La défense de l’Europe et la défense européenne incarnent deux visions opposées.

La défense européenne a été conçue par les traditionalistes comme défense européenne souveraine, sur le modèle de défense mis en avant par les États nationaux du XIXe siècle.

De nos jours, élaborer une nouvelle défense de l’Europe signifie créer, au sein de l’OTAN, un pilier européen ouvert à des accords avec les pays limitrophes (le Royaume-Uni après le Brexit, la Russie, Israël, les pays d’Afrique du Nord) et avec les pays les plus importants au niveau mondial.

Cet essai parcourt l’histoire européenne des soixante-dix dernières années, au cours desquelles se sont opposées ces deux visions, et propose un nouveau modèle dual de défense européenne reposant sur deux composantes : une contrôlée individuellement par les États membres et une autre organisée par les autorités européennes.

Ce modèle est basé sur l’expérience historique vécue par les États-Unis.

Une nouvelle défense de l’Europe, c’est la réponse aux grands défis européens : à l’intérieur pour soutenir la recherche, le développement, l’innovation et la création d’une industrie européenne de défense moderne ; au niveau international pour garantir la sécurité dans le cadre d’un ordre mondial subissant de profondes modifications.
EU ENLARGEMENT AND UKRAINE

PAT COX
Pat Cox has been the President of the Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe since 1st January 2015. An Irish national, he is 70 years old. After teaching economics, he then became journalist and anchor-man of the news bulletin on the Irish national television. He was first elected to the European Parliament in 1989, serving for three terms until 2004. He was the President of the European Parliament from 2002 to 2004. He was the laureate of the International Charlemagne Price of Aix-la-Chapelle in 2004. He subsequently presided over the European Movement International from 2005 to 2011. He was a member of the special European Parliament mission to Ukraine in 2012-2013, jointly with the former Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski. He is currently the Coordinator of the European Union project for the transport corridor from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean.

Bibliographic citation

Cox, Pat. *EU Enlargement and Ukraine*. Lausanne, Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe, Debates and Documents Collection, issue 27, April 2023

The views and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and are not binding on the Foundation as an institution

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine marks a point of inflection in global history and is the most momentous geopolitical event so far of the 21st century. It has been a wakeup call for the European Union (EU), the USA, the transatlantic alliance, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Changes that proved elusive over the decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall crystallised into policy reversals and reforms within days of Russia’s aggressive breach of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We have entered a new age of uncertainty, triggered essentially by one man, Vladimir Putin, whose war of choice is driven by his sense of grievance, ambition, and insecurity.

In the EU, for example, and especially in Germany, more strategic decisions were taken within several days of Putin’s invasion than had been taken in decades before. Nord Stream 2 was suspended. Years of policy continuity, Wandel durch Handel, of change through trade with Russia under Angela Merkel, Gerhard Schroeder and others, evaporated in the heat of the moment. Chancellor Scholz committed Germany henceforth to spending 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence, still awaiting delivery. The EU broke with long standing taboos in creating the European Peace Facility from its own resources with an initial €500 million to provide weapons for Ukraine’s defence. Fifteen days into the war agreement was reached at Versailles to phase out EU dependency on Russian fossil fuels as soon as possible. Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO. A Danish referendum reversed its European Security policy optout. Vacillation was displaced by decisiveness, complacency by urgency, division, for example on sanctions, by unity.

In Russia, post-Soviet and past Romanov glories have been manipulated to mould a narrative of patriotic nationalism, neo imperial spheres of influence and the restoration of a greater Russia – the Russkiy Mir. Russian ideologues promote this dream, having
Mother Russia at its heart, and asserting a right to defend the interests of co-ethnics abroad, thus self-justifying interventions such as Georgia, Crimea, Donbas, and the war in Ukraine.

Aggression abroad has been accompanied by repression at home. Putin’s neo-imperial and neo-colonial instincts are applauded by a subservient statist Russian commentariat. In Russia the Kremlin dominates and controls the nation’s deceitful war narrative. All independent media outlets have been closed. Independent civil society has been banned. Western elites, NATO, the United States, and the big lie describing Ukrainians as neo-Nazis are blamed for triggering Russia’s aggression. This aggressive war of choice is presented to the domestic Russian audience as a victim’s war of necessity. Russia the aggressor is presented as the liberator. Russia the war monger is portrayed as the peace maker. Russia the despoiler of human rights is depicted as their guardian. Russia systematically is laying waste to Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure while asserting it avoids civilian war targets. The war is not even called a war but instead is designated as a special military operation. To call it by its name is to risk imprisonment.

Today is day 392 of the war. Last Saturday was the ninth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea and of Putin’s covert hybrid war in support of Moscow-backed separatists in Donbas. To mark that event he visited both Crimea and Mariupol. For most of the past decade Putin’s war against Ukraine slipped out of our headlines and consciousness virtually disappearing in plain sight. It was punctuated by occasional desultory meetings of the Normandy contact group comprising the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine, and the well-intentioned but ultimately ineffectual Minsk Protocols instigated by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) together with Russia and Ukraine which contained but did not stop the fighting in Donbas.

All changed utterly on the 24th February 2022 when Russian troops and tanks poured over the borders of Ukraine from the north and the east, and elite troops were helicoptered into Hostomel, the large Antanov airfield ten kilometres north of Kyiv. The aim was to create an airbridge, overwhelm Ukrainian resistance, and replace its leadership with a spare part Moscow-friendly elite. Denied a quick victory and suffering multiple setbacks on the battlefield between last August and November, Russia mobilised more soldiers, unleashed the Wagner private militia in Donbas, and resorted to all out aerial bombardment of civilian infrastructure, in particular electricity and water. To date there have been 15 rounds of missile and drone attacks killing dozens of civilians, injuring thousands, and wrecking key infrastructural targets. On November 11th 2022, in a significant setback for Russia, Ukraine liberated Kherson. Since then the war has been conducted along a line of contact, stretching almost a thousand kilometres in eastern and southern Ukraine, with an especially heavy war of attrition being waged in Bakhmut, now in its eighth month, and Vuhledar, both in the Donetsk oblast, conducted through trench warfare and close combat, with a shocking loss of life, reminiscent of the worst features of Europe’s early 20th century.

After sham referenda, Russia annexed four Ukrainian oblasts last September, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, without expressly defining their boundaries. These connect the annexed Crimea to Russia through a wide eastern and southern corridor in Ukraine and cut off vast tracts of Ukraine’s territorial waters in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. The war in Ukraine is expected to intensify in the coming months. Putin’s determination not to lose suggests he is likely to continue to press for further territorial gains and consolidation. This is matched by Ukraine’s legitimate determination to recover lost territory and restore its full territorial integrity, as it deploys better arms and equipment from western allies on the battlefield. The duration of the war and its outcome

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1 A notable exception was Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, that was shot down by Russian controlled forces on 17 July 2014 while flying over eastern Ukraine. All passengers and crew were killed. In November 2022 a Dutch court found three men guilty of the murder of the 298 people onboard flight MH17, and handed down sentences of life imprisonment and a fine of more than €16m in compensation to the victims. The three men remain at large and it remains unclear if they will ever serve their sentences.
are indeterminate at this point. It is hard to know, all things considered, what either side would be prepared to settle for as a win, if that falls short of their own preferred definition of victory, or even if the war is winnable on their own preferred terms by either side.

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution on the eve of the first anniversary of the war, supported by 141 of the 193 member states, called for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine in line with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters; and reiterated its demand that the Russian Federation immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, and called for a cessation of hostilities. This mirrors key aspects of President Zelensky’s 10 point peace plan.

China has been refining its ‘no limits’ friendship with Russia during a three day visit by Xi Jinping to Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin, their fortieth face to face meeting. What is emerging is a new asymmetric relationship tilted towards China, and one likely to intensify in this direction over time. China has not condemned the invasion, has abstained in successive UN resolutions and is reported possibly to be considering supplying arms to Russia. In its 12 point peace plan China is calling for a cessation of hostilities and a resumption of peace talks but makes no appeal for a Russian withdrawal or any specific insistence on the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. If China wishes to play a meaningful role between Russia and Ukraine it will need to walk not only in the shadow of Putin but also will have to try to walking in the shoes of Ukraine on a pathway way to a just and sustainable peace.

At present the possibility of commencing meaningful peace negotiations remains elusive. This is so because no party to the conflict, neither the aggressor nor the defender, is prepared for that. For both sides elaborating a premature peace would carry significant risks. For Ukraine, the fundamental viability and sustainability of the state needs to be secured but remains existentially threatened. For Putin, having launched a war of choice, his personal standing, his political survival, and that of his ruling elite are at stake. Russia’s military factories reportedly are working three shifts, round the clock, and its army continues to mobilise recruits. While Putin’s territorial ambitions in Ukraine have been contained for the moment, he has never resiled from his stated goal of eradicating Ukraine’s existence. Exhibiting extraordinary resilience and courage, and despite all the hardships, Ukraine is fighting with determination for its freedom. Ukraine is relying on the willingness of its allies to supply it with the means to prosecute its war of defence. Putin who plays a long game, and who, under a reformed constitutional provision, may contest two further rounds of Russian presidential elections, starting next year, may rely on time, war fatigue among Ukraine’s allies, and a resurgence of American isolationism in the hope of retaining his ill-gotten territorial gains.

When the fighting eventually stops, as surely it will at some point, the empirical outcome of who holds what territory will become the de facto point of departure of any negotiation process. Assuming he remains in power, negotiating with Putin will not be easy. He is a man for whom, to quote George Orwell: ‘War is peace, Freedom is slavery, Ignorance is strength’.

One can add to this the hurdle of the International Crime Court (ICC) arrest warrant for Putin on charges of illegally deporting Ukrainian children which at a minimum opens him to potential arrest in any one of at least 120 states.²

2 As a state, the Soviet Union that Russia claims to be the successor of, has committed an unimaginable number of crimes against its own citizens. Mass persecutions, extermination of national groups, ethnic cleansing, forcible deportations, organised artificial famines, confiscations of property, imprisonments and killings of enemies of regime – the list is long, the victims counted in millions. And yet, almost no one was brought to justice for all these crimes. Similarly, there were no trials for crimes against citizens of other nations that the Soviet Union, and its successor Russia, dominated or invaded. Citizens from Baltic States, Central Europe, the Caucasus, or Central Asia – all suffered under Russia’s occupation and witnessed extrajudicial executions, looting of property, rapes and deportations. Justice was neither done nor seen to be done. Russia was not held to account for the indiscriminate bombing of hospitals and civilian infrastructure in Syria. Holding Russia to account on this occasion for Ukraine, for Europe and even for Russia itself would strike a blow for accountability and justice.
The eventual cessation of hostilities will be complicated not just by issues of territory, de facto and de jure, but also by binding security guarantees, war reparations, sanctions policy, and asset freezes or confiscation, criminal accountability for aggression, torture, and the abuse of human rights, and the return of deportees and of prisoners of war. Securing justice, like securing the peace, will not be easy. This long list is infused with politically sensitive complexity, not just for Ukraine but also for its allies and particularly for the EU. The strategic interests of both Ukraine and the European Union are closely aligned.

Beyond the war, whenever and however its ends, looms the challenge of establishing a sustainable and just peace. Here EU and Ukrainian strategic interests are even more closely aligned. Post war, an isolated and impoverished Ukraine trapped indefinitely in no man’s land, or caught in a frozen conflict between an anxious EU and a threatening Russia would be a constant source of instability. This is not in the interests of Ukraine and assuredly is not in the interests of the EU and its frontline eastern member states. I would argue that Ukraine’s aspiration to join the European Union is an issue of strategic EU significance and needs to be treated as such. As a matter of self-preservation, the EU cannot afford to risk a threatening and volatile political vacuum on its eastern flank, given Russia’s consistently aggressive behaviour in what it sees as its sphere of influence, and its self-justified right of intervention to protect Russian co-ethnics in its near abroad.

This is a unique strategic challenge for which an appeal to past precedent as regards the pace and nature of accession is of limited value. Uniquely at a time of war, Ukraine applied for and received EU candidate state status in record time. This is an act of European solidarity, and a promise to Ukrainians that their costly fight for freedom will not be in vain. There is a solemnity to this act that must transcend business as usual enlargement precedents. The European Parliament has correctly described Ukrainian membership of the EU as ‘a geostrategic investment.’ That investment will need to show meaningful and visible returns on the road to full membership while seeking to minimise process driven political fatigue.

Eight countries have EU candidate state status. These include Turkey, whose accession negotiations have been frozen for many years, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Moldova, Ukraine, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kosovo and Georgia also formally submitted applications for membership in 2022. There is considerable recent evidence in the cases both of Georgia and Moldova of Russia’s capacity and determination to engage in covert operations to sidetrack their respective EU membership aspirations.

For the purposes of this presentation, I propose to focus on the Ukrainian case. No previous EU enlargement has ever taken place under such complicated conditions. As pointed out by the President of the European Commission when referring to Ukraine’s candidate status there is no rigid timeline. It is a merit-based process. With so many states in the enlargement frame, she added also, ‘it’s up to the candidate country how far and how fast they reach the goals that are being set’. Though correct, this is only part of the story. EU member states and their respective appetites for acceleration or procrastination of the enlargement process also exercise critical influence in determining the pace of events. Member state unanimity is required from the European Council on when to open negotiations, the setting of negotiating mandates, through to the Council signing off on closing negotiating chapters, and for the final ratification of accession treaties.

As regards EU engagement, Ukraine is not starting from zero. Acceding to the EU has popular support, constitutional expression, and political priority in Ukraine, accentuated and not diminished by the war. Post Yanukovych, Ukraine duly signed
both the Association and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) with the EU. As a result, Ukraine gradually has been approximating its legal base to substantial elements of the EU acquis in many areas. This is recognised by the Commission even as its assessment report set a number of additional conditions to be fulfilled by Ukraine. Notwithstanding the pressures of war, I expect these will be addressed by Kyiv as a matter of top priority. Failure to do so would be a self-imposed delay brought by Ukraine upon itself. The early fulfilment of the conditions set by the EU would suggest that accession negotiations potentially could be launched by the end of this year. For Ukraine limited political and administrative bandwidth, and the significant uncertainties and risks associated with fighting and trying to win the war will impact the initial pace of engagement. This holds true also for the EU.

When negotiations start it should be possible to identify and deliver intermediate, pragmatic, and deliverable milestones, potential early wins, on the way to full membership. Ideally to achieve this, realistic mutual expectations between the EU and Ukraine should be established early on. Otherwise, fast track deliverables, such as transport or electricity connectivity, could risk to be misperceived both by Ukraine and some member states as alternatives to, and not accelerators of, the overall accession process. I do not see staged integration and a faster track logic as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, I would suggest they are and can be complementary.

For EU veterans, enlargement has always raised the classic debate between deepening and broadening the Union, posing the question: is the EU ready for enlargement?

Based on its internationally recognised de jure borders, including Crimea, Ukraine is a large state. In European terms it is second in size only to Russia and larger than Sweden, twice the size of Italy and almost one and three quarter times the size of Germany. Ukraine’s agricultural output as a share of GDP is a significant multiple of the EU average. Ukraine’s GDP per capita is just above a quarter of that of Poland. In summary, Ukraine is big. It has a large agricultural sector. It is relatively poor. These three observations alone have significant implications for the scale and allocation of the EU budget in areas such as the Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion fund expenditure to name just two.

I am assuming here that the cost of post war reconstruction will not be a charge on the EU budget but will be funded by various national and international pledges and possible Russian reparation or asset seizure payments. If that was not the case then EU budgetary needs would be even more acute. Experience teaches us that net contributing states are wary of committing significant extra resources to the EU budget, while net recipient states resist erosion of what they already receive. Is the EU ready in budgetary terms for what awaits it? In short, I would suggest that the answer right now is no. This can be fixed but needs to be anticipated and resolved.

Responding to the recommendations of the Conference on the Future of Europe, the Council recognised and concluded that only a very limited number of specific measures would require Treaty change in order to be fully implemented. This issue of amending the Treaties also has been addressed by the European Parliament, which suggests the need to reform voting procedures on Council in areas such as sanctions, the passerelle clauses and emergencies. The avoidance of policy making gridlock in a larger and more diverse Union of the future is a matter of common concern. Is the EU ready in institutional terms for what awaits it? I would suggest the answer right now is no. This too is an area that can be fixed and should be worked on. Failure to resolve foreseeable issues such as these in a coherent and timely fashion carries a high risk not only of frustrating the enlargement process but also of fracturing the wider strategic purpose it can serve.

As noted earlier, Council unanimity is required at many stages of the accession process. For those states less disposed to any given enlargement these procedures offer multiple points where through revealed preferences, hidden agendas, or the protection of national interests individual member states can block or delay progress.
Moreover, member states and the EU institutions will insist on hard evidence of a sustained Ukrainian commitment and capacity to root out the kind of endemic corruption and undue oligarchic influence that has blighted its early decades of independence and that, unaddressed, could diminish its future prospects.

If one contemplates the shock waves and insecurity that would emanate from instability in Ukraine, and truly sees its accession to the EU as an anchor of future peace with stability, then politically, the EU needs to draw a lesson from Mario Draghi’s three words that saved the Euro and do - ‘Whatever it takes’.

Ukraine’s systemic transformation from a post-Soviet deep state dominated by self-serving elites to an open, modern society and democracy is the work of a generation. The Revolution of Dignity in 2014 marked a decisive point of transition. The war marks a point of total rupture with Ukraine’s Soviet past. Any residual nostalgia for old days and ways is now expunged.

In much of the post-Soviet era and space, strong personalities coexisted with weak institutions. This combination resulted in an underdeveloped political culture characterised by weak political parties, opaque systems of justice and prosecution, too much impunity, too little transparency and accountability, poor checks and balances, and a totally inadequate separation of powers. This cultural dimension runs deep. It was sustained not only by interests but also by embedded attitudes and practices, learned and transmitted over time. This would not be an inaccurate description of the independent Ukraine prior to Maidan.

Ukraine is undergoing a deep transformation. In seeking EU membership, it is inviting the EU and its institutions into a deeper and long lasting relationship. This needs the EU to give credit to Ukraine where that is due, and obliges it to criticise Ukraine when and where that is necessary. The giving of time, commitment, and energy can and should be generous, but the giving of resources and the ultimate gift of membership must carry conditions. To avoid superficiality, membership should not be turbo charged. To avoid discouragement, it should not be unduly delayed. As regards full membership, the EU will need to strike a balance between Ukraine’s determination to get it early and the Union’s imperative to get it right.

The greater the clarity and commitment of the European Union to embrace and fulfil Ukraine’s membership aspiration the stronger will be the EU’s ability to shape and assist its reform and modernisation. A point of departure is to recognise the strong political commitment and will on the Ukrainian side to do whatever it takes.

Last July Ukraine published an ambitious National Recovery Plan focused on resilience, recovery, modernisation, and growth. Even as Ukraine fights this existential war, President Zelensky established a National Recovery Council to coordinate and develop the plan. It is suffused with references to the European Union, identifies 15 national programs, and spells out the assistance needed from partners. These include:

- Support on the way towards EU integration and unlocking access to markets.
- Assistance in strengthening a mutual defence and security system.
- Financial support, including facilitation of private investment.

The EU has an indispensable role to play in the animation and delivery of these planned objectives, especially post war.

In Ukraine, when the war ends, the individual and societal post traumatic physical and psychological consequences will be enormous. Ukraine will require massive assistance with reconstruction, starting with homes, hospitals, schools and essential infrastructure. It needs and deserves high levels of external support willingly given but with strict conditionality to avoid a reversion to older forms of elite corruption with impunity. The inevitable creeping
centralisation of power and of official communications policy during a period of martial law and war, in peace, will need to yield to open and accountable governance, pluralist politics and strong independent political, judicial and media checks and balances. Acceleration of the implementation of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA, further integration into the EU Single Market, and the earliest deepening of transport and energy linkages should be encouraged as concrete steps in the right direction. We know from past experience that an abiding challenge for candidate and newly acceding states is their limited administrative and absorption capacities. The call to establish an Eastern Partnership Academy for Public Administration deserves support. Early twinning arrangements both of personnel and territories should be encouraged between member states and Ukraine. EU resources need to be dedicated to assisting the development of quality National Programmes for Adoption of the Acquis in Ukraine and Moldova. Last but not least, our elected representatives must explain, explain, explain. Communicating the strategic necessity for the EU and also for Ukraine of proceeding down this road is essential to inform and prepare national public opinions for what lies ahead.

In this short paper I have argued:

- That Ukraine’s aspiration to join the European Union is a matter of strategic EU significance and needs to be treated as such.

- In terms of self-preservation, the EU cannot afford to risk a political vacuum on its Eastern flank.

- That this is a unique enlargement challenge for which an appeal to past precedent as regards the pace and nature of accession is of limited value.

- That I do not see staged integration and a faster-track logic as mutually exclusive.

- That a ‘whatever it takes’ approach is called for.

- That a balance must be struck between Ukraine’s determination to get it early and the EU’s imperative need to get it right.

This leads me to suggest that Ukraine’s ambition to join the EU has some parallels with another recent unprecedented EU event, Brexit.

There the EU 27 and the three institutions, Parliament, Commission and Council, stood together, agreed on what mattered most, and acted in concert with coherence and consistency. This proved to be remarkably effective. This is not a suggestion aimed at the creation of an artificial enlargement timetable but rather one that recognises the desirability within the EU of building the mutual trust and understanding essential to realising this most complex and unprecedented challenge. There are different emphasises evident between what some observers before the big bang enlargement of two decades ago described as old and new Europe. The EU’s centre of gravity looks poised to shift further east. Mutual distrust or incomprehension would offer no way forward. With Brexit no institution abandoned its prerogatives, but all acted in common cause and in the common interest, to agreed common timetables. Given the stakes and complexity involved, does Ukrainian EU membership not also suggest the need for a special and coherent political and inter institutional response?

**Conclusion**

When he chose to invade Ukraine twelve months ago, Vladimir Putin underestimated the courage and resolve of Ukrainians to defend their freedom, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. He misread the willingness and capacity of Ukraine’s allies to assist it in that task. Paradoxically, Putin has become Ukraine’s most potent unifying force, in forging the birth of a new Ukraine whose independence will have been earned not just through the referendum of 1991 but also through the appalling blood sacrifice, death and destruction being endured by its people today.
The EU is a Union of voluntary engagement not a Europe delivered from the barrel of a Russian neo-imperial gun. This is the choice and the dream of Ukrainians, to be part of the family of EU nations and states. In response to their nightmare of today we must help to deliver that dream for all their sakes but for ours also.

Thank you for the invitation and for your attention.

Slava Ukraini.
The Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe was created in 1978 by Jean Monnet, who conceived the first European Community (Coal and Steel) and was the first honorary citizen of Europe. He donated all his archives to the Foundation. As an independent institution serving the public interest, the Foundation is non-partisan and does not engage in lobbying. It receives support from the Canton of Vaud, the Swiss Confederation, and the City of Lausanne. It operates out of the Dorigny Farm, which is located on the campus of the University of Lausanne, its main partner.

The Foundation also keeps and provides access to numerous other private archives, including those of Robert Marjolin and the European papers of Robert Schuman and Jacques Delors, as well as images and audio-visual documents. In addition, it houses a specialised library and a European documentation centre, and it collects first-hand accounts from participants and observers through a filmed interview programme. It thus provides users, and especially researchers, with a coherent corpus of documentary resources on the origins and development of European integration and on Swiss-European relations.

Thanks to the internationally recognised importance of these collections and to the collaboration between Jean Monnet and Professor Henri Rieben, who chaired the Foundation until 2005, the Foundation is a focal point for European studies and an essential venue for meetings, debates and analyses about major issues facing Europe. It regularly organises conferences, European dialogues, and international symposia, forming partnerships with renowned institutions. It periodically awards its Gold Medal to prominent political figures who have worked for the common interest of Europeans; past laureates include José Manuel Barroso, Emilio Colombo, Mario Draghi, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Jean-Claude Juncker, Helmut Kohl, Romano Prodi, Helmut Schmidt, Martin Schulz, Javier Solana, and Herman Van Rompuy. The Foundation receives many visitors, regularly provides assistance to researchers and is involved in training university students. Each year, the Foundation awards the Henri Rieben Scholarship to several advanced PhD students. With support from the Canton of Vaud, in 2016 the Foundation created a think tank whose experts are currently working on the challenges of Society 4.0.

Finally, the Foundation also produces a number of publications. The Red Books Collection, which was created by Henri Rieben in 1957, now comprises 219 titles, while the Debates and Documents Collection, a series of shorter publications in open access, was launched in 2014. Taken together, these publications highlight the Foundation’s documentary collections and public events, as well as its members’ and partners’ expertise.

Both the Foundation Board, with more than 500 members from all over the world, and the Scientific Committee meet annually. Pat Cox, former president of the European Parliament and the European Movement International, has been president of the Foundation and its Executive Board since 1 January 2015. This role was held in the past by José María Gil-Robles (2009-2014), former president of the European Parliament and the European Movement International; Bronislaw Geremek (2006-2008), member of the European Parliament and former minister of foreign affairs of Poland; and Henri Rieben (1978-2005), professor at the University of Lausanne. Since 2012, the Foundation has been led by Gilles Grin, who holds a PhD in international relations and is a lecturer at the University of Lausanne.
Previously published issues from the Collection

Avec les contributions de Annika Brack, Pat Cox, José María Gil-Robles, Gilles Grin, Benjamin Haddad, André Liebich, Michael Reiterer, Jan Tombiński, Dario Velo et Francesco Velo.

Cover: alain kissling / atelierk.org
Inner Layout: atelier Kinkin
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La défense de l'Europe et la défense européenne incarnent deux visions.

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Cet essai parcourt l'histoire européenne des soixante-dernières années, au cours desquelles se sont opposées ces deux visions, et propose un nouveau modèle dual de défense européen reposant sur deux composantes : une contrôlée individuellement par les États membres et une autre organisée par les autorités européennes.

Ce modèle est fondé sur l'expérience historique vécue par les États-Unis.

Une nouvelle défense de l'Europe, c'est la réponse aux grands défis européens : à l'intérieur pour soutenir la recherche, le développement, l'innovation et la création d'une industrie européenne de défense moderne ; au niveau international pour garantir la sécurité dans le cadre d'un ordre mondial subissant de profondes modifications.