaded for politics based on reality. Rather than preparing to merge into a larger entity, France had to first ensure that it was prepared for “the bitter struggle for markets between some large states emerging from the current war” and to protect its agriculture. Any project for a “superstate” first had to prove how such a system could be compatible with “the interests of French independence and greatness”. The Communists seized on sovereignty to present themselves in the eyes of public opinion as the only credible defenders of the superior interests of France, as the guarantors of patriotism. This position allowed them to teach the Resistance a lesson and to appear as bearers of the heritage of the Resistance and protectors of the sacred memory of “heroes”:

We firmly request that the Resistance say that the independence of France with the restoration of its greatness, a sacred wish of all our heroes, must be the first guiding principle of future foreign policy.

<sup>281</sup> Note that the word “sovereignty” does not appear in the texts and speeches of the time.

<sup>282</sup> Central Committee of the Parti communiste français, “Observations du Parti communiste sur le projet d'un programme commun présenté par le Parti socialiste à la Résistance”, April 25, 1944, cited by H. Michel and B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, *Les Idées politiques et sociales...*, op. cit., p. 237.



In its attempt to monopolise the spirit of the Resistance, the *Parti communiste français* sought to ruin projects for the political reconstruction of France via non-partocratic approaches and to delegitimise a man such as Frenay by lumping him in with non-patriots, or at least those who had abandoned any concern for the “greatness” of France.

The political unity of the Resistance was no more than a dream or myth. National culture resisted the upheaval of the war and plans for political renewal, as demonstrated by the *Programme d'action de la Résistance* (adopted by the *Conseil national de la Résistance* on March 15, 1944), which instructed the provisional government to “defend the political and economic independence of the nation and restore France in its power, greatness, and universal mission”. The body of the Front National said nothing else: “In fact, the whole world wants the rebirth, grandeur, and economic independence of France”.<sup>283</sup> The CNR programme, which has assumed totemic status in the collective imagination, says nothing about the future of Europe and of the world.

In the France of Liberation, the powerful “sovereignist” front of Communists and Gaullists constituted a force opposed to the idealism of the federalists. Contrary to what one might think, the geopolitical approach of the French Communists was quite close to that of Gaullism: it was even more radically nationalist and anti-European. The scene was set in a sent by “Doucet” (Marrane), representative of the *Parti communiste français* to the *Conseil national de la Résistance*, to “Rabaud” (Jacques Bingen), the *Comité français de la Libération nationale* delegate in France, on March 28, 1944. It seems that this letter has not been published.<sup>284</sup> The issue at the time was the participation of the Communists in the government of the *Comité français de la Libération nationale*. But beyond that, it was on the policy of

283 *Bulletin d'information et d'organisation du Front National*, December 1944-January 1945, cited by H. Michel, *Les courants de pensée...*, *op. cit.*, p. 683.

284 Letter from “Doucet” (Marrane), representative of the *Parti communiste français* to the CNR, to “Rabaud” (Jacques Bingen), the CFLN delegate in France, on March 28, 1944. Archives of the Fondation Charles de Gaulle (Paris).

General de Gaulle that Marrane sought explanations. He referred to an address that the General gave to the Consultative Assembly of Algiers on March 18:

But for the renewed Old Continent to be able to find a balance consistent with the conditions of our time, it seems to us that certain groupings will have to be formed there without, of course, the sovereignty of each having to be undermined. As far as France is concerned, we believe that a western grouping of sorts, mainly based on economics and as large as possible, could offer great benefits. It seems that such a grouping enlarged by Africa, in close ties with the east and, in particular, the Arab states of the Middle East who are legitimately seeking to unite their interests — and of which the English Channel, the Rhine, and the Mediterranean would be the arteries — could constitute a capital centre in a world organisation of production, exchanges, and security... The French government is now prepared to undertake all necessary studies and negotiations with the other interested states.

For the Communists, this project was too Western-centric. What would become of Franco-Czech and Franco-Yugoslav ties, asked Marrane? As if it were decisive for French diplomacy! Marrane suspected a risk of “imperial withdrawal”. He compared the General’s speech to a speech given by Paul-Henri Spaak, who had been introduced as the “Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium”. At the time, Spaak was a refugee in London, a member of the Belgian government-in-exile. “Spaak spoke in fairly clear terms of linking his country’s policy to that of Great Britain and forming a dominion of sorts, a proposal that was bound to cause some concern about the future of the grouping of nations, the formation of which had been cited by President de Gaulle.” The Communists soon revived the Anglophobia they had demonstrated in the first months of the occupation in France, in particular when they wanted to resume publication of *L’Humanité* in 1940 in the presence of the Germans and wanted to dissociate themselves from the nascent Gaullism presented as subservient to Anglo-Saxon “capitalism”. We can sense the beginning of Cold War rhetoric and the beginning of a principled hostility towards the United States.

Hence Maranne's reference to a speech by Marshal Smuts, the president of South Africa and one of the founders of the UN. The same Smuts was presented as a danger by the Vichy press. The *Moniteur de Clermont-Ferrand* of March 28, 1944, for example, denounced the plans of the Anglo-Americans for Europe, and still wanted to believe that Germany itself was able to save "Western civilisation", as Gaultier Sauckel had announced in Paris in March 1944, promising that "the new Europe would be built on respect for people themselves and respect for the value of their neighbour". It is also true that de Gaulle had nothing but contempt for Smuts, who had predicted the end of France as a great power. The Communists were well aware that the founder of Free France was the person best-placed to counter "the Rooseveltian thesis of the absence of France".<sup>285</sup> But as if to warn de Gaulle, Maranne recalled the passage from the Smuts's famous speech: "Should we not work closely with these small democracies in western Europe, which, if left to fend for themselves, could one day go to ruin as they are lost today?" It is true that at the time, Europe was in a pitiful situation that was an insult to its rich past and its fallen power. Smuts wondered if European states were going to "follow the beaten path of isolation" or if "they would not be better off helping themselves by helping create a closer union with Great Britain, a great European state not only in terms of its global impact, not only as an empire and Commonwealth spanning every continent, but also great as a power on the continent of Europe itself." For Maranne, the message was clear: The Anglo-Americans wanted a "dominion" status for France. Its mission would be to take the lead in a small Western entente that would put an end to France as a European power". The Communist representative sought clarification from General de Gaulle, and reminded him of this desire to reactivate the "Franco-Russian alliance": "The France that suffers is with the Russia that suffers."

In Paris on April 25, 1944, the Central Committee of the *Parti communiste français* drafted "comments" that condemned the very idea of abandoning national sovereignty (and therefore, the federalist principle). In *L'Humanité* on January 11, 1945, Florimont Bonte published a

285 J.-B. Duroselle, "Le dernier *calvaire* du général de Gaulle en 1944. Les accords de débarquement", *Politique étrangère*, no. 4 - 1982 - Year no. 47. p. 1022.

violently anti-German article. Under the guide of anti-Americanism and anti-capitalism, and in accordance with the Moscow line hostile to the idea of a western European grouping, Florimont Bonte (the man who would sign the letter of the *Parti communiste français* against Frenay in August 1944) stigmatised the plan for a western European union and only espoused the principle of a close alliance with the USSR.<sup>286</sup> In describing it as "inadmissible" to "sometimes hear words of reconciliation being whispered under tearful pleas", he was in fact taking aim at Frenay and his friends. The newspaper *Combat* had this "rule of conduct not to confuse anti-Nazi *Combat* and anti-German nationalism".<sup>287</sup> The last article written by Bourdet before his arrest and deportation was focused on Germany, and in which he wrote: "There will be no Europe without Germany." Bonte contrasted the virtues of "hatred" with this morality of reconciliation: "The duty? The duty was to stir up hatred, hatred of the Boche, hatred for his accomplices, hatred of trusts without a homeland, hatred of the fifth column." His conclusion was a call for "sacred hatred". On January 21, 1945, the Central Committee recorded the government development of the *Parti communiste français*: Maurice Thorez insisted on "the national mission" of the Party. This nationalist campaign succeeded at the PCF. Legislative elections on October 21, 1945 produced a strong surge in support for the *Parti communiste français* (5 million votes and 26.1% of votes cast); at the time, it was the leading political organisation in France. When the Cold War began, it would be seen as vigilance in the face of the dangers weighing on the cultural, political, and economic independence of France. The *Parti communiste* wanted to "save" France by "regrouping national forces around it to defend its threatened independence".<sup>288</sup>

The intellectuals of the *Parti communiste français* would be the docile popularisers of the anti-European thesis. Thus, in a speech delivered within the framework of UNESCO at the Sorbonne on November 28, 1946, the poet Aragon ridiculed "the Europe of subtle people" and

286 P. Guillen, *art. cit.*, p. 168, pp. 157-158.

287 Yves-Marc Ajchenbaum, *À la vie, à la mort. Histoire du journal Combat. 1941-1974*, Paris, Le Monde éditions, 1994, p. 79.

288 G. Soria, *La France va-t-elle devenir...*, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

“European musing” far removed from social realities. For Aragon, “the European spirit does not exist”. For him, Europeanism was permanently marred by the use that Nazism made of it: “So this is what the chatter about Europe is for: chatter that perfectly complements the chatter about man and provides the European mysticism taken up by the LFV<sup>289</sup> and other Waffen SS on the fringes of the philosophy of the Western bloc”.<sup>290</sup> To Aragon, Europeanists were in the camp of the “collabos”, whom he had just mentioned in his speech with the *I am everywhere* process. This level of violence and bad faith, emanating from a great French literary figure, illustrates the strength of the opposition that the European project had aroused in France, the methods of the PCF, and the impunity from which it thought it could benefit. Preferring Europe to nations was a crime for the Communists, who at the time found themselves in a purely nationalist dynamic. There had to be an awareness of this, in order to measure the courage and lucidity of the men who promoted European reconciliation and imagined the future of a united Europe.

Maranne did not have to worry about the General’s vision of France’s place in Europe. In broad terms, Gaullists and Communists were on the same geopolitical wavelength. De Gaulle was not very sensitive to Europeanist projects supported by men such as Marjolin, Frenay, or Monnet. On August 5, 1943, Monnet wrote the General de Gaulle a Note that warned against sovereignism and recommended the formation of a “European entity” with a view to a “common economic unit”.<sup>291</sup> The role of the future Europe, according to de Gaulle, was first and foremost to *contain Germany*, neutralise it, and even to dismember it. This was evidenced by the Rhine State project (October 1944) for separation from Germany (which the Allies would not accept). At the time, 78% of French respondents were favourable to this partition.<sup>292</sup>

289 Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme.

290 L. Aragon, “Les élites contre la culture”, *Les Conférences de l’Unesco*, Paris, Fontaine, 1947, p. 100. Cited by Yves Lavoine, “Aragon et l’UNESCO 1946: le spectre du fascisme”, in Luc Vigier and Mar-yse Vasseviere (dir.), *Recherches croisées Aragon - Elsa Triolet*, no. 14, Presses de l’Université de Strasbourg, 2013, pp. 57-70.

291 G. Bossuat, *Les fondateurs de l’Europe unie*, Belin Sup Histoire, 2001, p. 67.

292 G. Bossuat, *L’Europe des Français. 1943-1959, op. cit.*, p. 76.

Frenay and his friends discovered that de Gaulle remained attached to a vision of the world dominated by outdated “Bainvillian concepts”.<sup>293</sup> In fact, almost all CFLN projects on Europe went towards solutions that cut Germany off at the Ruhr.<sup>294</sup> Charles de Gaulle’s trip to Moscow (December 1944), which had everything to please the French Communists, was part of this logic of prevention with regards to Germany and empowerment in the face of Anglo-Saxon supervision. De Gaulle’s plan was to rely on Stalin to create “a union of anti-German states”. In Moscow, Stalin told the General: “The German people (...) pose a threat first to France and Russia.” The same old Russia was coming together with the same old France against the same old Germany. But Stalin would not support a France that was emerging from the ruins. The Allies would oppose France’s vengeful policy towards Germany. In fact, France would be held on the edge and “its demands would be more and more procedural”, as Jacques Fauvet would later say: “The politics of grandeur are not longer to its measure”.<sup>295</sup> Behind their apparent idealism, the French federalists who had emerged from the Resistance, whose patriotism was considered suspect, had understood this new balance of power resulting from the war before others.

293 H. Frenay, “Les fossoyeurs de la Résistance”, *Octobre*, November 23, 1946.

294 See P. Guillen, “La France libre et le projet de fédération ouest-européenne 1943-1944”, in Michel Dumoulin (dir.), *Plans des temps de guerre pour l’Europe d’après-guerre, 1940-1947*, Minutes of the Brussels symposium, May 12-14, 1993, Brussels, Paris, Milan, Baden-Baden, Bruylant, p. 153-173.

295 Jacques Fauvet, *La IVe République*, Paris, Fayard, 1959, p. 42.

## The “Resistance Party”: A stillborn dream

Frenay fought for a new structure, an intermediary between the Resistance movement and the political party, to emerge. It was intended to transform the internal Resistance into a political project and move towards a united Europe. Frenay had a sentiment that was widely shared by Resistance fighters: contempt for the old political parties that had been conspicuous by their absence in the early days of the Resistance, and which were considered responsible for the defeat. In August 1943, *Les Cahiers politiques*, the underground publication published by the General Study Committee established by Moulin (on the initiative of François de Menthon and with the approval of Frenay), published a study on “The reforms to be made to the political regime in France” after the war. One chapter of this study was entitled “The harmfulness of political parties”. It ended with the following prediction, which would not come to pass: “They are currently shaken, even out of place. Let’s stop them returning to their vomit”.<sup>296</sup> This view was commonplace in the Resistance, where there was a rejection of the politics and policies of the past. In the absence of elections, the Resistance was a self-appointed representative of the people. A draft manifesto of *Ceux de la Résistance* (June 1943) reads as follows: “The Resistance movements see themselves as the natural agents of the will of the French people”.<sup>297</sup> A new elite had to seize the power that had failed to give birth to “a new France”. Thus, Frenay was not alone in thinking that there had to be a change in the political situation, that democracy could be brought to life outside political parties, and that the leaders of the Resistance were bearers of a “revolutionary political expression<sup>298</sup>” that could break free from the practices of pre-war insti-

296 René Hostache, *Le Conseil national de la Résistance. Les institutions de la clandestinité*, Paris, PUF, 1958, p. 53.

297 Cited by M. Granet, *Ceux de la Résistance (1940-1944)*, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 1964, p. 278.

298 R. Hostache, *Le Conseil national...*, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

tutional life. However, the experience of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* (MLN) soon persuaded him to render this “revolutionary mystique”<sup>299</sup> inseparable from the struggle of the Resistance.




Figure 4: The process of unification and politicisation of the non-Communist internal Resistance ©R.Belot

The *Mouvement de Libération nationale* (MLN)<sup>300</sup> brought together movements that had emerged from the *Mouvements Unis de la Résistance* (MUR), i.e. the non-Communist internal Resistance. It was the first Resistance organisation whose aim it was to create a focal point around which French political life was to be recomposed.<sup>301</sup> Its first congress was held in January 1945. The *Mouvement de Libération nationale* had a true international programme<sup>302</sup> inspired by the theories of *Combat*. It was recognised in the values of the Atlantic

299 *Ibid.*, p. 447.

300 Not to be confused with the Mouvement de la Libération nationale of 1941, the first movement created by Frenay before its merger with *Combat*.

301 Éric Duhamel, *L'union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance. 1945-1965*, PhD thesis, Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris-IV), 1993, t. 1, pp. 36-37.

302 AHUE, AS, 7. See also: H. Michel and B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, *Les idées...*, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

Charter, but intended to “fight for the creation of a democratic, European federation open to all peoples of Europe, including England and the USSR”. It had a clearly federalist line, not just a unionist line. For the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*, national states had to “hand over to the common federal state the right to organise the economic and commercial life of Europe; the right to have one army (...); the right to regulate foreign relations; the right to administer the peoples of colonial territories that were not yet ready for independence”. It sought the creation of “European citizenship in addition to national nationality” because it would be the people who would “democratically and directly” elect the government of the federal state. Thus, from the outset there was a desire not to create a Nazi- or Soviet-style Moloch superstate by subjecting it to the censure of “peoples”, on the one hand, and by establishing the principle of subsidiarity on the other. Contrary to a trend that existed among, for example, absolutist federalists à la Andrea Caffi, the libertarian socialist who wanted to “bring down the nation idol as soon as possible, this programme was not “nacionicidal”.<sup>303</sup> Federalists in the Resistance (CFFE, *Mouvement de Libération nationale*) therefore did not call for the end of nations (a process that would be ritually carried out against federalists, even today):

The European Federation is not opposed to the progressive elements of nations. National governments will be subordinate to the federal government when it comes to matters of concern to all federal states. However, national governments will continue to exist and develop with their own particular laws (that do not contradict federal laws) and with administrative, linguistic, and cultural autonomy.

This conception of European federalism was in full alignment with the CFFE declaration published in Lyon in 1944.<sup>304</sup> Entire sentences of it can be found in the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* programme, which shows that the MLN served as an incubator of the first

303 A. Caffi, cited by A. Bresolin, *Albert Camus...*, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

304 CFFE declaration, in Thelos (E. Rossi), *L'Europe de demain*, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1945, pp. 75-78.

substantial and coherent federalist initiatives in France. On the other hand, a particularly divisive point could only arouse opposition from both the Communists and the Gaullists: the question of Germany. The fifth element of the programme made this clear:

Only such a Federation can eradicate the causes of fascism and racism forever, by socialising the large German industrial sector on a European scale, destroying the Junker class and the officer caste, thus allowing the German people to regenerate themselves and participate in European life without being a danger to other peoples.

One can see that Frenay and his friends were not ready to put blind trust in Germany. They intended to cut down the threat of a revival of pan-Germanism at the root. But to admit the idea that the German people had to be able to “regenerate” was to ask public opinion to cross a threshold that was difficult to accept. Rather, it was a hatred of Germany and the Germans that dominated representations of the French. The Communists understood this.

Thus, there was no chance that this programme would be accepted by the Communists. It constituted an insurmountable dividing line.

However, an attempt was made to integrate the other large formation to emerge from the Resistance: The Front National. Its hard core (containing figures such as E. d’Astier de la Vigerie, the founder of *Libération-Sud*, and the scholar F. Joliot-Curie), was communist, but it attracted non-Communist figures to give the appearance of neutrality. In effect, it was a subsidiary of the *Parti communiste français* to extend its influence on the non-Communist Resistance. At the time of its second congress (May 1945), the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* was “in numerical terms the most important French political formation, even bigger than the *Parti communiste français* itself”:<sup>305</sup> it had perhaps 500,000 members. The MLN had a number of newspapers. The leadership of the MLN (Eugène Claudius-Petit, its president;

305 Cl. Bourdet, *L’aventure incertaine*, *op. cit.*, p. 402.



Baumel, the former Secretary-General of the *Mouvements Unis de la Résistance*, Frenay, André Malraux, Francis Leenhardt, Philip, Vianay, etc.) would oppose the attempted merger with the Front National, fearing that it would merge into a vast entity controlled by the *Parti communiste*. It was a violent crisis, but there were substantive questions, and in particular the relationship with Europe, where the incompatibility was clear. To clarify the situation, the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* decided to negotiate with non-Communist Resistance movements (*Libération-Nord*, *OCM*, *Ceux de la Résistance*, *Libérer et Fédérer*) to add them to a new party, which intended to ally itself with the Socialist Party. This party, which was thought up in early June 1945, would be the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance*<sup>306</sup>. The pro-Communist minority (Pascal Copeau, Maurice Degliame, Pierre Hervé, Albert Bayet, Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont, etc.) was excluded. The PCF protested against this formation, which it saw as “a divisive manoeuvre attempted by the steering committee of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* under the leadership of Minister Frenay”, who was driven by a “clear anti-democratic intent”.<sup>307</sup>

To counter the Communist manoeuvre, Frenay had no hesitation in asking General de Gaulle to become the head of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*. On March 1, 1945, he confided in the General:

My General, if this Labour-type rally does not show up, flag unfurled, to national elections, it will have missed its last chance. On the political scene, the place it would otherwise have occupied would be taken up by the old formations, and in particular by the *Parti communiste*. It would be very difficult for the rally to regain this place in the future. There is only one course of action left to ward off this threat: that you yourself call this country to this group and take the lead.<sup>308</sup>

306 É. Duhamel, *L'UDSR ou la genèse de François Mitterrand*, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2007.

307 *L'Année politique*, preface by André Siegfried, Paris, Édition Le Grand Siècle, 1946, p. 229.

308 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, op. cit., p. 506.

Of course, General de Gaulle did not comply with his request. The *Mouvement de Libération nationale* was already the silo of intrigue and twisted shots. But he knew, and Frenay would soon see, that the political transformation of the Resistance was an “illusion”:

No, Frenay, I will not do it. That is not my role. I understand your concerns, and the spectacle of the current wheeling and dealing, both in the Assembly and elsewhere, has done nothing to dispel these concerns. But, believe me, there is only one solution for men like you: to join parties and, from within, animate them, transform them. Everything else is just an illusion.

Frenay thus testified that he was not “anti-Gaullist”, as it has often been said, including among historians. He not only revealed his political immaturity, but also his generosity. It was the triumph of his ideas that mattered to him (French-style labour), not his own personal status. Perhaps there was the tactical idea that de Gaulle could have channelled the Communists. But soon he would understand that Gaullism was incompatible with his federalist ideas. He would also come to see that his dream of the Resistance’s transformation and political survival was doomed to failure.

Accused of being an apprentice dictator, de Gaulle was, on the contrary, the person who would bring together the Resistance, then the French people. He would assist in the process of turning the desire for revolution into adherence to republican principles, which involved a delicate political normalisation of the Resistance. The General would thwart the fear of Pierre Cot, for example, who feared the absence of a political and democratic culture in General de Gaulle. For Cot, politics was “the business of politicians”, not of Resistance fighters or of generals.<sup>309</sup> This applied to de Gaulle but also to the leaders of movements, who would make him their whipping boy. In London, French socialists in exile believed that “being Gaullist was not an end in itself. It is a temporary solution”. Like being a Resistance fighter.

309 P. Cot, *Le procès de la République*, New York, Éd. de la Maison française, 1944.

For the General, turning the Resistance into a political movement or party was inconceivable, as it would have been contrary to the proper functioning of republican institutions: it would have been to install a form of “feudalism” (to use the words of Alban Vistel) at the heart of the state that was contrary to the smooth running of democratic life. It was de Gaulle who was now giving lessons on democracy to those who had accused him of laying the ground for a dictatorship! And yet, he was not alone in thinking this way: The Socialists were the first to point out “the ambiguity of the single party”. Thus, on March 15, 1943, Blum wrote General de Gaulle a long letter to explain to him that “a democratic state (...) cannot live or reasonably be expected to be conceived without the existence of political parties” and that “the outright negation of political parties is equivalent to the negation of democracy”.<sup>310</sup> Raymond Aron, the guardian of the Republican temple, went to war against the idea of a “party of the Resistance”. For him, it was an illusion and a danger; it was better to think about renewing the old internal parties: “Turning *Combat and Libération* into parties is the easy way out, and would probably end in a fiasco. The idea of turning the Resistance into a single party is pure illusion, since there is no political unity among those who, with one heart, had fought for France.”

The political temptation of the Resistance was rejected by both de Gaulle and the traditional political parties. De Gaulle was hostile to the idea that the Resistance should survive on its own: its success should lead to its demise. In the memory of some, with the benefit of the passage of time, there appeared a willingness to understand the inevitable and salutary nature of this eviction. Robert Salmon, a close associate of Frenay, would later write: “De Gaulle did not believe in the Resistance as a political force, due to its heterogeneity. He was right. In the Resistance, he saw a rival and wanted to nip any quarrel relating to legitimacy in the bud. In his eyes, the Resistance no longer had a role as an organised force. The normal political forces were the parties, which did not bother him as they had been discredited. It was

<sup>310</sup> Letter copied by D. Mayer, *Les socialistes dans la Résistance*, op. cit., p. 212.

up to Resistance fighters to play as individuals within the parties”.<sup>311</sup> This was exactly what de Gaulle had conveyed to Frenay. It was also the exact opposite of what he would do when he created the *Rassemblement du Peuple français* (RPF) on April 14, 1947, which would accelerate the process of “quashing the memory of the Resistance”.<sup>312</sup>

Resistance fighters were idealists: they dreamt of political renewal outside political parties. They believed that the legitimacy conferred upon them as a result of being on the right side of the fight would predispose them to be agents of this renewal. This idealism condemned them to failure, and this failure revealed their ontological contradiction: they dreamed of uniting the people around their values, but could not break out of their revolutionary elitism. It was this contradiction that the *Parti communiste français* would be able to highlight in order to lessen the non-Communist Resistance. This failure was very well summarised by Viannay (alias Indomitius), the founder of the *Défense de la France* movement and a member of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*:

As a result of their very remoteness, the men in London and Algiers, who are very often drawn from the Third Republic and have for too long been separated from the suffering of the metropolis, could not feel this wind of revolution that was blowing over France, this wave of immense purity, this infinite desire to build a new homeland before the eyes of the world. All they saw was a cold political reality and in everything about it that was excessive, embarrassing, everything it was proud of and which was not servile, *they wanted to break the Resistance*. The Resistance was revolutionary. London and Algiers were nothing but political.<sup>313</sup>

<sup>311</sup> R. Salmon, *Chemin faisant. Vers la Résistance. Du lycée à Défense de la France*, Paris, Éditions LBM, 2004, p. 252.

<sup>312</sup> F. Azouvi, *Français, on ne vous a rien caché. La Résistance, Vichy, notre mémoire*, Paris, Gallimard, 2020, p. 219.

<sup>313</sup> Indomitius, *Nous sommes les rebelles*, op. cit., p. 65.

For them, Liberation had been the degradation of mystique into politics. They would not have criticisms harsh enough against the Fourth Republic that they had hoped for so much, but which they saw as a return to the more of the previous Republic, pure and simple. To them, General de Gaulle was responsible.<sup>314</sup> However, this failure (which must be seen in perspective, of course: the ideas of the Resistance for the creation of the new France were far from insignificant) was the very condition of the palingenesis of republican France. One cannot help but highlight the strange political paradox that was represented by the Gaullism of war: it was a soldier with a discreet and circumspect belief in republicanism who had saved the French Republic that the politicians had betrayed on July 10, 1940 for the benefit of Marshall Pétain and the Vichy regime!

De Gaulle's renunciation was a great disappointment for Frenay. In his newspaper *Octobre* (November 23, 1946), he criticised the founder of Free France for "not having perceived the revolutionary meaning of our resistance and for having, day after day, extinguished its flame as much by his cold haughtiness as by his bainvillian ideas". In his memoirs, the founder of *Combat* specified his criticisms and ideas of the man. Frenay denied de Gaulle "the image of the precursor to penetrating visions of the future", with one exception: "His call of June 18, 1940". De Gaulle would have always acted "under the pressure of events". With regards to the period at the end of the war, Frenay held him responsible for the failure of the political transformation of the Resistance and the return to partocracy. Frenay dreamed of the "marriage of socialism and the Resistance". He believed that de Gaulle could be the facilitator of this revolution, which would give rise to "the labour society, the humanist socialism that we were burning to build". This failure was to be shared with the *Parti socialiste*. Frenay, who wanted to be a socialist (he would join the SFIO) and a "left-wing Gaullist", had faith in Blum's anticipatory intelligence (in particular on the European question). Blum was the only politician who would find favour in the newspaper *Combat* in 1945: he was the

314 After leaving power in January, De Gaulle himself complained about this, for example, in his Bayeux speech of June 16, 1946. In his report, he emphasised in particular the restoration of "the State", a term that is used much more than "republic" (this term is used just once).

"bearer of heavy expectation, of a stubborn hope that never wanted to give up".<sup>315</sup> But a man such as Mayer, deplores Frenay, confined his actions to "the immediate horizon" and the *Parti socialiste* "gave birth to Guy Mollet". His final judgment on General de Gaulle was based on a formula that made Gaullists and many Resistance fighters jump:<sup>316</sup>

In reality, de Gaulle would probably have been a giant in the world of the 19th century that ended in August 1914. It is in no way to diminish him to say that he was, in a sense, a French Bismarck: authoritarian, paternalistic, and a nationalist.<sup>317</sup>

Disappointment often leads to unfairness, and does not predispose an individual to lucidity. By charging de Gaulle, Frenay was exonerating himself from his own responsibility (and from that of his friends) for his failed attempt to transform French political life. He should have read the criticisms contained in his own newspaper, even though the editorial team was now in the hands of Pia and Camus and intended not to suffer political injunctions. From January 16, 1945, while Frenay was minister, *Combat* warned against a process of dilution of the identity and unity of the Resistance and raised the question of its usefulness:

The drama of the Resistance was precisely to be both everywhere and nowhere, in government and yet without any real power, responsible for both everything and nothing. All of its energy would be wasted in inaction and electoral combinations.

315 *Combat*, September 25, 1945.

316 Like Francis Louis Closon (*Le temps des passions. De Jean Moulin à la Libération, 1943-1944*, Paris, Presses de la Cité, 1974, pp. 206-207), who, after having cited Frenay, wrote: "The General's build must have been so large that it could ensure so many! Who has not dreamed of this reconciling labourism, of this France of friendship whose thought was our refuge, when courage waned, energy was wasted, if it was not de Gaulle first. How comforting it would be to be able, even today, to point out a single culprit, suddenly freeing everyone from their dissatisfaction and remorse (. . .). Therefore, has Frenay, who was a member of the government of Liberation, forgotten that France was starving, that the factories were no longer running, that the workers were unemployed, that the trains had stopped, that the railroads had been ripped up, the budgets cut, that public order presented problems, that the revival took place first, alas, at the level of basic action, strictly material, at that dramatic level of purification, and that the war continued to rage?"

317 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira. . .*, op. cit., p. 567.

One contributor to *Combat*, Albert Ollivier, dreamed of this revolution that the newspaper had adopted as its motto (“From the Resistance to the Revolution”). As did Frenay, he thought that it would be possible to find a path “outside the political arena, but at the heart of politics”<sup>318</sup> to bring about a new elite and a new way of doing politics. However, this transmutation and this quest for a new territory of possibilities collided with reality. From February 22, 1945, Ollivier himself noted that “momentum has slowed down”.

It could be said that the relationship with Europe was a marker of the ideological divisions at work within the Resistance and the projects aimed at its political transformation. Nevertheless, Frenay wanted to continue to fight for his European ideas and to exist on the political scene. Having understood de Gaulle’s message and the limited future of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*, he created, with his friends, the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* out of the ashes of the MLN.<sup>319</sup> Its “manifesto” (July 7, 1945), in the drafting of which Frenay participated<sup>320</sup> and to a large extent which he had inspired, was co-signed by representatives of other Resistance movements: Léo Hamon (CDLR<sup>321</sup>), Georges Izard (OCM<sup>322</sup>), Jean Texcier (*Libération-Nord*). It had a left-wing orientation: “It is time for socialism” and for “economic democracy” to move towards “a classless society”. The UDSR was part of “the great movement of human anticipation undertaken by France in 1789”. It was for this reason that the manifesto announced its desire to “bring the capitalist exploitation of the colonies to an end” and to “raise the cultural level of indigenous populations”. Those who drafted the manifesto still wanted to believe that, within the framework of the *Conseil national de la Résistance*, “the

318 *Combat*, November 8, 1944.

319 The Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance was strengthened by big names from the Resistance. Francis Leenhardt was the Secretary-General, assisted by three deputies: Henri Ribière, the Secretary-General of Libération-Nord, Baumel, Secretary-General of the Mouvement de Libération nationale, and Izard, the Secretary-General of the OCM (Organisation Civile et Militaire). Frenay was at the Political Bureau with Antoine Avinin, Claudius-Petit, Jacques Piette, Rebeyrol, Morandat, and Texcier. The steering committee featured some illustrious names: Philip, Malraux, and even Michel Debré (before his conversion to Gaullism).

320 According to É. Duhamel, *L’union démocratique et socialiste...*, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

321 Ceux de la Libération.

322 Organisation Civile et Militaire.

unity of the Resistance remains”. I have shown, through the rejection of Philip’s European proposals in July 1943, that this was not the case. Their optimism led them to postulate the existence of a powerful link between “the Resistance of oppressed nations” and the desire for the “international solidarity” of “freedom-loving” peoples. This desire, postulated the authors, would be the natural consequence of the common struggle against Nazism. On the other hand, the authors believed that the state framework was no longer suited to the conditions of modern life:

In the modern world, the era of parties confined to state boundaries is definitely over. Thus, the action of the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* will only be meaningful and effective if it expands internationally. Across borders, it calls for the coming-together of those groups that recognise each other in the aspirations that it has set out. We must create a new international force to solve modern problems on their own scale, i.e. on a world scale: it is time for the solidarity of peoples.<sup>323</sup>

The *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* “praised the generous efforts made at the San Francisco conference”; however, it believed that this was not enough to ensure “collective security”. The manifesto proclaimed the credo of the federalist doctrine that had already been stated in the articles of *Combat*, in the Geneva Declaration, and in the manifesto of the MLN: “Only the generalised restriction of national sovereignties, however remote the realisation of such restrictions may seem, can effectively ensure the security of peoples”.<sup>324</sup>

The UDSR did not follow through on its ambition: it did not act on the need for a federal European union. The word “federal” is nowhere to be found in the manifesto, which only refers to the practice of pre-war treaties and pacts: “At present, the signing of a Franco-British pact must follow the successful conclusion of the Franco-Soviet pact,

323 Cited by É. Duhamel, *op. cit.*, p. 886.

324 *Ibid.*, p. 886.

provided that there is no change to France's rights anywhere in the world. The strengthening of the traditional friendship between France and the United States must definitively establish the harmony of international relations." The mention of the United States demonstrates the divergence of views from the Communists and Gaullists, even if the manifesto specifies that "French independence, exclusive of any foreign interference, is the precondition for France to accept and, if necessary, bring about the application of the principles defined above".

While the ambition was pure and disproportionate, the election results were very poor. The *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* failed to be what its founders would have wanted it to be: "the coming-together of all the forces of renewal and of socialism".<sup>325</sup> The UDSR had been marginalised by "a great party", the Socialist Party, to which it was close and from which it had sought caution. The process had been initiated by Frenay himself. He had invited Blum over to his house for dinner, with Hamon, to criticise the fact that Daniel Mayer had been a little reticent about the contribution that the non-Communist Resistance could make to the SFIO.<sup>326</sup> This pairing, which had also been sought by Blum, could have been dangerous for the identity of the MLN, then that of the UDSR. On the other hand, the latter had been "sped up" by the *Mouvement républicain Populaire* (MRP) which had been thought up by Bidault in the spring of 1943 and officially appeared in October 1944.<sup>327</sup> "The *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* was born too late", said Frenay, because of the "exhausting quarrels" that had ended up paralysing the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*: "The space that we should have occupied on the political spectrum has been taken by the old parties and by the MRP".<sup>328</sup> For Salmon, a founder of the MLN and a future European activist, the Resistance fighters had become "an inconvenience".<sup>329</sup> The failure of the UDSR was the failure of a dream of a political renewal in

325 Circular dated August 20, 1945. Archives of the Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance. AN, 412 AP 1.

326 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 534-535.

327 Eyewitness account of G. Bidault (February/April 1949), the World War II History Committee, AN, 72 AJ 46.

328 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, *op. cit.*, p. 545.

329 R. Salmon, *Chemin faisant...*, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

France under the impetus of the pro-European Resistance. As Soustelle would say, from early 1944 onwards the parties entered the scene and "appeared all over the intricate machinery of the Resistance".<sup>330</sup>

Frenay failed to make the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* the political core around which French political life could have been rebuilt based on the experience and values of the Resistance: the UDSR believed it was the instrument through which the Resistance would "carry out its political mission".<sup>331</sup> The legislative elections of October 1945 delivered a stunning blow to this dream: the Parti communiste won 161 seats, the SFIO 146, the *Mouvement républicain Populaire* 148, and the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance*, 17. Frenay's companion in battle, Claude Bourdet, was defeated. Frenay was not a candidate. He would inform the political office of the UDSR (October 15, 1945): "The rebirth of the old parties, insufficiently renewed in their men and methods, was solely replacing the country in the political structure that it had before the war".<sup>332</sup>

But his failure was not unique to him. The Resistance could not survive on its own (other than as a "mystic"<sup>333</sup>) within the framework of the return to a traditional political life where Resistance movements had to be content to be "more complements to traditional parties than alternatives".<sup>334</sup> At the time of Liberation, Frenay presented himself as a socialist but had not heeded the warning of a man he admired, Léon Blum, who saw the Resistance as "the most important political phenomenon that has emerged in this country for many years" but which, at the same time, had not "created a right to power for anyone", since "in a democracy no one has a prior right to power".<sup>335</sup>

330 J. Soustelle, *Envers et...*, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

331 Circular dated August 22, 1945 sent to all departments and all movements (signed: F. Leenhardt). Archives of the Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance. AN, 412 AP 1.

332 Cited by Y.-M. Ajchenbaum, *À la vie, ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-160.

333 H. Michel, *Les courants de pensée...*, *op. cit.*, p. 770.

334 Jean-Marie Guillon, "Parti du mouvement et parti de l'ordre", in P. Button and J.-M. Guillon (dir.), *Les pouvoirs en France à la Libération*, Belin, 1994, p. 58.

335 Speech given by L. Blum at the Conference of Secretaries of Socialist Federations, Paris, May 20, 1945: *Les devoirs et les tâches du socialisme*, Paris, Éditions de la Liberté, Problèmes d'aujourd'hui no. 7, 1945, pp. 11-12.



French political culture was deeper than the Resistance culture, which was too beholden to circumstances. As Henri Michel would write, the Resistance movements could not fight the return to political life and its “bad habits”: “not only did their fragile union quickly disappear and they entered into competition with each other; they also added their divisions to those of the political parties”.<sup>336</sup> For Frenay, this return to reality was painful: “Not so long ago, I believed that in public life I would breathe the same air as in our underground struggle, that I would come across the same team spirit, that unshakeable solidarity that had united us. How wrong I was!”.<sup>337</sup>

The error of this elite group of courage and commitment was to believe that it was the face of the country, and that it could change the course of history. The victory over Nazism and against Vichy would be the break that France needed for its rebirth. The legitimacy of the struggle of the Resistance was not powerful enough to change the order of things. The manifesto of the *Combat* movement, which was drafted in the summer of 1942, was full of creative promise: “*Combat* and Revolution”. Frenay and his followers, hunted down and underground, believed that the soul of France could change and that a new world could emerge from the catastrophe:

The revolution we carry within us is more than a material revolution: it is a revolution of the mind, of youth, and of the people. The bourgeois republic was made up of selfishness, narrowness, and fears scarcely concealed by oratorical goodwill. The men of the Resistance, hardened by their daily ordeal, would instil in France the spirit of generosity, greatness, and daring. Instruction truly open to all would be inseparable from education. It would form character as much as intelligence; thus, it would draw the real elites from the bosom of the nation, allowing their constant renewal: an elite that does not renew itself is an elite that dies. We wanted to merge an all-conquering individualism and a generous sense of community in a harmonious synthesis. The revolution within us is the dawn of a new civilisation.

336 H. Michel, *Les courants de pensée...*, op. cit., p. 443.

337 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, op. cit., p. 547.

## The hero of the Résistance the Communists wanted to kill

The “solidarity of peoples” was a beautiful utopia at a time when, in France, the solidarity of the Resistance was crumbling by the day with the resumption of political life. The ambition of Europe was not on the agenda of parties in search of electoral victories. This observation is perfectly visible in the fate of Frenay, the Resistance fighter who carried the greatest hope of a new way of doing politics and of thinking about Europe. It should be understood that his ministry had an impossible mission: to repatriate millions of people and allow them to reintegrate. It was the “ministry of suffering”. There was nothing but discontent to expect from this and blows to take: some say that it was precisely for this reason that the position was entrusted to him. This discontent would be used to weaken Frenay’s political position, and the moral capital of which he was the embodiment.

Frenay, who was not an establishment figure, would only belatedly understand the “formidable force that the mass of three million prisoners and deportees who would be joined by the parents and friends of prisoners and deportees, or persons over whom they exert their influence, represent politically for the elections and for the government”.<sup>338</sup> Historians have shown that Frenay did his best with the means at his disposal. And yet, when it came to this plan the Consultative Assembly “clipped its wings”.<sup>339</sup> The general problem of housing, supplies, and clothing that angered returnees was not the responsibility of a single ministry. This anger, which was justified in part, was instrumentalized. According to the historian Christophe Lewin, “the prisoners were used there as the weapon of choice”.<sup>340</sup> Frenay’s relationship with

338 As written in July 1944 by Michel Cailliau (“Charrette”), the head of a Resistance movement that recruited from among former PGs and a nephew of General de Gaulle: Michel Cailliau, “Quelques aspects du point de vue politique”, Algiers, July 3, 1944, AN, F9 3117.

339 F. Cochet, *Les exclus de la victoire. Histoire des prisonniers de guerre, déportés et STO (1945-1985)*, Kronos, 1992, p. 106.

340 Ch. Lewin, *Le retour des prisonniers de guerre français. Naissance et développement de la FNPG*, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1986, p. 131.

his colleagues was under strain. He complained about this to General de Gaulle on April 20, 1945, and threatened to resign. He believed that while the administration he had set up was now able to fulfil its mission, he wished to point out the unwillingness of other government departments to cooperate with him. As a result, there was a delay in the implementation of decisions that incited massive demonstrations at the instigation of the Communists. Beneath its windows, there were unending processions to cries of: “Food! Clothing! Shoes! Down with the black market! Frenay must resign!”<sup>341</sup> General de Gaulle intervened personally to request that the federations of former *Combatants* and victims of the war cease their agitation. A real enterprise of denigration and destabilisation was launched against Frenay by the newspaper *L'Humanité* and its subsidiaries.<sup>342</sup> Frenay appeared as “the man who dared not say his own name”; he would actually be called “de Clermont-Tonnerre” and depicted as the bastard child of an illegitimate union with a representative of the hated class. He was said to have “repeatedly refused to authorise the US repatriation of a thousand foreign (mostly Jewish) children held in Buchenwald”, a refusal supposedly motivated by xenophobia and anti-Semitism. Justice would be served and the newspaper *L'Humanité* condemned.<sup>343</sup> The Communist daily highlighted the case of Pierre Pucheu, the Vichy Minister of the Interior, and the meetings Frenay had held with him to obtain the release of certain members of his movement who had been arrested by Vichy police. Frenay would become “the obligator of Pucheu”. The Ministry of Prisoners, Deportees, and Refugees (PDR) would be no more than a “front comprised of *vichyssois*, shady, uncontrolled agents” and “people prepared to do anything”.<sup>344</sup> *L'Humanité* featured an almost daily column with the title “Scandals of the day with Frenay.” This could have been described as harassment.

From Algiers, in the Consultative Assembly, André Mercier, a member of the *Parti communiste français*, attacked his ministerial policy. He

341 Extract from *Femmes françaises*, relating to the demonstration of June 4, 1945. AN, F9 3137.

342 *Les Femmes françaises, L'Espoir, Rouge Midi, Liberté des Charentes, Travailleur Alpin*, etc. AN, F9/3137; F9/3168.

343 See *Octobre*, October 19, 1946.

344 *L'Humanité*, September 4, 1945.

accused Frenay of condemning “thousands of our own to death” and reproached him for not urging French prisoners still outside France to prepare for “escape and sabotage”. The party newspaper, *Liberté*, carried out this campaign of slander. Frenay then wrote to the Central Committee of the *Parti communiste français* on July 21, 1944. He returned to the policy of the Communists to refuse to join the Resistance reunification process that he had initiated, in order to jealously maintain the independence of the *Front National* and of the *Francs-Tireurs Partisans*.<sup>345</sup> When the first prisoners and deportees began to return to liberated France in 1945, the criticisms against Frenay doubled in violence. Frenay, steeped in military culture and in idealism, discovered the harshness of political life and the injustice of history. Faced with this smear campaign, the hero of the Resistance felt bitter loneliness: “Alone, I am alone, alternatively in the grip of disgust and anger. However, tomorrow, as I did yesterday, I will have a moral obligation to put on a serene front in front of my collaborators, my friends”.<sup>346</sup> He was a wounded man:

Thus, I am the man to be beaten down every day. *Gringoire* had Salengro; *L'Humanité* wants Frenay. For the same objective, the same method. Fascism is not renewed. There are two ways to bring me down: discredit the man by trying to dishonour him, and reduce the Minister to an incompetent and a prevaricator.<sup>347</sup>

Frenay, a man of integrity, was the man least likely to suffer from accusations of prevarication. However, it was indeed the “political leader of the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance*” that the Communists were targeting before the legislative elections of October 1945:

Scams, embezzlement, abusive requisitions, ten times the number of necessary staff, the use of *vichyssois* in some positions of responsibility, lavish spending, contempt for prisoners and deportees, an inability to defend their rights, a refusal

345 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, *op. cit.*, p. 449.

346 *Ibid.*, p. 530.

347 H. Frenay, *Méthodes d'un parti. Alerte aux démocrates*, Paris, Éditions universelles, sd (1945).

to receive their complaints, the use of dictatorial methods vis-à-vis personnel: this is a brief summary of the grievances brought by our correspondents against the administration of Mr. Frenay, the political head of the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance*.<sup>348</sup>

A month after this condemnation, *L'Humanité* took another swipe at party leader Frenay: "Truly, the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* has a worthy spiritual director".<sup>349</sup> Behind this defamatory campaign there was a political issue and a "fight by a party to eliminate one man"<sup>350</sup> who had become a scapegoat. The incredible work of this emergency and improvised ministry at a time of extreme scarcity was underestimated by this hate campaign. We can only "see the gap between the action accomplished and the view held of the same by its beneficiaries".<sup>351</sup>

For Frenay, these attacks were part of the overall strategy of the *Parti communiste* to "take control of the entire Resistance": "To conquer the leading positions at national and departmental level, there was a need to exclude all political adversaries, in particular the men from *Combat*, which they (the Communists) saw as the most dynamic and most important movement".<sup>352</sup> He had experienced it in the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*: the "essential" fear of the Communists was to see the emergence of "a large left-wing party" from the Resistance that could eat into the electoral support of the PCF. Conversely, the Communists accused Frenay of having wanted to "eliminate the Communists from the large family of the Resistance and push them into the opposition".<sup>353</sup> The Communist outburst against Frenay also targeted the man whose name was attached to the newspaper *Combat*. At the time of Liberation, this newspaper, under the leadership of Camus in particular, sought to place issues on a moral level. On August 23,

348 *L'Humanité*, September 15, 1945.

349 *L'Humanité*, October 14, 1945.

350 Ch. Lewin, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

351 *Ibid.*, p. 135.

352 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira...*, *op. cit.*, p. 438.

353 P. Hervé, *La Libération trahie*, Paris, Grasset, 1945, p. 67.

1944, at the time of the battle for Paris, *Combat* proclaimed: "It was not who we chose to kill. But we were put in a position where we either killed or fell to our knees." However, at the same time *L'Humanité* said that "not a single Boche should leave insurgent Paris alive." The use of revolutionary rhetoric annoyed the Communists, whose lexicon had become institutionalised. The moralism and revolutionaryism of *Combat* were violently ridiculed by the Communist P. Hervé in his journal *Action* (December 15, 1944):

Ostriches, plunge your little heads into the sand of metaphysical-literary debate. There is a huge gap between this debauchery of old clichés and the fervour of the national insurrection. Tell me about Soviet armies, US industrial production, Tito's war, our guerrillas in the maquis, the French army on the Rhine, and our French Revolution, which, if it was eloquent, could be but was not. We feel that upon emerging from illegality, old ghosts that wish to remove our pleasure from life and *Combat* slip between what is real and us.

Hervé, a most effective writer, had Frenay in his sights. Frenay was the man who had excluded the Communists from the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*, where Hervé sat as leader of the supporters of the merger with the Front National. He portrayed it as purely a product of idealism that could only be "bourgeois". The Communists, as we have seen, claimed to be close to the realities and to the "masses" that the Socialists would like to flee from and adopted a purely patriotic, even nationalistic, rhetoric in an attempt to compete with Gaullism. According to them, Europeanism and the myth of the "supreme state" were part of this "mortal" utopianism that could only go against "the independence and greatness of France". In the eyes of the Communists, Frenay was the man who, in the *Mouvement de Libération nationale* and in the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* wanted to attack the "dogma of national sovereignty". And yet, for the Communists, this dogma was unsurpassable. They had stated this forcefully in their criticism of the socialist project, imploring "the Resistance" to denounce this "plan to renounce national sovereignty

that was fraught with mortal threats to our country”.<sup>354</sup> Hervé, the intellectual of the *Parti communiste*, went to the effort of systematising his accusations in a book: *La Libération trahie* (Grasset, 1945), in which Frenay was the only Resistance fighter cited. This book was a weapon designed to delegitimise what he represented.

According to Hervé, Frenay and his movement, the UDSR, embodied a double sham. First was the myth that established the Resistance as “a formation of new men, hostile to the old parties, familiar with the authoritarian methods of government and recruited from all social classes, without distinction”. For the Communist intellectual, this attitude was “neo-fascist” since, by “violently criticising the Third Republic, politics, and class struggle”, it would have aroused “the approval of right-wing, militarist, and clerical circles”.<sup>355</sup> This argument was made as was, with no effort to demonstrate its veracity. The “neo-fascists” were said to have been of a “wait-and-see” approach under the Occupation out of a “fear of Communism” and in solidarity with the Intelligence Service. They would have opted for a policy of “maintaining order” in order to “suppress a possible Communist uprising”. When it became known that Frenay had invented the Secret Army and that *Combat* was one of the first movements to extol the merits of direct action, the level of bad faith on the part of the accuser and the defamatory outcome of such an assertion were assessed.

It was this “fear” that would give rise to the will to “dissociate the Resistance from the working class and from Communism”. Here, Pierre Hervé extracted revenge for the exclusion of the Front National by the majority of members of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*, of which Frenay was the architect. Indeed, the “neo-fascists” would bear responsibility for the failure of the strategy of the *Parti communiste français* to identify (and identify with) the Resistance. However, as the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* had failed to create a Resistance party that could reshape political life, its inspirers

354 Central Committee of the Parti communiste français, “Observations du Parti communiste sur le projet d’un programme commun présenté par le Parti socialiste à la Résistance”, April 25, 1944, cited by H. Michel and B. Mirkine-Goutzévitch, *Les idées...*, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

355 P. Hervé, *La Libération trahie*, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

approached the *Parti socialiste* “in order to use it for purposes that one can only guess”. Socialists and “neo-fascists” would have chosen the Communists “as enemies to be excluded” in order to conceal their divisions. For their part, the Communists focussed their fire on the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* in order to reach the *Parti socialiste* (the indirect manner is explained by the fact that both parties were politically engaged by in the same government) by denying it first place in the representation of the Resistance. This is apparent from Hervé’s definition of the Resistance: “Under certain specific international conditions, it has been a national and democratic movement of the French people, in which the Communists played a much more important role than any other political trend. In the eyes of some, this was his sin”.<sup>356</sup>

The use of “highly moralising phrases that made everyone happy” served the same purpose: to solder the nebulous MRP/*Parti socialiste*/UDSR against the *Parti communiste*. But Hervé recognised a certain ideological coherence in this process of rapprochement that resulted in the choice of two policy alternatives: externally, “the Western bloc”; internally, “the Catholic-Socialist bloc”. And yet, for Communists the idea of a “Western bloc” or “Atlantic bloc” (in its anti-American sense) was inconsistent with the “national independence” of which they wanted to be the sole guarantors, something that did not prevent them from praising the merits of the “Big Three”<sup>357</sup> coalition that still existed when Hervé wrote his text (August 1945). The campaigns in favour of the Western bloc (which de Gaulle had named thus, but the head of government was given particularly lenient treatment by the author) or Atlantic bloc were preparing “the subjugation of our country to the domination of international trusts based in England or the United States”. It was by citing the “trusts” (thus denounced by the UDSR) that Pierre Hervé relaunched the myth of the “synarchy” that would pull the strings of these pro-Western campaigns. For him, the

356 *Ibid.*, p. 147.

357 The United States, Great Britain, and the USSR.

UDSR could have been called the “Union of Synarchies of the Resistance”.<sup>358</sup> In this party, all he saw was the coming-together of “technocrats, ultra-Gaullists, and clerics”.

The analysis of the fate of Henri Frenay and what he represented strongly relativizes the “Resistentialist mythology” that would have dominated French society after the end of the Occupation. Historians must revise this “contemporary vulgate”<sup>359</sup>, and can only conclude that this myth was a myth.

<sup>358</sup> P. Hervé, *La Libération trahie*, op. cit., p. 206.

<sup>359</sup> François Azouvi, *Français, on ne vous a rien caché...*, op. cit. p. 31.

## Federalists: Petits-bourgeois with “vague aspirations”

The second line of attack against Frenay and the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* refers to “the humanist socialism” that they had claimed as their political objective.

Hervé reduced this humanism to an “intentional moralism” and good conscience that was ineffective in politics: “Here they are again, in position as guardians of Western civilisation, flanked by humanitarian ideologues and chapel revolutionaries.” The “revolutionaries of 1945”, as they were referred to with disdain by the author of *La Libération trahie*, were “powerless”: “Our humano-socialists are those helpless people who, if they did not exist, would have to be invented. Liberation has pushed them to the forefront of the political scene by some random sequence of events still has to be clarified”.<sup>360</sup> They had created a “disguise” with “the old skins of socialism”; this disguise was called “humanist or liberal, labour or Western socialism”. The mission of the Resistance would be to present “the errors successively condemned by socialism” as news. This “romanticism” and its “vague aspirations” were the instrument of “sophists” and “demagogues”, that they turned into a “weapon against labour and the great cause of universal emancipation”.

This was a formal attack on Frenay’s plan to create a “party of the Resistance”. However, it was also the negation of what had been the non-Communist Resistance. To dare to assert that a Frenay (and all those he represented) should find himself where he in fact found himself at the time of Liberation “by chance” was not only extremely violent, but also a total insult when one considers simple historical facts. It was the whole Resistance that was humiliated, denied.

<sup>360</sup> F. Avouzi, *Ibid.*, p. 68.



Hervé denied any political potential of the Resistance and any claim among Resistance fighters to disrupt the national political game. This claim, which had been at the heart of Frenay's vision, was reduced to an effect of "mediocrity":

Rather than just taking itself for what it was (i.e. very little in terms of theoretical thought), it aimed to turn all knowledge on its head; with its head in the clouds, it foresaw; it announced great works and gave us nothing but statements of intent. The mountain gave birth to a mouse. This mediocrity was no doubt due to the fact that Liberation was a sort of failed revolution of the petty bourgeoisie.

It was a constant among Communists to denounce the "ultra-socialist verbiage" that did nothing but betray an inability to "pose the immediate and prosaic questions regarding the establishment of the Republic". Frenay was guilty of "petit-bourgeois" idealism, due to the utopianism of his positions, in which he was locked in by his desire to play politics while refusing to accept the rules of the game, his belief that one could be on the outside and on the inside:

As a result of its intermediary situation, wedged between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the "petits bourgeois" wants to be above classes, above parties, above conflicts. It transmutes its mediocrity into an ideal... (...) Hence its love of absolute positions, moral judgments, and consoling illusions, which help it have a clear conscience in a universe dedicated to relativities. Liberation has coincided with a debauchery of utopianism.

European federalism had "consoling illusions": this was enough for Hervé to put Frenay in the "neo-fascists" category. We see by which rhetorical path and cognitive biases the Communists intended to ensure the reign of a sort of intellectual and historical terrorism in the name of a monopoly on truth and the interests of France that they sought to attribute to themselves and impose on political debate and the memory of the Resistance. The pioneers of the Resistance and of the anti-Nazi struggle had to be placed in the "neo-fascist" category. *Parti*

*communiste* leaders were even more extremist in their secret communication: it was the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République française* (Provisional Government of the French Republic, which was created on June 3, 1944) as a whole that would be "fascist". In the summer of 1944, André Marty explained to his counterpart in the Komintern, Georgi Dimitrov, that "the fascist orientation of this government is becoming ever more apparent".<sup>361</sup> He did not hesitate to assert that "the current government is no more than a collection of agents of the Allies, trusts, and elements with ties to the enemy (Frenay and, no doubt, de Menthon)".<sup>362</sup> To the Communists, the great Resistance fighter, Frenay, was no more than an agent of "the enemy". Thus, we can measure the irrationalism of the hierarchs of the *Parti communiste*, the violence that formed the backdrop to their vision of emerging politicians, but also their hatred of Frenay, even before the rupture that would be formalised within the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*, and which they would never let go. The Hardy trial, to which I will return later, would be another occasion for a hateful outburst against the *Combat* founder.

The *Parti communiste* were no longer rational, criticising the unrealism of the humanist federalists, while at the same time sinking into a kind of paranoia and witch-hunt. However, the attack on what Frenay and his Europeanist friends represented also came from intellectual circles on the Marxist left. This is what happened to Gilles Martinet, who in 1945 published a collective work that is little-known today: *La crise française*. In fact, it was a special issue that announced the creation of *La Revue Internationale*. The title of the Martinet article was particularly offensive: "Le révolutionnarisme : maladie sénile du capitalisme" ("Revolutionaryism: The senile disease of capitalism"). For him, Liberation corresponded to the advent of a new phenomenon: "A certain revolutionaryism without revolution" that emanated from the "different currents of the Resistance".<sup>363</sup> Martinet intended

361 Letter from Marty to Dimitrov, July 15, 1944, cited by Philippe Buton, *Les lendemains qui déchantent. Le Parti communiste français à la Libération*, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1993, p. 82.

362 Letter from Marty to Dimitrov, August 20, 1944, cited by Ph. Buton, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

363 G. Martinet, "Le révolutionnarisme maladie sénile du capitalisme", in *La crise française*, Paris, Éditions du Pavois, 1945, pp. 61-110.

to denounce the inconsistency of non-Communist transformation projects that spoke a lot about the death of capitalism without giving themselves the means for real implementation. “Who does not claim to be socialist, human, or humanist?”, he wrote. The movement created by Frenay (*Socialisme et Liberté*) was directly concerned. Martinet directly targeted the currents born out of the Resistance, which did not yet form a party in good standing. “Revolutionaryists” could be found “both in the National Liberation Movement, in this labour union formed by the Civil and Military Organisation and *Libération-Nord*, and in the Popular Republican Movement”. For Martinet, the “French crisis” came from that gap that existed between the “straw of words” and the “grain of things”. He cited the *Combat* newspaper of November 23, 1944, which cited “a poorly-formulated though generous liberal socialism”, claiming “a French collectivist tradition that has always given way to personal freedom and has borrowed nothing from philosophical materialism”. All these words used in fact cover different content that falls into different (and even contradictory) categories. Technocratic revolutionism, excessively marked with the imprint of the synarchic “technos” of Vichy, was repainted in bright colours under the words “non-statist socialism” or “contractual planning”. This would be a ruse aimed at reconciling with the capitalist order. “Collectivisation” was not intended to destroy private initiative and, as one can read in *Les Cahiers de l’OCM*, “the planned economy is not statist”: it was a way to maintain the capitalist framework. Martinet then took aim at what he called “chair revolutionism” or “humanist socialism”, a “new doctrine” that had just emerged. According to Martinet, its progenitor was André Hauriou, a professor at the University of Toulouse, who was one of the founders of *Combat* before he was appointed delegate to the Consultative Assembly of Algiers.

In 1945, Professor Hauriou published a book in Algiers: *Vers une doctrine de the Résistance: le Socialisme humaniste*<sup>364</sup>. It was this ambition of the non-Communist Resistance to propose a political doctrine in France that hindered the Communists’ claim to a political monopoly (party and intellectuals). The “humanist socialism” of Hauriou,

364 André Hauriou, *Vers une doctrine de la Résistance. Le socialisme humaniste*, Alger, Éditions de la Revue Fontaine, October 1944.

which was that of Frenay, was the search for a balance between “everything for society” and “everything for the individual” needed for individual self-awareness, to raise awareness of humanity and of the general interest. Hauriou and his companions dreamed of a “creative synthesis” that would lie somewhere “between Christian humanism and Enlightenment humanism, which would also result in the establishment of a new economic order, free from the servitudes caused by alienating labour, and establish a new world political order”.<sup>365</sup>

As did Frenay, Hauriou supported the thesis that maintaining the principle of “absolute political sovereignty” was an “anachronism” at a time of “the economic interdependence of states”.<sup>366</sup> His report was widely criticised, in particular by André Philip, who, with the socialists, proposed another report advocating full state leadership of the economy. For Hauriou, who had co-written the *Combat* manifesto with Frenay in the summer of 1942, “the constructive thinking of the Resistance was gradually becoming organised around two themes: freedom and socialism”. We must imagine a third way between Marxist collectivism and capitalist liberalism. Hauriou, like Frenay, was convinced that the revolution that the Resistance carried within it could only ignore the solution of the dictatorship of the proletariat because its aim is “a revolution of all French people, for the French people”. For Martinet, this unanimist revolutionism could only be an effect of idealism and morality: it should be put in the category of “terribly gratuitous public acts” doomed to impotence.

Martinet ended this ambition to “supersede”. For him, it was an old-fashioned idea: the “cooperatism” of Charles Gide, which had already demonstrated its impracticability. Professor Hauriou’s international federalist proposals were unveiled outside any historical reference (the Revolution of 1848, the Commune of Paris, “the gigantic Soviet experiment...”). For Martinet, it was candid to think that “ideas

365 Alya Aglan, “La Résistance, le temps, l’espace: Réflexions sur une histoire en mouvement”, *Histoire@Politique. Politique, culture, société*, no. 9, September-December 2009.

366 A. Hauriou, “Vers une doctrine de la Résistance. Le socialisme humaniste”, Algiers, 1944, cited by Christophe Révillard, *Les premières tentatives de construction d’une Europe fédérale. Des traités de la Résistance au traité de C.E.D. (1940-1954)*, Paris, Éditions F.-X. de Guibert, 2001, p. 46.

and passions lead men and change societies as much as economic circumstances and materialist interests". Insufficient dialectics, insufficient experience, says the author of the article: "The cave containing the treasures of humanist socialism is not apparent to us". Martinet also wished to denounce the revolutionaryism of former Communist intellectuals who advocated the "socialism of justice". In his view the men from the *Combat* newspaper: Camus, Pia, Malraux, and Pierre Herbart. The original problem with their thought? To not believe that the proletariat was "the only possible engine of the Revolution". These people, "disappointed with Communism", wanted to think big and embrace all under the *Combat* banner for "all social classes", except for the grande bourgeoisie. They agreed with Philip's theses, replacing the expression "class struggle" ("lutte de classes") with the "struggle of the classes" ("lutte des classes"): in contemporary times, it was the whole nation that opposed a small capitalist minority. There was to be no more talk of the interests of the proletariat or of the petty bourgeoisie, but of the interests "of the group, of the community, or even of the general interests of humanity". As expressed in the subtitle of the newspaper *Combat*, these humanists thought that one could go "from the Resistance to revolution", as if the present war could spontaneously "destroy the last vestiges of the crumbling capitalist regime". And yet, Martinet observed that no revolutionary crisis had yet occurred in America or western Europe. Consequently, this doctrine was running on empty, since these former Communist Resistance fighters thought that a revolution could be born without taking into account the leading role of the working class, without the emergence of a new October 1917.

Martinet then turned his attention to "the remarkable equivocation of the Resistance". Resistance fighters were presented as "new, mysterious, and attractive new men, in the image of the pure fighters of the Resistance". However, "social realities" could only dispel the "haze". Martinet, not without some prescience, thought that the prevailing conditions and the vagueness of the Resistance programme meant it would not be able to move the existing political order:

What will the men of *Combat* do? For now, they have not made a decision. Or, to be more precise, they believe they have made

their choice by maintaining that the ambiguity that strengthened them, but of which they now seem to be prisoners, i.e. by proclaiming that the Resistance, like war, carries a revolution within. What they do not notice is that if this revolution were to occur (which is not the case), it would only be made possible by shattering the cadres of the Resistance. Their ethical representation of such a revolution conceals its social composition in their eyes, and they would no doubt be less indignant at seeing the government turn away from the socialist path it had obligingly followed if they were to appreciate the importance of the role played by the French bourgeoisie in the Resistance. But they would prefer not to step down from the idealistic pedestal and regret the lack of boldness and realism of statesmen.

The Camusian *Combat* did not believe in "political realism" and clung to the idea of introducing the language of morality into the practice of politics. It was this haughty aloofness that deprived it of the means to lend concrete support to a Frenay fully engaged in the difficulties of day-to-day politics as a minister. This reticence towards politics and this inability to enter the institutional game to control it from within was found in the very logic of Frenay's choices: after the painful experience of real power, he took refuge in the metapolitical horizon of federalism, whose concrete prospects seemed very distant. International relations are the last point emphasised by Martinet, using the terms of the trial in utopianism of the *Parti communiste*:

They (the federalist Resistance fighters) express their support for the internationalisation of raw materials and for the European Federation, but they envisage these things within the context of the world as it is today, i.e. in a context where they are impossible to achieve, and where such proposals can only take on polemical significance in relation to major global conflicts. The internationalism of the protagonists of *Combat* is as lightweight as their socialism, and nothing betrays the weakness of their social foundations more than this lack of awareness of their own responsibilities.

While Martinet notes with satisfaction that their culture “goes beyond the limited horizons of the chauvinist clerics of the *“parti de la grandeur”* (Gaullism), he thought that the men of *Combat* took pleasure in “exercises of rhetoric” and behaved like “students”. They would have liked to have been doctors, but had to content themselves with being “bonesetters”, “bonesetters with the best intentions in the world, bonesetters with some good medical formulae in their heads, but bonesetters nonetheless”. Martinet’s conclusion: “In truth, revolutionaryism is no more than a disease, a senile disease, of capitalism.”

Frenay was indeed an idealist. He admitted to his “candour” when he summarised his political project in *Alerte aux démocrates*: “We believe that the Revolution can only be accomplished by way of and with an uncompromising truth that can never be influenced, whether by interest or calculations.” Frenay was right to assert that the Parti communiste wanted a monopoly on the word “revolution”, because there could only be one Revolution: “its own”. Frenay thought that another revolution was possible:

However, we will succeed in destroying the great economic and financial feudalisms that still make our regime a caricature of democracy as we would want it. We will do this by preserving for man the benefit of the freedom that, to this day, it has not been possible to reconcile in any state with the social justice that must be established.<sup>367</sup>

The touchstone of the project of Frenay and his people was the opposite of the Soviet experience: capitalist society cannot be brought down by sacrificing human dignity and freedom. Justice without liberty, liberty within justice: such was the squaring of the circle of the project of the socialist federalists, since Frenay considered himself a “socialist”. For Martinet, it was an illusion that led to aporia.

<sup>367</sup> H. Frenay, *Méthodes d'un parti...*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

## Frenay dropped by Camus and the team at Combat

While there was a reaction among some sectors, this reaction was not widespread and could not counteract the power of the Communist and para-Communist press.<sup>368</sup> This was the case with the *Témoignage Chrétien* movement, which we know held ideas similar to those of Frenay. The author of *France, prends garde de perdre ton âme*, the first *Cahier clandestin* of *Témoignage Chrétien*, published a controversial essay in October 1945 with the title *France, prends garde de perdre ta liberté*.<sup>369</sup>

The author was Father Gaston Fessard, a close associate of Father Chaillet, who managed this collection and would become a close associate of Raymond Aron.<sup>370</sup> This essay was a warning against the increasing influence and intolerance of the Communists and an attack against the “game of the anti” technique, i.e. of “anti-Communism = anti-France” blackmail. Against this new terrorism, the movement claimed “the right of citizenship for this healthy and thoughtful anti-Communism” which, while refusing to be systematic, would do everything to “resist the enterprises of the *Parti communiste* aimed at establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat and the triumph of Marxist ideology”, and whose link with Moscow created a strange identity: while there was indeed a “link of dependence” between the PCF and Moscow at least as close as that “of the Vichy government with the power of Berlin”, it could be said that “in relation to Stalin, the PCF was just as much a slave as Vichy was to Hitler”. In this regard, Fessard recalled facts that the triumphant *Parti communiste* would have rather suppressed. He dared quote extensively from the June 1941

<sup>368</sup> The Parti communiste français and its affiliates controlled 26.8% of the press, compared with 21% for the SFIO and 13% for the Mouvement républicain populaire. It should be remembered that 73% of the distribution of the French press was linked to a political party. See Y.-M. Ajchenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

<sup>369</sup> *France, prends garde de perdre ta Liberté*, by the author of “France, prends garde de perdre ton âme”, Éditions du Témoignage Chrétien, October 1945.

<sup>370</sup> According to R. Bédarida, *Pierre Chaillet...*, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

issue of *L'Humanité*, in particular the passage that says that “Europe cannot be rebuilt without the active participation of the USSR, or without the collaboration of Moscow and Berlin”. If the *Parti communiste* then proceeded to launch its troops into the resistance, believes *Le Témoignage Chrétien*, this would not allow it to claim a monopoly on courage and the struggle against the occupier:

If these rave reviews are to be believed, the Party was at the forefront of the fight everywhere and the font of all important initiatives and capital decisions. Moreover, as the party that organised the national resistance and the party of the executed, it would suffer greater losses than any other party. May future historians distribute the merits of this resistance fairly among the various factions of French people.

The author explains that far from having beaten General de Gaulle, the *Parti communiste* had, “after June 1941”, “used the latent Gaullism in the people to better effect than others” and attempted to “divert this Gaullism to its own ends”. Thus, in 1945, the Resistance was no more united than it had been in shadowy battles.<sup>371</sup> But for Frenay, who felt very alone, this support from close friends was a godsend.

In fact, and as unbelievable as it sounds, the founder of *Combat* could not find support within his own newspaper. Faced with the violence and incongruity of the attacks against him, Frenay wrote four articles in his defence that stemmed from vehement but justified and reasoned anti-Communism. In the name of this morality, which was ridiculed by the Communists, the editorial team refused on the grounds that Frenay was a minister in office, in the name of the principle that “no political leader may use the columns of the newspaper to express himself, even in the form of a free opinion”.<sup>372</sup> However, an editorial alluding to this affair – albeit in a subliminal manner – was published

371 Moreover, the unity of *Témoignage Chrétien* could not resist this fire: one faction, led by F. Bédarida and A. Mandouze, protested. See: R. Bédarida, *Pierre Chaillet...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-266.

372 Y.-M. Achjenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

on June 5, 1945. No mention was made of the attitude of the Communists. Frenay was entitled to a (one could say timeless) tribute in an unsigned editorial:

Henri Frenay is one of our comrades in *Combat*. When we say that this was the man who had founded the *Combat* movement in 1940, we will have said enough about the moral position he occupies among us. It was as a result of this camaraderie that we always refused to praise him, and even hesitated to defend him in a few cases where it would have been necessary to do so. It was for the same reason that he has always refused to ask for our support. All of this goes without saying, and at present we would not change anything in this basic attitude.

Yet the editorial team was reluctant to push the scruples “too far”, in order to avoid finding themselves in a position where they would have to “betray both a friendship and the truth”. Nothing was said about his role in the MLN and in the UDSR: only the action of the Minister of Prisons was mentioned. However, *Combat* did not want to enter into a counter-argument in relation to the “demagogic campaign”, whose origins it did not even mention (the Communists). The newspaper only asked that the minister be “heard”:

However, they refuse to listen to Frenay: the whole of the press in unison declares every day that the minister is wrong on all points, and calls on a bitter and disappointed public to shout this out with it. The minister has offered to show that he was right on a few points. This was probably the only thing we feared, since we refused to hear it. So what are these new customs where the simplest demand for fairness is so readily sacrificed? And what do repatriated prisoners (of whom there are one million) think of this France that has become free again, only to see the birth of new practices of servitude?

These are fine words and beautifully expressed, but presented very Jesuitically: it was not *Combat* that would allow Frenay to be heard and defend himself! The newspaper found a solution: it would be up to prisoners themselves to defend their cause and to ensure that their



cause was “devalued by acts of injustice”. And yet, it was organisations for the defence of prisoners, deportees, and repatriates who would often prevent Frenay from expressing himself publicly. The *Parti communiste* would not accept the fact that he could be allowed to justify himself. The September 23, 1945 edition of *L’Humanité* said that “Repatriates (...) are tired of hearing about the management of the failure of their minister and base insults directed at the first newspaper in France to prove itself in the struggle for independence and national rebirth.” To Frenay, the attitude of the editorial staff was a snub. The founders (Frenay and Bourdet) prepared for the break-up and would do everything possible to recover the newspaper and remove it from the hands of “usurpers”.

It is necessary to mention a “collective protest” that had circulated and been published in certain newspapers.<sup>373</sup> This initiative was taken by a group of Resistance fighters after a poster was affixed to the walls of Paris in the middle of May 1946. This poster stated (falsely) that Frenay had been appointed “general for life” for “having been unable to organise the reception of deportees”. The protest maintained that this false information was an affront to Frenay’s honour, and recalled the actions of this “pioneer of the Resistance”. Despite these glorious facts, Frenay was no more than a “retired colonel”, while his deputy, Pierre Guillain de Bénouville, who had no military title, would become a general. “For our part, we refuse to allow base insults to be levelled at a man admired by all of his comrades in the Resistance for his righteousness and selflessness, irrespective of their political differences with him.” Among the signatories to the protest were many former members of *Combat*, such as deportee Yvette Bernard; Jean Jurgensen, a member of *Défense de la France* and a member of parliament for Paris; Pierre Lacoste, from *Libération-Sud*; François Mitterrand, founder of the MNP GD; Jean Nocher, former head of department at *Franc-Tireur*; Eugène Claudius-Petit, from *Franc-Tireur* and the *Mouvements Unis de la Résistance*; Pierre Chaillet, founder of *Témoignage Chrétien*; Claude Bourdet, national director of NAP; Jeanne Sivadon, secretary-general of the *Petites-Ailes* movement and president of the

373 “Collective protest”, *Résistance du Var*, May 21, 1946. Source : OURS.

national association for deportees and interned persons of the Resistance; Michel Debré; Jacques Baumel; Antoine Avinin, a member of the *Conseil national de la Résistance*; Alban-Vistel, regional head of the *Mouvements Unis de la Résistance* and of FFI in Lyon; Hervé Thierry; Jean Texcier; Georges Cotton; Alice Delaunay; Jacques Dhonte; Agnès Bidault; Chevance-Bertin; Henri Aubry; and others.

Frenay left the Ministry for Prisoners, Deportees, and Refugees at the end of November 1945. But before leaving, at his last public appearance on November 11, he honoured the memory of the heroes who had died under the Occupation, drawing the names of those who would have the privilege of being buried at Mont Valérien. Among the 15 coffins was that of Bertéy Albrecht. An exceptional ceremony, devised by Frenay himself, was held at the Arc de Triomphe, where the coffins were placed at the foot of the Arc on a high catafalque.<sup>374</sup> The whole of France came together at the moment when, after a cannon shot and the bell tolled for the dead, the bells of Notre-Dame and of all the churches in France rang. The unity he had longed for had, for a short time, been found. “It was so that France could live that you fell on our road, you, Bertéy, whose coffin lies here, before me; you, the tortured of Cologne; and you, Jacques Renouvin, Marcel Peck, Jean-Guy Bernard, Claudius Billon, all of you from *Combat*, friends known and unknown ... And here we are, the survivors, having reached the end we had set for ourselves”.<sup>375</sup>

374 With regards to the technical and political aspects, see Serge Barcellini, “Les cérémonies du 11 novembre 1945. Une apothéose commémorative gaulliste”, *La France de 1945. Résistances, retours, renaissances*, Caen, Presses Universitaires de Caen, 1996, pp. 85-100.

375 H. Frenay, *La nuit finira*, op. cit., p. 557.

## Is a European Europe possible?

After having left his ministerial post and having had, for party legal reasons, put himself on the punchlist at *Combat*, Frenay created the weekly that was as ephemeral and it was unknown (September-December 1946) and whose editor-in-chief would be Claude Bourdet: *Octobre*. His articles provide a better understanding of his state of mind after the war.

He took note of the end of the Resistance in a shocking article entitled “The Bone Hunters of the Resistance” (23 November 1946):

As a political formation, the Resistance was buried at the last election. Tomorrow, at the edge of its grave, we will find family members wiping a hypocritical tear from their sleeves. Desperate to be seen in the front row, we will see in particular MM. Thorez, Hervé, Gouin, and Schumann, as well as Eugène Petit (Claudius), a miraculous survivor in Parliament of what was a great underground movement. Afterwards, each will return to their business claiming to be the sole legatee of the late intestate. We must admit that the Resistance is dead.

But because he believed that the values that stemmed from the Resistance were necessary and would triumph in the more or less long-term, Frenay did not despair: he intended to contribute to the analysis of what Europe could be. First of all, he wanted France (the “key to the situation in Europe”) to constitute the obstacle to “a division into two geopolitical regions, in which the two dominant ideologies would intend to liquidate the partisan forces of an intermediate solution”.<sup>376</sup> France could, and should, guide Europe to reinvent its destiny and choose a federal solution: “If, in the end, France, not a capitalist France but a socialist France, were to propose to European countries (including Germany) a federal union in which the abandonment of sovereignty in matters of foreign affairs and defence would be agreed, what could the risks be?”

<sup>376</sup> H. Frenay, “Socialisme démocratique en Europe”, *Octobre*, October 12, 1946.

Frenay therefore refused to side with either the Soviets or the Americans, contrary to what Europhobic propaganda would have us believe today. A European Europe, according to Frenay, could only be conceived within a truly federative framework that included a Germany that had become a major player whose unity had been guaranteed: “This German unity will be achieved even if we oppose it. It would be better that this unity be achieved with our support”.<sup>377</sup>

Frenay regretted that at the time of writing, this option was contrary to the “negative” theses of the Americans and the English, contrary to the “stropy attitude” of de Gaulle and Bidault, who refused to accept a central government and demanded the detachment of the Ruhr from the rest of Germany. For Frenay, the worst thing for Europe would be to agree to become a dependency of one or other of the “blocs”. Europe would miss its date with history by agreeing to play only one role: that of “the vanguard of international capitalism against the Soviet Union”<sup>378</sup> or “Yankee outpost”.<sup>379</sup> The future of a European Europe (the sole guarantee of peace) required a solution that challenged the United States-USSR rivalry (a conflict of power as much as opposition between two conceptions of the world) and which was heading towards a “synthesis” of the two systems and the two aspirations they embodied, since the “men of the West”, argued Frenay, “were just as much about social justice as they were about freedom” and refused “to sacrifice one to the detriment of the other”.

For these reasons, Frenay did not want to believe the first signs of the Cold War. What is little known, and what I intend to highlight to underline his independence of spirit and the authenticity of his Europeanism, is his refusal to settle in an arrangement of dependence on the English-speaking countries. This was very clear in his reaction to the famous address given by Churchill in Zurich on September 16, 1946, in which he announced the advent of the United States of Europe: “Europeans, we must make the United States of Europe”. In fact, the former Prime Minister merely envisioned simple intergovernmental

<sup>377</sup> H. Frenay, “Et l’Allemagne ?”, *Octobre*, October 26, 1946.

<sup>378</sup> H. Frenay, “Fédération européenne... Paix ou guerre ?”, *Octobre*, October 19, 1946.

<sup>379</sup> H. Frenay, “Courtade avec nous !”, *Octobre*, December 7, 1946.

cooperation between states, inspired by fear of the USSR (see his Fulton address of March 5, 1946: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent”). Moreover, his project was careful not to involve the United Kingdom in the continent. Thus, this speech was a decoy.

Frenay, a convinced federalist, was not fooled. This “great project”, he would write, was too overtly directed against the USSR. This – and Frenay did not agree with it – was justified on the grounds that the Churchillian project had no objective other than to “coalesce against its forces currently dispersed in the great political and strategic game that opened up with the last cannon shot of the war”. Such a Europe would be “a danger in the guise of salvation”.<sup>380</sup> One can understand why Frenay and *Socialisme et Liberté* refused - while regretting their decision to do so - to join the International Liaison Committee of Movements for European Unity, which would design the Hague Congress, under the chairmanship of Churchill.<sup>381</sup>

Freed from all institutional ties, Frenay wanted to invest in the field of “private partisan movements in favour of European unity”.<sup>382</sup> He founded *Socialisme et Liberté* in July 1946 with his friend Claude Bourdet, who had always been more left-leaning than him and was about to become one of the great figures of the progressive and neutralist intelligentsia. He was inspired by the theses of his companion in the Resistance, Professor Hauriou, and his previously-cited book, *Vers une doctrine de la Résistance. Le socialisme humaniste*. The ambition was not insignificant: how to change the modes of political governance (national and international) by drawing inspiration from the values of humanism and socialism<sup>383</sup> and rejecting the warlike view of the class struggle? More than a movement, *Socialisme et Liberté* could resemble what Bourdet himself modestly referred to as a “working group”

380 H. Frenay, “Fédération européenne... Paix ou guerre?”, *art. cit.*

381 Letter from H. Frenay to A. Marc, Paris, December 12, 1947. AHUE, UEF 1.

382 P. Du Bois, “Le mouvement européen...”, *art. cit.*, p. 409.

383 A. Aglan, “La Résistance est-elle un humanisme?”, in *Pourquoi résister ? Résister pour quoi faire?*, texts compiled and edited by Bernard Garnier, Jean-Luc Leleu, Jean Quélien, and Anne Simonin, Caen, Centre de Recherche d’Histoire Quantitative, 2006, pp. 35-47.

(this would now be referred to as a “think tank”). He attributed the failure of their strategy to the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance*, since it was the fraction of the “realists” who had prevailed, ready to “shamelessly sacrifice everything to the parliamentary game and attempt to form other alliances”.<sup>384</sup>

Frenay and Bourdet supported the actions of the revolutionary socialist Marceau Pivert, who had just launched the magazine *Masses*, whose subtitle was indeed “*Socialisme et Liberté*”. Pivert returned to the SFIO, the left wing of which he represented but he was well-entrenched in the socialist apparatus as the secretary of the Federation of the Seine. The movement of which Frenay was part at the time was clearly anti-capitalist and anti-Soviet, and of a libertarian bent. He himself claimed to be socialist, and would soon join the SFIO (who seemed to never to have wanted to acknowledge it). The leftists in this movement advocated the advent of a Europe of peoples, independent of the two blocs, condemning the two ideological systems: “It will be necessary to thwart the attempts of American financial capitalism at economic penetration and energetically repel the manoeuvres of political envelopment of totalitarian Stalinist collectivism.”

In this capacity, Frenay was present at the creation of the Provisional Committee of Study and Action for the Socialist United States of Europe<sup>385</sup> (which would become the Social Movement for the United States of Europe in November 1948, moving towards less radical positions) in London in February 1947. His detractors, as well as friends, had forgotten this commitment. One day in December 1951, Guy Mollet, the head of the *Parti socialiste*, called out to him in the corridors of the Consultative Assembly: “You are doing a terrible job and

384 Claude Bourdet, *L’aventure incertaine*, *op.cit.*, p. 406. The realists were Claudius-Petit, René Pleven, and Antoine Avinin in particular.

385 Its make-up was as follows: Marceau Pivert was president, flanked by an English vice-president, Bob Edwards, the chairman of the Independent Labour Party, and two secretaries: Doctor J. Robin of the international commission of the SFIO) and et John Mc Nair (secretary-general of the Independent Labour Party). Frenay was a member of the restricted Bureau, alongside Enric Adroher “Gironella”, a former activist in the Catalan Marxist Party (POUM) exiled in Paris, Fenner Brockway (from the Labour Party), Matteo Matteotti (international secretary of the Italian Socialist Workers’ Party), the German social democrat Léopold, and French socialist Marcel Klopstein. There were four French members: Bourdet, Léon Boutbien, Didier Limon, and Simon Wichene.

should remember that there is party discipline.” This comment was surely a reference to the campaign launched by the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* among MEPs to ask them to sign an appeal for the creation of a Federal Constituent Assembly. Frenay gave a sharp response: “This resolution was nothing more than the logical outcome of efforts made at Lugano, an international conference that the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe, of which, I remind you, I was a founder of and helped organise and whose results have been approved by my comrades Lhuilier, Jaquet, and Philip”.<sup>386</sup> He justified his position thus: “For my part, I consider that there is no contradiction with socialist doctrine in my European activity”.

The mission of this Committee was to call an international conference that brought together “socialists, trade unionists, progressives, democrats, pacifists, Resistance fighters, and deportees” with the theme: “The socialist United States of Europe: The only way to overcome the democratic and social crisis of Europe and prevent a third world war.” The motto of the conference, which was held in Montrouge on June 21-22, 1947, was “Unite or perish”.<sup>387</sup>

In the foreword to the conference minutes, Pivert recalled that this movement originated during the war on the initiative of the British Independent Labour Party and James Maxton, who wanted to revive the ideal of proletarian internationalism after “the Nazi fascist counter-revolution”. The circle then widened. This was how Pivert, a pacifist socialist with libertarian leanings, defined the political and geopolitical context of the Montrouge meeting in June 1947:

1. Activists of all tendencies who claimed mainly to be from the workers’ movement (trade unions and socialists) and who, for the first time since the end of World War I, entered

<sup>386</sup> Letter from H. Frenay to Guy Mollet, December 12, 1951. Archives of OURS.

<sup>387</sup> Source : *Unir ou Périr. Les États-Unis d'Europe. Rapport de la conférence internationale*, Paris, June 21 & 22, 1947, London, National Labour Press LTD, 1947. Archives of OURS. I would like to thank Frédéric Cépède for his help.

into a fraternal contract around a common propaganda exercise, do not resign themselves into dividing Europe and the world into two hostile blocs.

2. Nor do they resign themselves to the prospect or fate of a third world war that would bring about chaos and the ruin of all civilisation on the planet.
3. They do not place themselves in terms of power politics, diplomatic combinations, balances of military forces, areas of influence, or strategic points. On the contrary: all place themselves on the level of the common interest of all workers, of all united civilised men, whether they like it or not, in the search for a constructive solution to be opposed together to a false destructive solution to armed violence and war.
4. All postulate that beyond the positions taken by governments, staff, bureaucracies, and most of the time outside of any democratic consultation of the masses, there are elements of a universal public awareness that, if we can mobilise it, will force leaders to change the course of events that lead us to the worst disaster. (...)

We propose to propagate the idea of a socialist Europe, to study the conditions for it to come to pass and to fight the deformations, whether conscious or otherwise, that would tend to confuse us with the supporters of one bloc or the other. We appeal in our effort to the solidarity of American workers and will try to involve in our enterprise the workers of the countries of eastern Europe, as well as Russian workers themselves, so unfortunately isolated from the rest of the world.

Above all, we stress the need for all European workers to find and define themselves, if they want to escape the terrible dangers of one form of colonisation or another. As for the rest, we trust men of goodwill, the union and socialist activists themselves who would have to guide their organisations towards

this common perspective. If they did not succeed, not only would Europe be permanently torn and enslaved, but socialism would be no more than a generous rejected dream soon enveloped in its purple shroud where the dead gods sleep. He would have simply let his hour pass on the dial of history.

With Pivert<sup>388</sup>, Frenay would play an active part in the conference held in the party room at the Montrouge town hall on June 21-22, 1947, in the presence of representatives of a dozen countries “bringing together all nuances of socialist thought”:<sup>389</sup> “ England, Holland, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Poland, Luxembourg, Germany, Greece, Norway, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, the United States of America, and France. International movements were represented, such as the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*, which was largely in the majority (its president, Henri Brugmans, but also Marc, Koch, Voisin); the International of Religious Socialists; and the labour study and action group for the achievement of European unity (Charles Hernu). The socialist dimension of the event was not concealed: on Friday, June 20, before the grand meeting at the Mutualité de Paris, the delegates were given a “fraternal” reception at the socialist federation SFIO de la Seine. However, the objective was to go beyond the first core, as indicated in his first speech at the Mutualité:

For the first time in a very long time, socialists and libertarians, pacifists and Resistance fighters, trade unionists and writers, have come together around the socialist idea of Europe; survivors of the German death camps came to shout their desire for solidarity with German revolutionary socialists; a surviving Siberian convict came to assert his confidence in the revolutionary potential of the Russian people, which should not be confused with its bureaucracy; activists separated

388 <https://maitron.fr/spip.php?article166971>, notice to Marceau Pivert (new version), by Quentin Gasteuil. Version posted online October 28, 2014, last modified July 7, 2020.

389 According to a document by the Comité d'études et d'action pour les États-Unis socialistes d'Europe, session of October 1947. This document can be found in the archives of the European Movement. AHUE, ME 368.

within their country found themselves in agreement for common international work, in all works of life, towards the social transformation of Europe.

The issue for Pivert was twofold: to socialise emerging federalism, and Europeanise French socialism.

Why this strong presence of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*? In my opinion, Frenay was the reason. It is known that the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* was baptised in Paris on December 15 and 16, 1946, at the headquarters of the *La Fédération* movement, the most important French federalist body led by André Voisin, who was also secretary-general of the French coordination committee of federalist movements. The *Union européenne des fédéralistes* was the brainchild of three former Resistance fighters: Brugmans, Marc and Silva. Francis Gérard Kumleben, an anti-Nazi German exiled in France since the 1930s and secretary of the *Comité international pour la Fédération Européenne*, also deserves a mention for having put in contact, after a visit from Brugmans at his office the home of the weekly *Libertés*, the Swiss and Dutch federalists, thus allowing the international Herstein meeting of September 1946, which, along with the meeting held a month later in Luxembourg, would prepare the foundations for the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*.<sup>390</sup> Henri Brugmans, a former Dutch socialist member of parliament and former Resistance fighter, was president. The secretary-general was Marc, one of the fathers of personalist federalism; Marc and Frenay shared the greatest esteem for Mounier, with whom they had fought in the Resistance in Lyon (Mounier having been arrested with members of the *Combat* movement). Raymond Silva, a World War I veteran and at one time tempted by Colonel de La Rocque, was an active Resistance fighter; he had worked with Father Chaillet, one of the writers for the *Combat* movement in its early days, a founder of *Témoignage Chrétien*; a Jew himself, Silva

390 J.-F. Billion, “Les fédéralistes et l'idée européenne en France des années 1930 à la Libération”, in the collection *Les fédéralistes en Europe des années 1930 à la fondation de l'Union européenne des fédéralistes (Paris - décembre 1946)*, J.-F. Billion, Wilfried Loth, J.-P. Gouzy, D. Preda, Angelica Radicchi, and Fabio Zucca, Lyon, Presse Fédéraliste, 2018; in the underground Paris newspaper *Libertés*, the heir to the anti-Stalinist Marxist magazine *Que Faire?* founded by A. Ferrat in 1934 and close to the movements Libérer et Fédérer and L'Insurgé, see J.-F. Billion, “Il Comitato...”, *op. cit.*



organised with Soutou illegal passage for persecuted persons (Jews, escapees from the Compulsory Labour Service, and Resistance fighters) in Switzerland, where he would work to develop federalist theses. The *Union européenne des fédéralistes* (UEF) was a federation of autonomous movements (around 40) present in eight countries. Its programme was a federalist programme, but of no political colour, as stated in article 2 of its constitution: “The purpose of the UEF is to work on the creation of a European federation to which the powers required to safeguard the common interests of European citizens and states would be transferred. This European federation will guarantee fundamental freedoms (including the freedom of organised opposition) and have effective powers concerning international trade, currency, foreign policy, and defence”. Frenay became familiar with the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* at the conference organised by the latter in Amsterdam (April 12-15, 1947), where he represented the International Committee of European Socialists with the Spaniard Enrique Gironella and Englishman John Mc Nair. This was the first official contact between Frenay and the head of the UEF, contact that was facilitated by his proximity to Marc.<sup>391</sup> Note that on this occasion, the UEF feared that “the world should not split into hostile blocs” or be divided up into “zones of influence”. One of the points raised at this conference, which could only suit Frenay, concerned Germany. A motion condemned the fact that the German delegation was unable to attend this conference. As Jean-Pierre Gouzy would write, “the honour” of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* was “for having said in Amsterdam as early as April 1947 that there would be no solution to the problems of Europe without a solution to the German problem”.

On May 22, 1947, Frenay had a long conversation with Marc and Voisin, who appeared to want to deepen the relationship with the Committee for the Socialist United States of Europe. Frenay reported this to his friend and comrade Pivert. He warned Pivert that the nebulous *Union européenne des fédéralistes* had a number of formations “of a centrist or even right-wing nature”, but that these formations were willing to cooperate with personalities or groups “whose socialist spirit

391 J.-P. Gouzy, *Les Pionniers de l'Europe communautaire*, op. cit., p. 41.

was undeniable”.<sup>392</sup> In his eyes, the obstacle was not insurmountable: “While our own perspectives are not exactly the same as those of Marc or Voisin, the fact remains that the federalist nature of their concerns is also in our interests.” This letter reveals that Marc and Voisin had requested that Frenay help in their work. Frenay spoke about it to Bourdet and to Gironella, who seemed to be in favour of this rapprochement. He attempted to convince Pivert to join in, explaining to him, not without a certain relevance, that federalist ideas had a better chance of being valued within the framework of the UEF courtesy of a sort of multiplier effect (whereas the Committee could have appeared as a simple outgrowth of the SFIO) and that it would be useful to develop its socialist dimension:

Indeed, in the current perspective of our contemporaries, it must be recognised that the word “Europe” has greater resonance in the current state of world affairs than the word “socialist”. Therefore, I believe that if we walk away from such an enterprise, the work of which is already to a large extent done exclusively by those of a centrist bent, we would be failing in our duty and I, for my part, have always preferred the policy of presence to that of stroppy abstention.

As he did in the Resistance, Frenay advocated unity for better efficiency, even if this meant composing, i.e. in this case, sacrificing a little socialism for more federalism. This was even though the aim was, he would confide to Pivert, to tactically attempt to “influence the general orientation” of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* during congresses and not to allow the development of important initiatives “outside our influence”. On the contrary: it was the excellent structuring of the UEF, the number of its member organisations, and the weight of its publications (“... the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* currently has fifteen or sixteen journals in which to express its own ideas”) that won Frenay over. One can understand the importance of the presence of the UEF at the Montrouge conference: the aim was to convince Pivert to make common cause with the *Union européenne*

392 Letter from H. Frenay to M. Pivert, Paris, May 22, 1947. AHUE, UEF 1.

*des fédéralistes*, and *vice versa*. Two days after the conference, on June 24, 1947, a summit was held in Geneva with Frenay and members of the General Secretariat of the UEF, at which the principles of cooperation were established. The challenge was to “strengthen the socialist tendency with the UEF”.<sup>393</sup> Frenay did not yet know that he had just prepared for his future as a federalist. For Brugmans and Marc, the Montrouge conference was also an opportunity to observe Frenay’s behaviour, but also to confirm, as Marc would note, that the texts distributed to members of congress were “the same ones we support in federalist movements”.

The French delegation impressed the leaders of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*. Most of those present were from the SFIO (Albert Gazier, a former minister, Lamine Guye, a former minister, Léon Boutbien, Yves Dechezelles, Marceau Pivert, Georges Dardel, Gérard Valentin, etc.). A number of personalities emerged: Bourdet (introduced as “director of the newspaper *Combat*”; Emmanuel Mounier, director of the journal *Esprit*; René Lefeuvre, director of the journal *Masses*; Marcel Hytte, director of the journal *La République moderne*; André J.-E. Prudhommeaux, director of the newspaper *Le Libéraire*; Edmond Breuillard, secretary of the union of teachers in the Paris region; Pierre Girard, president of the French Confederation of European and Social and Cultural Forces; Bernard Salmon, member of the Bureau of the General Pacifist Confederation; Louis Louvet, Secretary-General of the General Confederation Against Racism; Louis-Henri Sampaix, member of the World Bureau of the International Union Against Racism; Maurice Joyeux, from the Anarchist Federation; the writer Robert Saarrac (in fact Sarrazac), a friend of Frenay from the Resistance and who had recently founded the Centre for Research and Globalist Expression and the Human Front of World Citizens. We note the absence of Camus, Spinelli and friends of André Ferrat. Frenay appeared as Secretary-General of the *Socialisme et Liberté* movement.

393 Minutes of the meeting held on June 24, 1947, between a delegation of the Comité d’études et d’action pour les États-Unis socialistes d’Europe and the general secretariat of the UEF. AHUE, UEF 213.

## Socialism first and the United States of Europe afterwards?

Work began at 10.00 a.m. on Saturday, June 21. The session was chaired by Bob Edwards, from the ILP, and president of the International Committee. He was accompanied by John McNair (England), Jef Last (Holland), Witte (Greece), Enrique Gironella (Spain), and Henri Frenay (France).

Jacques Robin, secretary-general of the conference,<sup>394</sup> began by citing the very recent change in the geopolitical context. Would the socialist United States of Europe be the only way to “overcome the economic and social crisis” and “prevent a third world war”? World War II had barely finished, and a fear of a new war began to occupy people’s minds. Why? This fear was a product of the realisation that “the world was polarising at an ever increasing pace around two blocs: the USA and the USSR: capitalism versus a “bureaucratic planned economy”. Given their diverging interests, together with opposing ideologies (“freedom” versus “social justice”) conflict could be the only inevitable outcome. During the morning’s discussions the conviction that Europe could appear as a “synthesis between the socialist economic planning rejected by the United States and the fundamental human freedoms that the USSR neglects” emerged: “We do not refer to a third bloc; if you wish, we could refer to a third force, not as opposition to the other two but as a product of a synthesis between the two main terms.” While the objective was economically viable, according to the speakers, would it be socially and ideologically viable? The only answer for those present: “international socialism”, which would constitute the necessary binder, since it alone would allow progress to be made. The “practical process”, as Robin would state, had yet to be determined. On this point, there seemed to be a lack of imagination. Fortunately, General Marshall had just given a speech (June 5, 1947) that took on the appearance of a divine surprise responding to

394 J. Robin would be the Secretary-General (1947-1957) of the Comité international pour les États-Unis socialistes d’Europe, which became the Mouvement socialiste pour les États-Unis d’Europe in 1949.

this need for a solution: “I believe”, said Robin, “that this Marshall proposal could be an opportunity for our socialist forces to provide our own solutions to these problems”. The limitations of the socialist federalists’ plans and their inability to imagine a path of their own cannot be expressed any more clearly: we settle into a frame of mind that is not predisposed to thinking about the autonomous future of Europe, let alone socialism. The terms used express a feeling of satisfaction that seems to go straight in the direction of unconditional acceptance: “General Marshall has proposed a plan on paper for the organisation of Europe. A magnificent platform that could allow us to start the current historical process and make it a weapon of *Combat*.” However, one issue would temper this irenicism: the US offer could be an “instrument that divided Europe into two blocs” or, conversely, “a first pledge of a world organisation for peace”. The first danger would be that “the European bourgeoisies” could appropriate it to assert their power. The second would be that this offer could become “a clever way of reorganising Europe for the service of America”. The issue of the meaning of the Marshall Plan was raised: would it have a “meaning of peace” (and therefore, of progress)? Yes, said the members of congress, if European governments refused “conditions of political and economic dependence” that the US could impose on them. The US offer could only be accepted if “it is used by the Europeans themselves on the basis of planning in favour of raising living standards for the masses of Europe, not for European bourgeoisies”.

The final motion of the congress expressed this ambivalence in clear terms: “The offer made by General Marshall to help Europe meets a vital need for the latter, but will not constitute a factor in peace if it is accompanied by any form of political and economic subjugation, whether acknowledged or not”.

The return to geopolitical reality was realised by an intervention by the representative of the “non-governmental” Polish Socialist Party, who intended to “dispel ambiguities”. Zygmunt Zaremba, an eminent figure in the Polish *Parti socialiste* before the war, one of the leaders of the Warsaw Uprising and exiled in France in 1946 after the Soviets took power in Poland, wanted to give a voice to countries in the Soviet zone of influence that were no longer able to express themselves. “Soviet

imperialism imposes Soviet governments on the countries of central and eastern Europe. It is only the USSR’s military occupation of these countries that enables the governments of these countries to hold on to power. All democratic institutions have been destroyed. Soviet security police act with vigour. It cannot be about socialism.” How to think of Europe under these conditions, he wondered? Some Europeans were suffering from this “heartbreak”. For Marc, the “shock” between the two blocs seemed inevitable. The best way to fight for peace would be to “constitute a third force” around a united Europe. Regarding socialism, he believed that federalism should not identify with it, firstly because too often socialist parties have disappointed the aspirations of the masses and the expectations of “revolutions” and, secondly, it was important not to exclude social strata “influenced by Christian doctrine”. The content of the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* programme was socialist, but the label had to remain neutral. Europe would only become a “reality” if it was based on a “coherent economic and social doctrine”.

While the final motion takes account of this position, it cannot avoid a certain ambiguity that reflects the limits of the federal project and its propensity to pious wishes:

Unless it wants to consecrate its own division, Europe is not conceivable without all of the people who constitute its historical community. Thus, it includes territories under Soviet influence, and which will form the essential connection with the USSR. As a first step, and given current circumstances, this half-European, half-Asian country cannot be included in the framework that the social and democratic Europe of tomorrow should set for itself.

It was during the Saturday afternoon session, chaired by Louis Vailant (Fédération de la Seine, SFIO), that Frenay intervened as secretary-general of the *Socialisme et Liberté* group. One of Frenay’s reasons for Europeanism came not from a doctrinal rejection of the phenomenon of nations (as is often said), but from the pragmatic observation of the weakness and failure of democratic nations in the face of Nazism

and the anti-humanist nationalisms that contaminated Europe in the interwar years. This was what brought him closer to Bertie Albrecht when they first met, as he told *Combat* in 1943:

It was at this property (Bertie's home in Sainte-Maxime), to which I would return so often afterwards, that we exchanged our first impressions of our shared concern about the Hitlerian tide in Germany and *the weakness of the great democratic nations towards it*. We met in Paris, in his apartment on Avenue Victor-Emmanuel. A kind-hearted woman, she could not be satisfied with the worldly life to which her fortune and relationships gave her access. She devoted all her activity to rescuing German refugees, who taught me about the brutality and sadistic cruelty of the masters of the Reich. For her as it was for me, the war was inevitable. We knew with absolute certainty that no concession would satisfy the Hitlerian Moloch and that, in the near future, two forces of civilisation would collide. We knew that France would soon undergo the great test. We decided to prepare for it, in order to serve better.<sup>395</sup>

This impotence of nations to curb Nazism was his obsession; it also fed his criticism of the myth of sovereignty. According to him, institutions and a policy that do not allow a return to such a situation had to be put in place. Peace in Europe required a preparedness to go beyond the Maginot Line or Siegfried Line, and to put aside the sovereignist illusion:

I believe that one of the main problems of our atomic age is to make it clear to men that the national sovereignties that were necessary at a particular stage of historical evolution no longer meet current requirements. If we persist with it at all costs, despite the evidence, we should not complain about what happens to us. It is clear that it is as a result of these national sovereignties that nationalist minds can develop: this is how we could continue to be made to believe that the security of

<sup>395</sup> H. Frenay, "Vie et mort d'une Française", *Combat*, August 28, 1943, p. 2.

men and women in each nation lies in the construction of a Maginot Line or a Siegfried Line, how we would continue to assert that we need military funds to defend ourselves, when these funds have only one result: to deprive different peoples of food. This century, I believe we should follow this formula: internationalism is a duty. (...) The second point I see as crucial is to bring together, in the same struggle, the working class (which has already been at the forefront of the fight for 100 years) and all executives and technicians, who, while not proletarians in the strict sense of the term, now also have the same goals: peace, socialism, and freedom.

We would have to wait for the intervention of Fenner Brockway, of the Labour Party, to enter into the concrete aspects of this Europe of the future. He recommended the creation of an industrial organisation that allowed Europe to avoid becoming a "colony" of the United States, proposing nothing more and nothing less than what would become Jean Monnet's CECA (Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier). For him, the solution was to pool the minerals of the Ruhr so that "economies are socialised": "Finally, we must socialise the coal of Europe; the complete socialisation of all minerals and distribution according to the needs of European populations to avoid differences in standards of living from one country to another." In addition to coal, Brockway wanted the movement to take into account "the big problem that remains", i.e. "our relationships with our coloured brothers in all the former colonies": "No country has the right to dominate another country."

The presence of anti-colonialism was discreet, as was that of integral pacifism, represented by Mr. Laval, a member of the French section of the Fourth International, a Trotskyist movement created in March 1944. In turn, he posed the question of how to proceed: "What do we want to do? The United States and socialism next? Or socialism first and the United States of Europe afterwards?" He chose the former option. This questioning would be at the heart of the European process throughout the 20th century. But what mattered most to this activist was the "struggle against European chauvinism", i.e. the "struggle against militarism": "Therefore, one should direct the

struggle against credit, colonialism, etc.” This was a point of major disagreement with a man such as Frenay, for example. At a time when “World War III” began to haunt people’s minds, when the formation of the two blocs was becoming more tangible by the day, was it the best time to disarm Europe?

Pivert praised the work done, even though he was not fooled by the “obstacles of all kinds” linked to the fact that he wanted to “put ideas side by side, to try to find language that could suit the comrades from different countries with different origins, different ideologies, but who have all understood the need to create Europe today.”

## “The German vacuum is at the heart of the European vacuum”

---

In Montrouge on the afternoon of Sunday June 22, there was a general discussion on a very sensitive issue: the “German problem”. Frenay, introduced as the “leader of one of the most important resistance movements in France”, was appointed to report to the conference on a document that, to a large extent, had been written by him. The minutes state: “Frenay took up the main points of the document and (to lengthy applause on a number of occasions) made an instant appeal to the Conference: he called for all aspects of the problems posed by Germany to be at the very heart of the examination of possibilities for peace.”

The former minister developed the general idea that the Germany of 1947, “despite having done away with Nazism, remained the main political problem for the world”, and not just for France.

It was a very detailed, quantified, and documented report that offered an economists’ reading of the European disorder and wars of the 20th century. The aim was to show that “Germany, the economic centre of Europe, determines the standard of living of the peoples of the continent” and that since the beginning of the 20th century, “the history of Europe and of the world has followed the economic and political evolution of Germany quite closely”. According to Frenay, World War I was caused by the economic and demographic growth of Germany, devoid of a tradition of empire and global networks, which led it to “go and conquer markets”; “the German bourgeoisie led Germany to the military conquest of vital new areas of expansion”. Social democracy, which was struggling against revolutionary tendencies, accepted the Treaty of Versailles, which was “dictated by the strength of the victor and intended to perpetuate the balkanisation of Europe and the economic suffocation of Germany”. Frenay pointed the finger of responsibility for the European dysfunctions of the inter-war period at the Treaty of Versailles. He forgot the efforts at peace made at the end of the 1920s, and ignored the economic upturn of Germany as a



result, in particular, of the forgiveness of debts and the normalisation of Franco-German relations before Hitler. The economic ruin that followed led to “internal dislocation” and the victory of Hitler, who would repeat the pattern and engage in the search for new outlets: “The bourgeoisie and capital united behind the screen of Hitlerism”: hence “the economic unification of Europe around Germany” and the domination of “European, even global” trusts and cartels. And yet, the Hitlerian “greater Europe” came up against not only the “American capitalist competitor and Russian totalitarianism (despite the tactical pact with Moscow)”, but also “the last remnants of internationalist socialist consciousness”. The war started in Germany, and dragged Europe into chaos. In 1945, “Germany and Europe were defeated. The winners were outside of Europe”. It was an idea dear to Frenay that Europe was “vanquished” and that the victors, contrary to the belief that Gaullists and Communists sought to assert, were not in Europe. This Europe had to be reborn as Europe, or die. For the great Resistance fighter, who paid a personal price for the country and who even “invented” the Resistance, the victory of France was largely a fiction: its freedom and autonomy had been hampered by its economic fragility and political weakness. The future of France could only be European.

And yet, in material terms Europe was in ruins, and its spirits low. But it was the economic angle that Frenay chose to develop around the theme: “The German misery of today is a reflection of the general misery of Europe”. His deeply-held conviction was that all European countries had lost this war; therefore, the fate of Germany could not be separated from that of other countries. He recalled that prior to the war, Germany was the main supplier to the rest of Europe and had the highest standard of living. In 1947, it was living on “American semi-charity and what Russian reparations plans left it”. Frenay had a masterly phrase: “The impoverishment of Germany determines the impoverishment of Europe. The German vacuum is at the heart of the European vacuum.” The observation was a bitter one: never had so many Europeans suffered from such a shortage of food, clothing, housing, and the most basic industry products. It followed from this

observation that there was a necessary link between German industrial reconstruction and European reconstruction. This theory is surprisingly close to the one that Monnet had attempted to promote.

The whole of Frenay’s argument aims to make Germany appear as a metonymy of Europe. Germany was the object of a veritable “symbolic and practical struggle” between the new superpowers that had won the war: The United States and the USSR. Who would get the biggest chunk of Germany? The Treaty of Potsdam (1945) set the scene for this “helmeted race between giants”: military occupation, agricultural regions given to Poland, the expulsion of 12 million Germans, and the dismantling of industry but, at the same time and contradictorily, an obligation to pay onerous reparations for many years. Thus, it was “economic revenge” that had condemned Germany to import its food without being able to export, which “imposed a real cold strangulation of the German people as a whole (whether Nazi or anti-Nazi) that would soon see it exhaust its physical and moral strength”. Thus, what we have here is a “polarisation” of Germany around the “two blocs” that existed in Europe and the world, as evidenced by the unification of the French, British, and American zones and the Saar and Ruhr coal agreement. Opposite was the Russian zone, which was essentially agricultural and whose industrial centres had been transferred to Russia. Berlin was at the epicentre of this new global confrontation that had taken Germany hostage: “Berlin, the heart of Germany, razed, looted, isolated from the rest of the country, is at the same time blackmailed, threatened, and seduced via material means by the four victor nations.”

Frenay then analysed the Moscow conference, which was held from March 10 to April 24, 1947. The American, British, French, and Soviet foreign ministers tried to reach an agreement on the fate of Germany. This conference, which was a failure, revealed a major US-Soviet divide, explained the speaker.

The Americans advocated raising German production so that it could pay for its imports, but feared that Germany would become “the centre of a powerful European economy” and take some of its global market share. The Soviets wanted to do everything possible to ensure

that Germany did not become the industrial arsenal of the Western bloc: the increase in production had to be proportional to the level of reparations payments. The differences observed were mainly political in nature: The Soviets were in favour of a unified German state, hoping that the Communist Party would prevail and allow the USSR “to absorb Germany without significant internal upheaval”. Meanwhile, the United States advocated a policy of decentralisation and “federalisation” to avoid this shift to the east, but also to exercise better control over the development of small political entities, deprived of “any economic life without the financial assistance of American capitalism”. For Frenay, “a fundamental discordance” was the reason for the failure of the conference on the following points: reparations; the economic unification of the four zones; a provisional political form granted to Germany; permanent borders; the future of the Ruhr and of the Saar; definitions of German assets in Austria; and the demilitarisation of Germany after the period of occupation.

What conclusion can we draw from this? “Germany, and therefore Europe, can only expect misery and preparation for war from the two blocs.” That year (1947), when the Cold War began to haunt people, for socialist federalists, it was not a matter of throwing themselves into the arms of the Americans. The emerging bipolarisation could only be dramatic for Europe, not just for Germany. Thus, Germany appeared to foreshadow what awaited the countries of Europe. However, distracted by other concerns and the urgency of their material situation, these European countries did not seem to grasp the challenges of the moment: “European nations’ position vis-à-vis Germany was strangely uncertain and without prospects. All driven to misery or expediency, these nations behaved according to their immediate day-to-day interests.” And what did the people think? They were even less clear-headed than their governments. The federalists and Frenay were not so fooled as to be unable to grasp the geopolitical issues of the moment. This would be one of the causes of resistance to the federalist solution among European nations. However, the federalists, who would remain an elite and were often visionary, would soon forget it... “The various peoples of Europe, horribly bruised by Nazism and its executioners, remain keenly sensitive towards their enemy of

yesteryear. Their view of Germany, which until the start of the 20th century had had the largest population in Europe, was an incorrect one”.

As stated in a general intelligence report (the police had a discreet presence in Montrouge), Frenay called for a disassociation between the Germans and Nazism, arguing that “a people, as a whole, cannot be deemed responsible when its actions come at a time when it is ruled by a dictatorial government”. Conversely, he emphasised the responsibility of the democracies that had “had the means by which to curb Hitler’s appetites since 1936”, but “did not act”<sup>396</sup> when Nazi troops occupied the Rhineland.

Frenay was then warmly applauded. His lesson in geopolitics was very relevant: one could still imagine that a Europe between two blocs was possible. As we now know, this hope was an illusion. Given his commitment to the Resistance, his lucidity on the “German problem” was both remarkable in its prescience and courageousness. However, public opinion was not mature enough to understand this.

Frenay did not stop there: he then invited the conference to vote on the wording of an appeal to the German people that he had written. “This would be”, he said, “the first real pledge of peace outlined since the end of World War II.” The conference report was complimentary: “It was one of the successes of this conference to have been able to make this international appeal to the German people and German youth”. The journalist from *Die Welt* promised to be the “propagandist” for this text. Leopold of the German Social Democratic Party was in agreement. Only the Polish delegation refused to vote for the text.

This was the text. It was to be sent to all socialist parties, trade unionists, and “German pacifists and German youth”.

396 Note from general intelligence, June 23, 1947, AN 457 AP 28 (private papers of Georges Bidault), cited by Olivier de Lapparent, *Henri Frenay, de la Résistance au fédéralisme. Itinéraire d'un Européen. 1940-1955*, DEA thesis, Université Paris I Sorbonne, 1997-1998, under the direction of Robert Frank, pp. 60-61.

## APPEAL TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE

German comrades,

At the end of the Paris conference, to promote the idea and identify the main lines of the constitution of the socialist United States of Europe, the delegates of 14 countries have decided to make this appeal to you.

In the aftermath of this war, the peoples of Europe, impoverished and starving, felt the anguish of a third world war weighing down on them, a war that would supersede the previous two wars in terms of the destruction and horror it would bring.

Two blocs are being formed around American capitalism and Stalinist totalitarianism at the cost of the enslavement of consciences and peoples, by not providing the expected solutions to the problems facing the world.

While all countries and peoples, in particular in Europe, are threatened by this deadly antagonism, it is in Germany where the two political rivals are most acutely at odds; it is through your country that the line of demarcation has now been drawn, and on which the outposts of the next conflict will be established.

The problem of Germany, which at the centre of this drama as a result of fate, is of interest both for the Germans and for all those who irrevocably refuse to be the fourriers of world oppression and the victims of the next atomic war to which it would be the prelude.

This is the reason we have identified the morally and economically viable positions that, on their own, give us an out in the face of the moral dilemma before us, and from the terms of which we are urged to choose. If we proclaim that all German parties and the majority of the German people are responsible for Hitler's rise to power, we must recognise that by denying

Germany the right to life, Western "democracies", an expression used to refer to world capitalism, pushed the German people to this solution to national desperation: Nazism.

We solemnly warn the German people against the mentality and methods introduced into large sections of German public opinion by 12 years of the Hitlerian regime. Only its will, translated into action to break definitively with this past, can and must create the climate of trust needed for the integration of Germany into the European community.

We proclaim that keeping a whole people in a state of psychological misery will not allow them to escape the environment of hate-based nationalism imposed on them by Hitler. If we do not feed Germany, there will be no solution to the German problem.

We proclaim that framework for discussion established at Potsdam and Moscow by the Big Four as regards Germany is criminally absurd. Placed in the anachronic perspectives of previous treaties, it can only favour warmongers to the detriment of peoples.

We proclaim that the weakening or annihilation of German economic strength is a crime against Germany and Europe, which, in order to survive, need the resources that come from German soil, industry, and engineering. This policy of economic Malthusianism is the outcome of the two global imperialisms and of the attitude of certain countries in Europe that fear that a resurrected Germany will support one or the other of the two blocs.

We denounce any policy that, in defiance of the person and the right of peoples to self-determination, leads to shameful migratory movements of people, sacrificed either to nationalism or to racism.

We affirm that the denazification, democratisation, and re-education of the German people can only be achieved by the German people themselves under the leadership of the

German resistance to Hitler, supported by all democratic peoples, not the work of occupying troops. War will be avoided not by mutilating Germany, but by integrating it into a larger community to which it, along with other peoples, would relinquish a large part of its sovereignty.

We proclaim that under no circumstances can the presence of occupying troops on its soil be considered a contribution to the socialist and internationalist recovery of the German people.

Finally, we urge Germans to realise that the two dangers that threaten them, and us, are capitalism and nationalist or authoritarian pseudo-socialism. To both, we will respond together with our ideal of socialism and freedom with the same resolution.

Having entered the age of superpowers, the successor to the age of nations, we must find the geographical bases that will ensure its political and economic independence (i.e. those that will make it a global reality) to secure the victory of this idea.

Aware of the historic times in which we live, we proclaim the need for, and urgency of, the constitution of the socialist United States of Europe on a federal basis. Inserted between two blocs, without wishing to oppose either of them, it alone can bring the world this first internationalist socialist hearth and the balance that is absent, i.e. constitute the barrier to the war that poses a threat to our freedoms and lives.

By means of socialisation at the base and within the framework of a planned economy, the people will demand to keep economic power (i.e. the keys to war and peace) in their hands, not in those of the State.

The socialist United States of Europe, which will have safeguarded the cultural autonomy of the peoples who comprise it, hereby appeals, by way of the vote of their sponsors, to overseas populations that are freeing themselves from the yoke of despoiler imperialism. We invite them to form with us,

irrespective of race, creed, or colour, the union of peoples who, by virtue of the immensity and wealth of their territories, demographic power, and shared ideal of social justice, freedom, and peace, will have the will, then the strength, to constitute the resolute barrier to international trusts and dictatorships, i.e. war.

This is the goal proposed by the men and women who participated in the Paris Conference for the socialist United States of Europe, a historic and decisive step towards peace. It is in order to achieve this objective that they issue the German people with a fraternal invitation to join them in a common effort for the liberation of all peoples.

Sure that they represent the wishes, whether expressed or not, of the vast majority of peoples placed by fate between the two deadly branches of the pincers of oppression;

Strengthened by the support that they will provide each other in the struggle that is about to begin;

Excited by the grandiose perspectives that they freely offer each other;

Aware of the importance and urgency of action;

*To strengthen our solidarity: The socialist United States of Europe!*

*For peace against war: The socialist United States of Europe!*

*For socialism and freedom: The socialist United States of Europe!*

*Against all forms of oppressions: The socialist United States of Europe!*

FORWARD, THEREFORE, WITH THE SAME POWERFUL MOMENTUM FOR THE SOCIALIST UNITED STATES OF EUROPE!

This declaration had obvious symbolic power: it sought to shatter the taboo that afflicted Germany. Proclaiming the reinsertion of post-Hitlerian Germany was by no means a rhetorical formality for those (the majority of those present at the conference) who had endured Nazism, who had fought it, and who had suffered under it. Frenay and his friends believed in the possibility of a German rebirth within a democratic, European framework. Their prescience, brave and generous, was fair and turned out to be correct. They were also right to link the formation of a European entity and the re-establishment of Germany. Their awareness of the polarisation of the world and of the threat of a new conflict was now commonplace in this environment of 1947.

But they were wrong to be right too early. They were out of step with French opinion, but also with the French government. The historian Georges-Henri Soutou reminds us that we must beware of the bias of anachronism when studying this period. Washington, at the very beginning of the post-war period, was not in the logic of transforming Germany into a military arsenal against the Soviets; the American government was above all preoccupied by the French attitude, “France having, since 1945, contributed powerfully, as is too often forgotten, to blocking the German question”<sup>397</sup>. This prescience did not protect them from a propensity for self-delusion. First of all, they deluded themselves about the concrete possibilities of the congruent and simultaneous advent of the United States of Europe and of socialism. They also deluded themselves about the ability of states to defeat “international trusts” and to emancipate themselves from capitalism, and about the prospect of a “union of peoples” and the reality of the will of peoples to impose themselves or oppose states. They also deluded themselves about the possibility of the existence of a Europe independent of the two blocs.

One great forgotten player was the State: it was as if the State had been swept away by war and was now no more than a bit player in history. However, Frenay knew how difficult it was to make a democratic

<sup>397</sup> Georges-Henri Soutou, *La guerre froide. 1943-1990*, Paris, Fayard/Pluriel, 2001-2010, p. 248

state work: he had experienced this difficulty in creating consensus, in forging a common will, in lessening ideological conflict and political rivalries, despite the urgent matters faced at the time.

The ultimate illusion was the belief in the efficiency of the *Comité d'études et d'action pour les États-Unis socialistes d'Europe*, and in its ability to change the course of history. What was the status of this committee? We are not really sure: it was neither a political party nor a movement. The *Comité d'études et d'action pour les États-Unis socialistes d'Europe* declares that it does not in any way aim to create a movement in the ordinary sense of this term; nor does it aim to create a new international, the birth of which would have no result other than to oppose the existing socialist international.”

So what did this committee want, and what could it do? “Essentially, it wanted to develop in an ever-larger share of public opinion the idea of the socialist United States of Europe as an essential factor in equilibrium and peace.” This was huge, and very vague. Above all, with the means put in place, it was inadequate: national and local committees set up with a mission to influence (“propaganda” and “counter-propaganda”) opinion, the media, and political players, and to create liaison committees with other international organisations. Contact with the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* was announced; it was Frenay who had established the contact. The only tangible project of the Paris conference: the forthcoming organisation of a new conference. Henri became the treasurer of the organisation. The conference was brought to a close with a “vibrant” rendition of *Internationale*.

This conference on its own summed up the limitations of the federalist movements that arose after World War II: all were affected by a sort of self-fulfilling Messianism fuelled by a discourse lost in incantatory generalities as generous as they were unrealistic.

Jacques Robin, the organiser of the conference, was not fooled. When the minutes of the conference were published two months later, he wrote: “Still in the area of insufficiencies, we note a vague phraseology of many interventions and a difficulty leading to concrete action.” He also noted a very insufficient connection with the socialist nuclei of



many European countries and the absence of prominent personalities. European socialist parties remained embedded in the national framework, and suffered from an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the Stalinist parties. The geopolitics connected to the bipolarisation of the world did not present itself as an opportunity for the advent of the United States of Europe, let alone for the socialist United States of Europe. In the summer of 1947, federalist socialists began to understand that the word “Europe” was going to be appropriated in the name of one of the two blocs, and that the Marshall Plan and the Molotov Plan were “the bait of the two giants”.

To parody Gilles Martinet, utopianism was the childhood disease of European federalism. However, it showed the path that would mark out some of its major insights in history.

## The people are not sensitive to the European ideal

As we had sensed during the Montrouge conference, Frenay was preparing to join the *Union européenne des fédéralistes*, which was less politically marked but more philosophically federalist. Two months later, he attended the first congress called by the *Union européenne des fédéralistes* in Montreux from August 27 to 31, 1947. It was an opportunity to see his friends again (Brugmans, Marc, and Silva). It was a success: 200 delegates and observers of 16 nationalities attended. There was also a development: for the first time since the war, Germans and Austrians participated on an equal footing with other Europeans at a democratically-called international congress. It was also the opportunity for Frenay to meet Denis de Rougemont. This congress was fundamental, as one of the founding texts of the integral federalism professed by de Rougemont was developed there.<sup>398</sup> It was he who gave the opening address and announced the “federalist attitude”, necessarily backed by “a certain idea of man”. In the future federation, this attitude would require a renouncement of any idea of hegemony and any “esprit de système”; “the love of complexity” led to respect for diversity and the refusal of uniformity, which prompted de Rougemont to say that federalism did not have a problem with minorities (a product of centralising States) and recognised the qualities specific to every nation. This was why the emergence of European sentiment and federalist institutions could not come suddenly and from above: according to de Rougemont, “a federation is being formed step by step by people and groups, not from a centre or through governments”.<sup>399</sup> In his memoirs, Frenay recalls a passage that he had particularly appreciated in that it resonated with what he had proclaimed for three years: “The European federation will not be the work of rulers charged with

398 D. de Rougemont (1906-1985) was born in Neuchâtel, and was the son of pastors. After completing his studies in Switzerland, he left for Paris in 1930, where he played a role in the foundation of the *Ordre Nouveau* (which was both a movement and a journal) and *Esprit*. Mobilised in Switzerland at the time of the declaration of war, he then went to the United States, where he taught at the *École Libre des Hautes Études* in New York. Upon his return, he was involved in the federalist movement.

399 Opening address by D. de Rougemont, cited by J.-M. Purro, *La fédération européenne...*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

defending the interests of their nation against the rest of the world. The federation would be the work of groups and people who take the initiative to come together *outside of* national governments”.<sup>400</sup>

The general policy motion of Congress took up the essence of the message of the Swiss federalist, and set out the three foundations of federal authority:

(...) federalists must declare that it is the absolute sovereignty of States that must be reduced. Part of this sovereignty must be entrusted to a federal authority (...) that must possess: 1) A government that is accountable to individuals and groups, not to federated States; 2) a Supreme Court capable of settling disputes between Member States of the Federation; and 3) an armed police force, placed under its command and responsible for enforcing federal decisions, without prejudice to a world security authority. If these conditions are not met, any attempt to achieve unions of an exclusively economic and cultural nature is doomed to failure.<sup>401</sup>

The federalists were loyal to their ideal, but seemed to want to remake the world far removed from geopolitical realities, the state of public opinion, and the significance of the national imagination. Federalism could appear as a sort of messianic essentialism, removed from the real world and its complexity. Just as Rougemont believed in the European dialectical man, he believed that federal Europe could reconcile the political-philosophical antagonisms that had shaped the contemporary history of Europe and which could divide it (justice/freedom, tradition/progress, unity/diversity, right/left, socialism/capitalism): “In the world of the 20th century there are just two camps, two forms of politics, two human attitudes possible: totalitarianism and federalism. A threat and a hope.”<sup>402</sup>

400 Cited in D. de Rougemont (dir.), *Dictionnaire international du fédéralisme*, op. cit., p. 263. This address would be published in 1947 under the title *L'attitude fédéraliste*.

401 The integral text of the political motion can be found in J.-P. Gouzy, *Les pionniers...*, op. cit., pp. 156-158.

402 Cited by Mary Jo Deering, *Denis de Rougemont l'Européen*, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe et Centre de recherches européennes, Lausanne, 1991, p. 213.

The second conference of the *Comité d'études et d'action pour les États-Unis socialistes d'Europe* was held at the Palais de la Mutualité in Paris in October 1947. Did it show signs of change? In the meantime, on September 20, 1947, the Marshall Plan had been signed. The Committee still seemed to be affected by the overestimation of its capacity to influence people and political leaders. The aim was to create national teams in each country in Europe in order to “turn our revolutionary theory into revolutionary action”.<sup>403</sup> How could this be achieved with the knowledge that Frenay and his friends did not want to replace large mass organisations, but only to “influence all movements”? How did they think they could influence political parties when they themselves had decided not to play a central role in them? Would they be the brains behind this approach, and leave its implementation to the parties? It was also unrealistic to believe in the existence of a desire for Europe among peoples that was inconsistent with reality, and a matter of autosuggestion. The socialist parties took a dim view of this organisation, an organisation that bore living witness to their poor awareness of Europe. Governments were caught up in emergency recovery and in the consequences of the catastrophe.

And yet, a clear-eyed analysis of the French situation should have led to a more moderate optimism. Frenay also understood very well what was happening in France in 1947. According to Frenay, the French political context was marked by a “polarisation” between “Gaullism” on the one hand (“representing French and American capitalist interests”) and “Stalinism” (representing the interests of Russian imperialism) on the other. At the time (October 1947), Frenay professed a fairly clear symmetrical rejection of both new forms of imperialism and of the two political systems incarnated by each. Why the reference to “Gaullism”? Because the French political landscape was affected by the shock of the political birth of the Gaullist movement, the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (April 1947). In this development, the Parti communiste saw the beginnings of a “one-party state” and the

403 The following citations are taken from the minutes of the Comité d'études et d'action pour les États-Unis socialistes d'Europe, the meeting of the International Committee, session of October 1947. AHUE, ME 368.

shadow of a dictatorship. The socialists feared the return of “boulangism”.<sup>404</sup> Families of the Resistance were split further. The newspaper *Combat* bore witness to this: Albert Ollivier and Pascal Pia joined the *Rassemblement du Peuple français* following the critical position of Camus, while the latter would lend his support to the *Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire* (RDR) created in February 1948 by the non-Communist and anti-Gaullist radical left.<sup>405</sup> The membership of this movement included André Breton and Claude Bourdet, one of the leaders of the *Combat* movement.

The Marshall Plan was signed on September 20, 1947. Federalists could not imagine that this signing would engage the future for more than 40 years, and that it would clear the way for the creation of a European Europe. The two blocs, the physical and ideological manifestation of the Cold War, would get the better of their independence and federalist hope. Frenay, clear-eyed, understood that the Jdanov report (September 1947) ratified “the permanent division of the world into two great camps: the USSR and Anglo-Saxon capitalism”. Thus, there was no longer any question of including Russia in plans for European unification, as he had suggested and as he had wished for a time. However, it was not yet a question of having America lean with its full weight against the USSR, even though Frenay was of the view that US economic aid (the Marshall Plan) was momentarily an “absolute necessity”, provided that it was oriented towards “European planning surpassing national economies”. Courtesy of this meeting of the International Committee at the Palais de la Mutualité, we know a little more about how Frenay viewed the rapid changes in international power relations. He was the rapporteur of, and inspiration for, an “Appeal to European peoples” published by the Committee on October 25, 1947.

Clearly, the dramatized tone of this appeal was linked to an emergency situation: “the prospect of a new war, a war more horrible than the one before it”. Expressed once more, this fear, linked to the appearance of the first symptoms of the Cold War, structured Frenay’s

404 An extreme right-wing movement in late 19th Century France.

405 Around David Rousset and Jean-Paul Sartre.

imagination for a long time and led to a conflict as regards the federalist ideal. Federalist mystique was threatened with dilution in the geopolitical stakes that required a choice to be made between one camp and the other. From this date onwards, making Europe would be more and more equivalent to putting in place a response *against a threat*: at first, the threat of war; later, the unilateral threat of Communism, with the outbreak of the Korean War. However, at the end of that year (1947) Frenay and his companions were persuaded that the threat of war could be deferred if the Europeans refused to choose one camp or the other:

The world is being divided at an accelerated pace into two irreducibly hostile blocs: American capitalism and Stalinist totalitarianism. In each of our countries, through the voices of their docile servants, both camps urge us to choose our side. By their own means, they gradually enslave consciences and nations.

To better conceal their imperialism, they put on a false mask: one, that of social justice; the other, that of freedom.

Men and women of Europe, Washington and Moscow will not teach us the meaning of these two terms: they were born on the barricades of the revolutions we share. Today, we will not call on Wall Street bankers or GPU<sup>406</sup> men to translate it. To choose between them is to accept the war that, whichever way it comes, would result in our annihilation. Therefore, whether it is to defend his life or the foundations of his civilisation, every European has an urgent duty to refuse to provide tithes assistance to one or other of the two adversaries.

This proclamation of European non-alignment allows us to put in their place those who, today, wish to portray Frenay as a stipend of Harry Truman’s United States. On the contrary: the former Resistance fighter wanted Europe, after its federal transformation, to constitute a

406 The GPU was the Soviet State Police, transformed in NKVD in 1934.

“third world force”. However, he was not interested in just any Europe: he wanted this Europe to be built on the foundations of the principles of socialism, presented as “also attached to the principles of social justice and freedom, refusing to sacrifice one for the other”. For Frenay, it was “the hope of our time”.

This appeal was supported and relayed by a “first appeal to international opinion” from a group of French “intellectuals” that brought together men who would count in political-intellectual debate, “despite their differences of opinion”. In fact, in addition to Bourdet and Pivert, the signatories to the appeal included in particular Sartre, Camus, Merleau-Ponty, Mounier, Jean Texcier, Ernest Labrousse, Jean-Marie Domenach, David Rousset, René Maheu, Georges Altmann, Simone de Beauvoir, and Georges Izard. Therefore, they agreed to implore the advent of a united, strong, and (of course) socialist Europe: “The USSR and the United States would have much less to fear from a continent that has been able to assert its sovereignty than from a collection of miserable nations with nothing to lose other than the freedom to choose the bloc with which they align themselves”.<sup>407</sup> This coming-together between French intellectuals and European federalism was short-lived: the increasingly Atlanticist positions of the federalists would cut federalist movements away from intellectual mediation, which would represent a serious disadvantage in federalists’ efforts to win over public opinion. At the time (1947), Sartre and his existentialism were viewed negatively by French Communists, who dreamed of a narrowly national culture.<sup>408</sup> From 1948 onwards, it would be the start of the Cold War era and the “great Schism” (R. Aron) that would push Sartre towards the Communist tropism that would become dominant in French intellectual circles and Aron towards Gaullism and the nascent RPF. Between these two poles, the first of which was predominant, there was the crossroads of those who, like Frenay, believed in the possibility of a third way and in the future

407 This appeal by intellectuals can be found in the minutes of the Comité d'études et d'action pour les États-Unis socialistes d'Europe, the meeting of the International Committee, session of October 1947. AHUE, ME 368. Text reproduced in M. Winock, “*Esprit*”, *des intellectuels...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 414-417.

408 See Jean-François Sirinelli, *Sartre et Aron, deux intellectuels dans le siècle*, Paris, Hachette Littératures, 1995, pp. 270-275.

of Europe. However, this belief was a minority view and not very popular, either in public opinion or among intellectuals: after 1950, as Robert Frank would write based on the itinerary of Edgar Morin, “in the eyes of many, Europe embodies a particular cause that is neither generous nor able to be made universal: that of the West versus the East, that of the North versus the South”.<sup>409</sup>

A clear-eyed observer, and although a believer of the view that Europe was an “inevitable historical necessity”, Raymond Aron saw clearly that this ambition encountered a major difficulty: its perception. “Let’s face it: the idea of European unity is first and foremost a conception of reasonable man, not a popular sentiment”.<sup>410</sup> It was another rationalist (pro-European) who put paid to federalist dreams at the international meetings in Geneva (1946) by explaining that “the European spirit” was a fantasy of intellectual or utopian policies, that the concept of nation was the myth with the most grounding in historical reality because it speaks to the “passion” of the people.<sup>411</sup>

While he fully subscribed to the political analyses of the Provisional Committee of Study and Action for the Socialist United States of Europe (to the point where he was one of its leading figures), Frenay soon came to understand the difficulty of making a movement like this exist outside of any commitment to political life: again, it was his aversion to partocracy and his difficulty understanding the rules of democratic governance; hence, we believe, his desire to join the camp of dyed-in-the-wool federalists. However, the ideological tension caused by the Cold War caught up with the federalist camp. He had to choose: a choice had to be made between the GPU and Wall Street. It was the end of a hope.

409 R. Frank, “Raymond Aron, Edgar Morin et les autres: le combat intellectuel pour l’Europe est-il possible après 1950 ?”, in A. Bachoud, J. Cuesta, M. Trebitsch (dir.), *Les intellectuels et l’Europe, de 1945 à nos jours*, Paris, Publications Universitaires Denis Diderot, 2000, p. 82.

410 Raymond Aron, “L’idée d’Europe”, *Fédération*, no. 39, April 1948, pp. 6-8.

411 Julien Benda, *L’Esprit européen*, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1947, p. 11. Cited by N. Stenger, *Denis de Rougemont. Les intellectuels et l’Europe au XXe siècle*, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015, p. 63.

This evolution towards greater pragmatism was symbolised by a discreet change in the title of the Comité international pour les États-Unis socialistes d'Europe linked to a joint intervention by the Labour Party and the SFIO. In November 1948, the Comité international pour les États-Unis socialistes d'Europe became the *Mouvement socialiste pour les États-Unis d'Europe*. The switching of the position of the adjective “socialist” reflected a new hierarchy in European political priorities. To quote Olivier Philip: “This is not just a name change intended to make it easier for people who are not members of an official socialist party to join. (...) From now on, it is no longer a question of first establishing socialism in all countries and then, as a consequence, of making Europe, but of making Europe first and then the struggle to make this Europe socialist”.<sup>412</sup>

As socialist as he was, Frenay now seemed to want to distance himself from the socialists. For him, personalism seemed to be the philosophy best suited to the moment and to his temperament. He recognised himself in Marc's formula: “We are neither individualists nor collectivists: we are personalists”. Anxious to highlight the human that was “both free and committed, both autonomous and united”, he got closer to Rougemont, convinced that Europe should not unite on the basis of an abstract system or “organising hegemony”, but in a pragmatic manner according to “guiding principles” that respected the culture of each nation.<sup>413</sup> The antidote to totalitarianism, Frenay understood, was the federalism that Rougemont had been able to define so brilliantly. If before the war some saw Europeanism as the only way to end fascism, in 1947 an elite considered federalism to be the only effective weapon against totalitarianism, whether it be brown or red. Rougemont could seduce Frenay for two reasons. First of all, he had called for a de-demonisation of Germany. In his book *La Part du diable*, written during his exile in New York, he explained that reality teaches us that, despite the horror of Nazism, “the Nazis are men like us” and that evil is in man. It also contains Camus' thesis (*La Peste*, published in 1947), that of Romain Gary in *Éducation européenne*

412 Olivier Philip, *Le problème de l'union européenne*, preface by D. de Rougemont, Neuchâtel, Éditions de La Baconnière, 1950.

413 N. Stenger, *Denis de Rougemont...*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

(published in 1945) and, later, that of Hannah Arendt on the “banality of evil”. However, the European project (since Hitler symbolised “anti-Europe”) was precisely what could excise Hitlerism from people's heads and from political practices: “the adversary is within us”, said Rougemont. Nationalism, anti-Semitism, and intolerance did not wait for Hitler to manifest themselves. For Frenay as well, anti-Nazism should not become hatred for Germans and polarisation surrounding Hitler should not be an “alibi” (Rougemont) to avoid denouncing the Soviet totalitarianism and intellectual terrorism that the Parti communiste was bringing to bear on freedom of thought. Frenay had been sensitive to this phrase of the address given by the Swiss federalist at the *international meetings in Geneva* (September 1946) on “the European spirit”: “Many intellectuals join a party, and this is what they call getting involved. For most of them, however, it is in fact an abdication of thought, an alibi”<sup>414</sup> To him, the European man was “the man of contradiction, the dialectic man *par excellence*”. Fundamentally, Frenay was a “personalist”. Emmanuel Mounier participated in the development of the *Combat* movement in Lyon, and was interned with Berty Albrecht; *Le Témoignage Chrétien* was created thanks to Frenay and his team. It was for this reason that the former Resistance fighter found himself in Rougemont's *Union européenne des fédéralistes*. The federalist fight deserved to be fought, he thought, because to put what was at stake in metapolitical terms was the only way to counter political totalitarianism and the totalitarianism of thought.

However, the long-term polarisation brought about by the Cold War ruined the idealist ambition of federalism and put the ambition of a Europe independent of the two “blocs” on hold. Henri Frenay could no longer take refuge in the depths of great principles or in “the love of complexity” of which Denis de Rougemont spoke. The Communists' hatred of him and of his own vision for society made it very easy for him to choose sides. Federalism became the weapon of another fight in a new war.

414 Cited by M J. Deering, *Denis de Rougemont...*, *op. cit.*, p. 200.



## German metanoia and the persistence of mistrust

The structural divisions among the former French resistance fighters against Germany resurfaced at two important moments in the 1950s.

First of all, with the European Defence Community (EDC). France was a driver of the initiative in 1950 but signed off on its demise in July 1954. As a French citizen but also as president of the Union of European Federalists, Frenay was very well disposed to the initiative: in it, he saw the way for Europe to conquer its strategic independence, accelerate the process designed to build a “political community”, and tie the FRG to the West. Frenay was behind a symbolically powerful act: meetings between former German and French combatants in Bad-Lauterbach, Switzerland, on 8-9 March 1952 and later on 28-29 June 1952.<sup>415</sup> French public opinion was not ready for this. It was worked on by a very well organised anti-ECD campaign: Gaullists and Communists were violently opposed to the EDC and, against all reason, did not hesitate to revive the demonised image of Nazi Germany to create fear. France was living in an age of anti-German propaganda and, faced with this wall of propaganda, the federalists were powerless. A split would form in the federalist front: Henri Frenay would gradually move away from the federalist fight. It was through his hostility to the EDC that General de Gaulle, who at the time was in the middle of “crossing the desert”, reappeared on the political scene. A veritable duel was once again established between him and Frenay. In March 1953, the latter published *La Communauté Européenne de Défense (CED)*. *Réponse au général de Gaulle*, a booklet published by the French Union of Federalists. It was a reaction to the press conference General de Gaulle had given at the Hôtel Continental on 25 February

<sup>415</sup> The meeting ended with an exchange of letters between Frenay and admiral Hansen, president of the *Verband Deutscher Soldaten*. A permanent secretariat was created with Jean-Maurice Martin, general delegate of the Federation and a member of the Union of European Federalists. See: Schütz, Mathias. “Kein Vergessen: Die Europa-Föderalisten, der Verband deutscher Soldaten und die europäischen Veteranentreffen 1952/53”, *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, vol. 75, no. 2, 2016, pp. 388-414. <https://doi.org/10.1515/mgzs-2016-0070>

1953. De Gaulle, stigmatising the “inconsistency” of rulers and the “impatience” of the federalists, cited “the spirit of abandonment”, “illusion and ignorance”, and “national abdication”. This would be a new “Munich”. For him, the danger was twofold: the American stranglehold on Europe and German predominance. He explained that this treaty, “combined with current US policy, leads directly to the military and political hegemony of the Reich in Europe”:

What would happen if the Reich were to be reunified one day before the end of the fifty years for which the treaty is supposed to be in force? [...] It is easy to see why, of the Six, it is the Reich Chancellor who is most attached to the so-called “European” army.

His speech draws on the lexicon of French nationalism that a Charles Mauras would not deny. Here we have the image so often used of the “eternal” Germany: a Germany that is eternally evil and naturally ready for “great adventures”. “However, in the interests of Europe (and even, in my opinion, in the interests of the German people), Germany must not be put in a position to render the fate of peoples associated with her dependent on her impulses.”

In his open letter, Frenay criticised the systematic use by General de Gaulle of the term “Reich” (rather than the Federal Republic of Germany) and of the “hateful mistrust” to which he had borne witness.

The UEF congress in April 1953 returned to the German question, in particular through resolution no. 1 of the Venice meeting inspired by Henri Frenay and Eugen Kogon:

The UEF could not allow the fate of Germany, which was of interest to Europe as a whole, to be dictated by its former victors. Germany had to be reunified. This could only be achieved through elections, but, on pain of the inevitable revival of the dangerous antagonisms of the past, a unified Germany, in the same way as the Federal Republic today, must be a full member of European institutions as they are created.

The UEF Central Committee (January 1954) warned against a rejection of the EDC, which would have the effect of “restoring the deadly Franco-German antagonism in Europe”; “prompt the creation of the German national army, with all of its consequences”; “promote the reversal of alliances, and as a result, play the game of – and into the hands of – Communism”. Within the UEF, the Germans were the most supportive of the positions put forward by Frenay.<sup>416</sup> For Ernst Friedlaender, president of the *Europa-Union Deutschland*, the real threat hanging over Germany was less nationalism and more neutralism (“ohne mich”), a neutralism that would grow in public opinion if the Germans form the view that they are being discriminated against, there is “no possibility for them to become partners of the West”: “We cannot let a country like Germany wait indefinitely”. The representatives of the German federalists recalled that the opposition of the UEF to the creation of a German army had first and foremost been linked to a “tactical requirement” aimed at the constitution of the EDC, which “was not a given”. With the EDC project having ended in failure, there should have been nothing to oppose it, if not an ontological “mistrust” towards a Germany that federalism could not sustain. Dutchman Brugmans in part shared the position of the German and that of Frenay: “We must cease the false tactic of presenting Europe as a solution to the German problem. This is true, but there is a hierarchy of dangers. The first is the Russian threat. We should not present ourselves as Europeans to control German rearmament; rather, the unification of Europe is a response to Bolshevik expansion, which is the real problem of our age.”

The drama and greatness of the federalists is not to have taken in literal terms the sugar parable of Maurice Schumann: “The need for the European federation is as evident as the solubility of sugar. But the truth is plain to see: it is slow to dissolve.” This history of Europe will be written solely and patiently, but without them, as a result of their failure to triumph in the following circumstances: if the federalists become impatient and extremist, they lose all contact with reality (political and popular) and become mere engaged spectators;

416 UEF, minutes of the Central Committee held in Paris on 18 and 19 September 1954. H. Frenay / J.-P. Gouzy collection.

if they are patient and compromise, they become mere bit players to an action devised and led by others and lose all sense of purpose and identity.

The second event that crystallised the division among the elders in the face of Europe and Germany was the Speidel affair. In Frenay’s personal archives I have found a very comprehensive dossier on this affair (in which he would become involved) that reveals, once more, the importance he attached to Germany in the process of European construction.<sup>417</sup>

In February 1957, the “Spiedel affair” broke in the British and French press. At the time, General Hans Speidel had been approached to serve as commander of land forces in the central Europe theatre of operations as part of NATO. The only problem was that this general was German. The Communists unleashed a vast press campaign to condemn this appointment (a “scandal”), a campaign reminiscent of the one they launched in 1952 following the appointment of General Ridgway as supreme commander of the Allied forces at a time when the slogan “US go home” was heard everywhere. The strategy of the French Communist Party consisted of highlight personalities of the Resistance to give historic and patriotic legitimacy to its approach. This approach started with a petition published in the newspaper *Libération* on 27 February 1957: “64 personalities of the Resistance of all political persuasions are calling in the Government to reconsider the appointment of Speidel”. The undersigned are “as united as they were in the time of the underground movement”. These personalities called for the dismissal of the German general, who was Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of “Greater Paris” from 1940 to 1942: General Otto Von Stülpnagel. For the signatories, this appointment could “crush the morale of the nation and rekindle the hatreds between Germany and France that we would have wanted to see extinguished”. The signatories included Jacques Debu-Bridel, Louis Marin, and Jean-Pierre Levy, but also the former companions of Jean Moulin, Pierre Villon, Robert Chambeiron, colonel Manhès,

417 A very comprehensive “Spiedel” dossier can be found in the private H. Frenay / J.P. Gouzy collection.

avowed Communists such as Benoît Frachon, Gabriel Péri, and André Tollet, friends of Frenay such as Bourdet, Léo Hamon, René Capitant, and Cerf-Ferrière.

Henri Frenay took this matter to heart, and not just because these signatories included some of his closest companions from the Resistance. Indeed, it went against the fight in which he had been engaged in favour of Franco-German reconciliation for 15 years, since his letter to the leader of Fighting France dated 8 November 1942. Outside federalist structures, from his apartment on 4 Rue Guynemer in Paris, he also launched a petition of his own on 6 March 1957 bearing the signatures of other former Resistance members, such as Henry Aubry, General Béthouart, Georges-Louis Rebattet, Jean-Louis Vigier, René Pleven, Eugène Claudius-Petit, and René Courtin. It was a “battle of the titles”: Frenay in particular had seven Companions of the Liberation, four former members of the CNR, and five former deportees. He would receive numerous letters of encouragement (in particular from Edmond Michelet, Lecompte-Boinet, Philippe Monod, André Betten-court, André Philip, and Francis Closon). In various forums, Frenay would again condemn the approach that consisted of “holding each German soldier, i.e. an entire people, responsible for Nazi crimes”. He denounced the hidden aim of this campaign (i.e. to obstruct the path to European unification), and stated his wish to do everything he could to “establish a climate of trust and friendship between France and the new Germany through which we can build a better future”. In the newspaper *Le Monde*, after having cleared Speidel of accusations of being an executioner (Speidel, a moderate who himself had been imprisoned by the Nazis in July 1944), the former founder of Combat saw that it was an action designed to strike at “the cornerstone of the European edifice, i.e. the Franco-German entente.”<sup>418</sup> Communist newspaper *L’Humanité*, which had resumed its attacks against Frenay, denounced “the odious article by Frenay in praise of Speidel.”<sup>419</sup>

418 H. Frenay, “Speidel est-il un bourreau?”, *Le Monde*, 17 February 1957. See the response by J. Debû-Bridel in *Le Monde*, 19 February 1957.

419 *L’Humanité*, 19 February 1957. See also the 15 February edition.

This case confirms what was revealed during the debate on the EDC: the prevalence in France of a potential anti-German sentiment that bears witness to the permanent nature of a national anti-European culture that is not specific to Communists; indeed, the right is not immune from such views. The League of Human Rights also got involved. Jewish organisations and organisations of former Resistance members came forward. A national rally was held in Auboué on 24 March 1957. This affair demonstrated the absence of unity within the Resistance after the war, and served as a reminder that commitment to the Resistance was not always associated with a desire to build Europe.<sup>420</sup> Indeed, Speidel himself had been a supporter of the EDC and was the military adviser to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and, as such, the representative of the government in Bonn in the Paris negotiations on the project for a European army. As the former officer of Nazi Germany, it is this symbol of the EDC whom we wish to neutralise. As a senator participating in the debate that had taken place in Parliament, General Béthouart let it be understood: “After the war, he lived in the French-occupied zone in Germany, then went to France to prepare the European Defence Community. After all, that could be what he is being blamed for and now, ten years later, we are witnessing a real war crimes trial brought against him!”<sup>421</sup>

The hateful campaign that developed against him obscured the fact that he had been accused of having participated in Operation Valkyrie, a plot to kill Hitler, in July 1944.<sup>422</sup> However, during the debate that took place in the Council of the Republic (the Senate) on 19 February 1957, amid general hostility, Georges Laffargue, a veteran of World War I and a member of the Rally of Republican Lefts, sounded a different tone and reported this heroic act. It should be noted that

420 For an introduction to the issue, see Antoine Fleury and Robert Frank, “Le rôle des guerres dans la mémoire des Européens: leur effet sur leur conscience d’être européen”, in René Girault (dir.), *Identité et conscience européenne au XXe siècle*, Hachette, 1994, p.149-156.

421 *Journal Officiel de la République française*, Parliamentary debates, Council of the Republic, 1st session dated 19 February 1957, p. 409.

422 Philippe Garraud, “Les généraux allemands et le nazisme: entre adhésion, subordination, conformisme et détachement”, *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, vol. 234, no. 2, 2009, pp. 5-24.

he campaigned for a liberal Europe, and that he was appointed to the European Coal and Steel Community in 1956 as the representative of France.

To have an informed opinion on this burning question, he met with André-François Poncet, the former French ambassador to Germany during the Nazi regime and thereafter. He told him that “I have had the opportunity to meet many men in Germany. I have known General Speidel for many years, and whose various opinions with which I am familiar. In Germany, this man has always been considered an enemy of Nazism.” He also confided in him that it was on the public record that Speidel had been “involved in the plot of 20 July against Hitler and that it was solely as a result of his release by General Béthouart that he did not have an impending date with the firing squad.” Left-wing Gaullist Jacques Debû-Bridel, a colleague of Laffargue, a great Resistance fighter and a former member of the National Council of Resistance, was consistently doubtful. He interrupted proceedings with “Let’s go!” He claimed two cautions: that of General Béthouart (the main who had released Speidel from prison<sup>423</sup>) and that of Henri Frenay, a man of “exceptional quality”. Later, Laffargue broadened the debate and raised the question of peoples’ and individuals’ responsibility for collective acts and “errors”, before considering that the most important thing is to encourage a Europe that is “trying to unite” and reject the “old ember of nationalism” that had been reactivated by the Speidel affair.

Led by Jacques Debû-Bridel, there was a “historic” debate on the reality of the German resistance, particularly within the army. With the help of unpublished documents, he sought to demonstrate that in France, Speidel would have been involved in the execution of hostages. He ended by raising the plot of 20 July 1944, recognising that there had

<sup>423</sup> An officer hostile to the Vichy regime and a member of the Resistance, in 1942 he was named head of the French military mission in Washington (rearmament of the French army in Africa), then, in 1943, chief of the national defence staff in Algiers under General de Gaulle. In August 1944, he participated in operations of the 1st French Army which liberated Alsace and, in April 1945, fought in the Battle of Germany with General de Lattre de Tassigny. As Commander-in-Chief in Austria, he took the title of High Commissioner of the French Republic in Austria. In political terms, he was a member of the MRP movement.

indeed been “German patriots opposed to Nazism”, that those who had stepped forward before 1944 had “all been executed”. Those who remained were “more or less hesitant”, “more or less bold, and more or less courageous”, people the senator characterised as opportunists (even though that specific term was not used). While he recognised that Speidel had been involved in the plot (having liaised with generals Rommel and Stülpnagel), “he did not get his hands dirty” as a result of that involvement, explained Debû-Bridel, that he had opposed any insurrectionist movement in Germany in the face of the Allied advance, and that his aim was to secure an armistice with General Eisenhower “to allow the German army to withdraw to the Rhine and continue the war in the east”: “Ladies and gentlemen, I do not blame General Speidel for having foreseen this solution. It was tempting for a general in the Wehrmacht, but don’t come to us with talk about resistance or participation in a democratic plot against Hitler!” His conclusion: “The enigmatic figure of Speidel is the personification of the German political officer”. So what did this have to do with his appointment to NATO? “Our clear insight leads us to the judgment that it would be extremely dangerous to place the ground forces of NATO under the control of this man”. Georges Laffargue responded that in France, it was the Communists who posed a threat and that they would not be ready to fight for France if it were in danger. Debû-Bridel’s response was that Speidel was “the man of the crusade in the east”. This did not prevent him from recognising that there are “men of good will” in Germany, and that he was one of those people “who do not despair of Germany”. He loved Germany, the Germany of Luther, of Kant (his grandfather also wrote a thesis on the philosopher), of Goethe, of Karl Marx, but he doubted that Speidel loved the same Germany as he did.

For Béthouart, who supported the approach espoused by Frenay and the supporters of Europe, this “exhumation”, ten years after the events was suspect and served a cause other than that of history. It was a war crimes trial, while Speidel’s past had already been examined, especially by the court in Nuremberg, and this process was in fact “the process of the rearmament of Germany and of NATO”. Béthouart’s testimony was essential, as it was he who freed Speidel: “And yet, I found this adversary in Kustrinn prison, hidden away in Bavaria.

He was one of a group of generals and diplomats arrested for their hostility to the Nazi regime. The next day, they were released on the orders of General de Lattre. For me, it is testimony that is sufficient.” Alluding to the Soviet coup in Hungary (4 November 1956), he was of the view that the destruction of NATO would leave the way open to “another invasion whose massacres in Hungary provided us with a perspective of the whole horror”. One must be consistent with oneself, and with one’s own commitments: “Now, we are part of the same military defence organisation and the same alliance as the Germans.” One must also move away from behaving as “yesterday’s loser” and look to the future. France will be in step with the times when it comes to understand that the appointment of General Speidel could be “the dawn of a new era in Franco-German relations and if a reconciliation guarantees peace in Europe and spares our children the horrors we have experienced.”

The Speidel affair was a symptom that revealed the fear of a return of the EDC and demonstrated the depth of the rejection that the EDC had caused; paradoxically, this rejection was more intense than that shown to NATO. Indeed, Speidel himself had been an active supporter of the EDC and was the military adviser to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and, as such, the representative of the government in Bonn in the Paris negotiations on the project for a European army. As the former officer of Nazi Germany, it is this symbol of the EDC whom we wish to neutralise. Such a case clearly demonstrates the permanence in France of a heterogeneous but strong current where, separate from Communist manipulation, pacifists, Germanophobes, nationalists, and anti-Atlanticists, united in their desire to obstruct European unification. Thus, we have a clearer understanding of the reasons for the failure of the federalists in France. Among some elected officials, there was a fear of Germany’s will to power, despite its democratic evolution and its metanoia. Its industrial renaissance was not seen as an opportunity for Europe, but as a threat to France and the sign of an improbable return of Nazi hegemony. In the debates of 19 February 1957 a senator from the Communist grouping, General Ernest Petit (General de Gaulle’s chief-of-staff in London during the war, then head of the French mission in the USSR), stated (without generating any particular reaction) that:

“I would add that the Germany of Bonn, aware that it had become the leading industrial power in continental western Europe, will not fail to assert its leadership of this region in an ever more vigorous manner, which would inevitably lead it to realise some Hitlerian plans to build a German Europe.”

Despite the admission of the facts, the French are not done with the catastrophist fantasy of the persistence of the rebirth of a Nazi Europe, or at the very least, dominating. Today, it is Walter Hallstein, whose past is being rewritten, who has become the whipping boy of anti-Europeans: he passes for the icon of German dominance or the survival of Nazism, when in fact he played a major role in advancing the Europe of the common market by aligning the interests of Germany with those of France, convinced as he was that there was “a European feeling” that was at the heart of peace on the European continent.<sup>424</sup>

As we saw at the start of this book, contempt for what Germany has become still serves to support the argument (or the imaginary concept) for disqualification of the European project. At the start of the third millennium, this is one of the common points shared by left- and right-wing sovereignists clinging to the myth of “France alone” and fascinated with the prejudice that “the unique history of Germany continues to weigh surreptitiously on the functioning of its democracy, both internally and externally”<sup>425</sup>. There remain refractories, in particular in France and the United Kingdom, to the thesis of German metanoia, i.e. the moral and political reconstruction of Germany that made this country “a nation like any other”.<sup>426</sup>

424 R. Marjolin, *Le travail d'une vie*, op.cit., pp. 264-265.

425 J.-P. Chevènement, *La France est-elle finie?* op.cit., p. 214.

426 Peter Sloterdijk, *Théorie des après-guerres. Remarques sur les relations franco-allemandes depuis 1945*, Libella-Maren Sell, 2008.



## Conclusion

The dream of the “united” Resistance would only last for a summer. The return to political reality shattered its mystique and unleashed existing centrifugal forces that had been dormant during the war. The Resistance, as such, failed to become a cohesive political force with Liberation: Resistance fighters who were favourable to a federal Europe would realise quite quickly and suddenly that their ideal was not shared as they had wanted to believe it was. There has long been, cultivated in the collective imagination, “the illusion of a Europe of the Resistance”.<sup>427</sup> The “memorial battle”<sup>428</sup> and the political guerrilla warfare between Gaullists and Communists has often been brought to light. However, behind the clash between these two political families there were convergences in the conception of the nation-state and of France’s foreign policy, but also in the claim to want to embody the heritage of the Resistance, i.e. “the real France”,<sup>429</sup> while at the same time marginalising and subordinating it and organising a “gap”<sup>430</sup> “between it and the parties. Gaullists and Communists did not believe in the Resistance as a political force. In the Resistance as a political force, de Gaulle perhaps saw “a rival”; above all, however, he had in mind the risk that a sort of unique party could represent for the democratic game that had to be reframed through political parties and institutions. The two currents would show the same anti-German and anti-American reactions. They were violently opposed to the Socialists and People’s Republicans because they shared the

427 Bertrand Vayssière, *Vers une Europe Fédérale? Les Espoirs et les actions fédéralistes au sortir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2007, p. 31.

428 Olivier Wieviorka, *La Mémoire désunie. Le souvenir politique des années sombres, de la Libération à nos jours*, Paris, Seuil, 2010, p. 49.

429 Pierre Nora, “Gaullistes et communistes”, in P. Nora (dir.), *Les Lieux de mémoire*, t. 2, Paris, Gallimard, 1997, p. 2492.

430 Marcel Degliame-Fouché, in *L’Avenir de la Résistance*, Paris, René Julliard, July 1945, p. 37.

same hostility towards supranationality. We know the famous phrase of André Malraux, who became a Gaullist in 1949: “There is us, the Communists, and nothing”.

The Gaullo-Communist conjunction could only block the emergence of a truly federalist policy and policy of rapprochement with Germany. The relationship to post-war Europe introduced a new dividing line and line of confrontation. The federalists regrouped outside institutional politics and created important movements that very often, however, ignored the complexity of political life and geopolitical reality; they did not want to see the indifference of the “masses” to Europe. Professional diplomats smiled at the idealistic pretensions of the men of the Resistance, which they found “a little lightweight”.<sup>431</sup> René Massigli severely judged one of the claims of Menthon and Frenay. With these men, he judged, “idealism reached the point of unrealism”.<sup>432</sup> As some of them confessed as early as January 1944, Resistance fighters had difficulty finding their place between the *Parti communiste français*, the Socialist Party, and the *Mouvement républicain populaire*. At the Consultative Assembly of Algiers, they felt “embarrassment”, a “fear” in the face of political practices; they were afraid of “breaking the unity of the French home front at the Assembly”.<sup>433</sup>

The *Mouvement de Libération nationale* died from the naive illusion that one can engage in politics without being a political party. The *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance*, which had dared to cross the political Rubicon, was surrounded on all sides. The *Parti communiste* had massacred it by pitting it against Frenay, the person who had inspired it, wanting to take control of the heritage of the Resistance. The *Parti socialiste* made it a suppletive force, while the *Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance* saw itself as its marching wing. Its development was hampered by the emergence of a new

431 Letter from R. Massigli to J. Monnet, November 24, 1943, cited by Eric Roussel, *Jean Monnet*, Paris, Fayard, 1996, p. 410.

432 R. Massigli, *Une comédie des erreurs, 1943-1956. Souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne*, Paris, Plon, 1978, p. 34.

433 Interview with René Cerf-Ferrière and Eugène Claudius-Petit, the journal *France* (published in London), January 28, 1944, cited by R. Cerf-Ferrière, *L’Assemblée consultative vue de mon banc, novembre 1943-juillet 1944*, Paris, Les Éditions Réunis, 1974, p. 278.

political force around which the political landscape would be structured. Born in November 1944, the *Mouvement républicain populaire* would be the central pillar of the Fourth Republic. It now represented the Christian-Democrat movement, supported by men who had participated in the *Combat* movement (such as Bidault, Teitgen, and de Menthon).<sup>434</sup> The *Mouvement républicain populaire* was despised by the Parti communiste (which had a penchant, against all reason and all dignity, to describe it as a “Petainist-collecting machine”), as it was its most serious competitor. Against all odds, the *Mouvement républicain populaire* followed the foreign policy line set by de Gaulle, at least until 1948. Georges Bidault, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from September 1944 to 1948, continued along this line after de Gaulle had left power. According to his friend Teitgen, who knew him very well, he carried a “latent nationalism” within him: “While he was a European in his mind, he was not one at heart”.<sup>435</sup> It would only be from 1948 onwards, aided by the Cold War, that the *Mouvement républicain populaire* and Robert Schuman would follow Monnet’s Europeanist strategy and understand that the “hard policy” defended since Liberation with regard to Germany had to be abandoned.<sup>436</sup>

Another fundamental element to be taken into account was the fact that, contrary to what one would like to believe, pro-European Resistance fighters were not in the majority within the French Resistance. I think it was approximately the same in Italy because of the strong position of the Italian Communist Party. For Viannay, whose *Défense de la France* movement was a member of the *Mouvement de Libération nationale*, “the men of the Resistance did not dare assert themselves politically” and “the government wanted to break the risks of second power represented by the Resistance”.<sup>437</sup> They were powerless to go against the general trend of French diplomacy from 1943

434 G.-H. Soutou, “Georges Bidault et la construction européenne, 1944-1954”, in S. Berstein, J.-M. Mayeur and P. Milza (dir.), *Le MRP et la construction européenne*, Brussels, Éditions Complexe, 1993, p. 198.

435 P.-H. Teitgen, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

436 Raymond Poidevin, “La nouvelle politique allemande de la France (juin 1948-avril 1949)”, in *Enjeux et Puissances. Pour une histoire des relations internationales au XXe siècle. Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Baptiste Duroselle*, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1986, p. 203.

437 Indomitius (Ph. Viannay), *op. cit.*, p. 78, p. 81.

to 1947 to want to make “an anti-German Europe organised around France”.<sup>438</sup> French public opinion was not ready to endorse this revolution: one cannot change the national habit of a people in a few years, and it was not easy to escape what Jean-Marie Soutou called the “Galician solipsism”.<sup>439</sup> Europe would be made, but step by step, when the French were able to understand that their country was “more the winner, in truth, than victorious”<sup>440</sup> in “a Europe demoralised by its dubious victory over Hitler, shrunken and stuck between two great empires...”.<sup>441</sup> The “Grand Soir” of the federalist Revolution is not going to take place. But what is certain – and this observation applies to all European countries – is that “it was indeed from the Resistance movements that the great manifestos of Europe would emerge”.<sup>442</sup>

Frenay’s political project was not only aimed at the renewal of French political life. As early as 1942, in an unpublished personal letter addressed to the leader of Free France, he suggested that he had already cast his mind forward to the post-war period, anxious to think about and get over the war by imagining a new way of making peace. This peace was a revolution. Idealism and experience led Frenay to become the apostle of a new conception of relations between European nations, a conception based on a wholesale re-examination of what the nation-State had been, which he saw as a reality that had been overtaken by globalisation imposed by the war. *To make peace without making Europe* (a federalist Europe, as far as he was concerned), that is to say without reintegrating Germany with its full rights would, according to Frenay, be to renounce the ideal that had been the supreme justification of the fight of the Resistance, both in France and elsewhere, and store up new historical disappointments. In this fight, the actions of Frenay and his companions constantly met with hostility from post-war Communists and Gaullists and the reticence of French public opinion, it should be added. He was wrong

438 G. Bossuat, *L’Europe des Français*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

439 J.-M. Soutou, *Un diplomate engagé*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

440 F. Le Grix, “Examen de conscience après dix mois”, in *L’Avenir de la Résistance*, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

441 D. de Rougemont, “Les maladies de l’Europe” (September 1946), in D. de Rougemont, *L’Europe en jeu*, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1948, p. 26.

442 G. Bossuat, *Les fondateurs de l’Europe unie*, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

to be right too early, and to fail to understand that the evolution of political cultures and representations is a very slow process. It was this slowness that exploded the slogan of *Combat*: “From the Resistance to the Revolution”. Finally, it must be said that the emergence of a new geopolitical paradigm, which was triggered by the Cold War and would shape the world for 50 years, put paid to the possibility of a European Europe in the short-term. But the most entrenched source of this resistance to change was the strength of national sentiment and the idea that, since the democratic revolutions of the 18th century, the State had been regarded as “the instrument of the power of nations and the safeguard of the interests of the people”. The prophets of the abandonment of the dogma of national sovereignty did not want to believe in the strength of the “massive attachment of citizens to the nation-State”.<sup>443</sup>

Frenay has often been accused of idealism due to the fact that he saw international life through “a sort of socialising humanism rather than in terms of power reality” (Massigli). And yet, it was precisely the consideration of the inability of Republican France to curb Nazism, to prevent the war and to win it, that led him to set out on the path of federalism. At the heart of his approach was the awareness that “national sovereignty” was a myth that was no longer in keeping with the realities of a globalised world. When Resistance fighters dreamed of turning “the ideal” into reality and in the newspaper *Combat*, a certain Camus wrote: “...we do not believe in political realism”, de Gaulle responded by saying that France must resume its place in the world and prepare for “the rise to power”: “it takes hard work and a long time, and a lot of initiative. But the power is at the end, a power that will not crush anyone. On the contrary: it will benefit all of us. This power may become the great national ambition!”

For Frenay, political realism was contrary to the understanding that France must imagine a destiny no longer in terms of unattainable “greatness”, but in terms of European cooperation. Power should not be dissociated from values and generosity. This could be the summary

443 Pierre Dardot, Christian Laval, *Dominer. Enquête sur la souveraineté de l'État en Occident*, Paris, La Découverte, 2020, p. 589.

of his vision of the world and of Europe. Raoul Dautry, another Europeanist, the Minister for Reconstruction at the time of Liberation and one of the fathers of the CERN<sup>444</sup> in Geneva, was convinced that the atom could be the instrument for the construction of a powerful Europe and for the rebirth of its prestige. To his press officer, who wrote the backdrop for his speeches and articles, he suggested immersing himself in the book written in 1943 by Maurice Druon, who at the time was exiled in London. In *Les Lettres d'un Européen*, addressed to a Frenchman, an Englishman, a German, a Russian, and an American, Gaullist Druon was persuaded that the future rested on the advent of a Europe that was “open”, united, and generous: “There are just two emotions that create happiness, and which we need to move towards: courage and generosity. People have expended a great deal of courage during this war. May they now expend a great deal of generosity, which is perhaps another form of courage.”

Frenay's commitment is interesting, in that it allows us to examine the question of the immediate failure of the plan of the non-Communist Resistance to establish an integrated Europe at the end of the war and, in general, the reticence of people to think “European”. But beyond that, and this concerns to the present day, it allows us to better highlight the anti-historical nature of today's anti-Europeanist theses, which thrive on myths, plots, lies, manipulation, and, above all, ignorance or, rather, a lack of awareness. Monnet was not the only person who wanted to make Europe: during the Cold War, federalist movements did not wait for the shackles of the CIA to promote the idea of a united Europe. In 1935, Frenay became aware of the threat posed by Nazism to democratic Europe and decided to engage to participate in a war of “civilisation”. His fight in the Resistance bore witness to this unyielding patriotism, ready to sacrifice everything in order not to suffer humiliation. But it was in this sacrifice and this suffering where he would find the resources needed to think about the world of tomorrow and imagine a reconciled, peaceful Europe, the Europe we are lucky to know today.

444 The Conseil européen pour la recherche nucléaire (CERN) was conceived in December 1951, in Paris, at an intergovernmental meeting of UNESCO. It was inaugurated in 1954.

Frenay's dream, in which the European Resistance would be "the glue of the unions of tomorrow" did not come true as he had predicted. The federalist "Grand Soir" did not take place. Europe was "built" differently via other means, in a different context. But this idealism, based on values tested by a commitment to life and death, had not been in vain: it had constituted a horizon of expectation that made it possible to enlighten those who wanted to change the course of European history. Only the resolute pragmatism of Jean Monnet could advance the idea of Europe. While not all Resistance fighters were Europeanists, the Resistance fighters represented by Frenay, as Élie Barnavi and Kryztof Pomian<sup>445</sup> would write, "served as a link between the Europeanists of the inter-war period and those of after the Victory": they had kept the flame of another Europe alight during the dark nights of Hitlerism, and their federalist commitment after the war helped develop a European consciousness and maintain a duty of collaborative governance between nation-States that, little by little, has become a reality.

445 É. Barnavi and K. Pomian, *La Révolution européenne, 1945-2007*, Éd. Perrin, 2008, p. 53.

## Bibliography<sup>446</sup>

- Aglan Alya, Frank Robert (dir.), *1937-1947. La Guerre-monde*, Gallimard Folio-Histoire, 2015, 2 vol.
- Aglan Alya, *La France à l'envers. La guerre de Vichy (1940-1945)*, Gallimard Folio-Histoire, 2020
- Aglan Alya, « La Résistance, le temps, l'espace: réflexions sur une histoire en mouvement », *Histoire@Politique. Politique, culture, société*, N°9, septembre-décembre 2009
- Ajchenbaum Yves-Marc, *A la vie, à la mort. Histoire du journal Combat. 1941-1974*, Le Monde éditions, 1994
- Albrecht Mireille, *Berty. La grande figure féminine de la Résistance*, R. Laffont, 1986
- Aldrich Richard, *Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*, UK John Murray, 2001/US Penguin-Putnam, 2002, republished by Duckworth 2006
- Altiero Spinelli, *il federalismo europeo e la Resistenza*, a cura di Cinzia Rognoni Vercelli, Paolo G. Fontana, Daniela Preda, Bologne, Il Mulino, 2012
- Andrieu Claire, *Le programme commun de la Résistance. Des idées dans la guerre*, Les Éditions de l'Érudit, Paris, 1984
- Année (L') politique*, préface d'André Siegfried, édition Le Grand Siècle, 1946
- Aragon Charles d', *La Résistance sans héroïsme*, Seuil, 1977
- Aron Raymond, *Chroniques de guerre. La France libre, 1940-1945*, préface de Jean-Marie Soutou, Gallimard, 1990 (rééd.)
- Azouvi François, *Français, on ne vous a rien caché. La Résistance, Vichy, notre mémoire*, Paris, Gallimard, 2020
- Bachoud A., Cuesta J., M. Trebitsch (dir.), *Les intellectuels et l'Europe, de 1945 à nos jours*, Publications universitaires Denis Diderot, 2000
- Badia Gilbert, *Les bannis de Hitler. Accueil et lutte des exilés Allemands en France 1933-1939*, Paris, éditions Atelier, 1990.

446 References to public archives, private collections and unpublished interviews can be found in the notes. Unless otherwise indicated, the place of publication is Paris.

- Barnavi Elie, Pomian Kryztof, *La Révolution européenne, 1945-2007*, Perrin, 2008
- Barré Jean-Luc, *Jacques et Raïssa Maritain. Les mendiants du ciel*, Paris, Stock, 1995
- Bédarida Renée, *Les armes de l'esprit. Témoignage chrétien, 1941-1944*, Editions Ouvrières, 1977
- Bédarida Renée, *Pierre Chaillot. Témoin de la résistance spirituelle*, Fayard, 1988
- Bellescize Diane de, *Les Neuf sages de la Résistance. Le Comité général d'études dans la clandestinité*, Paris, Plon, 1979
- Beloff Max, *The United States and the Unity of Europe*, Washington DC, Brookings, 1963
- Belot Robert, « Altiero Spinelli e Henri Frenay: due combattenti dell'impossibile richiesta federalista », *Altiero Spinelli, il federalismo europeo e la resistenza*, Éditions Il Mulino, 2012, p. 267-302
- Belot Robert, « Biais historiques et délégitimation du projet européen: une analyse du contre-récit nationaliste », *GERLFINT-Synergies Roumanie*, no. 15-2020 p. 23-40.
- Belot Robert, « Le rôle du Centre d'études germaniques dans la formation des officiers à la vigilance antinazie. Tentative d'évaluation et d'approche prosopographique à travers l'itinéraire d'Henri Frenay », *Revue d'Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande*, octobre-décembre 1997, tome 29, n°4, p.677-701
- Belot Robert, *Henri Frenay, de la Résistance à l'Europe*, Paris, Seuil (« L'Univers Historique »), 2003.
- Belot Robert, *La Résistance sans de Gaulle. Politique et gaullisme de guerre*, Fayard, 2006.
- Robert Belot, *Observer l'Allemagne hitlérienne à travers ses minorités à l'étranger. Henri Frenay au Centre d'études germaniques de Strasbourg (1937-1938)*, Lyon, Presse Fédéraliste, coll. Minorités nationales, 2022.
- Belot Robert, *Résistance et conscience européenne. Henri Frenay, de Gaulle et les communistes (1941-1947)*, Lyon, Presse fédéraliste, 2021
- Belot Robert, Preda Daniela (eds.), *Visions of Europe in the Resistance. Figures, Projects, Networks, Ideals*, Bruxelles, M.I.E. Peter Lang, Euroclio vol. 112, 2022.
- Belot Robert, Karpman Gilbert, *L'Affaire suisse. La Résistance a-t-elle trahi de Gaulle?* Paris, Armand Colin, 2009

- Benoit-Otis Marie-Hélène, Quesney Cécile, *Mozart 1941. La Semaine Mozart du Reich allemand et ses invités français*, Rennes, PUR, 2019
- Berstein S., Mayeur J.-M., Milza P. (dir.), *Le MRP et la construction européenne*, éditions Complexe, 1993
- Berstein, Serge, *Histoire du gaullisme*, Perrin, 2001
- Berstein, Serge (dir.), *Les cultures politiques en France*, éd. du Seuil, 1999
- Bessac-Vaure Stève, « L'idée européenne dans *Esprit* et *Les Temps modernes*: penser ou construire l'Europe? Idéalisme intellectuel et refus du réalisme (1945-1954) », *Siècles* [En ligne], 41 | 2015, mis en ligne le 01 juin 2015
- Bidault Georges, *D'une Résistance à l'autre*, Presses du siècle, 1965
- Billion Jean-Francis, « Il Comité Français pour la Fédération Européenne: le radici, la fondazione, i contatti », in Cinzia Rognoni Vercelli, Paolo G. Fontana et Daniela Preda, *Altiero Spinelli il federalismo europeo e la resistenza*, comp., Bologne, Il Mulino, 2012, p. 237- 266
- Billion Jean-Francis, « Les revues de la Résistance française et l'Europe », in Daniele Pasquinucci, Daniela Preda, Luciano Tosi (Dir.), *Communicating Europe. Journals and European Integration 1939-1979*, éd. Bruxelles, Peter Land, 2013, p. 359-396
- Billion Jean-Francis (eds.), *Les Fédéralistes en Europe des années 1930 à la fondation de l'Union européenne des fédéralistes* (Paris, décembre 1946), Lyon, Presse Fédéraliste, 2018
- Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse, Loth, Wilfried, Poidevin, Raymond, (dir.), *Institutions européennes et identités européennes*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1998
- Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse, *Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours*, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1996
- Bled Jean-Paul, « Le Centre d'études germaniques », *Saisons d'Alsace*, n°128, été 1995, p. 54.
- Bloch Marc, *Apologie pour l'histoire ou métier d'historien* (écrit en 1942), rééd. : *L'Histoire, la Guerre, la Résistance*, Paris, Quarto-Gallimard, 2006
- Bloch Marc, *L'étrange défaite. Témoignage écrit en 1940*, avant-propos de Georges Altman, Société des Éditions Franc-Tireur, 1946
- Booker C., North R., *La Grande dissimulation. L'histoire secrète de l'UE révélée par les Anglais*, Paris, L'Artilleur, 2003-2016, trad.



- Bordes François, « Preuves, revue marxienne? », *Cahiers du GRM* [En ligne], 12 | 2017, mis en ligne le 17 décembre 2017, URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/grm/924>
- Bossuat Gérard, *L'Europe des Français, 1943-1959: La IV<sup>e</sup> République aux sources de l'Europe communautaire*, Éditions de la Sorbonne, 1997
- Bossuat Gérard, *Les fondateurs de l'Europe unie*, Belin Sup Histoire, 2001
- Bougeard Christian, *René Pleven. Un Français libre en politique*, Rennes, PUR, 1994
- Bourdet Claude, *L'Aventure incertaine. De la Résistance à la Restauration*, Paris, Stock, 1975
- Braga Antonnella, *Un federalista giacobino. Ernesto Rossi pioniere degli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, Bologne, Il Mulino, 2007
- Bresolin Alessandro, *Albert Camus: l'union des différences. Le legs humain et politique d'un homme en révolte*, Lyon, Presse Fédéraliste, 2017
- Bruneteau Bernard, *Combattre l'Europe. De Lénine à Marie Le Pen*, CNRS éditions, 2018
- Bruneteau Bernard, *L'« Europe nouvelle » de Hitler. Une illusion des intellectuels de la France de Vichy*, Monaco, 2003
- Burrin Philippe, *La France à l'heure allemande, 1940-1944*, Paris, Seuil, 1995
- Buton Philippe, *Les lendemains qui déchantent. Le Parti communiste français à la Libération*, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1993
- Buton Philippe, Guillon Jean-Marie (dir.), *Les pouvoirs en France à la Libération*, Belin, 1994
- Cahiers Albert Camus*, vol. 3 : *Fragments d'un combat 1938-1940*, Paris, Gallimard, 1978, tome II
- Camus Albert, *À Combat. Éditoriaux et articles, 1944-1947*, Paris, Gallimard, 2002
- Capitant René Capitant, *Face au nazisme. Écrits 1933-1938*, Texts collected by Olivier Beaud, Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2004
- Caraffini Paolo, « La contribution française à la Déclaration fédéraliste internationale des mouvements de Résistance », in "Die Welt war meine Gemeinde" Willem A. Visser't Hooft. *A Theologian for Europe between Ecumenism and Federalism*, Filippo Maria Giordano, Stefano Dell'Acqua (eds.), Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2014, pp. 189-215

- Cerf-Ferrière René, *L'Assemblée consultative vue de mon banc, novembre 1943-juillet 1944*, Paris, Les Editeurs réunis, 1974
- Chaillet Pierre, *L'Autriche souffrante*, éditions Bloud & Gay, 1939
- Johann Chapoutot, *La révolution culturelle nazie*, Paris, Gallimard, 2017
- Chaubet E., Loyer E., « L'École libre des hautes études de New York: exil et résistance intellectuelle (1942-1946) », *Revue Historique*, 616, octobre/décembre 2000
- Chevance-Bertin Maurice, *Vingt mille heures d'angoisse, 1940-1945*, Robert Laffont, 1990
- Chevènement Jean-Pierre, *1914-2014. L'Europe sortie de l'Histoire?*, Fayard, 2014
- Cinquanta Raffaella, « Partigiani di tutta Europa, unitevi! ». *L'ideale dell'Europa unita nelle riviste clandestine della Resistenza italiana*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2020
- Clavien Alain, Gullotti Hervé, Marti Pierre, *La Province n'est plus la Province. Les relations culturelles franco-suisse à l'épreuve de la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, Lausanne, Antipodes, 2003
- Closon Francis Louis, *Le temps des passions. De Jean Moulin à la Libération, 1943-1944*, Presses de la Cité, 1974
- Cochet François, *Les exclus de la victoire. Histoire des prisonniers de guerre, déportés et STO (1945-1985)*, Kronos, 1992
- Cohen Antonin, *De Vichy à la Communauté européenne*, Paris, PUF, 2012
- Coleman Peter, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and The Struggle for The Mind of Europe*, New York, The Free Press, 1999
- Collectif, *Les fédéralistes en Europe des années 1939 à la fondation de l'UEF (1946)*, avec Jean-François Billion, Jean-Pierre Gouzy, Daniela Preda, Angelica Radicci, Fabio Zucca, Presse fédéraliste, Lyon, 2018
- Comte, Bernard, *Une utopie combattante. L'école des cadres d'Uriage, 1940-1942*, Fayard, 1991
- Cordier Daniel, *Jean Moulin. L'inconnu du Panthéon. Tome 3. De Gaulle capitale de la Résistance, novembre 1940-décembre 1941*, Paris, JCLattès, 1993
- Courtois Stéphane, *Le PCF dans la guerre. De Gaulle, la Résistance, Staline*, Ramsay, 1979

- Crouzet Denis (dir.), *Historiens d'Europe, historiens de l'Europe*, Seysel, Champ Vallon, 2017
- Cuvelliez, Jean-Louis, *Historique du mouvement Combat en Haute-Garonne, juillet 1940-janvier 1944*, mémoire de maîtrise (sous la direction de Pierre Laborie), université de Toulouse-Le-Mirail, juin 1987
- Dainville Augustin de, *L'ORA. La résistance de l'armée*, Lavauzelle, 1974
- Dardot Pierre, Christian Laval, *Dominer. Enquête sur la souveraineté de l'État en Occident*, Paris, La Découverte, 2020
- De Gaulle Charles, *Discours (juin 1940-décembre 1942)*, Fribourg, LUF/Egloff, 1944
- De Gaulle Charles, *Mémoires*, Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 2000
- Deering Mary Jo, *Denis de Rougemont l'Européen*, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe et Centre de recherches européennes, Lausanne, 1991
- Defrance Corine (avec la collaboration de Christiane Falbisaner-Weeda), *Sentinelle ou pont sur le Rhin? Le Centre d'études germaniques*, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2008
- Douzou Laurent, *La Désobéissance. Histoire du mouvement Libération-Sud*, Odile Jacob, 1995
- Du Bois Pierre, « Le mouvement européen au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale », *Relations Internationales*, n°48, hiver 1986, p. 410
- Duchenne G., Dumoulin M. (dir.), *Généralistes européens depuis le XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2012.
- Dufay François, *Le Voyage d'automne. Octobre 1941, des écrivains français en Allemagne*, Perrin/Tempus, 2008
- Duhamel Eric, *L'UDSR ou la genèse de François Mitterrand*, Paris, CNRS éditions, 2007
- Duhamel Eric, *L'union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance. 1945-1965*, thèse pour le doctorat de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris-IV), 1993
- Dumoulin Michel (dir.), *Plans des temps de guerre pour l'Europe d'après-guerre, 1940-1947*, Actes du colloque de Bruxelles, 12-14 mai 1993, Bruxelles, Paris, Milan, Baden-Baden, 1995
- Duroselle Jean-Baptiste, *L'idée d'Europe dans l'histoire*, préface de Jean Monnet, Denoël, 1965

- Duroselle Jean-Baptiste, *L'Abîme, 1939-1945*, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1982
- Europe, *États-Unis d'Europe, Europe des États-Unis ou indépendance*, Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialiste, Bruno Leprince éditeur, 2010
- Eyde Veronika, *Mouvement fédéraliste français: La Fédération. Étude de 1944 à 1958*, Mémoire de maîtrise, université Paris IV-Sorbonne, sous la direction de Georges-Henri Soutou, 2001/2002
- Fauvet Jacques, *La IV<sup>e</sup> République*, Paris, Fayard, 1959
- Febvre Lucien, *L'Europe. Genèse d'une civilisation*, Paris, Perrin, 1999
- Fleury Antoine, Frank Robert (eds.), *Le rôle des guerres dans la mémoire des Européens. Leur effet sur la conscience être européen*, Berne, Peter Lang, 1997
- Fouilloux Etienne, *Les chrétiens français entre crise et libération, 1937-1947*, éd. du Seuil, 1997
- France, *prends garde de perdre ta Liberté*, éditions du Témoignage Chrétien, octobre 1945
- Frenay Henri, « De Gaulle et la Résistance », *Preuves*, n°70, décembre 1958
- Frenay Henri, *Combat*, Paris, Denoël, 1945
- Frenay Henri, *La nuit finira. Mémoires de Résistance, 1940-1945*, R. Laffont, 1973
- Frenay Henri, *Méthodes d'un parti. Alerte aux démocrates*, éditions universelles, Paris, sd (1945)
- Garaudy Roger, *Le Communisme et la Renaissance de la culture française*, Paris, éditions sociales, 1945
- Gardier Michel, *La guerre des services spéciaux français (1935-1945)*, Plon, 1967
- Gerbet Pierre, *La construction de l'Europe*, Imprimerie Nationale, 1999
- Giordano Filippo M., Dell'Acqua Stefano (eds), « *Die Welt war meine Gemeinde* » Willem A. Visser't Hoof. *A Theologian for Europe between Ecumenism and Federalism*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2014
- Girardet Raoul, *La société militaire dans la France contemporaine (1815-1939)*, Paris, Plon, 1953, rééd. Perrin, 1998
- Gotovitch José, « Perspectives européennes dans la résistance et à Londres durant la guerre », in Dumoulin M. (dir.), *La Belgique et les débuts de la construction européenne. De la guerre aux traités de Rome*, Ciaco, Louvain, 1987, p.49.

- Gouzy Jean Pierre, *Les Pionniers de l'Europe communautaire*, Centre de recherches européennes, Lausanne, 1968
- Gouzy Jean-Pierre, « Henri Frenay, incarnation française du fédéralisme européen. Témoignage pour l'histoire. A propos du livre de Robert Belot », *Les Notes de l'UEF-France*, 2e année - N° 10 – 25 novembre 2008 <https://www.uef.fr/IMG/pdf/uef-henri-frenay.pdf>
- Granet Marie, *Ceux de la Résistance (1940-1944)*, Paris, Les éditions de Minuit, 1964
- Granet Marie, *Le journal Défense de la France. Histoire d'un mouvement de Résistance (1940-1944)*, Paris, PUF, 1960
- Granet Marie, Michel Henri, *Combat. Histoire d'un mouvement de résistance de juillet 1940 à juillet 1943*, Paris, PUF, 1957
- Grémion Pierre, « Preuves dans le Paris de guerre froide », *Vingtième Siècle, revue d'histoire*, n°13, janvier-mars 1987. Dossier : Nouvelles lectures de la guerre froide. pp. 63-82.
- Grémion Pierre, *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme. Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris, 1945-1975*, Fayard, 1995
- Greilsammer Alain, *Les mouvements fédéralistes en France de 1945 à 1974*, préface d'Alexandre Marc, Nice, Presses d'Europe, 1975
- Gruat Cédric, *Crimes hitlériens. Une exposition-deuil au sortir de la guerre*, éd. Tirésias-Michel Reynaud, 2017
- Guillon Jean-Marie, *La Résistance dans le Var. Essai d'histoire politique*, thèse pour le doctorat d'État, université de Provence, Aix, 1989, 3 vol.
- Guillon Jean-Marie, Laborie Pierre, *Mémoire et Histoire : la Résistance*, Toulouse, éd. Privat, 1995
- Harcourt Robert d', *L'Évangile de la force*, Perrin, 2021 (rééd. 1936),
- Hauriou André, *Vers une doctrine de la Résistance. Le socialisme humaniste*, Alger, Éditions de la Revue Fontaine, 1944
- Hazard Paul, *La pensée européenne au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (2 tomes), Paris, Éditions Contemporaines, Boivin et Cie, 1946
- Hazareesingh Sudhir, *Le mythe gaullien*, Gallimard, 2010
- Heyde Veronika, *De L'esprit de la Résistance jusqu'à l'idée de l'Europe. Projets européens et américains pour l'Europe de l'après-guerre (1945-1950)*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2010
- Hostache René, *Le Conseil national de la Résistance. Les institutions de la clandestinité*, Paris, PUF, 1958

- Indomitius (Philippe Viannay), *Nous sommes les rebelles*, 1945, collection Défense de l'Homme
- Jilek Lubor, « L'idée d'Europe devant la guerre : les exilés et le fédéralisme européen en Suisse, 1938-1945 », in *La Suisse en Europe. Une réflexion pluridisciplinaire*, Institut universitaire d'études européennes, Genève, septembre 1992
- Judt Tony, *Après-Guerre. Une histoire de l'Europe depuis 1945*, Paris, Armand Colin (translated from english), 2007
- Keim Albert N., "John Foster Dulles and the Protestant World Order Movement on the Eve of World War II", in *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 73-89
- Kedward H. R., *Naissance de la Résistance dans la France de Vichy. Idées et motivations. 1940-1942*, Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 1989
- Kergoat Jacques, *Marceau Pivert, socialiste de gauche*, éditions de l'Atelier, 1994
- Ian Kershaw, *Hitler. 1936-1945 : Némisis* (translated from English), Paris, Flammarion, 2000
- Korinman Michel, *Quand l'Allemagne pensait le monde. Grandeur et décadence d'une géopolitique*, Paris, Fayard, 1990
- Laborie Pierre, *Les Français des années troubles. De la guerre d'Espagne à la Libération*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 2001
- Laborie Pierre, *Le chagrin et le venin. La France sous l'Occupation, mémoire et idées reçues*, Paris, Bayard, 2011
- La France de 1945. Résistances, retours, renaissances*, Presses Universitaires de Caen, 1996
- La Résistance spirituelle, 1941-1944. Les Cahiers clandestins du Témoignage chrétien*, textes presented by François et Renée Bédarida, Paris, Albin Michel, 2001
- Langer William L., *Le Jeu américain à Vichy*, Plon, 1948
- Laughlan, J., *Tainted source: undemocratic origins of the European idea*, London, Little Brown, 1997
- Lavoine Yves, « Aragon et l'UNESCO 1946 : le spectre du fascisme », in Luc Vigier et Maryse Vasseviere (dir.), *Recherches croisées Aragon - Elsa Triolet*, n°14, Presses de l'Université de Strasbourg, 2013, p. 57-70
- Le Goff Jacques, *La vieille Europe et la nôtre*, Seuil, 1994

- Levi Guido, Preda Daniela, *Euro-scepticisms. Resistance and Opposition to the European Community/European Union*, Bologne, Il Mulino, 2019
- Lewin Christophe, *Le retour des prisonniers de guerre français. Naissance et développement de la FNPG*, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1986
- Lipgens Walter, Loth Wilfried (eds.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, 3 Vol., Berlin-New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1984-1991
- Loth Wilfried, *Der Weg nach Europa: Geschichte der Europäischen Integration 1939-1957*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990
- Loth Wilfried, « Les projets de politique extérieure de la Résistance socialiste en France », *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, tome XXIV, octobre-décembre 1977, p. 544-552.
- Loyer Emmanuelle, *Paris à New York. Intellectuels et artistes français en exil, 1940-1947*, Grasset, 2005.
- Lubac Henri de, *Résistance chrétienne à l'antisémitisme. Souvenirs 1940-1944*, Paris, Fayard, 1988
- Luneau Aurélie, *Radio Londres, 1940-1944*, Perrin, 2005
- Maritain Jacques, *À travers la Victoire*, Paris, Hartmann, 1945
- Maritain Jacques, *L'Europe et l'idée fédérale*, Mame, 1993
- Marjolin Robert, *Le travail d'une vie. Mémoires, 1911-1986*, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1986
- Martinet, Gilles, « Le révolutionnarisme maladie sénile du capitalisme », in *La crise française*, Paris, Éditions du Pavois, 1945, pp. 61-110.
- Massigli René, *Une comédie des erreurs, 1943-1956. Souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne*, Plon, 1978
- Mauriac François, *Le bâillon dénoué*, Paris, Grasset, 1945
- Maux-Robert Antoinette, *La lutte contre le chômage à Vichy. Henri Maux, le juste oublié, 1939-1944*, éditions Lavauzelle, 2002
- Mayer Daniel, *Les socialistes dans la Résistance. Souvenirs et documents*, PUF, 1968
- Mehlman Jeffrey, *Émigrés à New York. Les intellectuels français à Manhattan, 1940-1944*, Albin Michel, 2005
- Mélandri Pierre, *Les États-Unis face à l'unification de l'Europe, 1945-1954*, Publications de la Sorbonne, éditions Pedone, 1980

- Mélandri Pierre, « L'intégration contre la désintégration: les États-Unis, le plan Marshall et l'unification économique de l'Europe, 1947-1950 », in Giraud René, Lévy-Boyer Maurice (eds.), *Le Plan Marshall et l'unification économique de l'Europe*, Paris, Ministère des Finances, 1993, pp. 625-640.
- Michel H., Mirkine-Guetzévitch B., *Les idées politiques et sociales de la Résistance*, PUF, 1954
- Michel Henri, *Les courants de pensée de la Résistance*, Paris, PUF, 1962
- Missica Dominique, *Berty Albrecht, féministe et résistante*, Paris, Perrin, 2005
- Mitterrand François, *Ma part de vérité*, Paris, Fayard, 1969
- Monnet Jean, *Mémoires*, Fayard, Paris, 1976
- Monot Mathieu, *Socialistes et démocrates-chrétiens et la politisation de l'Europe*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2010
- Moret Claude (pseudonyme de Armand Bérard), *L'Allemagne et la réorganisation de l'Europe (1940-1943)*, Neuchâtel, éditions La Baconnière (Les Cahiers du Rhône), 1944
- Morin Edgar, *Penser l'Europe*, Gallimard, 1987-1990
- Mounier et sa génération. *Lettres, carnets et inédits*, Paris, Seuil, 1956
- Navarre Henri, *Le temps des vérités*, Plon, 1979
- Nelson Harold I., *Land and Power British and Allies Policy on Germany's Frontiers, 1918-1919*, Londres-Toronto, Routledge, 1963
- Nocher Jean, *J'ai choisi la vérité*, éd. L'Espoir, 1948
- Nora Pierre, « Gaullistes et communistes », in Pierre Nora (dir.), *Les Lieux de mémoire*, t.2, Gallimard, 1997, p. 2492
- Paolini Edmondo (ed.), *Altiero Spinelli. Dalla lotta antifascista alla battaglia per la federazione europea 1920-1948: documenti e testimonianze*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1996
- Paxton Robert O., *L'Armée de Vichy. Le corps des officiers français, 1940-1944*, Paris, Tallandier, 2004
- Paxton Robert, Julie Hessler, *L'Europe au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris, Tallandier, 2011
- Philip Loïc, *André Philip*, Bauchesne, 1988
- Philip Olivier, *Le problème de l'union européenne*, préface de Denis de Rougemont, éditions de La Baconnière, Neuchâtel, 1950
- Pinard Joseph, *Lucien Febvre. Militant socialiste à Besançon, 1907-1912*, Besançon, Cêtre, 2011



- Pistone Sergio, *The Union of European Federalists: From the Foundation to the Decision on Direct Election of the European Parliament (1946-1974)*, Volume 7 de Centro studi sul federalismo. Studi, Centro Studi sul Federalismo (Torino), Giuffrè Editore, 2008
- Pistone Sergio, *La lotta del Movimento Federalista Europeo dalla Resistenza alla caduta della Comunità Europea di Difesa nel 1954*, in *Id.* (ed.), *I movimenti per l'unità europea (1945-1954)*, Milan, Jaca Book, 1992, pp. 17-60.
- Poidevin Raymond, «La nouvelle politique allemande de la France (juin 1948-avril 1949)», in *Enjeux et Puissances. Pour une histoire des relations internationales au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Baptiste Duroselle*, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1986
- Poujol Jacques, «André Philip: les années de guerre, 1939-1945», *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire du protestantisme français*, vol. 138, avril-mai-juin 1992, p. 181-241
- Pourquoi résister? Résister pour quoi faire?*, textes rassemblés et édités par Bernard Garnier, Jean-Luc Leleu, Jean Quellien et Anne Simonin, Caen, Centre de recherche d'histoire quantitative, 2006
- Preda Daniela, *Euroscepticisms. Resistance and Opposition to the European Community/European Union*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2019.
- Preda Daniela, "First Attempts to found a European Federal State: a Retrospective Glance", in *The European Union Review*, IV (1999), No. 1, pp. 107-119.
- Proudhon*, textes choisis par Alexandre Marc, Egloff, coll. «Le Cri de la France», 1945
- Purro Jean-Marc, *La fédération européenne, ses principes et ses problèmes, vus par les fédéralistes au travers des Congrès de Montreux, La Haye, Rome et Lausanne*, Mémoire de licence présenté à la Faculté des lettres de l'Université de Fribourg (Suisse), 1977
- Rebattet F.-X., *The «European Movement», 1945-1953: a study in national and international non-governmental organisations working for european unity*, University of Oxford, 1962
- Révillard Christophe, *Les premières tentatives de construction d'une Europe fédérale. Des traités de la Résistance au traité de C.E.D. (1940-1954)*, éditions F.-X. de Guibert, 2001
- Rossi André, *La guerre des papillons. Quatre ans de politique communiste (1940-1944)*, Paris, Les Îles d'Or, 1954

- Rossi Ernesto, *L'Europe demain*, Neuchâtel, Éditions de la Baconnière, 1945
- Rougemont Denis de, *L'Europe en jeu*, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1948
- Roussel Eric, *Jean Monnet*, Fayard, 1996
- Nicolas Roussellier, «Pour une écriture européenne de l'histoire de l'Europe», avr.-juin 1993, *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire*, Paris Presses de la FNSP, p. 74-89
- Roussy de Sales Raoul, *L'Amérique entre en guerre. Journal d'un Français aux États-Unis*, La Jeune Parque, 1948
- Sadoun Marc, *Les Socialistes sous l'Occupation. Résistance et Collaboration*, PFNSP, 1982
- Salmon Robert, *Chemin faisant. Vers la Résistance. Du lycée à Défense de la France*, éditions LBM, 2004
- Shennan Andrew, *Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal 1940-1946*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989
- Silva Raymond, *Au service de la paix. L'idée fédéraliste*, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1945
- Simonin Anne, *Les Éditions de minuit. 1942-1955. Le devoir d'insoumission*, Paris, IMEC éditions, 1994
- Sirinelli Jean-François, *Sartre et Aron, deux intellectuels dans le siècle*, Hachette Littératures, 1995
- Sirinelli Jean-François, *Intellectuels et passions françaises. Manifestes et pétitions au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Fayard, 1990
- Soria Georges, *La France va-t-elle devenir une colonie américaine?*, Paris, Éd. du Pavillon, 1948
- Soustelle Jacques, *Envers et contre tout. D'Alger à Paris (1942-1944)*, t. II, Robert Laffont, 1950
- Soutou Georges-Henri, *La guerre froide. 1943-1990*, Paris, Fayard/Pluriel, 2001-2010
- Soutou Georges-Henri, *Europa! Les projets européens de l'Allemagne nazie et de l'Italie fasciste*, Paris, Tallandier, 2021
- Soutou Georges-Henri, «Le général de Gaulle et l'URSS, 1943-1945: idéologie ou équilibre européen?», *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1994/4
- Soutou Jean-Marie, *Un diplomate engagé. Mémoires 1939-1979*, éditions de Fallois, 2011
- Spinelli Altiero, *Diario europeo. 1948-1969*, a cura di Edmondo Paolini, Società editrice il Mulino, 1989



- Spinelli Altiero, Rossi Ernesto, *Le Manifeste de Ventotene. Pour une Europe libre et unie (et autres textes – 1941-1947)*, éd. Presse fédéraliste, Lyon, 2016
- Spinelli Altiero, Rossi Ernesto, *The Ventotene Manifesto*, preface by Eugenio Colorni, Introductions by Lucio Levi and Pier Virgilio Dastoli, Foreword by Laura Boldrini, Camogli (Genoa), Ultima Spiaggia, 2016
- Stenger Nicolas, *Denis de Rougemont. Les intellectuels et l'Europe au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2015
- Stonor Saunders Frances, *Qui mène la danse? La CIA et la guerre froide culturelle*, Denoël, 2003
- Teitgen Pierre-Henri, *Faites entrer le témoin suivant. 1940-1958. De la Résistance à la IV<sup>e</sup> République*, Ouest France, 1988
- Thalman Rita, *La Mise au pas. Idéologie et stratégie sécuritaire dans la France occupée*, Fayard, 1991
- Thelos (Ernesto Rossi), *L'Europe de demain*, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1945
- Tournès Ludovic, *L'Argent de l'influence*, Paris, Autrement, coll. «Mémoires/Culture», 2010
- Vaïsse Maurice (dir.), *De Gaulle et la Russie*, éd. CNRS, 2006
- Varsori Antonio, Calandri Elena (eds.), *The Failure of Peace in Europe, 1943-1948*, London, Palgrave, 2002
- Vaucheux Antoine, «“Les études européennes, quel ennui!” Quelques mots sur une illusion bien fondée...», *Politique européenne*, n°50, 2015, p. 160-169
- Vayssière Bertrand, *Un groupe de pression européen: l'Union européenne des fédéralistes (1940-1956)*, thèse pour le doctorat d'histoire, décembre 2000, université de Toulouse-Le-Mirail.
- Vayssière Bertrand, *Vers une Europe fédérale? Les espoirs et les actions fédéralistes au sortir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, PIE-Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2007
- Vayssière Bertrand, *Européiste et eurocrate: la vie fédéraliste de Raymond Rifflet*, Presses universitaires du Midi, Toulouse, 2018
- Vercelli Cinzia Rognoni, *Mario Alberto Rollier. Un valdese federalista*, Milan, Jaca Book, 1991
- Villiers Philippe de, *J'ai tiré sur le fil du mensonge et tout est venu*, Paris, Pluriel, 2020 (1ère éd. Fayard, 2019)
- Visser't Hooft W.A., *Le temps du rassemblement. Mémoires*, Seuil, 1975

- Voyenne Bernard, *Histoire de l'idée fédéraliste*, t. 3, Préface d'Alexandre Marc, Presses d'Europe, Nice, 1981
- Wall Irwin M., *L'influence américaine sur la politique française, 1945-1954*, Balland, 1989
- Wieviorka Olivier, *La Mémoire désunie. Le souvenir politique des années sombres, de la Libération à nos jours*, Seuil, 2010
- Winock Michel, «Esprit». *Des intellectuels dans la cité. 1930-1950*, Seuil, 1975-1996
- Wyrwa Tadeusz, *L'idée européenne dans la Résistance à travers la presse clandestine en France et en Pologne, 1939-1945*, Nouvelles éditions latines, 1987

# Documents

---

## **Combat and Revolution**

### **Combat newspaper, no. 34, September 1942<sup>447</sup>**

The time has come to express the deep meaning of our fight. We are fighting against Germany and its allies, whether they are in Rome, Tokyo (sic), or Vichy. But through Nazism, we are fighting alongside all wounded nations so that a better world can be born out of the terrible ordeal our country has faced.

Our role will not end with the liberation of the territory: beyond that, we want to rebuild France. We want France to make its necessary contribution to the restoration of Europe and of the world.

As soon as the French people and the United Nations have driven out the invader, the liberation government faces a number of imperative and immediate tasks: to ensure the material life of the country, punish traitors and profiteers, and abolish unfair and degrading laws promulgated by Vichy.

However, these essential measures will only be the prerequisite for the reconstruction of France. From now on, we want to take a stand for this great work and affirm our principles.

We want a Free France, because freedom is the most important commodity. The Vichy Government has shown us that in a peremptory way: the slope of arbitrariness and tyranny is

---

447 This article is a slightly amended version of the text drafted by Henri Frenay, André Hauriou, and Claude Bourdet in the summer of 1942.

a slippery slope. However... we no longer want the decadent carelessness that had led people to spinelessness and France to Vichy. Freedom has to be earned every day.

We want a fair France, because stable social relations are only made possible with justice, since it protects human dignity, the necessary basis of our civilisation.

We want an honest France, because the lack of honesty in public life (as well as in private) was one of the main causes of the collapse of 1940 and the defining characteristic of the Vichy regime. In the public domain, all forms of lying will be sanctioned by justice as dishonesty. We want the Republic because, for two years, the fate of the Republic and that of the Resistance have been inextricably linked, and also because the French nation can only fully express itself in republican institutions. What we want is the Fourth Republic. At a crucial time in its history, the Third Republic did not defend itself; she committed suicide. She belongs to the past.

The Republic we want will be strong, balanced, and modern: strong, to represent France with authority and dignity overseas and to resist the enemies of freedom within, and balanced in order to be stable. The State must be the complete expression of the real forces of the nation. Freely expressed ideological movements, freely formed workers' groups, incorporated bodies, regional communities, and spiritual groups that ensure national continuity, are among the main such forces. If opposed or poorly coordinated, they could have been causes of disagreement and anarchy. But validly expressed and organically united, they constitute the framework of the future State that will find the guarantee of its duration in the balance within these movements.

The Republic we want must be modern, because the public administration, both in terms of its spirit and technique, must benefit from progress made by private companies.

We want the revolution, because the revolution is still to take place, especially after the derisory parody that was Vichy.

The revolution we carry within us will be a revolution of all French people, for all French people. The magnificent gift that all the Resistance movements have given France is that of an immense cohort in which the will to bear witness together has already brought together representatives of all social classes, from all of the old parties.

From our crucible will emerge not a class revolution, but a revolution in which workers, peasants, technicians, and thinkers will have their place and part, according to their merit and efforts.

The revolution we carry within us will be socialist, because the time has come no longer for words but for action to wrest control of and the benefits of the economy from a powerful oligarchy and hand important sectors of the economy over to the nation or to the communities of producers and consumers, as the case may be.

Adopting the opposite view to that of Vichy, which consolidated big capitalism through the Organising Committees, we want workers to participate in the life of companies and to share in their profits. We will improve their standard of living by pooling the benefits of technical progress.

The revolution we carry within us is more than a material revolution: it is a revolution of the mind, of youth, and of the people.

The bourgeois republic was made up of selfishness, narrowness, and fears scarcely concealed by oratorical goodwill.

The men of the Resistance, hardened by their daily ordeal, would instil in France the spirit of generosity, greatness, and daring.

Instruction truly open to all would be inseparable from education. It would form character as much as intelligence; thus, it would draw the real elites from the bosom of the nation, allowing their constant renewal: an elite that does not renew itself is an elite that dies. We wanted to merge an all-conquering individualism and a generous sense of community in a harmonious synthesis. The revolution within us is the dawn of a new civilisation.

We wanted to merge an all-conquering individualism and a generous sense of community in a harmonious synthesis.

The revolution within us is the dawn of a new civilisation. This is the meaning of the global civil war.

History teaches us that borders are constantly getting broader.

The United States of Europe, a step towards world unity, will soon be a living reality for which we are fighting.

Instead of a Europe that is not united but enslaved under the jackboot of a Germany drunk on its own power, we will create with other peoples a united Europe organised on the basis of the law in liberty, equality, and fraternity.

French men, women, and children of the cities and of the countryside, we call on you to participate in the fight for the liberation of the territory from dictatorship, and economic and spiritual liberation. Come to *Combat*, which is fighting for France from Dunkirk to Bayonne, from Brest to Nice, and within the empire. With General de Gaulle and *Combat* forces alongside the United Nations, we will win the war and destroy fascism. Then, we will rebuild France.

---

## Letter from Henri Frenay to General de Gaulle

London, November 8, 1942<sup>448</sup>

My General,

At the last lunch you had with me at the Connaught Hotel, I expressed to you my concern about the way some people in the FFC view the French thesis of peace. While these concepts have not received your approval, that of the National Committee, or that of France, they seem to me to be of such gravity that I believe I should speak to you about them again.

You may consider it premature to pin such great expectations on a future that is still uncertain when the Allies have barely recorded their first successes. However, I want to take advantage of my stay in London, which will no doubt not be repeated, to share with you in general terms what we thought about *Combat*, and which I believe is in line with the aspirations of a very large number of French people.

The crushing defeat of the French armed forces in 1940 and the German occupation of the national territory, with its series of material privations and moral humiliations, did not result in a wave of nationalism such as that which generally existed in right-wing circles, as one might have expected.

If we do not endeavour to solve the problem periodically caused by war by way of new, bold solutions, public opinion will not be able to see why the same causes should not lead to the same outcome: bloody and ever more widespread conflicts.

Unfortunately, the solutions sought to economic problems are political and military.

---

<sup>448</sup> Source: *Combat*. B no. 14 II. Comité d'histoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale (Committee of the History of the Second World War). National Archives (Paris), 72AJ 47.

There is probably no shortage of goodwill among those who are responsible for thinking about the world of tomorrow. France fears the poverty of imagination of these people, the pusillanimity of their ideas. She fears – and not without reason, it seems – that their ideas on peace and international order will come from the same routine, formalistic, and slow spirit that has undermined their conceptions of war.

We at *Combat* are convinced that the political, economic, and military crises that have shaken the world in recent decades are ample evidence of the same need: to rebuild the moral, economic, and political foundations on which international life has been built. We believe that the truth is in the hands not of short-sighted entrepreneurs, but of bold architects.

We also know that France will not be alone at the peace table, that it will be even less possible for France to dictate this peace, to rebuild the world according to its own conceptions, than it was in 1918. However, it has a voice to be heard, a thesis to support. For us, it would be inconceivable that it should present an archaic and precarious solution, perhaps in the traditions of French diplomacy, but which would mean renouncing its traditions, a betrayal of the popular will.

While the strength of our country means it is no longer in the very top tier of nations, in the eyes of the world it will remain the chosen land of the Spirit. It owes it to its past not to close itself off in narrow conservatism, and not to manifest a degrading inferiority complex through the politics of fear.

My General, it is my view that you should attach your name not only to the liberation of the Motherland, but also to a thesis of peace whose generosity and wisdom do not exclude foresight. And if this does not triumph, then at least France, in your words, will have demonstrated the greatness of its spirit in the eyes of the world.

It seems to be that the peace negotiators will be united by a central concern: to avoid the return of war in Europe. In general, it is believed that there are two problems to be solved: first and foremost,

the German problem, followed by the economic problem, with the solution given to the political problem being the outcome of solutions to first two problems.

In my opinion, this assumption, which is so widespread, contains a major flaw with serious consequences. There are not two problems, but one: the economic problem, within which lies the German problem.

My General, I do not know if you share my point of view: hence the lengthy explanation that follows. I ask that you read it with patience.

I recall a conversation I had in 1935 with a very good friend who did not share my views on foreign policy. One of the things I told him was: “Whatever the policy followed by France from now on, we will one day see Germany, Italy, and Japan pitted against democratic countries.” Events have proven me correct. This can be easily explained.

The geographic and demographic characteristics of these three countries indeed offered common points that can be summed up as follows: an excessively large population living in too small an area and soil that is too poor. All three were what the Germans would call a *Volk ohne Raum*.

At certain points in their history, these three States have tried to solve the vital problem of the livelihood of their people by peaceful means. They have adopted the same procedures.

The first was emigration. It was not a mere coincidence that Japanese, Italians, and Germans expatriated their nationals by the million to available areas of the two Americas and neighbouring countries. For a long time, emigration was the best safety valve to ensure world peace.

But little by little, host states grew concerned about this growing influx of competition to their nationals in the labour market. They reduced the number of immigrants entering and, ultimately, closed their borders.

As a result of their natural resources, Germany and Japan simultaneously set out to industrialise. In order to secure the foreign exchange required to feed their people, they engaged in the mass export of manufactured products. As a result of the low living standards of their nationals, they would emerge victorious over their competitors by setting unbeatably low-cost prices. Democratic countries that could not lower their prices without reducing the standard of living of their respective working classes were then forced to raise customs barriers. Germany and Japan would respond by dumping manufactured products, which meant increasing misery for their workers. But even that was not enough: the dumping system was defeated by the systems of protections that had been built against it. The safety valve, which for a time had been reopened, was once again closed by the democracies.

Italy, whose lack of raw materials prevented industrial development, launched into empty colonial spaces. Only arid lands were still available, and she did not find there the settlements that would have provided a solution to the problem.

Thus, it was for the same reasons - albeit at different times - that these countries, plunged into growing distress and threatened with suffocation, paid heed to the apprentice dictators and put totalitarian regimes in power. From then onwards, war was inevitable.

I am not afraid to express my views. I believe there would be a certain greatness in affirming it one day in front of the world:

- While totalitarian countries bear the most immediate responsibility for the war, democratic countries are indirectly responsible,
- Hitler and Mussolini are their creation. The abominable fascist myth, the cult of war and blood, and the exasperation of racial pride, were used to galvanise their people and strengthen their resolve and muscles for war, for which they prepared using ruthless methods.



It must be recognised that both domestically and in their international interactions, democracies have betrayed the principles of generosity, justice, and equality that they now claim to uphold. Social conflict and war were the inevitable consequences.

This is why the German problem is, in my view, an inherent part of the economic problem. May the latter be resolved in a spirit of high justice. I am convinced that pan-Germanism will prevail.

I know that we are talking about the eternal Germany, the one that Tacitus and Caesar depicted and which can be found in Emperor Otto, Frederick II, Fichte, and Bismarck. This is true. I also believe that the permanent psychological data of a people are connected to hitherto permanent economic factors. The Germans would not go any harder than the Gaul, the Pomeranian of Frederick II any harder than the France of Voltaire, or the German Nazi any harder than their French contemporary. The harshness of life corresponds to harshness of the mind, and to insecurity corresponds the spirit of adventure.

Is it not a coincidence that the quintessential nature of the German spirit (i.e. the Prussian spirit) has its roots in the most deprived lands of the Reich? Is that not where we must search for the sustainability of this aggressive aspect that is so often denounced, and which makes us so afraid? Let life become sweet in Germany, and I am convinced that the so-called “eternal Prussianism” will fade.

This is why, in my opinion, the main problem to be resolved is the economic fact that must resolve the German problem. The other day, my General, you explained to me that the Americans planned to increase the standard of living of the peoples of Europe. I believe this would be a wise move, but I do not see what political measures would result.

The commitments made by the United Nations to the foreign governments present in London will lead peace negotiators to reconstruct the map roughly to resemble that of 1920. While this obligation is, in my view, obviously regrettable, it is a moral necessity that we will not abandon.

The main error, the mortal sin in the eyes of history, would be to want to restore these states to the fullness of an illusory sovereignty. In view of the mosaic of peoples that make up Europe, the right to self-determination should be considered one of the main causes of the current war.

The sovereignty of states born out of the treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Neuilly, and Trianon, was a myth that may have given satisfaction to narrow-minded nationalists but could not delude far-sighted statesmen.

Sovereignty is not an end, but a means: it is the means by which to protect the eternal moral values to which a country has an attachment. However, in the current era sovereignty is defined not only in terms of political and military independence, but also (and above all) in terms of economic independence, without which the other forms of independence are no more than a dangerous illusion.

In fact, the states born out of the last war have never been sovereign. Economic need has more or less forced all of them to waive a large part of their sovereignty to more advantaged states.

If we really want to build states that are suited to the century in which we live, we cannot do so by persevering with the fragmentation of Europe. The historical evolution of the world highlights a fundamental law that is stronger than men: borders are getting longer, not shorter. The world is moving, sometimes in pain, towards ever wider and deeper unity. Any construction that starts from the systematic desire to maintain or increase division would be criminally insane and condemn us to bloody new conflicts. Technical development has resulted in the economic interdependence of nations. Experience provides abundant evidence that in order to settle relations, it is no longer enough to exchange signatures at the bottom of treaties: we must boldly design an entirely revolutionary *modus vivendi*.

However, it is natural for each nation to want to preserve and protect what makes it unique: its language, customs, mores, religion, traditions, conception of life, everything for which men currently fight and die.

The war and German occupation amply demonstrated that it is not the illusory strength of a theoretically sovereign state (but which, in practice, is a vassal state) that gives a state the necessary protection. It is not enough to elevate nations to the position of states to ensure their existence.

We must then admit the necessary division between two notions that are imprudently confused: that of the Nation, and that of the State. The Nation is a permanent spiritual entity, while the State must be a sum of Nations conferring on each of them the internal and external security to which they have a legitimate claim, and which have total sovereignty. In theory, the borders of a State should be able to expand in line with global technical and economic development. Therefore, it is not a matter of artificially carving up a Nation at the angry stroke of a pen by a resentful diplomat. On the contrary: existing political unions must be expanded in order to give them the economic viability that will make them States.

Is it possible to create several economically harmonious blocs in Europe? I do not think so. First of all, wealth is very unequally distributed; second, the states of western Europe are the only colonial states. And yet, the countries and central and eastern Europe have a need for products from the colonies that, in proportional terms, is as great as that of France, Belgium or Holland.

For this reason, but also because I believe it would be wise to take advantage of the turmoil caused to the public conscience by the war, I believe that France should propose to the world the European federation with a common colonial fund.

I know in advance the objections that can be made to this project: I can already hear the clamour it will generate. However, is it not present in everyone's minds? Is it not the instructive will of the people? If

we want to be democrats at home, why not try to be democrats applying the common wish of Nations overseas? Specialists will oppose the project, as will interests, and therefore selfishness. We should also remember that economists, financiers, and professional diplomats are enforcement agents responsible for implementing a will, not for coming up with it.

With regards to interests, one must start with the idea of fighting them, not being subject to them.

I am also familiar with the questions that may be asked, the objections that can be (and always are) raised when it comes to getting out of a routine: What will you do with Russia? Will it be integrated or not? If yes, in whole or in part? And England? And its colonies? What about the will of its dominions? These questions need to be studied: neither those who pose them nor others can answer them *a priori*.

I also appreciate the difficulties that will arise between allies, and in particular the obstruction that the United States will no doubt engage in in response to such a project. Is this a reason not to do whatever we can? Should we necessarily have a defeatist attitude in politics? In the event of failure, the merit of an ambitious and generous solution would be to establish the responsibilities of each person in the face of history.

The USSR and the United States of America provide us with striking evidence that races that are very different and states with a wide diversity of gifts can coexist in harmony. Without doubt, there are old antagonisms in Europe that are difficult to dispel. This is the spiritual problem to which I will return later.

The guarantee of respect for nationalities that no political motive would pit one nationality against another could easily be conceived in the form of a cross-nation tribunal, before which any disputes would be brought.

But then the question will be asked: will you allow a German bloc of 80 million, a bloc that outnumbers its two largest neighbours, to exist

at the heart of Europe? Well, yes! And I am firmly convinced that to do otherwise would be to perpetuate a crime of *lèse-nation* and place a time bomb against the peace.

German unity is a historical given. At the risk of appearing sacrilegious, I would add that I rejoice in it because it is a capital expression of this ongoing, painful effort of people towards an ever greater and deeper unity that I consider both a necessity and positive.

In France, Bainville still had his followers who wanted to return Germany to a state close to that of 1803. Again, there is the sign of a serious misunderstanding, of culpable historical conservatism. Admittedly, Bainville was an enlightened mind and a distinguished historian, and in his judgment, he could not help but me a man of his generation. To him, the German unity that was forged before his very eyes was an accident, not the result of historical development. He was undecided, since he lived his youth in the years following our defeat in 1870. Touched in his ardent patriotism, he could not bring himself to deem good for others what had been good for France.

He judged German unity through the prism of French interests, not through the prism of the interests of humanity.

I am saddened when the differences between north and south, east and west, are pointed out in my presence, and when we conclude that the mutilation of German territory is a possibility. I am familiar with the differences that separate Prussians from people from the Rhine region, and Pomeranians from Bavarians. I also know that there are fundamental differences between the Breton and the Provençal, the Basque and the Flemish, and the Savoyard and the Alsatian. However, these people would become part of a united France.

In the name of Bainvillian principles, Germans recently believed that they could foster Breton separatism and Alsace-Lorraine while fascist Italy, in the name of so-called historical rights, wanted to annex Corsica, Savoy, and the County of Nice.

Isn't their failure resounding? All they have succeeded in doing is strengthen the ties they wanted to cut, and unleashing ever-greater hatred against them.

Why would we succeed where has Germany failed? Is it because Germany has only recently become a united country? Let us not forget that Savoy has been French for less than a hundred years, and that German unity was forged in four wars. The bond of blood shed in common, together with the linguistic bond, is the best and fastest-setting cement.

To go against these principles would be to create a dangerous irredentism, a new mysticism raised against a new diktat. We would be deliberately training generations of revenge. You cannot wound the soul of a people to such an extent without causing the most lasting, the most brutal, and – let's be honest – the most noble reactions. The unity of the Polish nation has survived despite 150 years of systematic oppression. May such a great example prevent us from repeating such criminal errors.

The peace will be a peace of justice and generosity, not of hate and egoism. Otherwise, there will be no peace.

But then, one could pose the question: how can this defeated Germany, territorially intact, imbued with Nazi mysticism, and still drunk on its past strength and disappointed ambitions, be prevented from recalling its defeat one day and resorting to arms again?

A country that does not find legitimate reasons to resort to arms either in its political situation or in the political or moral conditions of its existence has no reason to wage war. This is a condition that may be insufficient, or necessary at least. Hence the need, in my opinion, to deal with Germany on a strictly equal footing with all other Nations.

Besides, how, in a well-designed European union, could any of the Nations have the means to resort to war? Can we imagine California declaring war on Wisconsin? Unity in foreign policy, the creation of a

European army and no longer national armies, and the state control or socialisation of heavy industry, would prohibit not only Germany but any other nation from becoming a danger to other nations.

Since war has been made materially impossible, ideas will have to be fought in people's minds. Addressing the systematic destruction of centuries-old antagonisms will be the most sacred of duties. The necessary punishment of the guilty demanded by the world will not even be an obstacle to this plan.

Above all, the culprits are these cadres of the Nazi Party, who instilled the insane cult of race, war, and blood in a whole generation of young people. These are the people who must be punished even before the perpetrators of the atrocities, because they are the people who armed them. The German people themselves will thank you for it. As do all peoples of the world after a defeat, they will hold their leaders responsible. It is in the name of the German people and of the whole of humanity that several tens of thousands of Hitlerites will have to be executed.

Above all, let us remove from our intentions that which would consist of humiliating a great people for decades to come.

These intentions would include a brutal sanction imposed on a responsible minority; and would revolt against a less harsh but generalised and prolonged sanction.

Then, and only then, with all guarantees against immediate dangers having been put in place, will there be a duty to create the European spirit, to raise our thoughts beyond old frontiers, to create a spiritual community.

This thought is not the product of a dreaming brain, of a dangerous utopian. On the contrary: from the lessons of history, I draw the certainty that this enterprise is both necessary and possible. Switzerland provides us with an example – in miniature form – of a country made up of three nations and whose men are nevertheless united by the

powerful feeling of belonging to the same community. France itself, which today is a magnificent example of national unity, is made up of countries that have fought and hated each other for centuries.

This unity, which in the past took so long to achieve, can be forged within a few years as a result of the progress with which science and technology provide us. To love one another, we must first know one another, which in turn allows us to understand each other. In the past, it took weeks to travel the breadth of France. Now, one can travel across Europe in 24 hours. The spoken word is instantly carried from one end of the world to the other.

If European nations determined to come together in a large federation should decide at the same time on a concerted plan by which men and people would have to know each other better, and if they should apply this plan with perseverance, in the future (i.e., within a generation) the European community would be a *fait accompli*.

Let us organise travel for young people, for workers, for intellectuals; may French people could take holidays in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and in Italy, and Germans in France. May unions between nationals of two countries be made easier. May the works of the great European masters be translated into all languages and taught in schools; may students in educational institutions no longer be taught about the formation of the current states as an objective in itself, but rather as a moment in historical evolution; may they be taught at the same time about the achievements of Louis XIV and those of foreign sovereigns; may international associations be automatically created on professional or cultural grounds. May cinema, radio, books, and theatre be united in the service of this objective, and the game will be won.

This is the immense hope that is welling up within us right now in France, my General. And it is proof of the greatness of our Motherland that at the very moment when it is suffering unspeakably under foreign occupation, it is dominating its pain and its anger to let its reason and heart speak.

It would be a particularly good time to support this position in the aftermath of this war. Hitlerian propaganda had the rare merit of making the idea of a European order penetrate circles that had been irreducibly opposed to it. As for left-wing circles, their approval was acquired. The psychological impact of words is no longer to be feared. European unity and socialism respond to such a need that every country, every group of men, sometimes of dubious good faith, have also used them. Words are now recognised: do not let them fade into oblivion.

I do not claim that there are no longer supporters of another policy in France: surely, they are quite numerous. However, I sincerely believe that opinion in Resistance circles broadly corresponds to that which I have just expressed to you.

You will understand then, my General, my sad surprise when I heard qualified men argue before me in favour of positions so far removed from the national will.

This will we have felt, we have expressed to *Combat* in a recent manifesto that has not yet reached you. I would like to know whether it is necessary to make our study groups work on the basis of the principles that I have presented to you, and whether this position has any chance of receiving your approval and that of the National Committee at the same time.

Believe, my General, in my respectful devotion.

---

## Draft Declaration (of European Resistance Movements)

Geneva, 1944<sup>449</sup>

Letter accompanying the draft Declaration:

*“A number of activists from Resistance movements in France, Holland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, as well as the representative of a group of anti-Nazi activists in Germany, who have had the opportunity to meet in order to discuss the problems of the reconstruction of Europe, have noted that there was a general understanding between them: the safeguarding of freedom and civilisation can only be ensured on the European continent if the current anarchy of 30 sovereign states is replaced by a Federal Union. The solidarity that, from today, unites all peoples and all movements fighting Nazi oppression must not be relaxed once this oppression has been overcome. On the contrary: it must grow ever stronger and find its fulfilment in the creation of solid federal ties between the peoples of Europe.*

*Given the very conditions of the struggle waged by the various Resistance movements, conditions that meant that a veritable general assembly where this will would be affirmed could not be convened, said activists thought that it would be a good idea to draft a joint declaration to be sent to all countries where possible so that all parties, movements, and resistance groups that have become aware of the need for a close union of European peoples could accede to it. Thus, this declaration, the work of a*

---

449 The text published here is an extended version of the famous *Declaration of European Resistance Movements* of July 1944 published initially by Jean-Pierre Gouzy in *Les Pionniers de l'Europe communautaire*. It is not precisely dated and is titled “Draft declaration”. A bulletin drafted in Switzerland by Jean-Marie Soutou was published in *L'Europe fédéraliste. De la Résistance à l'unité européenne*, no. 1, September-October 1944. This is certainly the very first edition of the so-called Declaration of European Resistance Movements of July 1944. It was presented thus: “The draft declaration we are presenting to our readers has been prepared by activists from Resistance movements in nine European countries. Coming as it does after a long period of theoretical preparation and converging actions during which the activists were separated from each other in different countries, this declaration constitutes the first call for coordination and the first effective action of the European federalist movement (sic). We have preceded the publication of this document with the text of the accompanying letter.” Source: AHUE, AS, 5.



*few people, would become a clear position for the main Resistance movements and solemnly demonstrate their desire to solve the fundamental problem of the peaceful existence of free and civilised peoples.*

*We are sending you this text so that you send us your accession to it as soon as possible. When examining this document, please pay attention to the central statement contained therein, i.e. the statement in relation to the need to rebuild Europe on a federal basis, since it is on this issue, first and foremost, that we ask you to take a position. It would undoubtedly be useful if the final text of such a declaration were to be drawn up after all the tendencies had been able to specify their corrections and amendments. For the moment, we request that you waive this requirement, or at least give us your observations, stating that you will continue to approve of the project as a whole in the event that the other signatories do not approve your corrections. Detailed discussions can be postponed to the general meeting that will follow the end of hostilities.*

*This extraordinary procedure has been imposed on us by the current conditions of our work. A federalist declaration of resistance must be issued and disseminated by the press and radio as soon as possible in all occupied countries and Allied countries. If we continue to exchange covert messages to come to an agreement, months and months will pass before we can work out a definitive text and we will lose the opportunity to say what we have to say. We hope you take into account the fact that this declaration has been seriously and carefully drafted by representatives of various countries, and that the varied points of view have already been expressed.*

*Please gather as many adherents as possible to this declaration. However, we urge you to send us the membership lists of parties, movements, and isolated groups as soon as possible, as it would be preferable if we could constitute a first European core from now on, even if it is comprised of partial forces, rather than waiting for unanimous support before starting our action.”*

A number of activists from Resistance movements in Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Holland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, as well as the representative of a group of anti-Nazi activists in

Germany, came together in a city in Europe on March 31, April 29, May 20, and July 6 and 7. They drew up the draft declaration below, which they submitted to their respective movements and to all European Resistance movements for discussion and approval. They believed it was the right time to disclose it to international public opinion, pending the publication of the same in its final draft as soon as it has been accepted by the movements, groups, and parties to which it has been submitted.

## I

The resistance to Nazi oppression that had united the peoples of Europe in the same struggle created between them a solidarity and a community of goals and interests that took on their full meaning and scope in the fact that the delegates of European resistance forces came together to draft this declaration, in which they intended to express their hopes and intentions for the fate of civilisation and peace.

Subscribing to the essential elements of the Atlantic Charter, they affirm that the life of the peoples they represent must be based on respect for the person, security, social justice, the full use of economic resources to the benefit of the whole community, and the autonomous development of national life.

## II

These aims cannot be achieved until the various countries of the world agree to overcome the dogma of the absolute sovereignty of States and become part of a single federal organisation.

The lack of unity and cohesion that still exists between the various parts of the world does not allow the creation of an organisation that brings together all civilisations under a single government. At the end of this war, we will have to limit ourselves to creating a less ambitious universal organisation, but which can develop in the direction of federal unity, in which the great civilisations that constitute the

federations will have the mission of ensuring collective security. However, this will not be an effective instrument for peace unless these great civilisations are organised in such a way that a spirit of peace and understanding can prevail.

It is for this reason that, in the context of this universal organisation, the European problem must be addressed in a more direct and radical way.

### III

Peace in Europe is the cornerstone of world peace. Indeed, within a single generation, Europe has been at the epicentre of two global conflicts that, first and foremost, were caused by the existence of thirty sovereign states on this continent. It is important to remedy this anarchy by creating a federal union among the peoples of Europe.

Only a federal union would allow the participation of the German people in the life of Europe without such participation posing a threat to other peoples.

Only a federal union would solve the problems with the demarcation of borders in areas with mixed populations. With these problems resolved, these areas would no longer be the focus of mad nationalist lusts and would become merely questions of territorial demarcation, of pure administrative competence.

Only a federal union will safeguard democratic institutions to prevent countries that are not sufficiently mature in political terms from jeopardising the general order.

Only a federal union will allow the economic reconstruction of the continent and the suppression of monopolies and national autarkies.

Only a federal union will allow logical and natural solutions for sea access to countries in the centre of the continent, for the rational use

of rivers that run through several States, for the control of straits, and, in general, for most of the problems that have troubled international relations in recent years.

### IV

At present, it is impossible to predict the geographical limits of the federal union that could ensure peace in Europe. However, it should be pointed out that from the very outset, it must be strong and large enough to avoid being no more than a zone of influence of a foreign State or becoming an instrument of the hegemonical policy of a Member State. Moreover, from the outset it must be open to countries that are within Europe, whether in full or in part, that want to become Member States.

The federal union must be based on a declaration of civil, political, and economic rights that will guarantee the free development of the human personality and the normal functioning of democratic institutions. It must also be based on a declaration of the rights of minorities to an autonomous existence that is compatible with the integrity of the nation-states of which they are part.

The federal union shall not violate the right of each Member State to resolve its particular problems in accordance with its ethnic and cultural characteristics. However, in view of the experiences and failures of the League of Nations, States will have to irrevocably abandon attributions of their sovereignty that relate to the defence of territory, relations with powers outside the federal union, and international exchanges and communications, to the federal union.

The federal union must have:

1. A government that is accountable not to the governments of the various Member States but to the people, through which it must be able to exercise direct jurisdiction within the limits of its powers.

2. An army placed under its orders from this government, and excluding any other international army.
3. A supreme tribunal that will judge all questions relating to the interpretation of the federal constitution and settle disputes between Member States, and between States and the federation.

## V

The peace born out of the war must be founded on justice and progress, not on vengeance and reaction. However, it must be implacable towards all war criminals, whose impunity would be an insult to the sacrifice of the war dead and, in particular, of the anonymous heroes of the European Resistance. Germany and its satellites must participate in the economic reconstruction of regions to which they have laid waste, but Germany must receive assistance and, if necessary, transform its political and economic structure so that it can be integrated into the federal union. To this end, it must be fully disarmed and temporarily subject to federal control, whose main tasks will be as follows:

- Entrust power to truly democratic elements that have waged an unequivocal fight against Nazism.
- Rebuild a democratic and decentralised state free from Prussian militarism and bureaucracy.
- Demand the radical destruction of the feudal agrarian and industrial system.
- Integrate German heavy industry and the German chemicals sector into the European industrial organisation, so that it can no longer be used for German nationalist purposes.
- Prevent the education of German youth from being imparted according to Nazi, militarist, or totalitarian doctrines.

## VI

The undersigned resistance movements recognise the need for active participation by the United Nations in solving the European problem, but want all of the measures to be implemented between the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of the peace to be implemented as a function of the requirements of the federal organisation.

They call on all spiritual and political forces worldwide, in particular those of the United Nations, to help them achieve the aims set out in this declaration.

They promise to consider their respective national problems particular aspects of the European problem as a whole, and decide to henceforth set up a permanent office in charge of coordinating their efforts to liberate their countries, organise the Federal Union of European Peoples, and establish peace and justice worldwide.

The Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe was created in 1978 by Jean Monnet, who conceived the first European community and was the first honorary citizen of Europe. He donated all of his archives to the Foundation. As an independent institution serving the public interest, the Foundation is non-partisan and does not engage in lobbying. It receives support from the Canton of Vaud, the Swiss Confederation and the City of Lausanne. It operates out of Dorigny Farm, which is located on the campus of the University of Lausanne, its main partner.

The Foundation also keeps and provides access to numerous other private archives, including those of Robert Marjolin and the European papers of Robert Schuman and Jacques Delors, as well as images and audiovisual documents. In addition, it houses a specialised library and a European documentation centre, and it collects first-hand accounts from participants and observers through a filmed interview programme. It thus provides users, and especially researchers, with a coherent corpus of documentary resources on the origins and development of European integration and on Swiss-European relations.

Thanks to the internationally recognised importance of these collections and to the collaboration between Jean Monnet and Professor Henri Rieben, who chaired the Foundation until 2005, the Foundation is a focal point for European studies and an essential venue for meetings, debates and analyses about major issues facing Europe. It regularly organises conferences, European dialogues and international symposia, forming partnerships with renowned institutions. It periodically awards its Gold Medal to prominent political figures who have worked for the common interest of Europeans; past laureates include José Manuel Barroso, Emilio Colombo, Mario Draghi, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Jean-Claude Juncker, Helmut Kohl, Romano Prodi, Helmut Schmidt, Martin Schulz, Javier Solana and Herman Van Rompuy. The Foundation receives many visitors, regularly provides assistance to researchers and is involved in training university students. Each year, the Foundation awards the Henri Rieben Scholarship to several advanced PhD students. With support from the Canton of Vaud, in 2016 the Foundation created a think tank whose experts are currently working on the challenges of Society 4.0.

Finally, the Foundation also produces a number of publications. The Red Books Collection, which was created by Henri Rieben in 1957, now comprises 219 titles, while the Debates and Documents Collection, a series of shorter publications in open access, was launched in 2014. Taken together, these publications highlight the Foundation's documentary collections and public events, as well as its members' and partners' expertise.

Both the Foundation Board, with more than 500 members from all over the world, and the Scientific Committee meet annually. Pat Cox, former president of the European Parliament and the European Movement International, has been president of the Foundation and its Executive Board since 1 January 2015. This role was held in the past by José Maria Gil-Robles (2009–2014), former president of the European Parliament and the European Movement International; Bronisław Geremek (2006–2008), member of the European Parliament and former minister of foreign affairs of Poland; and Henri Rieben (1978–2005), professor at the University of Lausanne. Since 2012, the Foundation has been led by Gilles Grin, who holds a PhD in international relations and is a lecturer at the University of Lausanne.







# LES CAHIERS ROUGES

**The** anti-Europeans of today organize their propaganda by seeking to undermine the honorability and sincerity of the pioneers of the united Europe. They revise history in order to relativize the prescience and the courage of an elite that wanted to learn the lessons of the drama that Europe has known with fascism, Nazism and war.

**This** book is a refutation against this “fake Knowledge”.

**The** highlighting of the itinerary of Henri Frenay, founder of the most important movement of the French Resistance, minister of General de Gaulle at the Liberation, who became one of the leaders of the European Union of federalists, allows us to rediscover one of the living sources of the desire for Europe and peace of those who have risked the worst for our freedom.

**The** idea of building a federal and democratic Europe was shared by the non-communist European Resistances, be they Italian, Romanian, German, Belgian or Dutch. It took shape in Switzerland, within the exile communities, and gave birth to the first *Declaration of the European Resistances* (July 1944).

**But** this choice was a new struggle, sometimes violent. He encountered opposing forces, sometimes also from the Resistance, hostile to this project of overcoming national interests and sentiment.



Robert BELOT is a professor of contemporary history at the University of Lyon-Saint-Etienne, holder of the Jean Monnet European Chair “EUPOPA”. He heads the Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree DYCLAM+.

His research focuses on European history (19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> centuries) and the socio-political construction of memory. He wrote the first political biography of Henri Frenay.

He co-edited with Daniela Preda: *Visions of Europe in the Resistance. Figures, projects, networks, ideals*, Brussels, M.I.E. Peter Lang, Euroclio, 2022.